

IQBAL REVIEW

Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan

April 1963

Editor

Dr. Muhammad Rafi-ud-Din

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

Title : Iqbal Review (April 1963)
Editor : Muhammad Rafi-ud-Din
Publisher : Iqbal Academy Pakistan
City : Karachi
Year : 1963
DDC : 105
DDC (Iqbal Academy) : 8U1.66V12
Pages : 172
Size : 14.5 x 24.5 cm
ISSN : 0021-0773
Subjects : Iqbal Studies
: Philosophy
: Research



IQBAL CYBER LIBRARY

(www.iqbalcyberlibrary.net)

Iqbal Academy Pakistan

(www.iap.gov.pk)

6th Floor Aiwan-e-Iqbal Complex, Egerton Road, Lahore.

Table of Contents

Volume: 4

Iqbal Review: April 1963

Number: 1

1. IQBAL'S IDEA OF PROGRESS	4
2. BENGALI TRANSLATIONS OF IQBAL AND HIS IMPACT ON BENGALI LITERATURE	10
3. INTELLECTUAL SECULARISM	19
4. IQBAL'S HUMANISM	53
5. EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF IQBAL	57
6. METAPHYSICS OF SOCIETY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF	85
7. IQBAL AS A POET WITH A MESSAGE TO THE MODERN WORLD	139
8. THE FRUSTRATED MAN	160

IQBAL'S IDEA OF PROGRESS

DR. FAZLUR RAHMAN

Iqbal's idea of progress is rooted in the very central core of his philosophy of Reality. Here we are not concerned with how Iqbal came to this view of Reality, nor with a detailed statement of the con-tent of the view itself. For our purposes it is sufficient to state (a) that Reality is by its very essence "pushing outward", expanding and moving and also by its very nature demanding such dynamic expansion on the part of anything that would be real, and (b) that this dynamism is not just any movement in the ordinary sense of that word but has a built-in quality of purposive self-direction. Without this latter quality, which is shown to be spiritual-moral in character involving knowledge, will and purpose, there would neither be creativity nor order in the true sense of these words. On this view, which may be called the philosophy of "expansive actionism", even the elemental fact of existence is not just a fact but essentially an act. Indeed, this part of existentialism Iqbal would have certainly confirmed and on this point he anticipates this form of existentialism. Now, in the entire range of being man has a unique status in the sense that he is the most proper and developed locus of this moral dynamism; as such, he has the greatest range of prospects and possibilities before him but by the same token, faces equally serious penalties for his failure to discharge these potentialities. This proper moral expansion of the human age when it reaches its full fruition is

describable par excellence by Iqbal's term "Khudi," which is a kind of "enfrenched self-hood" and the dynamic process whereby it is attained—a process really of "self-giving" and self-sacrificing endeavour—is called "Ishq".

It is obvious, I think, from this account that progress is not just an added attribute of Reality or an effect of it; Reality itself is just this purposive, creative flow of energy: an infinite progress itself. Anything that is real can claim this nature of being real only to the extent that it shares this progressive, creative energy. I think it is also obvious that this philosophy of actionism is at bottom inspired by a vision of the thoroughly moral-spiritual nature of Reality. God is active, creative, self-demanding. He wants others to act and demands from them to do so. No human ever stood in a genuine contact with this God without being wholly transformed and impelled to action through imperatives. The effect of these imperatives imperiously commanded by God he feels in his very bones. He sets out to change the world in the interests of progress and collaboration with God. He sets out to establish a sane, just, good world order. Anything short of this is simultaneously a betrayal of his own humanity and the godhead of his God.

One most capital conclusion that flows from this picture is the concept of indivisibility of right and truth. You cannot divide life into the allegedly religious and so-called secular sectors. Indeed, if the terms 'religious' and 'secular' are used thus mutually exclusively and consequently restrictively—as is the obvious

intention—then neither is applicable to the process of Reality which is one unitary flow without tolerating bifurcation or duality. In Iqbal's own words, "all is holy ground", and he even categorically denied that 'religious' and 'secular' or spiritual and material were even two aspects of Reality. Of course, if, e.g. an act of mine is motivated by wholly selfish ends and is not integrated into the directed flow of the process as a whole, then it would be an action cut off from the springs of Reality; it would be an action simply wrong. This would be an action springing from an attitude of mind that Iqbal would be prepared to call 'secular'. Indeed, it seems that on this view "secular" and "kufr" would be, in the final analysis, identical, if the term "secular" is to be given any tenable meaning. The term 'secular', however, whatever its meaning may be, has attained a kind of religious status in the modern West. Various contributory causes have influenced its genesis and growth but the most deep-rooted spiritual foundation from which it seems to feed is the assumption that truth cannot succeed in the world which is essentially evil; it must, therefore, suffer the tragedy that is its due share in the world. Success is almost a sin and truth may not really commit this sin.

Such a truncated view of spirituality assumes a permanent dislocation between God and the world-process and in order to overcome, in some measure, the pessimism that flows from it, is forced to postulate some kind of a special Divine intervention in God's own good time. In the meantime, the governance of the world is entrusted to a 'secular' system that is little more than a grandiose and systematic hypocrisy. If hypocrisy creates

difficulties and becomes intolerable in certain situations, but the premises of secularism are not to be changed, then some form like that of Communism is the logically inescapable conclusion.

Iqbal's vision of Reality as a ceaseless, creative, purposive flow went hand in hand with his discovery of the true meaning of the Islamic Movement and the message of the Qur'an. The Muslim orthodoxy, at its best hands and most perceptive moments and, indeed, as a whole, had kept faithful to the active and the Commanding God of the Qur'an. Its conceptions of the actual imperatives flowing from God may have become at times rather history-bound but it never let go the essential vision that man is here to make an incessant and positive endeavour and God is there to Command. Iqbal's demanding Reality and the Qur'an's Commanding God are absolutely identical. And in the Islamic Movement, which started with the positive achievement of the Holy Prophet who implemented a moral-spiritual ideal of goodness and justice in the actual texture of history. Iqbal found a paradigm to which he untiringly called people—not only Muslims but the whole world.

To the Secularist West he said, at times with a good deal of bitterness, that if they really meant to set up a sound world-order, secularism could not conceivably deliver the goods. In fact, it was a mere instrument of national glorification through which they gratified certain primitive drives of man for power and exploitation. To the Muslims, Iqbal said that Islam, which they claimed to follow, is undoubtedly pure progress and is the only

system that has the necessary conditions for an integrated, onward-moving world-order. But he reminded the Muslims, at times with biting sarcasm, that Islam lay in the Qur'an and in the biography of the Holy Prophet and in the very early history of the Community, but not in their actual life. How could a Community call itself truly Islamic that did not move onward, when God Himself acts and moves and imperiously demands that every thing move? How can you move at all with a system that is manifestly history-bound? That is why Iqbal called the Muslims back to the Qur'an, and to receive inspiration from the example of the Holy Prophet.

The most basic desideratum of Iqbal Studies still remains a serious attempt at working out the central theme of Iqbal's philosophy of life. Only when his central thesis is worked out clearly and stated satisfactorily will every statement that he made on every individual subject fall into a true perspective and receive its due importance and meaning. Otherwise his utterances are likely to appear and have, indeed, appeared too many, a juxtaposition of contradictions. It is also primarily because of a lack of a clear formulation of his central message, that devotees of a whole range of opinions from the extreme right to the extreme left have claimed Iqbal's support. Such a formulation of Iqbal's central philosophy, as is envisaged here, cannot be found in Iqbal himself. This is not a peculiarity of Iqbal alone but a problem that confronts, in varying degrees, the thought-legacy of many thinkers. The reason is that a creative thinker expresses his thought, rather than neatly formulates it; it may even be said that

he suggests rather than enunciates. It would not, indeed, be a misuse of Iqbal's own terminology if we say that a creative thinker operates by 'Ishq rather than by 'Aql. It is the task of a serious interpreter to enunciate and neatly formulate. The task of interpretation, if taken earnestly, is, indeed, in itself a task of high intellectual creativity. Such an interpretation of Iqbal, which may ipso facto indicate the path of a genuine future philosophical development in Islam, still remains to be achieved.

BENGALI TRANSLATIONS OF IQBAL AND HIS IMPACT ON BENGALI LITERATURE

By: MUHAMMAD ABDUL HAI

Some months back a responsible journalist once commented in the editorial columns of the Pakistan Times to the effect that for lack of Bengali translation of Iqbal's work there was an intellectual vacuum among the Bengali Muslims and therefore the University circles of Dacca in particular suffered from an intellectual pull of Calcutta.

There was a marked resentment in University circles over this statement and it evoked their sharp criticism and some leading Dailies of Dacca came out with editorial comments.

The comprehension of Islam and its principles and the depiction and portrayal of glories of Islam and Muslim history were nothing new to Muslim Bengali literature. It can be traced as far back as the 16th century and since then there has been a long chain of Muslim Bengali literature representing Islamic culture and thought, ideas and ideals and the Muslim way of life. Regardless of the merit of the Muslim Bengali literature there has been no flagging of enthusiasm on the part of the Bengali Muslims to depict their own lives, and in the early twenties of the present century their tendency reached its high-water mark in the poetry of the rebel poet Nazrul Islam.

It is however true that it was left to Allama Iqbal the Philosopher and national poet of Pakistan to reinterpret Islam in terms of the modern world and kindle in man a 'unique consciousness of his true status in relation to God and the universe'. Although no attempt has yet been made on the part either of the Government or any individual or association to translate all the works of Iqbal in their chronological order, he began to be translated and articles on his poetry and teachings started appearing in Bengali literature long before the idea of Pakistan was conceived.

Of all the works of Iqbal the 'Shikwa and Jawab-i-Shikwa' has the largest number of Bengali translations. The earliest of these days back as early as 1928. A. H. Kalimullah elder brother of Dr. A. B. M. Habibullah the present Head of the Department of Islamic History and Culture in the University of Dacca, translated the work while he was a student of 2nd year class in the Islamic Intermediate college, Dacca. He died of typhoid a year later and his work was published in the (Sahityik'-the then monthly journal of the Bangiya Musalman Samiti (Muslim Society of Bengal) edited by the late Yakub Ali Choudhury and Golam Mostafa, the poet.

Ashraf Ali Khan a fiery youngman was the second person to trans-late Shikwa and Jawabi Shikwa in the thirties. It was published in book form most likely some time between 1936 and 1938. As a man Ashraf Ali Khan was very restless and he was, as one could see, attracted to Shikwa by the throbbing of his own

heart which bore similarity to Iqbal's. It is a sad story how Ashraf Ali Khan was consumed by his own burning passion and committed suicide.

Dr. Muhammad Shahidullah's translation of Shikwa and Jawabi Shikwa appeared as early as 1940. He rendered it directly from Urdu and gave a very faithful word for word translation.

Then came Aminuddin Ahmad's translation of Shikwa and the Jawabi Shikwa. It was serially published in the monthly Mohammadi in the early forties, Muhammad Sultan published his translation in book form in 1964 and Abu I Kalam Mustafa in 1952. The renderings done by Golam Mostafa first appeared serially in 'Purabi' the East Pakistan Regional Guild's organ and later in the form of a book in 1960 Mizanur Rahman another exponent of Iqbal also translated Shikwa and its Jawab and published it in book form alongwith the renderings of some other important poems from Bangi Dara under the title Iqbalika in 1960. The name of Moulvi Tamizur Rahman, Kazi Akrairi Hossain and Bazlur Rahman may also be mentioned as the translators of this work of Iqbal.

Although Asrar e Khudi has more than one translation in Bengali, they have not gained as much currency due perhaps to its subject matter as those of Shikwa. Of these Syed Abdul Mannan's renderings in free verse done as early as in 1945 have gained most currency. The second edition of his book appeared in 1950 with the financial aid of the Iqbal Academy. In his attempt to translate Asrar-i-Khudi, Mannan I think has been greatly influenced by

Abdul Majid Sahity Ratana who was the first man to translate *Asrar-e-Khudi* in forceful rhythmic Bengali prose. Majid was inspired by Nazrul Islam to undertake this work and his translation appeared serially in *Moazzin* a monthly organ of Khademul Insan Society, some time in the late thirties.

Iqbal-e-Kavita (1952) edited and compiled by Syed Ali Ahsan contains selections of Iqbal's poems translated by himself, Farrukh Ahmad and Abul Husain. In this work Ali Ahsan and Farrukh Ahmad attempted to translate parts of *Asrar-i-Khudi* but neither of these gifted poets made much headway. Ali Ahsan's contribution in this book is his incomplete translation of *Asrar-e-Khudi*. It is a pity that as yet we have no full Bengali translation of this very important work of Iqbal on the line of *Secrets of Self* done in English by Nicholson. The name of Mirza Sultan Ahmad also deserves mention as the translator of *Asrar-e-Khudi* and *Ramuz-e-Bekhudi* which appeared in book form in 1954. A. F. M. Abdul Huq Faridi's translation of *Ramuz-e-Bekhudi* came out in 1955. Although Faridi does not claim himself to be a poet his knowledge and appreciation of Persian is unquestionable. What his renderings lack in poetic quality, has been compensated for by his understanding of the original.

Although many selected poems from *Bange Dara*, *Bale Jibril*, *Zarbe Kalim* and *Payam i Mashriq* have been translated by many over and over again we have as yet no full translations of these books. *Iqbal-e-Kavya Sanchayan* (collections from Iqbal's poetry) by Moniruddin Yusuf deserves special mention in this regard. It is

a collection in one book of the translations of some notable poems from Bang e-Dara, Bal-e-Zibriil, Zarbi Kalim and Armughan-i-Hijaz and a Bengali Academy publication of the year 1960. Yusuf's translation in verse is pleasant reading and in some poems he drew on idioms and expressions used by Abul Husain in Iqbaler Kavita.

Mizanur Rahman's translation of Bale Zibriil was also published in 1960. It contains renderings of 50 rubais and qitas and some 53 selected poems. The author himself was the publisher of the book on behalf of the Iqbal Nazrul Society.

Kalam i-Iqbal also contains renderings of some select poems of Iqbal. Being commissioned by the Iqbal Academy Golam Mostafa undertook this work and it came out in book form in 1957. Kalami Iqbal and Iqbaler Kavita mentioned earlier have received appreciation of readers and critics alike.

We have no translations as yet of Zabure Ajam, Javednama, Musafir, Armughane Hijaz and Pasche Bayed Kard.

Apart from the part or full translation of the poetical works of Iqbal mentioned so far, his six lectures on Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam evoked keen interest among the Bengali Muslim intelligentsia. Abdul Huq a young essayist translated it in Bengali in early forties which appeared serially in the pages of Masik Mohammadi. Mujibar Rahman Khan also translated a few chapters which also appeared serially in the same periodical. None of them could how-ever bring out a book of

their translation and it was left 610957 to a board of translators including Kamaluddin Khan, Muhammad Moqsed Ali, Sayedur Rahman and Abdul Huq who succeeded in bringing out the complete translation in book form entitled 'Islame dharmiya Chintar Punargathan'. It was sponsored and published by Pakistan Publications and edited by Ibrahim Khan and Sayedur Rahman.

The translations apart, Bengalees have made a constant endeavour to introduce Iqbal to Bengali readers since the early twenties and as a matter of fact he was introduced in Bengal when the whole province was throbbing with Nazrul Islam's poetic fervour and there was a restlessness in the political horizon of this part of the country. Nazrul was more a freedom fighter than a Muslim; nevertheless it was he who more than any body else in Bengal established the individualistic attitude of man in general and Muslims in particular through his uncompromising and forceful pen. At the same time articles describing the message of Iqbal began to appear in Bengali periodicals and journals. One of the first to write on and translate from Iqbal was Golam Mostafa and his earliest writings on Iqbal were published sometime in 1929. S. Wajed Ali's name should also be mentioned in this connection, for he too evinced interest in Iqbal sometime in the early thirties in his own periodical Gulistan. Later he collected his own writings on and translations from Iqbal and published them in book form under the title Iqbaler paygam 'message of Iqbal'. The name of Abdul Quadir also deserves mention for having translated a number of poems from Bang-e-Dara and published them in the Bengali Mahenau edited by himself.

Not only have Bengali Muslims been interested in Iqbal's writings; Amiya Chakravarty—one time secretary of Tagore and a well known Bengali intellectual of the present day West Bengal, translated from Iqbal and wrote on him in the early thirties. In fact it was due to his writings in those days that the attention of the Bengali intelligentsia both Hindus and Muslims was drawn to Iqbal's great genius.

Contributions made by S. Wajed Ali, Dr. Shahidullah, Habibullah Bahar, Sayed Abdul Mannan, Golam Mostafa and Mizanur Rahman towards popularising Iqbal in Bengal are worth mentioning. Apart from his translation of Shikwa Dr. Shahidullah wrote a book on Iqbal in 1945 which ran into as many as four editions, the latest of which appeared in 1958 in enlarged and revised form. This book has served as a comprehensive introduction to Iqbal for Bengali readers. Habib ullah Bahar's book on Iqbal was published in 1944 and Syed Abdul Mannan's in 1951. Mannan also translated into Bengali K. G. Saiyyidan's work Educational Philosophy of Iqbal under the title Iqbaler Shiksha Darshan in 1958:— The latest-book Iqbalke jatatuku jenechi (The little that I could know of Iqbal) written by Mrs. Murjahan Begum an ex-student of mine in the University of Dacca and now a Professor of Bengali in the Eden Girls' College, appeared in December 1962. The present writer also wrote three articles in the late forties and early fifties entitled 'Pakistaner Jatiya Karl Iqbal' (Iqbal the national poet of Pakistan) Iqbaler Momen (Iqbal's interpretation of Momen) and Rani (The message of Iqbal). These

have been included in a book of essays entitled *Bhasa O Sahitya* (Language and Literature) published in 1960.

Since the establishment of Pakistan we can hardly come across any popular Bengali periodical which has not contained writings on Iqbal in either Bengali prose or poetry. The Bengali *Mahenawr*, published by the Regional Publicity Branch of Dacca apart from its special Iqbal numbers, publishes articles, poems and also translations from Iqbal as a regular feature in its every issue.

All these would indicate that there has been a considerable amount of translation and critical work in Bengali on Iqbal and the Bengali reading East Pakistanis are much better off now in this respect than ever before but the impact of Iqbal on Bengali literature has not been as great as it should have been. In Farrukh Ahmad, one of our ablest poets of today we find the greatest disciple of Iqbal. In his *Satsagarer Majhi* (The Sailor of the seven seas) first published in 1944 in Calcutta, Farrukh used the Sindbad myth to rouse his country men from deep slumber and prompt them to action in search of new frontiers much on the line of his great master. Older poets like Shahadat Hossain and Golam Mostafa also preached the idea of a brotherhood of all Muslim people as well as a nationalism based on Islamic faith beyond the frontier of a geographical territory. Among the essayists Md. Wajed Ali, Mujibar Rahman Khan, Dewan Md. Azrar and Hasan Zaman heavily drew upon Iqbal's interpretation of Islam and man's status in society vis-a-vis God and universe.

Iqbal to-day is better known and appreciated in East Pakistan more as a political thinker and philosopher than as a poet. The reason is not far to seek. Barring a few Bengalees of the older generation, there is hardly any one among the present generation of educated Bengalees who can read Iqbal in either Urdu or Persian in original and appreciate the linguistic artistry and genius of this great man. Secondly, excepting a few compilations in Bengali verse such as *Iqbaler Kavita*, *Kalame Iqbal* and *Iqbaler Kavya Sanchayan* other translations do-not evoke any enthusiasm among the poetry reading intelligentsia of East Pakistan. This proves the dictum that it is only the good poets who are usually the good translators and we have yet to see our good poet taking the responsibility of translating Iqbal in an organized and planned manner.

INTELLECTUAL SECULARISM

An Obstacle to the Development of Social Sciences

DR. MOHAMMAD RAFI UDDIN

عشق کی تیغ جگر دار اڑالی کس نے

علم کے ہاتھ میں خالی ہے نیام اے ساقی

There are three recognized levels of the Universe in which we live and which we study viz. the world of matter, the world of life and the world of mind. There are also three main divisions of knowledge corresponding to these three levels of existence.

1. The knowledge of the world of matter or the physical sciences which include Physics, Chemistry, Geology, Astronomy etc.

2. The knowledge of the world of life or the Biological sciences which include Botany, Zoology and their sub-divisions.

3. The knowledge of the world of mind or the Psychological Sciences known popularly as the human and social sciences They are collectively described sometimes as Social Science and at other times as Social Philosophy or the philosophy of the activities of the human individual and society. Among the branches of Social

Science or Social Philosophy we have to count the philosophy of Politics, the philosophy of Ethics, the philosophy of Economics, the philosophy of Law, the philosophy of History, the philosophy of Art, the philosophy of Education and the psychology of the Individual and Society. All these departments of knowledge are not only the branches of the same subject— single science of man—but they are also inseparable from each other and overlap each other. The reason is that each of them is based on and constitutes an application or elaboration of the knowledge of human nature and the nature of man is a single indivisible whole. For the political man is the economic man, the ethical man, the juridical man, the intellectual man and the aesthetical man, at one and the same time.

The Western scholars are known to have made an astounding progress in their knowledge of the world of matter. They know today how to split up the atom and use the energy latent in it to destroy a city like Hiroshima in the twinkling of an eye. They know how to fly around the earth in space and to photograph the surface of Venus at close quarters. Their progress in the biological sciences may not be very great or very satisfactory. Yet it is in their opinion good enough to prevent them from complaining of its utter inadequacy. But such is not the case with the human and social sciences. For the modern thinkers and philosophers of the West are found to be bitterly lamenting their lack of progress in these sciences. They agree on the following three points:

1. That the human and social sciences are in a state of complete disorder at present. At least none of them has developed sufficiently to acquire the coherence, the rational order or the system that characterizes a science and thereby to merit the title of a science.

