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IQBAL: A REFORMER OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY¹

R. Harre

It is often suggested that the Islamic resurgence of recent years is a purely political movement. This is certainly not true of events in Pakistan. In that country's independence and in its progressive governmental philosophy can be seen one of the very few cases in history of the translation into reality of a philosophic theory of the state and life of man. The suggestion for a separate State for Indian Muslims came in the first instance from the philosopher Iqbal. Further, much of the political character that the new State now exhibits can be traced to the philosophic theories which Iqbal developed, and which were circulated by him both in Urdu and Persian poetry, and in the more conventional medium of English prose.

To understand the kind of revolution Iqbal brought about, as well as to appreciate his quite daring originality, the conceptual scheme which he recommended must be seen against the background of the intellectual history of Islam. The conventional Muslim account of man has, from the earliest times, been of a Cartesian orthodoxy, and parallel to this account there has been a similar account of the world as consisting of both physical and

¹ This article is reprinted, with grateful acknowledgement, from the Hibbert Journal for 1958.

spiritual elements. In the early days of Islam both kinds of elements were accounted equally real and equally worthy of investigation. Muhammad himself instructed his followers in the great benefits they would derive from the study of nature. However, some five hundred years after the Prophet's death a marked change came over Islamic philosophy and religious practice. While it had formerly been an act of piety to study by the appropriate techniques either the physical or the spiritual world, it became, under the influence of a group of mystics called Sufis, proper to study only the spiritual. The explanation of this revolution need not detain us, but its effect was pervasive; the intellectual freedom and activity that had characterised the first five centuries of Muslim civilization rapidly disappeared. It required nearly a thousand years for a counter revolution to develop within this tradition, for Iqbal was the first Muslim philosopher wholly to oppose this orthodoxy.

His opposition is quite fundamental, and hangs, not upon piece meal revision of the traditional conceptual scheme but on the recommendation of one compounded partly of elements from the early centuries of Islamic culture, and partly of elements derived from an evolutionary view of the world, owing much to Bergson and Whitehead. The result is a new view and a novel interpretation of Quranic doctrines what Iqbal called his “reconstructions” that is wholly at variance with Sufi tradition.

Iqbal's reconstructions are based upon three main principles which he believes to be interconnected. They are:

1. There are three fundamentally different kinds of things we can study: inanimate matter, living organisms and minds. The attempts that have been made to study these three kinds of things (these three areas of experience) have given rise to three groups of sciences, the physical, the biological and the psychological. It is important to understand that Iqbal regarded psychology as one science among a group of mind studies, others being, for example, theology and the striving for mystical experience. The total picture of the world that we derive from all three groups of sciences is what Iqbal calls religion.

2. It is proper for an individual to be active. Blind obedience to that fate which is taken to be the will of God cannot offer any theoretical grounds for immortality, nor is the belief in predestination, which is supposed to justify the acceptance of Qismat, supported by experience in any of the three realms.

3. All these three kinds of things we can study are changing from what they were into something else. The world, the animate creation and God are each changing. Muhammad was the last prophet, not because he gave a final description of the three realms of experience, but because he recommended a method of enquiry that enables a day-to-day record of the change to be kept.

The metaphysical background is supplied by a theory of time. It is a principle for Iqbal that there are three main levels of experience, each with its appropriate group of science, but of these sciences only physics has provided us with a theory of time. The most developed form of the theory Iqbal takes to be that advocated by Whitehead, for whom "Nature is not a static fact in an adynamic void but a structure of events possessing the character of continuous creative flow, which thought cuts up into isolated immobilites out of whose mutual relations arise the

concepts of space and time.” This, however satisfying as a physical explanation of a certain kind of temporal experience, cannot be taken as a complete philosophic theory, for it concerns only one of the three “regions of Reality.” Iqbal says, “Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory. It does not pass, events do not happen (on this theory), we simply meet them.” No mathematical theory which treats time as another dimension of space will do as an explanation either, for this takes away the essential element of change which is the central feature of our experience of time. For a complete theory we must turn to the other levels of experience, since if physical explanations will not do for time as experienced in other ways, perhaps from them we may derive an explanation for the character of physical time.