2. That the proper development and systematization of these sciences is a dire need of mankind at present. If this need is not fulfilled quickly enough the western civilization may decay and even totally collapse.

3. That the reason why these sciences have failed to develop and become systematic so far is that they can be properly developed and systematized only on the basis of a correct view of human nature and their understanding of human nature is very poor.

This statement can be substantiated by endless quotations from eminent authorities but I shall give only one of them as a sample. McDougall the well-known psychologist who is himself the author of several outstanding works on Psychology, says in his book "World Chaos":

"Our ignorance of the nature of man has prevented and still pre-vents the development of all the social sciences. Such sciences are the crying need of our time; for lack of them our civilization is threatened gravely with decay and perhaps complete collapse."

"We talk of Psychology, of Economics and of Political Science, of Jurisprudence, of Sociology and of many other

supposed sciences; but the simple truth is that all these fine names simply mark great gaps in our knowledge—they vaguely indicate regions of vast wilderness hardly yet explored—regions which must be reduced to order, if our civilization is to endure.”

“My thesis is that in order to restore the balance of our civilization we need to have far more knowledge, (systematically ordered or scientific knowledge) of human nature and of the life of society than we yet have.”

“Here then is the only road to remedy the perilous and ever more dangerous state of our civilization. We must actively develop our social sciences into real sciences of human nature and its activities. The task of finding a basis and providing a methodology for the social sciences is far more pressing today than it has ever been.”

“What then in practical terms is the remedy? I give my answer most concisely by suggesting what I would do if I were a dictator... I would by every means seek to divert all our most powerful intellects from the physical sciences to research in the human and social sciences.”

Skinner, another eminent psychologist, supports the view of McDougall generally when he admits:

“Science has evolved unevenly. By seizing upon the easier problems first it has extended our control of inanimate nature without preparing for the social problems that follow. There is no point in furthering a science of nature unless it includes a

sizable science of human nature because only in that case the results will be wisely used.”

The question naturally arises: What is the reason that Western scholars who have made such a wonderful progress in the sciences of matter and to some extent in the sciences of life have hitherto failed to make any progress worth the name in the human and social sciences, and that too in spite of their realization of the fact that if they do not evolve the social sciences adequately their civilization is likely to collapse? What is the reason that the scholars of the West who have thoroughly known the invisible world of the atom of matter have not been able to know thoroughly the invisible world of the atom of society viz. the mind of the human individual, in spite of the great urgency and vital need of the knowledge of the latter? The answer can be given most confidently by saying that the reason is a peculiar Western attitude of mind amounting to an acute prejudice or aversion against all intellectual ideas relating to the physical, the biological or the psychological sciences, which imply or include or lead to the concept of God as a part of an intellectual conclusion, explanation or theory. This attitude of mind which may be appropriately described as INTELLECTUAL SECULARISM is common to all Western scholars including those who are atheists and those who believe in God and even happen to be religious-minded in some way. But while this attitude of mind is intelligible in an atheist it cannot be understood in a man who believes in God as the Creator of the Universe. The knowledge of the ultimate origin of an object is a part of its total knowledge and it is

the total knowledge of an object that we by our very nature desire and aim at. A rose is not a mere rose with none to cause its existence but to a religious man it is a rose that has been created by God as a manifestation of His infinite power, wisdom, creativeness and love of beauty and to an atheist it is a rose that has been created by the material and mechanical forces of nature operating all by themselves. We may not know it sometimes but we always attribute some ultimate origin to every-thing that we know in this universe. If we cannot attribute to it its real or true ultimate origin we are bound by our nature to attribute a wrong ultimate origin to it. In this latter case our knowledge of the object becomes wrong.

It is true that a scientist must endeavour to explain everything with-in the framework of the laws of nature but if God is really the Creator of the Universe and its source or origin then it cannot be denied that the mental, moral and aesthetic attributes and qualities of God enter into the laws of the universe—the physical, the biological and the psychological laws—and make them what they are just as the mental, moral and aesthetic qualities of a human artist enter into the picture that he creates and makes it what it is and just as the potentialities of a seed enter into the shape and size of the leaves, branches and flowers of the tree that grows out of it and make them what they are. As such neither the laws of nature nor the nature of God can be fully under-stood in isolation from each other. Iqbal only amplifies this idea when he writes:

“Nature, as we have seen, is not a mass of pure materiality occupying a void. It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour and as such organic to the Ultimate Self.

Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phrase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah.”

That God and nature cannot be understood apart from each other is one of the basic teachings of the Holy Quran which exhorts the believers and the non-believers alike to study nature in order to know God and to believe in God in order to understand nature in a proper manner.

افلا ينظرون الى الابل كيف خلقت والى السماء كيف رفعت والى الارض كيف
سطحت

(See they not the camel how it is created? And the heavens how it is raised high? And the mountains how they are fixed and the earth how it is spread).

Studying Nature in the light of his belief is according to the Holy Quran as much the duty of a believer as praying, because the more he understands the Universe the more he will understand his creator and the purpose of his creator.

ان فى خلق السموات و الارض و اختلاف الليل و النهار لايت لاولى الالباب
الذين يذكرون الله قياما و قعودا و على جنوبهم و يتفكرون فى خلق السموات و
الارض ربنا ما خلقت هذا باطلا- سبحنك فقنا عذاب النار-

(In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day there are surely signs for man of under-standing. Those who pray to Allah standing and sitting or lying on their sides and reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth. Our Lord thou hast not created this Universe in vain. Glory be to thee. Save us from the chastisement of the fire).

The Quran asserts that the validity of its teachings which emphasize the love and worship of God will become more and more evident with the growth of man's knowledge of the laws of matter, life and mind.

سنريهم آيتنا فى الافاق و فى انفسهم حتى يتبين لهم انه الحق-

(We will soon show them our signs in the external world, i.e. the laws of nature operating in the worlds of matter and life and, in their own minds until it is quite clear to them that the Quran is truth).

The Quran warns mankind that if they do not make a proper use of their eyes and ears and their thinking powers they will be among those who go to Hell.

و لقد ذرانا لجهنم كثيرا من الجن و الانس لهم قلوب لا يفقهون بها و لهم
اعين لا يبصرون بها و لهم اذان لا يسمون بها لهم كالانعام بل هم اذل- اولئك هم
الغفلون-

(And verily we have created for Hell many a jinn and human being who have hearts wherewith they understand not and they have eyes wherewith they see not and they have ears wherewith they heart not. They are as cattle, and they are more astray. Those are the heedless ones.)

That explains why the Muslims have never been secularists to their attitude towards knowledge. Books written by the ancient Muslim scholars on scientific subject make a mention of God frequently in the beginning, in the middle and at the end, thus indicating that the writer looks upon the knowledge that he wants to communicate to his readers as a knowledge of God's creation which must be acquired primarily for the purpose of knowing God in a better way. In fact it was on account of and not in spite of the spiritual attitude of the Muslims to-wards the world, inspired by the teachings of the Holy Quran, and their intense desire to know the Universe as the creation of God, that they were able to invent the scientific method and to become the founders of modern science. Islam is the first great movement of History for a careful study of nature and the Western science owes its existence to this movement. It will not be out of place to

quote here a few well-known passages from Briffault's "Making of Humanity". He writes:

It was under their successors at the Oxford School that Roger Bacon learned Arabic and Arabic Science. Neither Roger Bacon nor his later namesake has any title to be credited with having introduced the experimental method. Roger Bacon was no more than one of the apostles of Muslim science and method to Christian Europe; and he never wearied of declaring that knowledge of Arabic and Science was for his contemporaries the only way to true knowledge. Discussions as to who was the originator of the experimental method are part of the colossal misrepresentation of the origins of European civilization. The experimental method of Arabs was by Bacon's time widespread and eagerly cultivated throughout Europe.' (p. 202)

'Science is the most momentous contribution of Arab civilization to the modern world; but its fruits were slow in ripening. Not until long after Moorish culture had sunk back into darkness did the giant to which it had given birth rise to his might. It was not science only which brought Europe back to life. Other and manifold influences from the civilization of Islam communicated its first glow to European life.' (p. 202)

'For although there is not a single aspect of European growth in which the decisive influence of Islamic culture is not traceable, nowhere is it so clear and momentous as in the genesis of that power which constitutes the permanent distinctive force of the

modern world, and the supreme source of its victory—natural science and the scientific spirit.’ (p. 109)

‘The debt of our science to that of the Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries of revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab culture, it owes its existence. The ancient world was, as we saw, pre-scientific. The Astronomy and Mathematics of the Greeks were a foreign importation never thoroughly acclimatized in Greek culture.

(The Greeks systematized, generalized and theorized, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute method of science, detailed and prolonged observation and experimental inquiry were altogether alien to the Greek temperament. Only in Hellenistic Alexandria was any approach to scientific work conducted in the ancient classical world. What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of inquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of Mathematics in a form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into the European world by the Arabs.’ (p. 190).

And now it is the intellectual secularism of the Christian successors of the Muslim scientists that is hampering the growth of science in some of its most important aspects.

Intellectual secularism could have grown and flourished only in the peculiar intellectual climate of Christendom for it has its

source in the teachings of Christianity itself. The founder of Christianity separates the dues of Caesar from the dues of God and thus creates a cleavage between the world of matter and the world of the spirit, between that which is mundane, secular and temporal and that which is celestial, spiritual or divine. With Christianity this world and the next contradict each other. One can acquire the joys and blessings of the next world only by sacrificing those of this world. Religion and science can have nothing to do with each other, because religion is irrelevant to man's life on this earth. It is meant for the betterment of the life to come. Intellectual knowledge and science are on the other hand required for the betterment of this life. Religion insists on belief without reason. It is dogmatic and irrational and deals with a world which cannot be seen while the conclusions of science are based on reason, intellect, observation and experiment. It is, therefore, quite natural for a Christian to believe that mentioning God as a part of an intellectual argument must destroy its rational character and must bring the discussion within the realm of religion with all its emphasis on dogma, prejudice, irrationality or faith without reason rather against reason. How different is this outlook from the attitude of Islam to-wards scientific knowledge to which I have made a reference above.

The intellectual secularism of the Christians of the West, that is to say, their prejudice against the concept of God as an intellectual idea, born of their religion, was further accentuated by the reaction against religion engendered by the penalization and suppression of intellectual freedom by the Church, the tyranny of

the inquisitions and the pro-longed and bitter conflicts of the state and Church which ultimately brought about the separation of the two. Once religion was openly separated from politics it could not be expected to retain its hold on any important aspect of the life of the individual and the community. The result was the secularization not only of the political activity of the individual and the community but also of the legal, economic, social, educational and intellectual activity of both.

The prejudice against God and religion was further strengthened by the attitude of the 19th Century physicists who believed that matter was real because it was visible and could be subjected to experiments in the laboratory. God, spirit and consciousness could not be real as they could not be seen and subjected to experiments. It came to be accepted generally by the western scholars, no doubt on account of the accepted generally by predisposition of their Christian minds to keep religion apart from science, that the world is like a machine which is operated by its own law and does not need an external power to work. The prejudice was finally bestowed the status of an intellectual idea and raised to the pedestal of a standard scientific view by the evolutionary theory of Darwin who was himself the product of the cold and rigid mechanism and materialism of the Nineteenth Century. He explained evolution and the emergence of man as an outcome of the fortuitous play of the reckless forces of nature which he described as the struggle for existence, natural selection and the survival of the fittest. According to him it was a mere chance that man had developed such faculties as reason,

conscience and imagination and could indulge in such activities as religion, morals, politics, education, law, art, science and philosophy. What is now a human being might have been any wretched animal even a worm if the wind of chance had blown in a different direction. Darwinism was therefore welcomed as a theory of man and the universe which suited the western disgust for religion because it could explain everything without the aid of any ultimate spiritual factors and forces that may be operating in nature. It was generally accepted by the intellectual world of Darwin's own time and since then has had a pro-found effect on the development of all branches of science. It is now generally believed, in view of this theory, that every object or phenomenon of nature is a chance product of the evolutionary process and should be capable of being explained adequately by reference to its immediate visible past which really creates it. This principle is applied not only to the understanding of matter and life but also to the understanding of human self-consciousness which is therefore considered to be an emanation from matter and since matter has no visible past it is regarded as its own explanation. But if the existence of God may be a fact and if the human personality may be related to God and dependent upon God, by its natural constitution, how can we evolve a scientific theory of human nature which avoids the concept of God.

So strong is the prejudice of Western philosophers against the idea of God as an intellectual concept, that they do not suspect that their ignorance of human nature which they believe to be fraught with dangerous possibilities for the entire human race may

be due to the fact that they are ignoring the possibility of the notion of God being the only key to a scientific understanding of human nature. Indeed they are not prepared to acquire a scientific knowledge of at the cost of their intellectual secularism. They cannot conceive the possibility of a theory of human nature being at once spiritual and scientific. When they complain of their ignorance of human nature they have in mind that a scientific theory of human nature, when formulated will be secular or non-spiritual. But it can never be so. For man has something of the Divine in him and if God is actually in existence he cannot be extended from the domain of science or knowledge without making science unscientific and turning knowledge into ignorance.

A scientific theory of human nature cannot be a theory based only on a few facts observed as a result of experiments made on human beings in a laboratory. All the known and established facts of human history current and ancient provided by the activities of human individuals and communities constitute the legitimate scientific data of a science of human nature. If we can hit upon a hypothesis which is really able to explain these facts or to organize these facts into an ordered and coherent system, this hypothesis will become a scientific fact and the system of facts organized by it will become a scientific theory of human nature. That human beings are religious minded and worship God attributing a particular set of qualities to Him is a scientific fact and a true explanation of this fact ought to form a part of a scientific theory of human nature.

To argue that God is not a scientific fact because we cannot see God is not correct. The visibility of an object or an entity is not essential to a scientific proof of its existence. If we become scientifically sure of the presence of smoke at any place we become scientifically sure also of the presence of fire or combustion at that place. Indeed not only the existence but also the details of the qualities and characteristics of an invisible object can be known scientifically by its visible effects and manifestations. No scientist has ever seen an atom.

Yet who can deny today that the atom is a scientific fact. It is generally recognized by the scientists themselves that scientific facts are of two kinds—the facts based on direct observation and the facts in the form of assumptions which explain and order facts based on direct observation. The atom is a scientific fact of the second category and so is God because the force of the creative will of God which some scientists of the West have only vaguely and partially understood as life-force and to which they are forced to attribute the qualities of will and consciousness (which belong only to a personality or an individual) is ultimately the only assumption that can adequately explain and order all true facts of Physics, Biology and Psychology.

T. H. Huxley summed up the scientific code admirably well when he wrote to Charles Kingly:

“Sit down before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every pre-conceived notion, follow humbly whenever and to whatever abysses nature leads or you shall learn nothing.”

Huxley is right and the reason why our scholars of human nature have learnt “nothing” is that they refuse to “sit down before fact”, and to give up their “pre-conceived notion” that the concept of God must be irrelevant to a scientific understanding of human nature. They are not prepared to follow humbly into the “abyss” of a spiritual interpretation of man and the universe to which nature may be leading. That this is actually so becomes clear when we consider the point at which the progress of modern secularist philosophers of human nature has come to a halt. This point is their view of the source and purpose of the urge for ideals in the nature of man and the relation of this urge to his animal instincts.

Following the Darwinian concept of evolution which, of course, suits eminently their intellectual secularism, they believe that what comes first in the sequence of the results of evolution is matter with its physical laws and then comes the animal with his instincts and last of all there appears the human being with his gift of self-consciousness or personality and its capacity to love ideals. The animal is a modified product of matter which becomes alive on account of the modification. It is nothing but matter in its origin. They conclude therefore that since the urge for an ideal in a human being has its origin in his animal nature it can be only a modified form of one or more of his animal instincts. They derive man from the animal and the animal from matter so that ultimately the reality of man is matter.

Thus we see Freud explaining the human urge for an ideal as a distorted and modified form of his sex instinct the object of which is to provide man with a substitute activity in the form of religion, morality, art, science, philosophy, and politics to compensate him for the thwarted and obstructed activity of his sexual instinct. According to Adler man's urge for an ideal is a distorted and modified form of his instinct of self-assertion which has been operating all along in the history of organic evolution for the protection of the life of the animal against other hostile and aggressive animals. When an individual is unable to satisfy a particular desire for power he creates the desire for a relevant ideal and strives after it to compensate himself for his sense of inferiority. Karl Marx is of the view that the urge for ideals in man is only an unconscious distortion of his economic urge. Man strives after an ideal apparently but really his activity is motivated by his economic conditions which he desires to improve. McDougall explains the urge for an ideal in man as a result of the occasional reinforcement of the sentiment of self-regard—itsself a peculiar compound of all his instincts—by the instinct of self-assertion. But all these explanations of the source and purpose of ideals in human nature are logically defective, incoherent and inconsistent. Freud for example does not tell us why and how a man's ideal which according to him is born of his sex instinct is sometimes able to rule and control his sex instinct to the extent of eliminating it totally from his life. Adler is unable to explain how the instinct of self-assertion the primary object of which is the protection of life creates an ideal for the sake of which man

becomes ready sometimes to lay down his life. Similarly the view of Karl Marx does not explain why if the function of a man's ideal is to improve his economic conditions which are only a means for the preservation of his life, does he become ready to starve himself to death for the sake of his ideal whenever his ideal calls upon him to do so. Such questions are very difficult to answer consistently with any of the theories of ideals put forward by these writers. Hence none of them has even faced such questions. The mental attitude of each of these writers is no more reasonable than that of a man who, not knowing how and why a tree grows, may insist upon telling us that what exists first of all in the history of the growth of a tree is its stem and later on there appear its branches and leaves and finally there is its seed embedded in a flower. He ignores the original seed of the tree out of which the tree grows simply because it was hidden from his view below the soil and he did not see it. He saw instead only the stalk of the young tree growing out of the soil. Just as he in his ignorance explains the tree out of its stem and not out of its seed which is its real origin so these writers in their ignorance explain the human being out of matter and not out of self-consciousness which is his real origin.

The secular attitude of these writers towards knowledge has made them blind to the possibility that self-consciousness the entity which emerges in man as the highest and the last product of the evolution of the universe and which bestows upon him the capacity to love ideals may be also the source or the origin of the Universe as the personality of its Creator, as the seed of a tree

which is the highest and the last product of the growth of a tree is also its source or origin.

As a matter of fact there is no idea of the place and role of ideals in human nature and human activity more satisfactory and more convincing than this that “the urge for ideals is neither derived from nor sub serves any of those human impulses known as instincts, which man shares with the animals below him on the ladder of evolution. On the other hand it is man’s natural and independent urge for beauty and perfection which rules and controls all such impulses in spite of their biological pressure for the sake of its own expression and satisfaction.”

This idea is a hypothesis which is able to explain and organize in the form of a beautiful coherent and ordered system all the known and established facts of human nature and human history inferred both from introspection and observation and no substitute idea can explain, order or systematize these facts to the same extent. From the intellectual and scientific point of view therefore this capacity of the idea has to be taken as a dependable criterion of its validity as a scientific fact and there can be no escape from it. But imagine the extremely disturbing implications of this idea for an intellectual secularist.

The idea implies that the urge for ideals is the real and the ultimate motivating power of all human activities whether economic, political, ethical, legal, intellectual, artistic or otherwise. As such it is life itself. As it is not the creature or servant of instincts it is the creator of instincts and has created them through

ages of biological evolution to employ them in its own service. It is the will of the creator itself working in man for the realization of its own ends. It was the cause of biological evolution in the past and cause of physical evolution earlier and it is the cause of human or socio-psychological evolution now. At the physical stage of evolution it manifested itself as electric energy and caused the material universe to evolve through its various stages till it became ripe for the emergence of life. At the biological stage of evolution it manifested itself as life-force and evolved the animal up to the stage of its biological perfection in the human being. At the human stage of evolution it has manifested itself as the urge for an ideal and there can be no doubt that its object is to bring the human race to the stage of their highest socio-psychological or ideological perfection. When an individual loves his ideal passionately the joy, the pleasure or the satisfaction that he gets from obeying his ideal surpasses far in intensity and quality and is far more valuable and preferable to him than any pleasure that he can derive from the satisfaction of any of his instincts. That is why he becomes ready to lay down his life (for the preservation of which instincts are meant) for the sake of his ideal whenever his ideal demands it. This urge can be perfectly and permanently satisfied only by an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection—an ideal which has all the qualities of beauty, goodness, truth, power and creativeness which the religious man ascribes to God. If an individual cannot love such an ideal which is the only true ideal of his nature that is if he, in view of the difficulties of his educational environment, lacks a personal realization and experience of the

beauty of such an ideal he is forced to love another ideal which, owing to an error of his judgment, appears to him to be beautiful. This new ideal does not possess the qualities of the Right Ideal but the individual attributes these qualities to it wrongly and unconsciously in order to satisfy an urgent and irresistible demand of his nature.

Since the ideal whether wrong or right is the motivating force of all human activities, all the experiences of an individual whether intellectual, aesthetic, moral or spiritual arise in the service of the ideal and are made to serve the ideal. The love of the ideal organizes, integrates and unifies into itself all his experiences. This implies further that when the ideal of an individual is right and perfect i.e. when his ideal is God all his true experiences will be relevant to it and he will not need to modify them in order to make them consistent with his ideal. But when his ideal is wrong and imperfect all his true experiences will be irrelevant to it and the individual will be forced to modify them and alter them in the process of their emergence so as to make them consistent with his ideal. Thus neither the morality of a man who loves a wrong ideal can be a true morality nor his scientific knowledge can be a true scientific knowledge.

When an individual has a secular attitude towards scientific know' ledge it means that he does not permit his knowledge of facts to be organized by the Right Ideal. But one cannot be ideologically neutral Hence he will in effect permit his knowledge to be organized by some wrong ideal which happens to thrust

itself in the ideological void created by his secularism. This means that intellectual secularism leads person to have a wrong perspective of things and his knowledge of the human, biological and material sciences is never absolutely correct although the extent of his error will be different for different spheres of science. For a secularist believes in some false God as the God that is relevant to scientific knowledge. Unfortunately it is not generally realized that to have a secular attitude towards knowledge is not the same thing as to have no belief about the existence or otherwise of God or to believe that God exists but scientific knowledge has no relevance to God. It means something different. It means that God may exist but scientific knowledge has no relevance to true God, while it is positively relevant to some false God say matter or mechanical forces or some other substitute for true God.

A secular attitude towards knowledge is most harmful to the development of the human and social sciences. It is a little less harmful to the development of the biological sciences, and it is the least harmful, apparently almost harmless to the development of physical sciences. In other words its harmfulness becomes less and less as in his scientific investigation and inquiry a scientist is removed farther & farther away from the realm of conscious purpose. The reason for this is plain to see. The ideal of a scientist even when it is wrong and imperfect is the chosen conscious purpose of his life which he thinks is the true purpose of human life and which he is bound to regard vaguely as the purpose of the universe itself. His wrong ideal alters and twists the true results of

his investigation most of all when the material of his investigation relates to the human world, the world that is directly and totally controlled by the ideals of human beings including his own ideal. While endeavoring to explain the nature of the political, ethical, social, intellectual, educational, legal, artistic and economic activities of man he interprets them in such a manner that his own ideal or his own view of the true purpose of these activities is vindicated. As a matter of fact the nature of the human urge for an ideal reveals that the purpose of all human activity whether political, ethical, intellectual, economic or otherwise is the perfect realization of an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection, which is God. It means that philosophies of politics, ethics, education, art, economics, law and history and the psychologies of the individual and society can never be rationally ordered, true and systematic unless this important fact is made the core or the essence of each. Since this has not been done so far all these human and social sciences are in a state of chaos.

The Wrong ideal of a scientist is able to alter and twist the true results of his investigation to a lesser degree when his investigation relates to the world of animals because it is a world that is external to him. However in the absence of his knowledge of the true nature of human urge for ideals a scientist cannot see the creative will of God taking the shape of a life force in his own instinctive urges as well as those of other animals and therefore cannot explain the nature and direction of the processes of life and the causes and objectives of organic evolution. Western Biological Science has made some progress no doubt but the

secularistic attitude of the Western biologists is now working to bring its progress to a halt.

The wrong ideal of a physicist does not enter into the results of his investigation very much except at the very highest stages of the development of physics when this science begins to enter the realm of philosophy. It, however, affects the purpose for which he can use his findings and strictly speaking the purpose for which a piece of knowledge is intended to be used cannot be separated from it. A fact is never the same fact to two persons loving two different ideals because a fact known to an individual is according to him a fact in so far only as it is relevant to the theoretical and practical requirements of his ideal.

His knowledge therefore acquires a particular complexion or colour borrowed from his ideal; it bears the stamp of his ideal. Even the material universe is not the same for two persons who believe in two different ideals. Even the simple statement two plus two is equal to four cannot have the same significance and cannot impart the same piece of knowledge to two persons who believe in two different ideals. The famous story of a hungry man who was put the question what does two plus two amount to and gave the reply four loaves of bread is a very eloquent statement of the fact that the purposes of men modify their knowledge of hard facts. What we call knowledge is not merely a piece of information about an object external to us. It is also our internal attitude derived from our ideal towards that object and our idea of the use we should make of it. It is the information plus the

attitude towards the information. The information and the attitude both combine to form the complete idea of the object, the organic whole that we call knowledge. It is this organic whole that constitutes our intellectual experience. The knowledge of the properties of objective things is a subjective reality and our subjective attitude towards those objective things emerges in our consciousness simultaneously with that reality and forms an inseparable part of it. Consequently when ideals differ, knowledge even if it may be the knowledge of physics or mathematics cannot really remain the same although it may be apparently the same. A white carpet spread in a room fitted with electric bulbs of different colours will look yellow, green, red or blue according to the light that is turned on and it is evident that to say that a carpet is white is not the same thing as to say that it is red or blue. The Nazis rightly believed that their Science was different from that of the rest of the world and the Russians rightly believe today that their science even their Physics or Mathematics is not the same as that of the capitalists.

To be brief the implications of the only true and the only possible explanation of the place and role of ideals in human nature which lead irresistibly to the concept of God, are such that the scholars of the West cannot accept it in view of their creed of intellectual secularism. So strong is this prejudice against the idea of God that when they feel that their study of nature has brought them very close to this idea and it may become difficult for them to avoid it they are horrified and refrain from using the term God and use some other term instead and thereby stop following

nature further in the same direction. But since unfortunately the Western scholars are accepted by the world as the leaders of mankind in the intellectual field their prejudice has passed for a rational view and spread far and wide to the corners of the earth. The results have been already very disastrous and more disastrous results are bound to follow. The world's progress in the knowledge of human nature has come to a dead stop and the human and social sciences which could be formulated only on the basis of a correct view of human nature are in a state of disorder. The biological sciences too are not in a healthy state. The theory of the fundamental cause of evolution, which if properly formulated could have made the human race hopeful of a glorious future, has been misunderstood. Its errors are being perpetuated by a clique of influential biologists who insist on maintaining its secular character at all costs.

If the scholars of the West had not been suffering from theophobia and had had the courage and the good sense to accept the advice of one of them, Mr. Huxley, quoted above, that is, to "follow nature wherever and to whatever abyss it may lead," they would have successfully crossed the point at which their knowledge of the human and social sciences has come to a halt and would have accepted as true the only explanation of the role of the urge for ideals in human activity that is rationally possible. In such a case intellectual secularism would have disappeared from all sciences including the biological and the physical sciences automatically. For when we change our view of man we have to change our view of the entire universe. A spiritual view of man is

incompatible with a secular view of any part of the universe and its knowledge.

Some of the most eminent physicists of the world have already come to the conclusion that the ultimate nature of electric energy which has caused the material world to evolve to the stage of its perfection is a conscious force which has a mathematical mind. Yet they refuse to come to the conclusion, which is obvious to a man of religion, that this conscious force is the will or the creative desire of God. Similarly some eminent biologists have arrived at the conclusion that there is an internal conscious drive in an organism which regulates its growth in a chosen direction and which is the cause of all organic evolution from its earliest stages to the last. They call it the life-force, the elan vital or the vital impetus and attribute to it some qualities of mind consciousness. But they like their physicist brothers also refuse to come to the next conclusion which is equally obvious to a man who believes in God that this life force is the will or the creative desire of God which has expressed itself in a form that is appropriate stage of evolution. Again all psychologists believe that man has an urge for ideals and some of them believe also that it is an urge for beauty and perfection. But no psychologists have cared to arrive at the next immediate conclusion that this urge can be perfectly satisfied only by an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection which can be no other than God and that it is the will or the creative desire of God that is expressing itself in the historical process urging the human society to act for the achievement of their own highest beauty and perfection.

A physicist may say, "I do not know anything beyond the mathematical nature of the Reality of matter that I have discovered. I do not know that it has moral qualities and I do not want to compensate my lack of scientific knowledge as a physicist by the teachings of revelation although I believe in revelation." Similarly a biologist may say that he has no scientific knowledge of the other qualities of the life-force that it may be possessing and he has no reason to suppose it is God on the authority of revelation. A psychologist too may make a similar reply. But really there is nothing to prevent the physicists, the biologists and the psychologists from adopting the will or the creative desire of God instead of a mere mathematical mind a life-force or an instinct as a provisional conclusion or hypothesis explaining the cause of material, biological or human evolution just to discover how far it can explain other facts of which no satisfactory explanation is yet available. If they had done so they would have found that the hypothesis does really explain a host of such facts and also opens the way to the knowledge of a host of new facts of the worlds of matter, life and mind. What is more they would have been able to coordinate and integrate their separate sciences into one Science of the Universe which would have ultimately explained everything, would have served as the Common Weltanschauung of humanity and would have united them as a single family of God. But what has actually stopped the physicists, the biologists or the psychologists from doing so is nothing but prejudice, aversion from religion and an irrational secular attitude towards the universe.

My plea is that there is a point in the development of secularized scientific knowledge where the most fundamental of all the facts of revelation common to the teachings of all the great religions of the world, namely the idea of God and scientific knowledge, embrace each other as two inseparable companions each merging itself in the other and giving a tremendous rational support to the other, so that it cannot be distinguished which is science and which is revelation. When that point is reached scientific knowledge can no longer progress without its other companion. That point has been already reached and now scientific knowledge cannot progress headlong unless it is made to embrace its inseparable other companion from whom it was unfortunately separated and whom it has been traveling through the centuries to rejoin. The idea of God is no longer a myth. It is a scientific fact which explains, orders, enlightens, enriches and reveals other scientific facts.

All human beings have an immense store of potential love for each other and a strong unconscious desire to live in unity and peace like a single family. The reason is that the motivating force of their activities is the same namely the urge to love and serve an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection, namely their Creator. They are disunited because the intellectual secularism of their educators, teachers and text-book writers have made them forget their Creator, the true common ideal of their nature which alone can give them an enduring happiness and satisfaction. As a consequence they have split up into a number of groups or sections each loving and serving a different substitute for their

true ideal, a false God which is a race or a nation or a colour or a country or a creed such as Democracy, Communism, Socialism etc. Each of these sections of humanity desire to see their false God become the undisputed master of the world. They are therefore openly or secretly the mortal enemies of each other although they keep their hostile designs against each other camouflaged by attractive philosophies, skilful propaganda, sweet words, treaties and aids. We have already witnessed the result of their bitter enmity against each other in the shape of two world wars and a third world war which will be an atomic war likely to end in almost a total annihilation of mankind is imminent. The remedy is only one and it is that men and women all over the world should come forward to love and serve the ideal of their nature which is the only possible basis of their unity. But this is impossible as long as intellectual secularism is not eradicated throughout the world and our knowledge of man and the universe which is now related to false Gods is not delivered from its prison and related once again to the Creator of man and the universe to whom alone it is relevant. The differences of religion among the various human communities of today is no hindrance to the achievement of this goal for it can be achieved totally without entering into any religious controversies and we know that more than half of the human race are unanimous in their belief in God and His qualities.

It is however hoping against hope to think that the Western scholars will ever give us the lead in the matter. There are incapable of doing so. They can never cross the point mentioned

above at which their knowledge of human nature has come to a halt. They will never accept the true explanation of the place of ideals in human nature as it is totally incompatible with the history and culture that have gone into their making.

They will not awaken to their mistake till their civilization has actually collapsed and when this happens it will be already too late to rectify the mistake. I am therefore convinced that we Pakistanis have a great role to play in the present intellectual situation of the world. Thanks to Iqbal the idea that the urge for ideals is the real and the ultimate motivating power of all human activity which is capable of eradicating intellectual secularism completely from all scientific knowledge is already ours. This idea is true and unshakable. It can hold its own most firmly against any intellectual challenge that may come from any quarters. With the help of the idea we can change the world. We can use it to create a smooth and peaceful world-wide intellectual revolution ending in the eternal unity of the human race and the reign of a permanent peace in the human world. But we must make a beginning at home and how can we make a beginning? By revising our textbooks in all the sciences, physical and biological as well as human and social and for all stages of education right from the primary classes to the M.A. classes in such a manner that the readers are made to realize, or experience the truth that the universe in all its three departments of matter, life and animal is the creation of God, that their own departments mental object in studying nature and acquiring knowledge of the universe is to know God and His qualities which are expressed in creation better and better so that

they may be able to love and serve God more and more wholeheartedly, that no human activity whether ethical, educational, intellectual, aesthetic, economic, political, or legal, can be at its best and highest and directed rightly and fruitfully in the long run which does not enable the individual or the community to love and serve God wholeheartedly. How the writer of the text-book will present his subject matter and what methods and devices he will use to make his text-book perfectly adapted to his purpose is a matter that can be left to those who will supervise and direct his work.

I quote at the end a poem of Iqbal entitled “A conversation between Knowledge and Love” which sums up beautifully the ideas I have just expressed.

علم
نگاهم راز دار هفت و چار است گرفتار کمندم دوزگار است جهاں بینم بایں سو باز کردند مرا با آنسوئے گردوں چه کار است چکد صد نغمہ از سازے کہ دارم ببازار افکنم رازے کہ دارم
عشق
ز افسون تو دریا شعلہ زار است

هوا آتش گزار و زهر دار است
چو با من یار بودی، نور بودی
بریدی از من و نور تو نار است
بخلوت خانه لاهوت زادی
ولیکن در نخ شیطان فنادی
بیا این خاکدان را گلستان ساز
جهان پیر را دیگر جوان ساز
ز روز آفرینش همدم استیم
همان یک نغمه را زیر و بم استیم

References:-

1. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam—Iqbal
2. First Principles of Education—M. Rafiuddin
3. Ideology of the Future—M. Rafiuddin

IQBAL'S HUMANISM

By: C. NANDY

It must be admitted that sufficient research has not yet been made on the works of the great philosopher-poet Iqbal. Many people know him only as a great poet. His philosophy, his deep insight into the ways of human life and society, his exposition of a new out-look of life and his contemplated pattern of a new society, are subjects still to be studied deeply to be understood in their real perspective.

Iqbal was born at a time when the Muslim society of this sub-continent was in a stagnant state of progress, if not, definitely decadent. The people had in them a mighty life-force lying latent and they wanted somebody to move them on. This stirring of new life came from this great poet and philosopher, Sir Md. Iqbal. The poet breathed new life and enthusiasm into the decadent Muslim society and opened before them a new vista of life and light. He was not merely a dreamer but a practical man. He taught people that man should strive hard to reshape the destiny of this world. He despised passivity, quietism and inaction. He inspired them to throw off the inertia and inhibition of the past.

In his opinion a man is endowed with full freedom to develop his unlimited potentialities in active contact with his environment. The world is dynamic, it is ever growing and it offers scope to man to develop his free and creative activity, to conquer nature and to develop the latent powers of his individuality. Man is essentially a creative activity.

It is not a fact that the destiny of man is a sealed matter. For every individual the future exists as an open possibility. Man must develop that by constant effort and activity. He never tolerated the escapist attitude of avoiding struggle. This reminds us of the 19th century Indian Sannyasi-Swami Vivekananda who preached boldly that “Struggle is life and inactivity is death”. Poet Iqbal spoke with convincing passion that a man was capable of evolving Divine qualities in himself by ceaseless activities. He elaborated a message of dynamic activism and of a potentially glorious future.

Poet Iqbal placed greatest emphasis on human achievements. Here we find him in line with the German philosopher Nietzsche. Man was glorified, human genius exalted. He taught that man must strive hard to reshape the destiny of the world. He condemned those who recoiled from struggle and loved peaceful quietism. He called it sinful to indulge in a feeling of passivism and inactivity. He could never reconcile with the idea of resignation. He said the goal of humanity is not submission but supremacy. Poet Iqbal spoke with supreme eloquence:—“Your heart beats like a coward at the thought of struggle. That is life but death when it loses desire for combat?” Again he said:—”Dive into the river of life and fight the waves. Everlasting life is the outcome of conflict.” Struggle was the soul of these verses.

With poet Iqbal life was a ceaseless endeavour.

In the opinion of Iqbal, man is the centre of creative and dynamic energy. He can defeat the inertia of matter and effect changes in the existing state of things. By his ceaseless effort he

can overcome his own limitations and realise himself and become a God. But the man. The poet adored was not the present man. He was actually dissatisfied with men as he saw, inferior in calibre, limited in intellect. He urged that the object of evolution was to bring such ideal men. So we find the quest of ideal man.

He emphasized on the personality of man. He argued that in a social environment individual personality found better scope to develop, and opportunities for expansion of life. In a society, a man, con-fronted with opposing views and forces, found greater fillips to fortify and strengthen his personality. Isolated individuals are forgetful of higher ends of life.

He visualized an ideal society where the spirit of brotherhood and love, social service and spiritual warmth would permeate every heart. There would be no aggressive wars, no colour or race or class or national distinctions. The ideal society would consist of strong personalities.

Aim of life according to him was to achieve a dynamic personality with a strong sense of ego-hood. This could develop only in a new social order, providing equal opportunities of life for all and free from present ills and evils of life. He said the ethical ideal of man was to develop a strong personality and for that he recommended ceaseless activity. His total emphasis was on activities, on work. By ceaseless activity a man would conquer nature and develop the latent powers of his individuality. He believed that man might evolve divine qualities in his self by endless activity. He wrote that when “Man realises himself and all

his potentialities, he becomes God". The same idea we find in the Hindu Upanishads "Know thyself".

The motive force in work is love. It is love that directs human activities to the working out of God's increasing purpose on earth. A perfect individual is he who has absorbed the divine purpose. He works out the divine plan. In Iqbal's views, man works out the plan of God and becomes co-worker with God. In his opinion the true believer is he who does develop all his latent potentialities and use them for the conquest and remarking of the world. Iqbal finds the differences between a believer and a non-believer, not in a narrow theological difference but in a fundamental attitude in our life. He said conquest of nature through knowledge was an act of prayer.

He emphasised on love as the motive force of all activity. He emphasised on a balance between intellect and love. He said intellect must be inspired by love, science by faith otherwise intellect would be mere trickery.

The great poet and thinker Iqbal was not only the architect of the future, he was really the architect of a new, vigorous and going ahead Muslim society that bids fare today to make remarkable progress in every sphere of life. His clarion call to robust activism gave a new impetus to the people. He called the Muslim people to wake up.

The poet is remembered today with highest honour and respect in Pakistan.

EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF IQBAL

ABADULLAH FARUQI

It is important to note that all great educators have been great philosophers. Plato's scheme of cultural education depended upon his idealism. Rousseu's anti-social philosophy gave rise to his natural education. Pragmatist philosophy has been responsible for the project method in education. It is true that Iqbal was not an educationist in the strict sense of the word; but one cannot deny his contribution to our educational ideology. He did not present any specific educational technique or methodology; but he directed our attention to those basic and fundamental principles of education which underlie all the sound educational practices. When we work out the practical implications of his educational ideas they do throw lurid light on the modern problems of education and point out to their healthy solution.

Education

Education, which signifies the development of personality, is a purposive process; it is a process which is consciously directed towards some end. Mill defines it as, "culture which each generation purposely gives to those who are to be successors in order to qualify them for at least keeping up and if possible for raising the level of improvement which has been maintained".

Similarly, K. G. Saiyadain remarks that “Education in its full and correct signification must be visualized as the sum total of cultural forces which play on the life of individual and community. If this is clearly understood, it follows that an emergence of an outstanding creative thinker, who has distinctive message to give or new values to present before the world, is a phenomenon of the greatest interest for the educationists, and the more his ideas catch the imagination, the understanding and enthusiasm of his contemporaries, the greater must be his influence as the educative force”.

Viewed in his perspective, one cannot escape the fact that Iqbal comes under the category of the educationists, though he is not an educationist in the limited sense. Every educational system is concerned with the critical evaluation and transmission of the cultural heritage, knowledge and ideas of social groups, to its young members, and is thus much wider in its outlook than the narrow system of education that goes on within the precincts of schools and colleges. This limited process of teaching and learning does not take into account the social and the personal influences which shape and modify the destiny of the individual and of the community. Iqbal lays special emphasis on these cultural factors and his philosophy of life is of infinite value for education. Like other educationists, he stresses the fundamental point that the educator must necessarily inquire into the nature and function of the self in relation to the environment in which it is placed.

Self, according to him, is not a mere illusion, as some of the pseudo-mystics and pantheists would have us believe. It has, on the other hand, an abiding significance of its own. The doctrine of self-negation, according to Iqbal, is positively dangerous in its socio-political implications.

Thus, Education is concerned with the problems of individual and society. It is the process of enabling the individual to take his rightful place in the society. It must, therefore, be interested in those studies which concern the individual on the one hand and the society on the other.

Naturalism in Education

The child occupies the central figure in the educational system of the naturalists. The subject and method of education must be in consonance with the natural tendencies of child's mind, his instincts and emotions. While educating the child the teacher must take into consideration his dominant psychological trends and the stage of development of his personality. The psychology of development is of utmost importance for education. We must study the nature of infants, children and adolescents and adjust our educational approach accordingly.

Psycho-analysis has given a great impetus to naturalism in education. It stands for unrestricted expression of the unconscious impulses of the child. He must be given freedom and opportunity for natural development so that he may not suffer

from mental depression and conflict. It condemns sexual taboos, authoritarian methods and corporeal punishment.

Rousseau considered that the first twelve years of human life are extremely important. During this period the child must be given full opportunities for the perfection of his instruments of knowledge, namely, his sense organs. Nothing was to be done during this period to mould child's mind. He was not to read and write. His body and his sense organs were to be exercised and trained. No moral training should be imparted to him during this period.

Like, Rousseau, Iqbal emphasises the empirical aspect of know-ledge. He realised the importance of sense-perception. According to him development of an active personality is impossible without concrete environment. Self-realization, which according to Iqbal, is conducive to educational goal cannot be conceived without the material environment. He further realised the importance of freedom which was particularly emphasised by the naturalists. According to Iqbal, the latent power of the individual cannot develop, unless he is placed in an atmosphere of freedom and is thus able to interact with the environment and thereby get direct and first hand experience. Yet, he is a rigid disciplinarian and advocates such strict regulations as prepare the child for straneous obligations of life. In other words, he does not agree with Rousseau's "freedom idea" in its extreme form. Naturalists further stress on adjustment to environment as the educational aim. Iqbal differs from the naturalists, insofar as he

holds that, not adjustment, but the conquest of the environment is the real aim of education. Therefore, according to him the child should not yield himself to environmental forces. Man has always been mastering his material environment and shaping and re-shaping it according to his own needs and desires. Consequently against the views held by the naturalists, Iqbal contends that the environment should be shattered and remoulded if it does not accord with the aspiration of the individual. He expresses this idea when he pleads that if the world does not conform to your standards, instead of submitting to it you should destroy and remold it.

گفتند جهان ما آیا با تو می سازد

گفتم که نمی سازد و گفتند که برهم زن

Idealism in Education

He agrees with the idealists that the material and the physical universe, as known to science, is an incomplete expression of reality. Man has a peculiar power which manifests itself in the form of intellect, intuition, culture, art, morality and religion. These are peculiar to man and are certainly beyond the range of positive science.

Idealism is bitterly opposed to naturalism, in so far as it regards that the real aim of education is to mould the environment according to ideals or the individual values and not

to yield oneself to the physical environment which is an eternal embodiment of human will and intelligence; much of it is the result of man's capacity for inventiveness. Iqbal beautifully gives expression to this idea:

تو شب آفریدی چراغ آفریدم

سفال آفریدی ایاج آفریدم

بیابان و کوهسار و راغ آفریدی

خیابان و گلزار و باغ آفریدم

من آنم که از سنگ آئینه سازم

من آنم که از زهر نو شینه سازم

You (God) created the night, I the lamp;

You created the clay, I the vase.

You created the jungle, mountains and deserts

I created gardens, orchards and flower-plots.

It is I who make glass out of stone

It is I who extract elixir out of poison.

So far as the cultural and the spiritual environment is concerned it is entirely a product of man's creative activity. Man sets before himself philosophical and cultural problems and has been tackling them since long. Hence, he cannot be said to be a slave of environment in any sense. To set about questions, to inquire into the origin of things and to strive for something better than the given are distinctive marks of man alone. The cultural environment consisting of religion, science, art, and literature is overgrowing. To it many sages in all ages have contributed. It welds together all mankind. Underlying this cultural environment are three eternal values which man can apprehend by his spiritual capacity. They are "Truth, Beauty and Goodness". To these three eternal values Iqbal adds a fourth, viz: apprehension of God, having the eternal values as His attributes.

The Muslim philosophers, who were under Aristotle's influence, thought that God was in essence 'Reason', another class held that He was the Highest Good, the Sumum Boman; and yet another group regarded Him, as the one Supreme Beauty. The Neo-Platonic mystics belonged to the last group, and Iqbal in the early period of his development seems to be entirely under their influence. Latter on there was a change in his position and he came to regard Beauty as one of the ninety-nine Names of God which denoted the different names of divine shades.

Thus, following the Neo-Platonic tradition he regarded Beauty as eternal; but later on he came to regard it as the product of man's experimentation and grappling with the stern realities of

life. In other words, the eternal values came to be regarded as the creation of man in the course of his attempts to meet his own needs and to overcome the difficulties in his way. His philosophy, thus, becomes humanistic under the influence of pragmatic philosophy.

As an idealist, he lays emphasis on the doctrine of self-realisation, which means the realisation of divine attributes forming the essence of man's nature and ultimately leading to progressive socialism. That is exactly what is meant by the holy Prophet's tradition *تخلقوا باخلاق الله*; i.e. create divine attributes. Thus, the idealist goal of self-realisation is not egoistic. This goal aims at the realisation of those values and attributes which are essentially social and altruistic. The purpose of education is to help the student in his self-realisation. As such, the task of any system of education is to transmit to the individual the entire cultural heritage and to guide the student in the continuous growth of his apprehension of the ultimate reality as well as of the divine-attributes. The knowledge of his cultural heritage enriches the individual self. The educator by his efforts assists the educant who is developing his personality in accordance with the laws of his own nature to attain levels that would otherwise be denied to him.

Thus, self-realisation means consciousness of divine attributes which constitutes the very essence of man. Such a self is also in

union with the whole world and has realised the ultimate value of such union, namely goodness, truth, beauty and unity of God (توحيد). Thus, education must be religious, moral, intellectual and aesthetic. In order to produce a balanced and harmonious personality none of these aspects may be neglected. Hence a man, who is perfect according to the idealist standpoint, is identical with the self of the whole society.

Iqbal, thus, combines the best of materialism and of spiritualism in his philosophy, and exhorts the Individual to make full use of the physical aspect of education, which should aim at physical fitness of the body and acquisition of necessary bodily skill. According to him physical and spiritual are not sharply opposed to each other; they have a certain amount of common ground. Iqbal, also considers mind and body as a single inseparable reality and emphasises the need of intellectual, aesthetic and social values, which must be pursued for the development of self.

Pragmatist Theory of Education & Its Influence on Iqbal's Thought Unlike the idealists pragmatists do not believe in the existence of eternal values like "Beauty", "Truth" and "Goodness". According to them these values have no prior existence; rather they are created by man in the course of his attempts to overcome the difficulties in his way. Pragmatism is essentially humanistic as it stresses the fact that there are human

purposes to be fulfilled and that philosophy is only a weapon which helps in pursuing such aims. Since man is the measure of all things, pragmatism stresses individual needs and their satisfaction for them. Again, since all values arise in the course of man's activity and since they are pursued only to satisfy human needs and wants, pragmatism is essentially enterprising and experimental in nature. The pragmatists deprecate any attempt on the part of the educator to prescribe any specific goal for the education of the child. Life is itself experimental. Therefore, there is no definite goal to which the child must advance. Like naturalists they start with the child as it is. For them the child, his physical and social environment and interaction between them are of fundamental importance. However, they are more deliberate in their method than the Naturalists. It is child's nature to experiment with life. He should be encouraged to do so because when he is face to face with new situations, he develops new responses and attitudes. The pragmatists are not in favour of giving the child a set course of study. They hold that true knowledge does not consist in acquiring of a dead culture, particularly from books; rather, it consists in developing skill that is useful to deal effectively with the situations of real life. In other words, education consists in encouraging the child to learn for himself through experimental creative activity. "Learning by Doing" sums up the educational method of pragmatism. Human activities are more important than school subjects. Instead of working at separate subjects, the pupil is encouraged to draw freely upon all knowledge that is relevant to the activity to which he happens to be engaged. Any study they

undertake is motivated by their desire to solve their own problems; it is viewed and valued from the standpoint of its utility in dealing with such problems. Such a method of education is the characteristic contribution of pragmatism and is called the project method. The essence of this method is this: “the problem comes first and learning is acquired in the course of its successful solution”.

Iqbal, while agreeing with Dewey’s pragmatism and also with certain aspects of humanism does not confine the utility of education to the material end; but rather comprehends the need of spiritual aspect as well. While, Dewey tests everything including any idea, hypothesis, faith or religion by the way it works, by the consequences; Iqbal, on the other hand, tested the ideas by their conformity to the principles of the development of self, often accepted on the authority of religion. Subsequently, however, being influenced by the pragmatist philosophy, he brought experimentalism to some extent in the realm of education and philosophy. He believes in the equality of opportunity among mankind for full development of every individual. Dewey is against idealism, which believes in universal and unchanging values. He is opposed to Plato who believed in the world of ideas. In his opinion the imaginary world tends to become the property of the leisured classes who leave the phenomenal world or the actual world to the craftsman and artisan and the slaves. Dewey’s published views are contained in his book namely “Democracy and Education”, and “Reconstruction in Philosophy”. His influence beginning with the modern educational field of

Columbia University New York has gradually extended to the Far East and Russia.

Iqbal shows indebtedness to pragmatist philosophy. While under the influence of Neo-platonism (i.e. before 1908), he believed in the eternal values (Beauty, Truth and Goodness) and despised the phenomenal world. Under his emancipated position, however, he identified God with “Supreme ego” or “the eternal will”. Further, Beauty, instead of being an eternal value came to be regarded as “only a quality of the ego—in action; of the ‘will to power’, when it climbs to its heights. Ugliness appears when ‘will to power’, the fountain of all life and all growth, runs dry”.

Iqbal gives expressions to these ideas in his following beautiful lines:

نمود جسکی فراز خودی سے ہے، وہ جمیل

جو ہو نشیب میں پیدا، قبیح و نا محبوب

سری نظر میں یہی ہے جمال و زیبائی

کہ سر بسجده ہوں قوت کے سامنے افلاک

“Glorious is he, who reveals his identity through the attainment of self While, ugly and repugnant is he who takes its birth in the lowest strata of being, Nothing but submission of

heavens to the dynamic power of self Constitutes elegance or beauty in my eyes”.

Thus, the essence of reality as held by Iqbal is the will of the ego. His theory, therefore, ceases to be idealistic. It, on the other hand, becomes atavistic. For, life according to him, is essentially volitional and is definitely directed towards some end, the end being spiritual rather than material.

Briefly, according to Iqbal, the highest aim of education is to strengthen the individuality of all persons so that they may develop their potentialities. Naturalists, on the contrary, stress on adjustment to environment as the educational aim. Idealists emphasise the development of personality and attainment of universal values. The pragmatists hold progress and creation of human values as the goal of education. Knowledge is the essence of education and is an indispensable means for it. Obviously, adjustment to environment cannot be achieved without the knowledge of the environment; nor appreciation of eternal values without the knowledge of spiritual and cultural universe. Likewise, progress and creation of values are empty cries without full knowledge of man and the world around him. Iqbal contends that the essence of self is revealed only through intuition. Psychology which regards self to be a mere flux of sensation and feelings and thoughts fails to grasp an inner unity of self behind all the multiple experiences. In order to apprehend the unity of self which is the pivot of all experiences, Iqbal turns to the inner depths of our consciousness and has recourse to intuition. He

further holds that it is definitely not the aim of education to yield one self to environmental forces; rather the real aim of education according to him is to subjugate the material force. As he himself remarks that if the time does not move in harmony with you, change the times:

زمانه تو نسادزد تو با زمانه ستیز

Thus, according to K. G. Syedain:-

“No one can develop any intelligent theory of education without consciously postulating some conception of the nature of the individual to be educated, his relationship to the community and, what may be called, his ultimate destiny. For, the essence of the educative process, reduced to its most elementary terms, lies in the fact of a living human organism being in constant interaction and contact with a vast and complex environment, which keeps on changing and growing as a result of the continuous, mutual intercourse. Like the philosopher the educator must necessarily inquire into the nature of these two terms of his activity—the individual and the Environment—which ultimately determine the solution of all his problems”.

The naturalists stress, like Iqbal, the development of human personality, but they seem to have no idea of any goal for the education of the child. They only aim to give the child every facility for growing in-to free, active, happy and well-adjusted human being. They believe that when every one in the society has such a normal and free growth of his personality, the society as a

whole will progress,—thus individual aim becomes identical with social aim.

Pragmatists, on the other hand, do not look at the curriculum from the narrow view of utility. Their aim is human progress and they look at education as the chief means of achieving it. They stress the need of systematic experiments in school which should be based on the present activities and interests of the child. The child's experience must be enriched so that he may be prepared for adult life. Thus Dewey's curriculum is based on child's nature and life; and its material is selected from different activities of real social life. In this way a child's personality is so enriched and so socialized that he not only develops a well-adjusted dynamic personality but he also becomes an effective social unit contributing to the democratization of the society.

Idealism approaches the problem in an entirely different way. It concentrates not on the present experiences of the child but on the experiences of the human race as a whole. In the word of Ross, "It stands on the position that the purpose of the child is to reflect civilization itself; the main purpose, therefore, of the course of studies is to epitomise and organize, in representative fashion at least, the capitalized experiences of race of which the child is a member".

School studies must, therefore, represent (a) what man does and strives to do. It ought to improve the major crafts of mankind especially those which provide the fundamental needs of food, clothing and shelter. This would involve the use of tools and

learning of the fine arts. The curriculum should also include (b) what man knows. This must include literature, science, mathematics, history and geography. Finally, the school must provide (c) man's mode of feelings and their expressions in art, poetry and music.

From the above it is evident and abundantly clear that the idealists stress on such a school curriculum which insures that the child would become a member of the human race in the real sense of the word, possessing all that is valuable, imbued with the social and spiritual traditions of the society and doing his best to carry humanity ahead to the goal of realization of fundamental social values. Iqbal agrees partially with the naturalism of Rousseau, with pragmatism of Dewey and with certain aspects of humanism. He has reconstructed religious thought in Islam by combining religion and science on the one hand and has bridged the gulf between science and philosophy on the other. He has revolted against the old system of Muslim education which he thinks has outlived its utility. He condemns speculative attitude of philosopher and goes to the extent of subjecting Greek thought to a scathing criticism and points out that the spirit of Greek philosophy is opposed to Islam. Mere speculation, he maintains, can neither afford to grasp the material world nor can it give us any definite knowledge of the ultimate reality. Plato denied the reality of the phenomenal world, which Iqbal affirms in his philosophical and educational thought. Almost all the idealists are unanimous on the point that all cognition through the senses and experience is illusory, and that only the ideas of pure reason constitute reality. Iqbal positively

holds that speculation without experience leads us nowhere. For him no knowledge is possible without experience. In his own effort at the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam he avails from modern philosophy which is essentially empirical since Kant. The spirit of Islam, too, is essentially empirical and lays special emphasis on the reality of the phenomenal world. Consequently, according to Iqbal, experience is a necessary source of knowledge and beyond the world of senses there is also a new horizon of transcendent reality which the scientists have failed to comprehend. Iqbal affirms the existence of God, the reality of the self, its freedom and immortality and instead of confining knowledge to the empirical reality alone he goes further and believes also in the intuitive reality. He vigorously holds that empiricism and rationalism both have failed to reveal the true nature of the finite or infinite self. This knowledge of self, according to Iqbal, is therefore possible only through intuition. Thus, the intuition of the self then gives us a point of departure from the rationalistic and empirical method of enquiry and makes possible the divine knowledge of the supreme's ego. This opens a new avenue of knowledge for the affirmation of self and the existence of God.

Thus, it is rightly held by Iqbal:

خودی ہو علم سے محکم تو غیرت جبرئیل

اگر ہم عشق سے محکم تو صور اسرافیل

He combines reason and Intuition to attain a true vision and knowledge of self and, therefore, condemns that knowledge which is not so characterized.

وہ علم کم بصری جس میں ہمکنار نہیں

تجلیات کلیم و مشاہدات حکیم

God, according to Iqbal, is a Supreme Ego and is characterised by eternal will. The finite ego can come in personal communion with Him, without obliterating their own selves. He, thus, starts with self-consciousness and passing through the consciousness of the objective phenomenal world arrives at the infinite.

In view of his philosophical concept it becomes abundantly clear that he is neither a humanist nor an idealist nor a pragmatist in the strict sense of the term; he has rather his own ideas on education based on his own concept of ideal life. The aim of education, according to him, is to develop personality by activity, creativity and originality, with a view to preparing man for the conquest of the material forces of the universe and further the achievement of spiritual heights of man. His conception of 'individuality' is, therefore, unique and is altogether different from the conception held by the traditionalists. "The individual" of his conception is thoroughly "community minded man" who according to him will be the voice of the society. Iqbal also stresses the need of a balanced development of body and spirit

and considers them indissolubly connected with each other. This constitutes the crux of his philosophy. Dr. S. M. Abdullah, in his article on Iqbal's philosophy of education, maintains that the fundamental subject of study according to Iqbal is "Din", which includes science. Science should not be considered merely "Knowledge gained by observation and experiment", but it should embody all "Knowledge based on truth". Thus, Iqbal's conception of science is characteristically his own. Science, according to him comprises the knowledge of Anfus (Lein) and Afaq (cyi91) i.e. the realm of the self and the cosmos. Iqbal has also emphasised the study of history and is also an admirer of "vital" literature and arts including architecture. He has, however, opposed drama and theatre keeping in time with the general Muslim temper.

A comprehensive view of Iqbal's ideas about education would reveal that he has tried to reconnect the broken links of the educational tradition of Islam. His emphasis on "anfus" and "afaq" is, in a way, a restatement of the doctrines propounded, on one hand, by Rumi, and, on the other, by Ibn Khaldun and later on by Shah Wall Ullah of Delhi. His chief contribution to the educational ideology is the emphasis on "din", as the main subject of study.

Briefly, education, according to Iqbal, is a means to an end and not an end itself. The end of education being Islamic Ideology and Culture. It is through education that a culture perpetuates itself. Since every system of education basically

consists of social ideals, norms, and values and is based on its specific culture, Iqbal exhorts us not to imitate other nations. For this tendency of aping, according to him, is suicidal. He therefore says,

اٹھا نہ شیشہ گران فرنگ کے احساں

سفال ہند سے مینا و جام پیدا کر

“Seek not the bounty of the glass-blowers of the West Make your own cups and goblet from the clay of India”

تا کجا در تہ بال دگراں می باشی

در ہوائے چمن آرا در پریدن آسوز

“How long will thou abide under the wings of others? Learn to wing thy flight freely in the garden of breeze”.

In the following lines, he criticizes those, who, having neglected their own system of education, have adopted alien system of education.

علم غیر آموختی اندوختی

روئے خویش از غازہ اش افروختی

ارجمندی از شعارش می برید

من ندانم تو توئی یا دیگری

عقل تو زنجیری افکار غیر

در گلوئے تو نفس از تار غیر

بر زبانت گفتگوها مستعار

در دل تو آرزوها مستعار

قمریانت را نواها خواسته

سروها بت را قباها خواسته

باد مے گیری بجام از دیگران

جام هم مے گیری بدام از دیگران

آفتاب هستی یکے در خود نگر

از نجوم دیگران تا بے خبر

تا کجا طوف چراغ محفلے

ز آتش خود سوز اگر داری دلے

“You have learnt and amassed knowledge of others and brightened your face with rouge borrowed from others.

You seek honour by aping the manners of others.

I know not, whether you are yourself or just ‘another self’

Your intellect is chained in the thought of others;

The very breath in your throat comes from the strings of others.

Borrowed speeches are on your tongues;

Borrowed desires in your heart.

Your canaries sing borrowed songs;

Your Cypresses are clad in borrowed mantles.

The wine in your cup—you get from others;

The cup, too, you borrow from others.

You are sun; look for once into your own self.

Seek not your light from the stars of others.

How long will you dance around the candles of the Assembly?

Lit up your own light, if you have a heart.”

Iqbal further makes a fervent appeal for the adoption of ideological system of education, which is purely Islamic.

According to him culture and ideals of society should be the guiding factors of our education. He therefore very aptly remarks

زنده فرد از ارتباط جان و تن

زنده قوم از حفظ ناموس کهن

مرگ فرد از خشکی رود حیات

مرگ قوم از ترک مقصود حیات

“Life of the Individual depends on the relationship of the body

and soul.

Life of the nation depends on the preservation of its tradition and

culture.

Individual dies if the life-flow ceases.

Nation dies if the ideal of life is spurned”.

Further, according to Iqbal, the Islamic ideology which is the end of our education is the only means to establish a balance between- in-dividualism and collectivism. He regards the

development of Individuality as the fundamental value, but does not ignore, at the same time, the growth of social sense and collective responsibilities. While, he holds that man must not lose his individuality in the social collective, he also enjoins the Individual to subscribe to the social good. There-fore an ideal system of education will always aim at the establishment of balance between the development of Individuality and social consciousness of the individual.

فرد قائم ربط ملت سے ہے تنہا کچھ نہیں

موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرون دریا کچھ نہیں

Individual exists by virtue of his social contacts. He is nonentity without that association.

“He is like a wave in the river and has no existence outside it. Again he says

فرد میگرد ز ملت احترام

ملت از افراد مے یابد نظام

“The Individual derives dignity from his nation.

A “millat” is constituted when the Individuals group together.

Iqbal, in his Letter to K. G. Saiyidain explains his ideological conception of education:

“By ‘Ilm’ I mean that knowledge which is based on senses. Usually I have used the word in this very sense. This knowledge yields physical powers which should be subservient to “Din” (i.e. the religion of Islam). If it is not subservient to Din then it is demonic, pure and simple-It is incumbent on Muslims to Islamize knowledge.

“Abu Lahab should be metamorphosed into Haiyder”. If this Abu Lahab becomes Haider-e-Karrar, or in other words, if it i.e. (knowledge and power it wields) becomes subservient to Din, then it would be an unmixed blessings into Mankind”.

Iqbal’s Educational Philosophy P. 99 by K. G. Saiyidain.

This conception of education is further elucidated by the author of Principles of Islamic Education in the following lines:

“Thus the primary purpose of education should be to imbue the students with their religion and ideology. They should be taught the meaning and purpose of life, Man’s position in this world, the doctrine of Tauheed (Unity of God), Risalah (Prophethood), Akhira (Life here-after) and their bearing upon Individual and social life, the Islamic values of morality, the nature and content of Islamic culture, and the obligations and the mission of a Muslim. Education should produce men with deep-held conviction about Islamic ideals of Individual and collective life”.

Islam, again, is positively opposed to idealism and abstract thinking and so is Iqbal. Following this scheme of education, he

lays special emphasis on life-affirmation and the conquest of the world. Education, according to him, should always aim at the development of balance of the Individuality and the social consciousness of Individual.

Dr. Rafi-ud-Din,¹ while accepting the view that Education is a process of Natural Growth, held that man has a natural urge for this growth. This urge takes the form of love of an ideal of the highest Beauty and perfection. He therefore very aptly remarks that “love of the ideal is an independent urge of human nature which is neither a product nor a servant of the animal instinct or the basic economic need of man, but which on the other hand rules and controls his animal instincts and basic economic needs for its own expression and satisfaction”.

He, further, subscribes to the view that human nature is the only dependable guide to knowledge. For, according to him, the end of education is determined by human nature or by the natural qualities of human consciousness. These natural qualities of human consciousness are identified by him with man’s urge to love an ideal of the highest Beauty and perfection. He very aptly says that if a person’s ideal is not perfectly good, beautiful and true, he is obliged to judge many actions which are really right as wrong and many actions which are really wrong as right. It is on account of his love with imperfect ideals that he makes different judgments about what is just, virtuous, moral, good or true. Thus “the justice, truth, morality, virtue, honesty, fraternity, equality or a liberty of a man who believes in a wrong or imperfect ideal is

very much different from and very much inferior to the justice, truth, morality, virtue, honesty, fraternity, equality or a liberty of a man who believes in a perfect ideals. The former is forced by his love, unconsciously to interpret these terms narrowly and wrongly and hence immorally and wickedly”.

He further maintains that “the ideal being the generator of the deed and the creator of its value, the deed is good or bad according as the ideal from which it results is good or bad. Hence the character of a man who loves a wrong ideal is never really noble or lofty. He thinks that no truth, no justice, no equality, no liberty and no virtue is good enough which conflicts with the interests of his ideal. The result is that he cannot express and satisfy completely his moral urge and cannot grow educationally to the fullest extent. If, on the other hand, a person’s ideal is perfectly good, beautiful and true, his moral action is of the highest ethical standard. The reason is that, in such a case, his desire for an ideal does not interfere with his desire for moral action for its own sake. Both of these desires seek expression and satisfaction in the same direction. The love of the ideal reinforces the desire for moral action and the desire for moral action for its own sake reinforces and strengthens the love of the ideal, while both of them are seeking expression in the right direction. Each helps the other to achieve its full expression and satisfaction”. (First Principles of Education by Muhammad Rafiuddin P. 292-93).

To conclude, Love of God, His qualities of perfection and Beauty is the innate urge of the child. The educator must see to it that the innate urge of love is not diverted into the channel of any other ideal and that his love for God actually determines his action.

“Action is the test of love. A person loves an ideal only to the extent to which he is able to act according to its moral demand and no more. Only those moral judgments and moral actions can be really moral and conducive to the perfect educational growth of an individual which result from a sincere, unmixed and whole-hearted love of God”.

METAPHYSICS OF SOCIETY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

A. H. KAMALI

In my last paper on the “Nature of Social Experience According to I the is Philosophy definitive of Self I concluded that the Law of Mutual otherness category of Social consciousness. This is the only true premise in this field which” accords with the *Philosophy of Self*.ⁱⁱ Any other notion whether it is Collectivism or Individualism simply leads to the negation of Social Experience. Not only does it negate Social Experience but it also contradicts the basic tenets of Selfism, especially the axiomatic principle that every ‘ego’ is an irreducible entity characterized by Self-possession. Consequently, there is no question of mergence in other Self, however universal has created this order of reality, which in no way can be reduced to self-experience, that is, to an experience of an ego. If one admits such a reduction, it is nothing but denial of the creative ability of God. Philosophy of Self can only have self-assuring growds if and only if we are capable of reflecting such theories in whatever guise they may be found.

According to the metaphysics of Selfism, Social order is ultimate order of reality. It has its own mode of givenness. An analysis of this mode puts the theory of ‘Space’ in a new light, and reveals its true character as a constructive step towards the formulation of the details necessary for a comprehensive

statement of Selfism. It is in the ultimate nature of reality as a social system that the category of space comes into being.

I

Examination of the Idea of Community in Plurality

As we do apprehend in the Law of Mutual Otherness the philosophicmulatedal foundation of the construction of social experience and the structure of group system, we are confronted with a very novel and original exposition in the concept of the “Community of Interpretation” for by Josiah Royce, a massive effort to provide an accommodation of the plurality of selves. within the body of the Monistic thought scheme. It merits a separate treatment.

This theory has exercised enormous influence on social behaviourist like G. H. Mead; it has been incorporated in the development of self by many social psychologists like Newcomb and C. Young and is represented by such thinkers as E. Cassirer and C. Mannheim. It is more reasonable to see how Royce himself expresses the position.

(i) Royce’s Definition of Community

“Our idea of the individual self is no mere present datum or collection of data, but is based upon an interpretation of the sense, of the tendency, of the coherence, and of the value of a life to which belongs the memory of its own past. And therefore

these same facts will help us to see how the idea of the community is also an idea which is impressed upon us whenever we make a sufficiently successful and fruitful effort to interpret the sense, the coherent interest, and the value of the relations in which a great number of different selves stand to the past

(a) Plurality of Individuals

“Now when many contemporary and distinct individuals so interpret, each of his own personal life, that each says of an individual past or of a determinate future event or deed ‘that belongs to my life’, ‘that occurred or will occur to me’, then these many selves may be defined as hereby constituting, in a perfectly definite and objective, but also in a highly significant sense, a community. They may be said to constitute a community with reference to that particular past or future event or groups of events, which each of them accepts or interprets as belonging to his own personal past or to his own individual future.

“A community, whether of memory or of hope exists relatively to the past or future facts to which its several members stand in the common relation just defined. The concept of the community depends upon the interpretation which each individual member gives to his own past and to his own future

(b) Unity of Self Enlargement

“Our definition presupposes that there exist many individual selves But let these selves be able to look beyond their present chaos of fleeting ideas and of warring desires, far away into the past whence they came, and into the future whither their hopes lead them. As they thus look, let each of them ideally enlarge his own individual life, extending himself into the past and future, so as to say of some far-off event, ‘I view that event as a part of my own life.’ That former happening or achievement so predetermined the sense and the destiny which are now mine, that I am moved to regard it as belonging to my own past, or again for the coming event I wait and hope as an event of my own future.

And further, let the various ideal extensions, forwards and back-wards, include at least one common event, so that each of these selves regards that event as a part of his own life.

Then, with reference to the ideal common past and future in question, I say, that these selves constitute a community.

II

(ii) Incorrigeability of the Definition

That Royce does not observe the distinction between the concept of ‘logical class’ and that of a ‘community’ is quite discernible. A logical class is generated in the common property of objects; classification under the denomination of a common characteristic carves out a class of objects, independent of any

other relations or properties they might have. Royce uses the concept of community synonymous with the class concept. Consequently, if a Martian and an earthly pagan, each could say to himself: “Well! this sun magnanimous sun I behold in the sky is my ancestor, then both form a community.

(a) External Loci

The idea of community involves mutual recognition and interpersonal contact. Royce puts its loci in an externality. If I wish to know that I am in communion with you, I should not know my relation with you, but must go beyond our mutual relations and see whether I and you have the same contents as possessions of our Individual selves or not. The directness of I and you is to be mediated by the intervention of the common core of possessions. Again, the common events, facts and episodes need not have mutual references, that is they need not warrant a logical and necessary transition from one to another. It is enough that if I breathe the air and a snail takes in the same air both of us form a community. Perhaps, the idea of explicit “minehood” must be there. The poor snail may not possess it. Then he may be ruled out of the community. Royce makes the idea of self-enlargement at ideal plane, so as to include some past or future (which should also be owned by others) into the realm of mine possessions, an integral component of community life. This leads to a slightly distinct point.

(b) Ego-Centricity

The principle of self-enlargement on the basis of increasing consciousness which expands to win over some past contents to the wealth of my ego-organization and which harnesses some future possibility to its benefit of results in merely an ego-centric experience eternally separated from all other persons who are also engaged in the same hectic business of personal aggrandizement. As Josiah Royce would recognize, it may happen that there are several many egos, each of them may be so big as to include all the universe in his ego-structure. Would it produce community? Surely not.

Each individual may pass through the same track of experience, but this never involves that they are in communion. The idea of community is a distinct notion cannot be explained away in terms of ego-expansion even at ideal plane. Let there be two persons A and B; if A in his self-enlargement involves all the contents of B's life it will be a self-experience without becoming a social experience; and if B does the same, again it will be a personalistic experience. The essence of communion (of course, conscious union) is that both A and B should recognize each other, should have mutual reference in their dealings, should be affected by mutual presence, and should modify their behaviour in regard to each other.

Direct mutuality, let us conclude, constitutes the loci of every group life; dependence on some externality, however personal it may be, does not catch even the iota of a group life. Running in the spread of common contents is the directness of inter-personal transactions that constitute a community.

III

(iii) Implications of Identity

Now, we come to a point of still greater consequence. The core of Monistic thought is affirmed in the formulae of the identity of subject in the Multiplicity of contents. Josiah Royce's formulation seems to move in quite opposite direction. His notion of community in its skeleton is the identity of content in the Multiplicity of subjects. Diverse subjectivities are pinned to some identical data in the becoming of a community. This is what Royce implies and yet it could not be expected of a Monistic thinker as he were:

(a) Meanings of Subject-Object Opposition

But, to me it seems that this riddle can be explained away in the context of the total Monistic Tradition of modern times. The Monistic formulae implies duality of knowing act with the consequence that every subjectivity implies an objectivity. The isolation and exclusion of an ego, consequently, involves a

separation and exclusion of the related range of objects from the circle of another ego. It follows that if two selves are absolutely away from each other, they have no objectivity in common. Objective definition of a self, then, means the description of the pattern of objectivity in its possession. It further implies that change in the objectivity involves a change in the ego-existence. Therefore no object, no subject.

(b) Unity of Subject in Plurality of Subjects

Now, with this analysis in mind, we can see that identity of objects means the identity of subjectivity. If there is an absoluteness of common object, without some private sector of objectivity, there would be only one Self. The degree of the privacy of some object determines the degree of the isolatory existence of some mind. That many selves hold the same past in common means that one single subjectivity is pervading with its corresponding objectivity in the form of that past. It also follows that uncommon objects, memories, expectations are objectivities corresponding to some separate isolated selves. Josiah Royce therefore has no idea of self in social relations with other selves, of each other's recognition and of mutual interaction. His definition of experience is always ego-centric in the Absolutistic Fashion to which he is always a party

His identity of content in the multiplicity of subjects is identity of a Subject in the Multiplicity of subjects or the Identity of Object in the Multiplicity of Objects.

His community of objects disguises the identity of mind. It means that behind the objective diversity of the social system there is unity of subjectivity.

IV

(iii) Community of Interpretation

Royce moves further from the community of memory and the community of future to the notion of the community of Interpretation of which he says that it is the ultimate structure of reality. This part of his exposition is exceptionally original, but one which exceptionally fails in positing the structure of social life. The inward Monism of his social philosophy comes out with all its implications.

“...A community, as we have seen, depends for its very constitution upon the way in which each of its members interprets himself and his life A self is a life whose unity and connectedness depends upon some sort of interpretation of plans, of memories, of hopes, and of deeds. If, then, there are communities, there are many selves who, despite their variety, so interpret their lives that all these lives, taken together, get the type of unity which our last lecture characterized.”

(a) Triadic Structure

“An interpretation is a relation which not only involves three terms, but brings them to a determinate order. One of the three terms is the interpreter; a second term is the object—the person or the meaning or the text—which is interpreted; the third is the person to whom the interpretation is addressed.”

When a process of conscious reflection goes on, a man may be said to interpret himself to himself. In this case, although one personality, in the usual sense of the term, is in question, the relation is really triadic relation. And, in general, in such a case, the man who is said to be reflecting remembers some former promise or resolve of his own or perhaps reads an old letter that he once wrote or an entry in a diary. He then, at some present time, interprets this expression of his past self.

But, usually, he interprets this bit of his past self to his future self. ‘This’, he says, ‘what I meant when I made that promise is what I wrote or recorded or promised’. ‘Therefore’, he continues, addressing his future self, ‘I am now committed to doing thus’, ‘planning thus’ and so on.

The most general distinctions of past, present and future appear in a new light when considered with reference to the process of interpretation.

...The present potentially interprets the past to the future and continues ad infinitum.

...The triadic structure of our interpretations is strictly analogous, both to the psychological and to the metaphysical structure of the world of time. And each of these structures can be stated in terms of the other”.

(b) Self: A Community?

“Let one consider that when my present judgement, addressing my future self, counsels: ‘Do this’, this counsel, if followed, leads to an individual deed

The will to interpret undertakes to make of these three selves a Community.

I, the interpreter, regard you, my neighbour, as a realm of ideas

...I seek unity with you. And since, the same will to interpret you is also expressive of my analogous interests in all my neighbours, what I here and now specifically aim at is this: I mean to interpret you my neighbour to somebody else, to some other neighbour who is neither yourself nor myself. Three of us, then I seek to bring into the desired unity of interpretation.

There would be no melting together. But for me the vision of the successful interpretation would simply be the attainment of

my goal as interpreter. This attainment would as little confound our persons as it would divide our person. We should remain, for me, many, even when viewed in this unity.

Let us give to this sort of community a technical name. Let us call it a Community of Interpretation.

(c) The Status of Interpreter

In a community thus defined, the interpreter obviously assumes, in a highly significant sense, the chief place. For the community is one of interpretation. Its unity is the ideal unity of insight the interpreter would possess... The interpreter appears, then, as the one of the three who is most of all the spirit of the community.

These selves, in all their variety, constitute the life of a single community of interpretation... The history of the universe, the whole order of time is the history and the order and the expression of this universal community.”

(d) The World as Community of Interpretation.

“The world is the community. The world contains its own interpreter. Its processes are infinite in their temporal varieties. But their interpreter, the spirit of the universal community—never

absorbing varieties or permitting them to blend—compares and, through a real life, interprets them all.”

These lengthy quotations from Royce fully express his total philosophy of society which seems to make community-structure the ultimate category of the process of reality.

Accordingly, the self is a continuity, in which three moments distinctly come out within its dynamic flow: the past, the present, the future. Royce says that these distinctions are relative ego-centres among whom the Present singles out itself as the synthetic bond. It restores the unity, connects the past with the future through its mediation, contains both the aspects and becomes the meeting ground of the isolate and sundered individualities, and thereby makes the continuity of Consciousness possible. Thus, the Self is itself a community. Every ego is a community of interpretation in its own nature.

V

(iv) Refutation of the Community—Nature of Self

The problem is: whether the life of consciousness is divisible into three selves. Is there really a past self, which wills to be interpreted? and is there really a future self which seeks interpretation from the Present self?

(a) Indivisible Subject

There is the past, the become; there is the present, the becoming; and there is the future the outcome of the becoming. All these three moments are the data before the same ever present single self. Reviewing the past, the self is inspecting its already become performance. The become is not living; it does not stand as a living person before the self reviewing it. The self passes judgement upon it, as it passes judgement on all other things, maybe self, maybe not self. The self tries to carry its beneficial aspect to the future, tries to mitigate its harmful impacts on the present conditions, and in doing so it remains indivisible and in clear objectivity keeps itself above board. It is delightful over its past success and feels shame over the disgraceful deeds. Whatever may be the reactions, these are the reactions of the same self.

(b) Undivided Self in Internal Conversation

The internal conversation is a talk with ones own self; conversation is undoubtedly a transitive relation, but, nevertheless, it is reflexive relation also. It is called 'monologue' when addressed to one self. The self who talks, the self to whom the talk is addressed is the same undivided self. Speaker, the listener and the one (the past activity about whom the counsel is delivered are not separate selves hammered out in the process of speech, of the single original self-hood. The speaker, the spoken about and the listener do not convey a tracheotomy; they are

merely distinct roles of the same self, assumed in successive moments. The listener totally carries over all that the speaker contains; and when in turn it becomes a speaker, thence it conveys fully all that it has, to the listener. The spoken about, the listener, the speaker, and then the listener may be conceived as the mode of conversation in the life of consciousness. The same self is assuming the successive roles. The subjectivity is identical throughout all the objectivities of the themes, speaking and listening. To speak, to listen, to think, do not multiply the self, simply differentiate its roles. Consequently Royce's plea that in community-structure is posited the real mode of conscious life is not valid. To be self means to be a subject; and therefore we reject the different functions of consciousness as distinct selves. None of them is a distinct subjectivity.

George H. Mead who develops his theory on the basis of Royce is not right when he says, "the self, as that which can be object to itself, is essentially a social structure and it arises in social experience. We can think of a person in isolatory confinement for the rest of his life, but who still has himself as a companion and is able to think and is able to converse with himself as he had communicated with others

It is the sort of social conduct which provides behaviour within which that self appears. We divide ourselves in all sorts of different selves. The unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole, and each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects

the unity and structure of one of the various aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated.”

(c) Reduction of Community

The whole argument is mistaken. Objective differentiation does not constitute a subjective multiplication of the self. Therefore, the conception of the multiplicity of selves in the inner life of consciousness is untenable. Mental structure does not project a case of social structure. Consequently, to conceive the social world on the model of this inner structure is an outright reduction of the real multiplicity of selves to the unity of one subjectivity, which is none the less an absolute renunciation of the plurality of egos and mutual otherness which is the essence of community life.

The interpreter in social world about \s horn Royce speaks is not short of single subjectivity which turns the whole experience into an ego-centric experience.

(v) The Constitution of Community

Moreover, community does not follow the pattern of interpretation which makes the group dependent on an Interpreter who mediates between all of them. In a community of three, one is not mediated by an Interpreter (the most significant of them) to another. All the members of the community, A, B, C

are directly linked in the communal relations so that (1) A—B, B—C, A—C, and their reverse are directly realized, (2) A—BC, B—CA, C—AB also at once come into being; and (3) A's image of A—B—C, B's idea of A—B—C, and C's precept of A—B—C are immediate processes belonging to the various facets of this community.

Community is a web of direct relations between the member and in a small community of three individuals there are more or less three groups of immediate connections, as we have shown above, which come to operate without the intermediation of any of the participants. Royce's theory neglects them all in the service of Monism, and thus has no place for genuine social systems.

VI

Spatial Nature of Society

Social relations are the constructive rules of social experience. This nature of social experience involves the presentation of the relata and the relatum. Consequently, in every social experience the related terms are also affirmed, otherwise the experience loses its social character, and succumbs to ordinary external or egoistic experience.

It is our business to explore the most general properties of the relations, shared by all of them.

(i) Generic Character of “Relatedness”

(a) La Aian Wa La Ghair (لا عين و لا غير)

Let us conceive a society in which there are two individuals A and B inter-related in the social Relation R. R in its nature is dependent on A; for if there is no A, there is no R. But R is also dependent on B, if there is no B, there is no R. Consequently, R. is dependent on as well as independent of A.

It may be said that R is other than A, but this is false for R is identical with A, but it too is false. R, then may be defined as, it is neither identical with nor different from A. Similarly R is neither identical with nor different from B. This character reveals a categorical nature. They are La aian wa la Ghair i.e. “not-identity not difference.”

From this class character of the social relations, one may be led to argue (1) to the extent to which R is identical with A, it is different from B, and to the extent to which it is different from the former, it is identical with the latter, consequently (2) the entire social relation is reducible to the individuals who are brought under its fold. It is what the advocates of Individualism believe. Individualism is based on the conviction that the social Realities are reducible to their component individuals ; its methodological version makes this conviction a guiding precept of the analytical techniques for the investigation in the social problems.

However, to us, it is plain that the premise (1) and its consequence (2) both are unsatisfactory, rather distorting formulations. Our analysis has led us to the points that, in the society under review the relation R is neither identical with A nor with B, nor is different from A nor from B. From this information it never follows that to the extent to which R is different from A, it is identical with B and vice versa. The truth is: 'R' has a 'Sein' which is indivisible between A and B.

(b) Indivisible Wholeness

Related terms do not divide the relations for the relations are indivisible. It is never the case that a part of the love is myself and the rest is the alter; a section of the competition is A-group of firms and its another part is the B-group of enterprises. The indivisibility of relations among the individuals is the most important characteristic which clearly marks off the reality of society as distinct from that of the individuals. 'Love' is identical with the lover and different from the lover. Without being bisected in its essence it is implanted in the lover. The Gestalt character of the social relation say of ordination governs the order of the social hierarchy. It installs itself in every individual of the social system. Similar is the case with every relation. It is morphological, it grows and changes, it blossoms and decays, but whatever it is, it exists there without admitting fragmentations and distribution among the individuals. Therefore, it is an immense

distortion to imagine that it has segments, some identical with one individual, and others identical with the alter-individual.

The class-characteristic that a social relation is identical with and different from the individual is a necessary property of the total seen of the relation. In a competitive society, competition is identical with every member and yet is different from him. Every one competes with and is exposed to competition from other individuals. Competition, thus, in its total feature is operative with every individual; it is a 'wholeness' coincident with and yet different from everybody. Every individual is directly initiated in the struggle as it is identical with his being, continuous with his self; yet is initiated in a different realm, a realm which is other than his personal existence. It is this realm which is named as society. Individuals are akin to the beds of the plants, and the relations to the seedlings growing into plants. A growth quite distinct and separate takes place. A formation is accomplished, which can be reduced in no way to the 'beds' from which it has developed and unfolded. There is a lot of sense in the assertion that the bed are identical with the plants and the plants have identity with the beds; but this assertion needs supplementation by another truth that the plants are different from the beds. It is in their gestalt property that they are neither different from nor identical with the soil that their real essence is concealed and exposed. They are indivisible, and make totalities; they have no segments which could be said to be identical with the earth, while others are to be conceived as different.

The simile between botanical growth and social order is not perfect; for there is one fundamental difference that the plants are not relations and the social order, on the contrary, is a network of relations. But, still it serves an important clarity by pointing out how there are other examples of indivisible “identity and difference” which result in new orders of existence.

VII

(ii) Spatial System

Social order as a network of relations is perfectly akin to space—a relational system composed of neighbourhoods or say of simultaneities. In fact, the most general properties discerned in the social relations are the properties of all sorts of relations and by way of implication of space itself.

(a) Identity with the terms

Space is identical with all the things which are found in its span. It is dependent for its existence on all the entities which are related in its fold. Remove the entities one by one, and the space transforms, changes, ‘contracts’. Remove all of them save one and no space is there. This is what the space is.

(b) Difference from the terms

But it is irreducible to the presentations of its terms. In space, every entity is introduced to an objective order different from its own being. Consequently, it is not a sum or an aggregation of entities; its essence is not exhaustible in the nature and wholeness of the discrete particular things which are inter-connected in it. Its difference from one existing thing does not make its identity with other compresent things. Consequently, its universal characteristic may be summed up as a 'gestalt' which cannot be extenuated to its component terms (entities), although it is identical with every thing which is there in it. It is this 'wholeness' which is invulnerable and is inviolably exhibited in the nature of space.

(c) Social Space

Space comes into being as soon as there is plurality. As we have told earlier, it is not itself the principle of individuation and thereby of plurality. On the contrary, it presupposes the latter; as soon as some entity comes into being along with an already pre-existing entity, the primitive spatial nexus also comes into being. A third thing added, the space transforms, and so on. A Science of all the possible trans-formations of space i.e. Mathematics may also develop along with.

Social system has all the properties of space and consequently falls within its general category.

VIII

(iii) Inadequacy of Individualism

Discovery of the essential nature of society in the class character of spatiality renders methodological Individualism exposed to the most powerful and logical criticism. It is very hard to imagine somebody rash enough to reduce the being of a triangle to the being of the three points. A triangle has its own constructive principles, possesses distinctive structural properties, and has no similarity or resemblance with the constitutive character of the point or sum of points. Reduction to points cannot be carried away as a methodological principle. But, Individualism, obstinate and unhesitant, carries out reduction to the vanishing point, erases the social Sein to the individual existence, and turns down to peep through the essences like circles, triangles, etc.

Shrunked to a very primitive thinking, Individualism is restive at the discrete atoms, without responding to the order which is generated in their compresence. Even the lower organisms develop a keen perception of space and move in it. What a Paradox! No Reductionist has doubted the credentials of a science of space nor has ever attempted to level the Geometric patterns down to the component points, yet hastens to fly in the face of social facts and insists on their treatment in terms of the individual persons.

Realism of space and Nominalism of Society are anomalous, for society itself is a space.

(b) Inconsistency of Individualism

The Individualist may argue that he moves in search of the society, but always comes across the individual persons. He is right; he does not see society in the sense in which he sees individuals. This difficulty is not unique; is not peculiar with the society alone. All kinds of space display it. We see the sense-data but do not see the physical space. This difficulty never forbids us to obtain the firm grasp of the spread of space; of the configuration and the gestalt in which the sensa are related with each other. We become aware of their mutual positions, their intervening distances and their relative directions. Similarly, in the perception of the society, we do behold the individual persons but that awareness does not run counter to our intuition of the society; we behold their relative status, their mutual distances, their crossing point and various constellations. Lower animals do not remain at sense-data level; they intuit distances between the sense-data; observe the pattern of their mutual connections and adjust their behaviour accordingly. Perhaps no organism indulges in the cynical resignation from space on the basis that it is not a sensory material, no human being, consequently, is justified to claim that he does not observe the society on the plea that it does not appear to him as a person.

IX

(c) Existentialistic Reaction to Space and Society

It is something, not accidental, but correlative that all the philosophies that pose a contemptuous attitude towards space also have a derogatory disregard for society. Undoubtedly, the reaction is consistent; space and society are discredited on a uniform basis, because they exemplify the same principle in their givenness.

Existentialism, in Heidegger and Sartre, Jasper and Berdyaev is in search of existence and unveils it in the depths of subjectivity. This philosophic valuation which puts subjectivity on the highest point of the scale of Existence disvalue space as the principle of distraction and society that of dissipation of Existence. Authentic life starts with the power and process whereby the self regains and reconstructs itself as the central existence, and moves away from the invasions of nothingness. Absolute Personalism (Existentialism) conceives in space and society the encroachments of the threatening nothingness, inertia and immobility; and attempts to redeem itself in the dynamics of inner freedom, which is becoming, a-relational, ever-flowing and uncommitted.

Existentialism is thoroughly consistent in its treatment of space and society at the same plane. Society is an example of space. Existentialism is further right in its reaction against absolutism which looks in the social Existence a Sein of Higher

Subjectivity. Like space, society is antithetical to the principle of subjectivity, and therefore, it is repugnant to the Existentialists.

Spatial character of social system and its being identical with and different from all the individuals inter-laced in its nature is the only adequate conception which steers away clearly from the vagaries of Individualism and Collectivism. Individualism is reluctant to go beyond the separate individuals and cogitate the system instituted in their compresence. Collectivism goes beyond the individuals to a higher Ego Activity and contradicts the Law of Mutual Otherness the cardinal principle of social Experience.

(iv) Conclusion

It is the concept of Spatial nature of society. We have propounded, that complies with the constitutive Law of Social System. It recognizes in society formulation of a distinct order of being which contains the essential fulfilment of the law of Mutual Otherness.

Society comes into being necessarily; it is a natural and logical fact. The very actuality of plurality logically involves the formation of space. Likewise, the very becoming of the multiple of living individuals logically entails the existence of society. This insight belies the Individualistic view that society is a human innovation.

Society is never a living Individuality, nor is it reducible to individuals. It is a Sein in its own right; a Sein that does not

warrant a subjectivity in its nature. It is an objectivity through and through. Just as it is ridiculous to portray a subjectivity in the constitution of Space, it is erroneous to imagine a subjectivity as the essence of society.

Space is not something over and above the points connected in it, it is continuous with them. Society, too, is not over and above the individuals; does not make a higher stage in their evolution; it is spread along with them. The individuals have subjectivity, but the society enjoys objectivity. Individuals have mind, but the society mere givenness. It is known but not a knower.

Space and its example society are objects without ever becoming subjects.

An examination of the degree of objectivity of society and its place in the formal scheme of being is our next inquiry.

X

4. SOCIAL IDEALISM TO SOCIAL REALISM

Every individual observer has an intuition of space, there are as many space-perceptions as are the perceiving individuals. It is also common place that every person carries with him an image of society; and there are as many pictures of the social order as are the spectators and participant members of the society. Since society is spatial in character, the transition from private spaces to

the public space, from personal imageries of the society to the objective social order have one and the same principle in common.

Consequently it may be hoped that investigation into the epistemology of space-intuition would cast enormous light on the problem of the conciliation and integration of the private imageries into the comprehensiveness and totality of the objectively given spatial and social realities.

Some philosophers believe in the atomistic origin of the spatial presentations. Wundt in his "Physiological Psychology" adopts the principle of Ingression and says that all psychical processes are compound sensations; and are produced by the cerebral processes in their mutual fusion. Consequently, a spatial presentation may be regarded as a case of fusion of the discrete sensation-elements. Durkheim extends this principle to society and talks about social representation as a case of welding together of the ideas of several individuals. This principle of ingression misses the important characterization of a sensation that it is, phenomenologically speaking, indivisible and simple presentation; a collective representation, similarly, is a simple event. It does not seem to be present as an impression upon impression or as idea of one individual impressed upon the idea of another individual.

Kant appears to be more correct in holding that space is not obtained from other particulars. He considers it apriori in origin. The apriority of an object in the Critique of Pure Reason, at once, involves two senses (1) self demonstrative character and (2)

Ontological independence. When Kant concedes apriority to space, he recognizes its essence as independent of the particulars which it contains. Spatiality is a sui generi being; it is not obtained in the mutual fusion of the isolated sensations defining the discrete particulars. This Kantian exposition contains a grain of insight that cannot be weakened with the passage of time.

If space is apriori, in this sense, then what is its ontological status and morphological essence?

(i) Ideality of Space

Kant, regards spatiality as transcendently ideal; and conceives its essence as ideation in nature. Therefore, it belongs to an observing mind.

Kant, thus offers Idealistic Interpretation of the principle of spatiality; and assigns to it the function of systematization and organization of the contents of sensibility. Ultimately, it is an ordering frame work which is introduced in the atomic data of experience represented through the sense organs to a perceiving mind. On the basis of this formulation, space in its nature, must be viewed as transcendently ideal; and part of the structure of the observing person. It is operatively present as the ordering principle which works upon the presentations of discrete living entities. The sensibility of the spiritual beings—a possible faculty corresponding to our sense-organs, to be informed of the living individual persons—supplies the necessary atomic data upon

which this principle works and reproduces them as formed connected and synthesized presentations known as associations.

(a) Society as a form of Intuition

Thus, society resides in the mind of the observer as a form of ‘spiritual’ intuition; its nature is subjective givenness; its function is objective arrangement. We have not yet brought out one important thread of Kantian thought, the conception that space is a particular and that it is Universal. It is such a particular that it contains other particulars; and consequently enjoy a distinct status. Its universality is proved according to Kant, by the fact that all the (limited) spaces are part of the Universal space. It may also be conceived that every particular society is a fragment of a larger society. Every given space can be expanded hence already seen as a part of a larger space. Every society may also be broadened without contradiction; and thus pre-supposes an unlimited and absolute society. The universal society constitutes the universal ground of all the societies on the model of the Absolute Space.

But, where do the Absolute Society and Space exist? In imagination. They are the Forms of observation which can work infinitely without contradiction. Their being is imaginative and exist for some subject of experience. Beyond the mental structure of the subject they do not exist. Complete Kantian exposition of the nature of space runs as follows :

(b) Absolute Particularity

It is an absolute particularity, which possesses an imaginative essence existing in the percipient and operates as the ordering set of the data given by the sensibility. Grafted on this model, society would be a universal particularity with an imaginative nature in the intuiting mind working upon the contents supplied by the 'spiritual sensibility'.

Consequently, social Sein has the ontological nature of Ideality, transcending the particular individuals just like the space. Beyond the apprehending consciousness it does not exist. Its essence is the mode of apprehension.

(ii) Social Idealism

Society has Sein as an object to a subjectivity. Collectivism misconstrues social order as itself of the nature of subjectivity. Idealism of Kant--as applied to social facts—takes it as an 'object' which is

never a subject, yet only exist so far as a subject apprehends it. In this philosophy, society is not a Mind, but given to or made by the Mind as a mode of perception. So, to this philosophy we give the name of social Idealism, which in its direct meaning is but Space-Idealism.

XI

Reduction of space (and by implication of society) to the form of perception has a tradition which does not start from Kant; it evinces support from Leibnitz also, who viewed space as a manifold of relations in opposition to Newton (and Kant). For him, all relations, nevertheless, are intellectual; it is the knowing act which connects the discrete existing entities. Consequently, Leibnitzian space, in spite of its relational character as opposed to substantial nature, is ideal in its Sein just like the Kantian space. By implication, the Leibnitzian concept of society would reduce it to an Ideal manifold of relations imposed by the apprehension on the plurality of the living persons.

Reality, in Leibnitzian philosophy, is instituted in windowless monads, who according to a pre-established harmony (a sort of invisible hand) are synchronized with each other. The intuitive faculty, in the act of knowing, connects them in a system. This systematization and convertibility constitutes the phenomenon of space. Therefore, Idealism of society is an outright consequence of this philosophy; Phenomenal and imaginative character of space (and society) pronounced in Monodology falls in line with the Kantian approach, charged with the denial of Factual Objectivity of social system.

Society is an imaginative scheme in which the spectator fits the individuals; the Kingdom of Ends is a realm of autonomous

wills acting on the principles of consistency and universality, the criterion of Moral behaviour. There is no social experience, no sympathetic response, no mutual commitment. There is simply an idea of moral duty which should not admit the influence of love hate indifference etc. The category of social relation as something real is absolutely foreign to the directions of Kantian thought.

Thus, in Leibnitz and Kant, depreciation of society and space to a form of intuition devour them with a ghostly existence, which has no reality-claim beyond and independent of the knowing mind. This reductionism to perception cannot be read along with Berkeleynessist percipii. Berkley, in ontological sense, reduces every object to perception; but the perception does not remain the know-ledge of the mortal individuals; it is the universal consciousness which essentializes the nature of the existing objects including space; and they continue to be there even though we are not holding them in our thought. Berkeley's thought, as Dr. M. M. Ahmad very sagaciously analyses, is definitely tended towards impersonalism and absoluteness of space; a sort of objectivity and continuity which is not modified by your perception or mine.

Berkeley's ideas on that interpretation necessarily entail the following: If the particular objects have X value in the total scheme of being, space, which contains them, also has the same value. The degree of objectivity and reality of space is the same which belongs to the objects which are discovered in it. Leibnitz and Kant radically differ from Berkeley. To them, the space, I

behold, is a framework bestowed on the sense-data by my mind; the space you perceive is the form of perception your knowing set imposes on them. There is multiplicity and relativity of space absolutely dependent on the subjective structure of the apprehending spirits. Berkeley would object to this position, and would remark that all of us apprehend the same universal space, which in its essence is dependent on the universal consciousness. There is, thus, a certain degree of realism in Berkeley, which is never found in Leibnitz and Kant. To them, if the objects, which are noticed in the space have X degree of reality, the latter would always have a Y degree of reality, which entails a knowing mind Z.

XII

We have taken to elaborate the Leibnitzian-Kantian view of space because of the tremendous influence it yields on the later thought development, both in the theory of perception (of space) and in the theory of social formation. The influence is explicit in the developments leading to the maturity of Gestalt school; and implicit in the shaping of social theory.

The Graz school, for instance, considered that the external world does not contain configuration. The 'shape' is a product of the nervous structure, which receives atomic sensations. Wundt, propounding his concept of creative synthesis, writes, "The product which results from any collection of elements is more than the mere sum of these elements." Meinong speaks of the

mental synthesis, which presupposes elements which are synthesized and the result is a “Gestalt Qualitat” Benussi gives a very nice illustration that the four dots (A,B,C,D) of a square, if put without so joined by an intellect, may mean two oblique lines; may mean two triangles, etc. What they mean is the product of the perceiving mind. There are some inner processes, psychical factors which determine the shape-character of the presentations.

(ii) Kantianism in Social Theory

The traditions of social sciences are also saturated in this Kantian approach which is so much pregnant in the history of psychology of perception. It decisively makes the ‘form’ a function of imaginative creation.

This line of approach is followed by some of the most illustrious social thinkers.

C. H. Cooley writes, “In order to have society, it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind. He further says, “The imaginations which people have of one another are the solid facts of society. I do not mean merely that society must be studied by the imagination—that is true of all investigations in higher researches—but that the object of study is primarily an imaginative idea or group of ideas in the mind that we have to imagine imaginations.”

This theory does not rob society of existence; it concedes reality to it. However, the reality is but ideal one. Hence it is social Idealism. Social Idealism is the philosophy, which conceives the nature of society as subjectively real (as an object), and objectively unreal (as a fact), and which makes it dependent on the imagination of the perceiving individuals.

Philosopher-Sociologist Florian Znaniecki upholds social Idealism under the principle of Humanistic Coefficient. He remarks: "In a word, the data of the cultural students are always 'some-body's' never nobody's data. This essential character of cultural data we call the humanistic co-efficient, because such data, as object of the students theoretic reflection, already belong to somebody else's active experience and are such as this active experience makes them. If the humanistic coefficient is withdrawn the system would disappear and in itsstead he would find a disjointed mass of natural things and processes, without any similarity he started to investigate."

He explains further, "Since the cultural system is what it is because of human experience, and since the basis of its reality is its actual construction, the fact that it may be simultaneously constructed by many human agents must have a bearing on its the cultural world as much as the fact that it may be successively constructed time after time.

"A rite, a custom, even a personal habit remains identical as long as the agent intends to uphold it as the same, though it may change greatly in composition and structure; whereas at other

times a slight deviation from a custom may constitute a break of the custom, if it is intended to break it. The logical implication of social Idealism, as presented above, is that the inquiry into the structural principles, functional connectives, and axiological patterns of a given society is essentially a survey of the opinions, intents and images of the individuals who live in it. If it were true, the research as to the structure of the Soviet society would be accomplished in the mapping of the modes of apprehensions in which each citizen holds it; the nature of the Pak-society would be surveyed in the stock-taking of opinions of the Pak citizens. Reduction of the society to the imaginative operations and subjective intents would deprive the former of objective reality at par with the individuals which participate in it.

XIII

(iv) Establishment of Social Realism

(a) Irreducibility of Society to Conscious Experience

Social Idealism tends to deal with social facts in terms of the conscious experiences of the individuals. Treated as an imaginative construct, social system is equalized with the conscious states of the individual persons. This reduction is unable to explain the undesired turns the social events takes place, and ravages the whole social life. Nobody, neither the capitalists

nor the working class like the cyclic changes and consequent instability in economic system, yet it takes place, and ravages the whole social life. Nobody wants war, yet war becomes inevitable; no one has planned the growth of slum areas, yet they exist and develop. There is a gulf between the logic of facts and the imaginative constructs. The society follows its own principles of becoming, its own law of fulfillment, and the fascinating individual images, ideal pictures are overthrown in the emergence of new facts. All of us know the 'American Creed' which is the image of society and life of more or less every American, yet also know the tragedy how far it differs from the real organization, causal processes and the total structure of the American Society. The analysis at the conscious level fails to grapple with such problems, which always pre-suppose a 'social unconscious' in their nature. The simple and innocent image that every one is free and pursues his ends anticipates a society of free mobility, but the accumulation of facts produces social conditions which engineer monopolistic concentration of powers threatening the very existence of 'little man'. It is because facts, social facts, follow their own path independent of the awareness of the individuals. Their path represent the social unconscious.

In psychology, we have discarded the analysis at the conscious level and go to the depth of the individual's unconscious. In social analysis, too, we are bound to discard social Idealism and confront the real logic of facts, which is independent of the individual imageries. It is, to the logic of facts, we refer, as existing

in its own right, unarticulated by the imaginations of the individuals, that constitutes the realm of social unconscious.

(b) Objective Logic Of Social Events.

A social event juxtaposed with another social event gives rise to a spatiality which has its own logic of structure and properties of existence, that cannot be deduced from the image of any single component event. Social system refers to this real core of connection which makes the component events mutually committed in the generation of the social space. This basic insight makes possible the transition from social Idealism to social Realism.

XIV

(c) Objective Bases of Image

The stand-point of social Realism is further consolidated at the epistemological level by the analysis of an “image”. An image does not constitute the reality but simply reflects it. The reality is not dependent on it; it is, on the other hand, the image which is dependent for its existence on reality and its processes. In short, images do not have subjective origin for their specific character, they have objective basis. The subject of knowledge simply entertains them, and the objective world is reflected, not made in them.

Images are the plastic medium through which the objective facts communicate with the subject of experience. Social images are mirrors of social reality; and presuppose for their being possible not only the bearer of experience, but also the objective and real existence of the social order. Consequently if any piece of social inquiry, in its primitive level and 'protocol' stage is based on the images, it volunteers itself to the condemnation which attends to a second hand collection of facts.

Instead of direct social facts, their images in the individuals lend an inquiry to a charge which is difficult to meet. It makes the effort unnecessarily subject to the principles of image making and the laws of their translation to the objective facts. An image is a work of selection; it gathers those pieces of reality, which are discerned by the subject, under his own system of valuations, and thence integrate them in accordance with its own peculiar logic of synthesis. This is true of every image, system of images; and there are at least as many systems of images as are the individuals with their personal values, selections and constructions.

An inquiry which sees in the images, the stuff on the basis of which a real theory of society should be formulated, makes itself a prey to the psychology and principles of imagination, not only to the general laws but also to the empirical facts. If there is a slight mistake in the apprehension of the relation (Translation) between the image and the reality, the whole inquiry collapses. This analysis is alone sufficient to reject the principle of starting with the images rather than the objects of which they are images.

(d) The Stuff of Social System

Images do not constitute the social system; they are its selected reflections. The stuff and material of the social system is given in the nature of the 'relations' which are there between the individuals.

And what are the relations?

They are such 'acts' which have bi-polar or multipolar references; commit one individual with another individual, and condition every-one with everyone. The individual consciousness may have or may not have grasps of these 'acts' and their logical implications. When-ever, they are, they have their own impacts, which are inherent in their particular nature. It is in their givenness that the entire social system is generated.

The wishes of the individuals that they are part of the same social system or that they have broken away from it have no meaning. It is an irrevokable objective fact unconditioned by the intents (of the individuals) whether the present social system is a continuity of some old tradition or makes a rupture from it. Bare intents and wishes do not create or destroy the identities, similarities and continuities. We can not accept Znaniecki's thesis of social Idealism. It needs not be some-body's experience, before it is known to some foreign observer. It may be for the first time known although existing since long.

The distinction between a social fact and its image is always valid even when the primitive social connections are under review. A may be acquainted with A-B Relationship, but the acquaintance may not be thorough; it may be covering some elements of the entire fact. Moreover, even if it is of the whole of the relation, it does not make it, it is simply informed of what it is. In this manner, we come out of the reduction of Social Sein to Social image and out of the Social Idealism which is often implicit and sometimes as bold as in Cooley, Spengler, Znaniecki, Mannheim and others.

Transition from the position of Social Idealism to the philosophy of Social Realism leads towards the general conclusion that society is a spatial being independent of, though known partially or completely to, the individual observers.

XV

Is it a substance-like entity or a relational manifold?

Kant states his position as denoting the substance like nature of space that it is a particular like other particulars. It is a being in the same sense in which others like man, tree, ocean, etc are beings. He also points out a fundamental distinction of space in its being a Universal.

(i) Substantialism

The overall position of Newton and Kant is that space is a particular characterized by universality.

Being a universal particular, it is the ground of all the sensuous entities and persists even at the removal of all the 'particular' particulars. Society, too, being spatial in nature, is a universal particular which must subsist even though there is no individual contained in it.

This is Substantialism.

From it, it follows that we may have a direct intuition of space and society independent of the entities that are arranged in their contents. The motion of particular individuals, their transformation from one point to another, their direction and location are absolutely determined with reference to their respective ground of existence. Absolute rest and change, localization and stationing are meaningful terms in this scheme of thought.

(a) Ground Framework

Consequently, space-awareness is intuition of the ground framework that enables us to grasp the character and significance, status and importance of the entities that are found in it. This is the approach which is adopted by the varieties of Holism and various Gestalt schools.

Priority of the 'Ground' over the 'parts' is the common core of contact between the multiple of configurationistic and organismic theories. The most vital point in all of them is the specific use of the term "whole". The whole is the earlier condition of the particular entities and provides the essential basis of their mutual connectedness. If it is withdrawn they fail to communicate any 'Total' sense and are nonetheless a heap of unconnected dissociated particles. It gives them the Gestalt Qualitat of synthesis and unity. Second law of Wheeler states that the parts receive their properties from the 'whole', and the third law defines that the whole conditions the activities of its parts. It is the presence of the whole that puts the parts on a higher synthetic plan. According to Eherenfel, the whole is a content that is witnessed in the complex patterns; and confer on them the special properties they are noticed to possess. If there are six notes in a melody, it is the seventh character of wholeness that makes it what it is. The whole is not derived from the parts but predetermines them in its totality which produces the higher order of experience—called the melody. Burkhardt contends that Gestalten are Qualitatively irreducible.

(b) A-relationality

The whole, is, then a-relational. It is the ground of the things an(their relations. Rubin explains that a ground is relatively homogeneous and simpler than the figure in it. It lies beyond the operator of analysis.

Organismic theories, scrawling with their concept of the 'whole' ripple in the mystic epistemologies are bellicose to the principle of analysis. Wertheimer deplors the extreme analytical approach to the scientific problems and Krueger holds that the unitary property of all experience is aboriginal and it is most intensely professed in the regions of feeling. An experience approaches the dimension of a feeling, the more perceptual content it embraces, and the less indistinct it becomes from the rest. But, "an emotional complex loses the intensity and plasticity of its emotional character to the degree that it becomes analysed."

(c) Mystical Experience

Consequently, the 'whole' is envisioned in an a-relational a-conceptual a-perque.

Holistic thought and Gestalt theory, at this level of philosophizing are hardly discernible from Bergsonianism. Allama Iqbal and Khalifa Abdul Hakim, in line with them, entertain the intuitive mystic approach towards the Ground-reality which bestows wholeness and unification upon the particular atomic entities. The 'whole' does not admit any marking off; dots and lines are mere artifices of the apprehending Intellect; they are incisions which serve only pragmatic motif and destroy the 'Ganzheit' in atomic derangement of the intellectual abstractionism.

It is interesting to note, that Kant too is not far away from this conclusion. He conceives space as the background of the sensuous entities, and grasps in it a substance like a-relational being so much so that points, dots, lines, angles, etc. are mental inventions and imaginative constructions with the obvious character of ‘phenomenal’ trans-formation.

The organismic and voluntaristic philosophy is, indeed, a maturation of the ideas lurking in the First Critique of Kant. If intellect distorts the Reality, then anti-intellectual faculty grasps it; so says the contemporary organismic philosophy as an advancement upon the original Kantian view.

(d) Beyond Language

The Ground reality—space—is beyond discrimination and so it cannot be put in words. Words are atomic, particularistic and discrete therefore, it is uncommunicable. It can be grasped, apprehended but cannot be couched in language. It is pure perception; and in pure perception alone it discloses itself.

One who is privileged to intuit it, at once knows the form-quality it would accord on the figures, shapes, and patterns that emerge in its comprehensive pervasion. To him, the entire Geometry must be revealed apriority.

Society, being as pace, is mystically contacted in our perception. Apriorism is the method. One who becomes aware of

the ground social space very well knows in advance what Qualities the particular groupings, social constellations, and community-forms, would assume. His knowledge is flashy, direct and independent of the particular observations.

Space is independent of the figures that are generated in its spread, is free from the atomic points, determined lines; it is basic to them and determine the essential irreducible properties of their formulation. Society is not an exception. Spangler, Muller, Frobenius must appear to give the aprioristic schemes of the “High Civilizations”. They are the choicest persons to enjoy the splendid intuition of the Primeval symbol the Ganzheit of every society, and consequently command a right to prophesy what is destined to become. History merely places at their service a stock of supporting evidence. “This high plane of contemplation once obtained” declared Spangler, “the rest is easy. To this single idea one can refer, and by it one can solve, without straining or forcing, all these separate problems of religion, art-history, epistemology, ethics, politics, economics, with which the modern intellect has so passionately—and so vainly busied itself for decades.”

XVI

(ii) Relational Nature and Formalism

(a) Analysis of a Pattern

The spell of this ‘intuitive perception’, which moves beyond elements and components to seize the Gestalt—Qualitat and Unity, is broken as soon as some structure of organization is set before eyes there is no evidence of a higher synthetic plane, an isolable Ganzheit which governs the components and reproduces them into the patterns of units and organizations. The pattern of a series, the style of a clustre, the structure of a mass are not over and above the ‘elements-in-mutual relations.’ The Holistic standpoint of the unanalysability of a synthesis is not true. Every whole is composed of parts; and does not refer to some higher quality which systematizes it into the organization it has. If there are six notes in a melody, it is their functional succession and not the Seventh property of wholeness, that makes it what it is. Samuel Alexander explains, “Pure or absolute music is formal, because its subject is exhausted by the tones themselves as the musician designs them.” Remove the tones, one by one, and the music loses its character. It is entirely made of the tones and does not wait upon the so-called Totality (over and above the tones) to become a melody. Thus, the Holistic point of view of the distinguishable pragnanz is repudiated by the Principle of Formalism.

By formalism, I mean the philosophy which conceives that a whole comes into being in the relations, its constituent elements have with each other, and which rules out a distinct Ganzheit or pragnanz to be the apriori condition of their being what they are

as part of the whole. A building, too, is a form; it consists in the bricks and their relative arrangements horizontal as well as vertical. The spectator views it from different angles, keeps them in his memory and orders them in his mind corresponding to the arrangements of the external building and enjoys the whole without completing it with some synthesis or imposing on it some form-quality from his own mind. When Herbert Read* writes to N. Gabo “Our modern civilization has to a large extent lost the sense of form Even in music, a great many listeners get on very comfortably without it, allowing their senses to be flooded formlessly and indiscriminately by the flow of sound”, he does not disprove our thesis; simply complains that the public is not generally attentive to the fulness of music. The people are satisfied in the short limits of the immediately present flow; but the short limits are large enough to contain a number of the bits of sound in relative position to make a musical presentation enjoyable by the audience. If people do not appreciate a melody in its totalness, they enjoy its individual notes; and if their immersement in the immediacy delves them further, then parts of a musical note are sufficient forms consisting in small audible data in a concrete systematics to attract their attention.

(b) Analyzability of Forms

Forms, then are analyzable Triangleness is not an added property to three intersecting straight lines. It is synonymous with their interlocks. A circle is composed in the movement of a point

maintaining an invariant distance with some other point. No irreducible, supra-relational pragnanz of circularity; no mystic element; no contribution from the mind.

Holism must give way to Formalism; mystic fervour to analytical sobriety. From the angle of composition, a shape is a construct; a natural form is a construction in nature; develops as the natural elements get-together in specific contacts and relations. All artistic works are constructions in this sense; they do not depend on some indivisible wholeness; they are formulated in the relative ranking and inter-position of their particular pieces.

Modern Gestalt Theory adopts the philosophy of Formalism in its rejection of the Holistic stand-point and thus replaces Kant by Leibnitz “to apply the Gestalt theory”, says Koffka, “means to find out which parts of nature belong as parts to functional wholes, to discover their position in those wholes, their degree of relative independence and the articulation of larger wholes into sub-wholes.”

(c) Space: Construction in Sub-parts

Space is a ‘whole’ consisting in the sub-wholes and as such it is a relational manifold. Consequently, it is not the ground of configuration but itself a configuration. It does not possess an apriori claim. It is constructed in the events that take place and becomes the direct object-matter of mathematics. Holistic formulae of its a-relationality makes it the basis of the Gestalten,

we experience in the external nature, of the shapes we find in the physical universe, with the implication that it does not remain an object-matter of Mathematics, but becomes the presupposition of Mathematical intuition in the study of the figures and shapes that are said to emerge in its ground. The implication is not restricted to this limit; they are accentuated by their very logic to deny even that much to Mathematics. As the form-quality of figures is bestowed on them by their ground-reality, they are not amenable to Mathematical approach. Such are the necessary consequences of the seemingly innocent Kantian thesis that Space is a Universal Particular containing other particulars as their apriori ground.

But happily this thesis is incredible. Space is nothing beyond the particulars; it occupies the level of being that belongs to them and comes into being as they do become compresent. The particulars are directly related with one another (a simple case of spatial illustration); and in their relatedness they are constructive events of the spatial composition.

Space is not a particular but an interlock of relatedness of the particulars. A datum when apprehended as surrounded by others is a functional aspect of a configuration.

XVII

(iii) Objection to the Vacuousness of the Forms

We deny that a form or space contains (as Kant says) other particulars as distinct from its formality or design. To say that forms are empty and that any content may be put in them is a contradiction. If they are conceived in the Kantian manner (that they are particulars like other particulars) then they may be empty things to be filled up by other things. Newtonian space is such a particular which houses many particular bodies. But, this idea constitutes a misrepresentation of the nature of a relational manifold. Since, we have adopted the position that space is not a particular but a relational manifold, it should be demonstrated that the idea of containing something else, of accommodating any datum is foreign to its nature. A song, let us be illustrative, is a relational manifold; it is not vacuous; can contain nothing besides its Sein. It may be said that it has a content; sound is the datum the form of song contains. This is incorrect analysis. Sound is a common name of many sounds; and each sound is a moment of the form, a fabric of its becoming, an element in its architactomic. A song is a network of relations between many sounds. The song does not contain them ; on the contrary, they construct in their inter-relations the song as it were. Similarly, the structural properties of a gravitational field are functions of many chunks and parameters of gravitation. The stars, moons, and other celestial bodies individually determine the properties of the space around them. "Einstein's gravitational laws specifically, one group of these laws set forth the relation between the mass of a gravitating body and the structure of the field around it; they are called structural laws.* Just as a fish swimming

in the sea agitates the water around it so a star, a comet, or a galaxy distorts the geometry of the space-time through which it moves.” This means that the stars and other heavenly bodies are part of the design of the space-time. Gravitation is a name of the relations that make the field, and as such it stands for the warp and woof of the structure that comes into being in the co-existence of the bodies. Seeing in this light the entire gravitational field contains nothing beyond its Constitution.

It may be said that a triangle is capable of containing some point within its fold. (Figure I). This is definitely wrong.

The presence of D inside or outside A B C (figure II and III) constitutes a new form which may be represented as a manifold of triangles. D is a structural part of the design and not a something contained in it. Form is complete and contains nothing. It has structure and has nothing within its structure. Kant’s theory that space contains other particulars is contradictory to the nature of Formality.

(iv) Conclusion about Society

Space and society being forms (network of relations) contain nothing beyond their structure. They are not vacuous forms. “The smallest, social group is made of the two individuals. In the pair, there is but a single relationship possible... With a group of three individuals, there are no less than six potential relationships... In addition, there are the relationships among the sub-groupings....

With a group of four people, to carry the process of increase only one step further, the possibility of inter-relationship becomes enormously complicated, and the number increases 30 to 25.” The social system is an enormous space (or say form) it contains no individual within its structure; the individuals compresent by entering into social relations with each other are the integral components of its design. Therefore, the idea that society is an a-relational ground reality that contains the individuals is an awful confusion.

Society is an objective being; it is relational in character and occupies the same level of being which is occupied by the individuals. It is directly constructed in the real social relationships of the individuals. It can be studied in its constructability; and can be analyzed into its components.

It is in short, a real spatial system. It is Leibnizian rather than Kantian; it does not become ground of anything else.

IQBAL AS A POET WITH A MESSAGE TO THE MODERN WORLD

By Jaliluddin Ahmad Khan

Allama Iqbal's works are so enormous in their scope, so rich in their diversity and so profound in their implication that it is not possible to sum up his teachings in the short period of time which is here at my disposal. Allama Iqbal's writings equally defy classifications. They refuse to surrender themselves to a specific or a definite form of literary nomenclature. Iqbal is at one and the same time a poet of nature and a poet of human emotions, a poet of the self and a poet of the cosmos, a poet of the inner world of man and a poet of civilization, a national poet of Pakistan and an international and humanitarian poet, a poet of tradition and a poet of progress, a poet of the East, who nevertheless ceases not to address himself to the West, a poet of Islam and accordingly a universal poet, a philosophical poet and a poet with a political vision, a lyric poet and a poet of dramatic dialogues. It is therefore impossible to invite attention to all these aspects within the limits of a single paper. Consequently I shall confine my attention to Iqbal's relevance to the modern world. Iqbal's relevance to the modern world can be studied in what, for want of a better word, can be called his message. But in order to bring out the significance of this message, I shall start by treating Iqbal as an ordinary poet, as a poet, say, of nature and of human feelings. This would show that even if Iqbal did not have a message to

propagate, a lesson to teach, an attitude to develop, he still could be valued for the superb artistic skill with which he manipulates his impressions and experiences of life.

In his early as well as his later poetry we can see Iqbal's concern with Nature. But Nature in Iqbal, howsoever fascinating and realistic the description, is never studied for its own sake. It is always associated with emotional overtones or with moral and philosophical implications. Somehow the human world has the greater relevance in his poetry. He would not let the soul of man submerge and drown itself in the apprehension of Nature. Instead, he uses Nature to develop and kindle the soul of man:

جہاں ہے تیرے لئے تو نہیں جہاں کے لئے

Nevertheless, Nature is delineated with a perfect realistic and objective concreteness. Writing an ode on an evening which he spent near the river Necker close to Heidelberg, he says:

خاموش ہے چاندنی قمر کی

شاخیں ہیں خموش ہر شجر کی

وادی کے نوا فروش خاموش

کھسار کے سبز پوش خاموش

فطرت بے ہوش ہو گئی ہے

آغوش میں شب کے سو گئی ہے

کچھ ایسا سکوت کا فسوں ہے

نیکر کا خرام بھی سکوں ہے

تاروں کا خموش کارواں ہے

یہ قافلہ بے درا رواں ہے

خاموش ہین کوہ و دشت و دریا

فطرت ہے مراقبے میں گویا

This is an objective description of Nature. But a single couplet which ends the poem invites attention to the soul of the poet and brings Nature in harmony with his mood:

اے دل تو بھی خموش ہو جا

آغوش میں غم کو لیکرے سو جا

Sometimes Nature is employed as a scenic background to intensify the emotional intensity of the meanings of the

philosophical and political dialogues which are to follow: as when the poem Khizr-i-Rah starts with the following lines:

ساحل دریا پہ میں اک رات تھا محو نظر
گوشہ دل میں چھپائے اک جہان اضطراب
شب سکوت افزا ہوا آسودہ دریا نرم سیر
تھی نظر حیراں کہ یہ دریا ہے یا تصویر آب
جیسے گہوارے میں سو جاتا ہے طفل شیر خوار
موج مضطر تھی کہیں گہرائیوں میں مست خواب
رات کے افسوں سے طائر آشیانوں میں اسیر
انجم کم ضو گرفتار طلسم ماہتاب

But very commonly, natural imagery itself is employed for an elucidation of philosophical meanings. If the early poetry of Iqbal would invite the attention of children towards a mountain and a squirrel (پہاڑ اور گلہری) or towards a spider and a bee (مکڑا اور) (مکھی) the very objects of nature seem to be loaded with an intense realisation of the philosophical meaning of existence, in a poem

like (حقیقت حسن) where one becomes aware of the necessary decay of beauty in this life. p.116-117 (Bang-i-Dara).

خدا سے حسن نے اک روز یہ سوال کیا
جہاں میں کیوں نہ مجھے تو نے لازوال کیا
ملا جواب کہ تصویر خانہ ہے دنیا
شب دراز عدم کا فسانہ ہے دنیا
ہوئی ہے رنگ تغیر سے جب نمود اس کی
وہی حسیں ہے حقیقت زوال ہے جس کی
کہیں قریب تھا ، یہ گفتگو قمر نے سنی
فلک پہ عام ہوئی ، اختر سحر نے سنی
سحر نے تارے سے سن کر سنائی شبنم کو
فلک کی بات بتا دی زمیں کے محرم کو
بھر آئے پھول کے آنسو پیام شبنم سے

کلی کا ننھا سا دل خون ہو گیا غم سے

چمن سے روتا ہوا موسم بہار گیا

شباب سیر کو آیا تھا ، سو گوار گیا

Sometimes Nature becomes an obvious link with the supernatural and the natural and the supernatural are visualised within a single perspective. The Sair-i-Falak is a very good illustration of the point. p. 192-193 Bang-i-Dara.

تھا تخیل جو ہم سفر میرا

آسماں پر ہوا گزر میرا

اڑتا جاتا تھا اور نہ تھا کوئی

جاننے والا چرخ پر میرا

تارے حیرت سے دیکھتے تھے مجھے

راز سر بستہ تھا سفر میرا

حلقہ صبح و شام سے نکلا

اس پرانے نظام سے نکلا

کیا سناؤں تمہیں ارم کیا ہے

خاتم آرزوئے دیدہ و گوش

شاخ طوبی! پہ نغمہ ریز طیور

بے حجابانہ حور جلوہ فروش

ساقیان جمیل جام بدست

پینے والوں میں شور نوشانوش

دور جنت سے آنکھ نے دیکھا

ایک تاریک خانہ سرد و خموش

طالع قیس و گیسوئے لیلی

اس کی تاریکیوں سے دوش بدوش

خنک ایسا کہ جس سے شرما کر

کرہ زمہریر ہو روپوش

میں نے پوچھی جو کیفیت اس کی

حیرت انگیز تھا جواب سروش

یہ مقام خنک جہنم ہے

نار سے ، نور سے تمہی آغوش

شعلے ہوتے ہیں مستعار اس کے

جن سے لرزاں ہیں مرد عبرت کوش

اہل دنیا یہاں جو آتے ہیں

اپنے انگار ساتھ لاتے ہیں

It shall be seen, therefore, that Iqbal as a poet is a superb and skilful artist and yet all the time he remains supreme moralist. In his search for meanings in life, he becomes a great idealist, and in his concern with nature, he continues to be a positive realist. The contrast between Idealism and Realism is resolved through Islam, which as the Din-i-Fitrat is a revealed religion in accordance with the laws of Nature. The growth of self in accordance with these laws is then developed in the doctrine of خودی. It is thus through Islam that Iqbal's idealism is brought in perfect harmony with realism. He makes the real approximate itself to the ideal and the ideal to embrace and infold the real. It is here that the message of Iqbal directs itself in its several ramifications. He has been writing

amongst a people who, owing to a hundred years of slavery, have gradually allowed themselves to be influenced by an extremely painful form of inferiority complex. Iqbal, therefore, finds it necessary to emancipate the minds of Muslims from an easy surrender to foreign values. He strives to rehabilitate the confidence of Muslims in their own selves, so that they may be pre-pared for the great task of leadership that lies ahead of them.

سبق پھر پڑھ شجاعت کا صداقت کا عدالت کا

لیا جائے گا تجھ سے کام دنیا کی امامت کا

A glance at the writings of Iqbal would reassure us how great is the significance Iqbal attaches to this message. The very titles of his books would indicate the importance Iqbal gives to the quality of his message. He presents the traditional attitude of the spiritual East as a remedy for the sufferings of the materialistic West. As a counterpart to Goethe's West-Ostlicher Divan, Iqbal addresses his Payam-i-Mashriq (The message of the East) to the West. The lyrical fervour in the quality of this message embraces itself in the sacred song of the e.g. j. He knows how the East itself has been disintegrating under the colonial exploitation of the West and in order to resist the corroding influence of the West, he writes his Pas Che Bayad Kard ay Aqwan-i-Sharq (What Then Should The Eastern Nations Do?). But the full flowering of his message takes place in the way Iqbal interprets the role of Islam within the context of the present day world. Its final consummation, of course, is presented in his Armughan-i-Hijaz. But he proceeds to

this final phase through a systematic formulation of his intellectual, imaginative and aesthetic attitudes. He builds up a philosophy of the progress of human destiny within the cosmos and writes his *Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi*. He directs the attention of the Muslims towards the realisation of the responsibility that they owe to the rest of the world. The very title of the first Urdu book *Bang-i-Dira* calls to mind the picture of a caravan which has already gone before and the strayed travellers have to be directed towards their destination through the echoes of the bells ringing amongst people who have already left. It is here in this book that the poet announces (p.306-307).

خدائے لم یزل کا دست قدرت تو زباں تو ہے

یقین پیدا کر اے غافل کہ مغلوبے گماں تو ہے

پرے ہے چرخ نیلی فام سے منزل مسلمان کی

ستارے جس کی گرد راہ ہوں وہ کارواں تھ ہے

مکان فانی مکین آنی ازل تیرا ابد تیرا

خدا کا آخری پیغام ہے تو جاوداں تو ہے

حنا بند عروس لالہ ہے خون جگر تیرا

تری نسبت براہیمی ہے معمار جہاں تو ہے

تری فطرت امیں ہے ممکنات زندگانی کی

جہاں کے جوہر مضمہر کا گویا امتحاں تو ہے

جہاں آب و گل سے عالم جاوید کی خاطر

نبوت ساتھ جس کو لے گئی وہ ارمغان تو ہے

یہ نکتہ سر گذشت ملت بیضا سے ہے پیدا

کہ اقوام زمین ایشیا کا پاسباں تو ہے

The Bal-i-Jibril would lead the Muslims on the wings of spiritual inspiration offered by the Islamic revelation;

اٹھ کہ خورشید کا سامان سفر تازہ کریں

نفس سوختہ شام و سحر تازہ کریں

It announces

سبق ملا ہے یہ معراج مصطفیٰ سے مجھے

کہ عام بشیرت کی زد ہی ہے گردوں

The Zarb-i-Kalim will strike with the force of a Moses against the tyranny of the modern Pharaohs of mankind. All the shibboleths of modern civilization (whether they refer to education, woman arts or politics) are examined in turn, only in order to point out the confusion that is characteristics of a society which has taken too many things for granted. One by one Iqbal brings down the idols of a sophisticated culture which is already decaying and which needs to be rejuvenated by a spiritual form of art.

بے معجزہ دنیا میں ابھرتی نہیں قومیں

جو ضربے کلیمی نہیں رکھتا وہ ہنر کیا

This spiritual form of art, therefore, becomes relevant to the modern world not only in terms of Iqbal's philosophical message, but also in terms of his political vision of a disintegrating Europe which is waiting to be led by Islam, if along with the rest of the world, it is to be directed towards a progressive humanitarian destiny:

تمہاری تہذیب اپنے خنجر سے آپ ہی خودکشی کریگی

جو شاخ نازک پہ آشیانہ بنے گا ناپائدار ہوگا

دیار مغرب کے رہنے والوں خدا کی بستی دکان نہیں ہے

کھرا جسے تم سمجھ رہے ہو وہ اب زرکم عیار ہوگا

The way in which the Western nations, in order to develop them-selves economically and politically, undertake vast schemes of colonial exploitation of the nations of the East and thus come into conflict among themselves is illustrated in the critical comments of Mussolini which he makes when he advances his forces against Abyssinia:

کیا زمانے سے نرالا ہے مسولینی کا جرم

یہ محل بگڑا ہے معصومان یورپ کا مزاج

میں پھٹکتا ہوں تو چھلنی کو برا لگتا ہے کیوں

ہیں سبھی تہذیب کے اوزار تو چھلنی میں چھاج

These instruments of civilisation who conspire together to rob the colonies of their resources are ultimately responsible for bringing about a cultural disintegration of the peoples of the East. That is why in order to perpetuate this tyranny, the devil Iblis instructs his political children: (p.148 Zarb-i-Kalim until AAhu.)

لا کر برہمنوں کو سیاست کے پیچ میں

زناریوں کو دیر کہن سے نکال دو

وہ فاقہ کش کہ موت سے ڈرتا نہیں ذرا

روح محمد اس کے بدن سے نکال دو
فکر عرب کو دے کے فرنگی تخیلات
اسلام کو حجاز و یمن سے نکال دو
افغانیوں کی غیرت دیں کا بے یہ علاج
ملا کو ان کے کوہ و دمن سے نکال دو
اہل حرم سے ان کی روایات چھین لو
آہو کو مرغزار ختن سے نکال دو

Iqbal shows how education has been employed by the English to weaken the force of the character that belonged to the Muslims of the past. An English Lord when he is sending his son for administration in India says:

سینے میں رہے راز ملوکا نہ تو بہتر
کرتے نہیں محکوم کو تیغوں سے کبھی زیر
بیچارے کے حق میں ہے یہی سب سے بڑا ظلم
برے پہ اگر فاش کریں قاعدہ شیر
تعلیم کے تیزاب میں ڈال اسکی خودی کو

ہوجائے ملائم تو جدھر چاہے اسے پھیر

تاثیر میں اکسیر سے بڑھ کر ہے یہ تیزاب

سونے کا ہمالہ ہو تو مٹی کا ہے اک ڈھیر

Iqbal shows, how as a result of this kind of education, there has been a transformation in the standard of values of the Muslims:

تھا جو ناخوب بتدریج وہی خوب ہوا

کہ غلامی میں بدل جاتا ہے قوموں کا ضمیر

He, therefore, reasserts the value of the traditional Muslim culture and rehabilitates it within a society which has been fast succumbing to a slavish imitation of the West:

The art of the actor, who in his habitual role of playing other peoples' parts gradually denies the course of his own actions, is a negation of the self:

حریم تیرا، خودی غیر کی، معاذ اللہ

دربارہ زندہ نہ کر کاروبار لات و منات

Art, than, is not to be just an instrument for providing some particular kind of pleasure. Its purpose is to produce a strong and effective soul: p. 113.

آیا کہہاں سے نالہ نے میں سرور سے

اصل اسکی نے نواز کا دل ہے کہ چوب نے

دل کیا ہے اسکی مستی و قوت کہہاں سے ہو

کیوں اسکی اک نگاہ الٹی ہے تخت کے

کیوں اسکی زندگی سے ہے اقوام میں حیات

کیوں اسکے واردات بدلتے ہیں پے بہ پے

کیا بات ہے کہ صاحب دل کے نگاہ میں

جچتی نہیں ہے سلطنت روم و شام بے

جس روز دل کی رمز مغنی سمجھ گیا

سمجھو تمام مرحلہ ہائے ہنر ہیں طے

A slavish imitation of the West therefore cannot be encouraged:

چھوڑ یورپ کے لئے رقص بدن کے خم و پیچ

روح کے رقص میں ہے ضرب کلیم الہی

Similarly when he comes to the problem of the emancipation of women, Iqbal is very direct and straight-forward in posing the problem: p. 93.

اس بحث کا کچھ فیصلہ میں کر نہیں سکتا

گو خوب سمجھتا ہوں کہ یہ زہر ہے وہ قند

کیا فائدہ کچھ کہہ کے بنوں اور بھی معتوب

پہلے ہی خفا مجھ سے ہیں تہذیب کے فرازند

اس راز کو عورت کی بصیرت ہی کرے فاش

مجبور ہیں معذور ہیں مردان خرد مند

کیا چیز ہے آرائش و قیمت میں زیادہ

آزادی نسواں کے زمرہ کا گلو بند

Iqbal is nevertheless convinced that it is not through any set conventions that the real position of womanhood can be safeguarded:

نہ پردہ نہ تعلیم نئی ہو کہ پرانی

نسوانیت زن کا نگہبار ہے فقط مرد

But in his resistance to the West, Iqbal is particularly keen to repudiate the political institutions of the West:

مجلس آئین و اصلاح و رعایت و حقوق

طب مغرب میں مزے میٹھے اثر خواب آوری

دیو اسبتداد جمہوری قبا میں ہائے توبہ

تو سمجھتا ہے یہ آزادی کی ہے نیلم پری

When Edward VIII abdicated because he could not be allowed to marry a previously married woman, Iqbal analysed the meaning of monarchy in England:

ہو مبارک اس شہنشاہ نکو فرجام کو

جسکی قربانی سے اسرار ملوکیت ہیں فاش

شاہ ہے برطانوی مندر مین اک مٹی کا بت

جسکو کر سکتے ہیں جب چاہیں پجاری پاش پاش

ہے یہ مشک آمیز افیون ہم غلاموں کیلئے

ساحر انگلیس مارا خواجہ دیگر تراش

Monarchy is only a sacred institution amongst the English people to perpetuate a foreign tyranny over the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent. In his devoted love for his country, he, therefore, brings up a complaint against his own people to allow themselves to submit to a foreign 'yoke':

معلوم کسے ہند کی تقدیر کہ اب تک

بیچارہ کسی تاج کا تابندہ نگین ہے

دھقان ہے کسی قبر کا اگلا ہوا مردہ

بوسیدہ کفن جس کا ابھی زیر زمیں ہے

جاں بھی گرو غیر بدن بھی گرو غیر

افسوس کہ باقی نہ مکان ہے نہ مکین ہے

یورپ کی غلامی پر رضامند ہوا تو

مجھ کو تو گلہ تجھ سے ہے یورپ سے نہیں ہے

This extreme love of liberty finds itself best illustrated in the poem where even the hell is not prepared to accept the dead body of a slave so that the grave which has held him for so long comes out with a complaint:

آہ ظالم تو جہان میں بندہٴ محکوم تھا

میں نہ سمجھی تھی کہ ہے کیوں خاک میری سوزناک

تیری میت سے مری تاریکیاں تاریک تر

تیری میت سے زمین کا پردہ ناموس چاک

الحذر محکوم کی میت سے سو بار الحذر

اے سرافیل! اے خدائے کائنات اے جان پاک

We can very well imagine how with this terrible yearning for independence, Iqbal would have welcomed the actual birth of

Pakistan. It was not given to him for himself to see, however, the realisation of the dream of his life. He, therefore, ends on a note of regret when in a quatrain he almost sums up all the qualities of his poetry:

کوئی دیکھے تو تیری نے نوازی

نفس ہندی مقام نغمہ تازی

نگہ آلودہ انداز افرنگ

طبیعت غزنوی قسمت ایازی

We, however, who have been blessed with the fruits of independence, should stop to ask ourselves whether at a moment when our kismet has become *ghaznawi*, is it not that our *tabiat* has become *ayazi*?

THE FRUSTRATED MAN

A Rejoinder to a Western Critic of Iqbal

Khurshid Ahmad

A leading professor of an American University recently visited the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent to study the religious thought and its currents and cross-currents in this region. Naturally, he had to devote a good deal of his time on Iqbal. He had a lengthy discussion with the writer of these lines and one of his main objections on Iqbal was that he was not a realist. As an architect of Islamic renaissance he leaned heavily towards the hypothetical. In a nutshell, the society Iqbal visualized was a society of saints and not of fallible human beings made of flesh and bones.

Our American Professor is not alone in expressing this doubt. Most of the Westerners think in these terms. And we shall try to analyse in these pages the ideas of those who proffer this objection.

What Iqbal Wanted?

Before we analyze the objection it would be in the fitness of things to be clear about what Iqbal wanted and what the Muslims believe in. Iqbal is the pioneer of the twentieth century renaissance of Islam. He critically studies the contemporary phase

of Muslim History and came to the conclusion that the Muslims have declined by gradually drifting away from Islam and their revival can come only if they reconstruct that individual and social life in accordance with the principles of Islam. He rejected the line of the blind imitation of the West and hope-fully asserted that Muslims can even beat the West by bringing about an Islamic renaissance which would open a new chapter in the life of the mankind. He was perturbed over the spiritual crises of the West and saw the way out only in the Islamic revival. His recipe was as follows:

“And religion alone can ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves and restore him that attitude of faith which makes him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter. It is only by rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition, and a civilization which has lost its spiritual unity of its inner conflict of religious and political values.”

He therefore crusaded for a moral reorientation of the human society and the establishment of right over might and of virtue over vice. It is under Iqbal's impact that the renaissant forces of Islam are endeavouring to reform the individual, the social organisation and the state. They want that instead of greed, scramble for power, social antagonism and economic exploitation, moral values should reign supreme and the individual and

collective life should be organised on the basis of love, truth, human brotherhood, social cohesion and political cooperation. They do not believe that this change can be brought about in the twinkling of an eye; but they do hold that reform will come gradually and assuredly. This is a highly rational and moral approach and its sponsors look towards future with hope, courage and confidence.

Now, those who say that this is utopian and a vain hope, they, in effect, say that man is irrational and an incarnation of vice. They allege that man cannot and will not act according to the true light of reason; that human nature is wicked and that baser passions have so overwhelmed the good sense of man that he cannot organise his life in accord with nobler values. They have lost faith in man, his moral calibre, his creative faculties, his powers of reason and his virtuous nature. It is this frustrated attitude which turns them into arch-pessimists, the prophets of despair. And unfortunately many a Western thinker suffer from this agony of despair.

Historical Background

This attitude has a history of its own. Renaissance in Europe opened up a new age. New confidence in the powers and faculties of man was expressed. Modern man revolted against God and arrogated to himself all the human and divine powers. A new social philosophy was developed, the philosophy of Humanism.

This Humanism had three important ingredients and they are as follows:

- (i) An appreciation of all that is noble and lovely in the works of man and nature;
- (ii) Complete faith in the powers of science and the confidence that education alone can create a new and more perfect order; and
- (iii) Inevitability of progress.

Humanism envisaged that the world and all its inhabitants will get better and better as the generations succeed each other, until at last there will be formed a perfect community built on an international order of justice. The Dialectical Idealism of Hegel, Historical Materialism of Marx, Theories of Evolution of Darwin and Herbert Spencer, all intensified the belief in the continuous progress of mankind; so much so that Herbert Spencer openly declared that:

“Progress is not an accident but a necessity—it is certain that men must become perfect.”

H.G. Wells, the famous historian and liberateur challengingly said that:

“Men are borne along through space and time regardless of them-selves as if to the awakening greatness of man.”

Condorset, in the same spirit, wrote:

“Men will never retrograde, so long, at least, as the earth occupies the same place in the solar system. Progress in the art of medicine will so prolong life that death will be the exception rather than the rule.”

And Wordsworth in an optimistic flare shouted:

“Burn your books on chemistry and read Godwin on necessity.”

This inevitability of progress became an article of faith with the modern man. But the course of history did not follow his bright fancies. He was confident that he was creating a paradise on earth and he had outmaneuvered God; but something else was revealed to his unwary eyes; the failure of his civilization. Wars; wholesale massacres of human beings; unending cycles of economic depression; moaning cries of the hungry and the underfed; social antagonisms; class-struggle; the rising waves of crime and intolerance; all these drove the winds off his utopia of automatic progress. His confidence was shattered; his faith melted away. And a general feeling of disillusionment filled the air. This feeling of disappointment and frustration is today writ large on the horizon.

To support this contention, we would like to present a few glimpses of the modern trends in the Western thought. This will clearly show why our critics say what they say.

Modern Trends

Luis Mumford is a leading historian of our age. He says:

“Today every human being is living through an apoclyce of violence... Now, for the first time in human history there is no spot on earth where the innocent man may find refuge... something else has been revealed to our unwarry eyes. The rottenness of our civilisation itself... If oar civilization should perish, this will come about in part, because it was not good enough to survive.”

Prof. Susan Stabbing says in “Ideals and Illusions” that:

“In no other century have so many human beings— men, women, and children—suffered pain, anguish of heart, bitterness of spirit and unnecessary death.”

Dr. Arnold J. Toynbee warns the modern man and says that: “Looking back on the twenty one civilizations I have studied, I am not sanguine about man's ability to make good moral decision if he aims only at a worldly goal.”

Albert Schewitzer, a leading philosopher of history declares: “We have entered a dark journey in a time of darkness.”

J.J. Sanders ably sums up the situation:

“Five centuries have now passed away since the reawakening of cultural life in Italy, which we knew as the Renaissance, ushered in the most brilliant and fruitful period of Western European history. Today the universal mastery in science, in thought, in art and in literature, which our continent seemed to have attained in the nineteenth century, is threatened by assault from without, by disintegration from within. Faith in unlimited and uninterrupted progress is dimmed; the world war has destroyed the hopes of perpetual peace and prosperity; national hates and rivalries are intensified rather than diminished and the gloomy prophecies of ‘the decline of the West’ are something more than the fancies of a few eccentric philosophers.”

Philosophers at their Wits End

This is the general feeling of discontent and frustration which has filled the modern world as waters fill the oceans. Philosophers of progress have become philosophers of despair. Nicolas Berdayve is one of the greatest contemporary philosophers of our age. He says:

“The hands of universal history are pointing to a fatal hour, that of twilight, when it is time to light our lamps and prepare for the night.”

He calls the mechanization and collectivisation of the modern age as “the disintegration of the human image.”

Kierkegaard, the famous Danish philosopher, was more disgusted. He said:

“When I want to it, I spit at my own face.”

Even A.N. Whitehead has declared in his “Adventures of Ideas” that :

“The nineteenth century was an epoch of civilized advance. But at length it wore itself out. ...The values of life are slowly ebbing. There remains the show of civilization without any of its realities.”

The economist is puzzled at the paradox of poverty amidst plenty and the recurring cycles of prosperity and crises. The psychologist is worried at the prospects of the neurotic man and the study of the disturbed psyche has become the central problem of psychology. Theories of Sigmund Freud are the production of this age of frustration and those who have studied Dr. Jung's *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* know what baffles the modern psychologist. Modern literature is also portraying the frustrated man and his shattered ambitions.

T.S. Eliot says:

All our knowledge brings us nearer to our ignorance, All our
ignorance brings us nearer to death,

But nearness to death no nearer to God.

Where is the Life we have lost in living?

Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? The
cycle of Heaven in twenty centuries

Brings us farther from God and nearer to the Dust.

And That :

We are the hollow men We are the stuffed men Leaning
together

Headpieces filled with straw.

Alas!

Our dried voices, when We whisper together

Are quiet and meaningless

As wind in dry grass

Or rats' feet over broken glass

In our dry cellar.

Shape without form, shade without colour,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;
Those who have crossed
With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom
Remember us—if at all--not as lost
Violent souls, but only As the hollow men
The stuffed men.

W.H. Audin cries in agony :

“I have come a very long way to prove,

No land, no water, and no love.

Here am I, here are you;

But what does it mean? What are we going to do?”

In literature Aldous Huxley's “Ape and Essence” and “Time Must a Have Stop” are best illustrations of this frustration. James Joyce has also dealt with the frustrated man in a literary fashion and T.F. Powys has played on the same tunes. Earlier, Friedrich Nietzsche and Dostoevski were two great prophets of the Frustrated Man. Dostoevski's “The Possessed” (particularly the character of Kirilov), “An Author's Diary” and “Pages from

Journal of an Author” clearly portray the frustration of the age. Albert Camus, the French literary idol, is one of the best representatives of this new trend. His novel “The Outsider” has now become a classic in the literature of frustration. His central themes are Death and Suicide. The Angry Youngmen of English and continental literature also represent the same trend. Colin Wilson, in his masterly survey of the English, French and German literature (The Outsider), shows that the hero of the modern novel is one who is indifferent towards life, towards values and towards himself. He is a stranger in his own society, an outsider!

This disillusionment had been so widespread and deep that H.G. Wells, who used to paint future in bright colours before the first world war, confessed his frustration by the close of his life. The lamps of his imagination were extinguished and in his “Fate of Homo Sapiens” he writes :

“In spite of all my disposition to brave-looking optimism, I perceive that now the universe is bored with him, (i.e. Man), is turning a hard face to him, and I see him being carried less and less intelligently and more and more rapidly along the stream of fate to degeneration, suffering and death.”

And his final testament to mankind was that pathetic book, “Mind at the end of its tether” wherein he says:

“There is no way out or round or through the impasse. It is the end.”

Why Passivism?

Now, this is the intellectual atmosphere and cultural context in which our modern critic lives and breathes. He had to sustain such shocks that his confidence in man has been shaken. He fails to see that man can become virtuous and society can be organized on moral values. He has such a bitter ring of memory that the image of a better society baffles him and he cries in astonishment:

“You want to establish a society of saints!”

The fact is that we have faith in man and God. We believe that the catastrophe which engulfed the West is of its own making. The modern man started in folly and ended in frustration. Had he correctly understood his real position in the universe he would not have gambled and lost. This is the crux of the problem.

Iqbal stands for the twentieth century renaissance of man and feels that man is reasonable enough to sort the grain from the chaff and is capable of rearing a new and prosperous civilization. We are prepared to learn from the successes and the failings of others; but, are determined to strain every nerve to bring about the coveted renaissance. Iqbal very beautifully sums up the entire situation when he says:

“Modern Europe has, no doubt, built idealistic system... but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring. This is the reason why pure thought has so little influenced man, while religion has always elevated

individuals, and transformed whole societies. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies, whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me Europe today is the greatest hinderance in the way of man's ethical advancement. The Muslim, on the other hand, is in possession of these ultimate ideas on the basis of revelation, which speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalises its own apparent externality.”

If the West fails to understand Iqbal and his revivalist thought on this count, the fault lies in the psychological and cultural make-up of the educated critic and the sooner it is realized the better.

ⁱ See Dr. M. Rafiuddin, First Principle of Education, Iqbal Academy, Karachi.

ⁱⁱ Iqbal Review, April, 1962