A theory satisfying to the three realms is provided by Iqbal by the exploitation of an analogy between the relation of perception to physical reality and the relation of the third realm to perception. Iqbal argues that there must be two selves going to make up each individual, these he calls the efficient and the appreciative self, for there is an inner as well as an outer experience, and so there must be an inner something to be experienced. The efficient self is that which concerns itself with, and which is itself partially formed by, the physical world. We know quite well that the time of the physical world is serial time and the succession of impressions is what the efficient self apprehends. This self Iqbal likens to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. The other self, the appreciative self, is available only to keep introspection, and when we do find it, by, for example, religious exercises, we

find ourselves in “appreciative time,” a “changeless now.” This, of course, cannot be described by us consciously since to do so we would be required to use categories applicable only to serial time. In our ordinary experience of ourselves the efficient self is dominant and breaks up this changeless now into a series of nows ; and these, so Iqbal says, are the instants of linear time. It is in various analogies with this process that Iqbal finds the “typical movement of life.” Analogies drawn are: God to his creation ; from a confused to a clear perception of reality; from “knowledge-as-a-whole” to the abstractions of the physical and other sciences.

Having made this analysis Iqbal then makes another conceptual recommendation of great importance. We are to regard, he says, the appreciative self and its analogues as creative. We do not, for example, find things, we make them. “What we call things are events in the continuity of nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for the purposes of actions.” Not only do we make things, but in political and ethical action, among other things, Iqbal believes that we also make our ends. He regards this view as a consequence of the two kinds of experience, the inner and the outer. The result of our inner experience is the grasping of a continual succession of goals and purposes which give significance to everything that happens. The past and the future are carried into every event. There is no final cause, for this would involve the loss of that spontaneity that Iqbal regards as one of the facts about our lives that are indubitably given.

Now what holds the efficient and appreciative selves together into an individual? Iqbal answers this by invoking a Bergsonian term “duration,” by which he means that all events which come one after another in serial time are held in a kind of suspension. Only out of such a suspension, Iqbal argues, can creation take place. There is no time logically prior to this background self. However, this vague exposition is not Iqbal's last word on “duration,” for in discussing the nature of God he provides an explanation of the queer notion of suspension. Both Iqbal's religious theory and his ethical principles are developed within the conceptual scheme that I have just sketched.

Let us now see how Iqbal put this metaphysics to work. It must be remembered that Iqbal's main purpose as a philosopher was practical, he aimed at the reformation of the character of a culture and his method was the philosophic reconstruction of the fundamental tenets of Islam. This practical purpose showed itself in a reconstructed theology and reformed ethics.

Iqbal's theology begins with the proposition that God must be capable of change. This is not “change in the serial sense where change is marked by one state giving way to another but in the appreciative sense. This means that when, in our perception of him, God is serialized, he appears to change, the many aspects which are held in intimate, contemporary suspension in him appreciatively are serialized by our understanding into a changing, evolving Godhead and his Creation.” It follows from this doctrine that God can be both continuously creative and yet remain the

same. When we understand him and the universe in a serialized procession of states, the source of these states is the suspension in God of everything that has been, is and will be looked at by our efficient selves. God is creative, but perceived by the deep experience of our appreciative selves he is complete and together, existing, as it were, all at once. From this theology follows an altogether new explanation of the traditional Islamic doctrine of the finality of the prophethood.

Prophets appear in history, one following another, each contributing but a deep appreciative understanding to our serialized knowledge of God and the Universe. Iqbal talks of this process, the paradigm of all mystical experience, as the “supercharged ego” bringing back knowledge from God. Now since both God, in his aspect as the serialized Universe, and Man as his efficient self are changing, it is quite unreasonable to believe that any revelation which occurred at a given Point in the serialized succession of states that is history, is a final revelation of the character of God which is wholly appreciative, and which can only be understood serial-wise at the end of time, that is never. Muhammad was the last prophet, not because he brought the final revelation of truth, but because he brought the method of free, personal enquiry which made further revelations unnecessary. Each man has the way clear for him now, if he wishes, to experience God and understand the world for himself. The search for understanding is keyed to our metaphysical explanation of ourselves as having through the two selves, efficient and appreciative, an entrance to both worlds of knowledge, without

and within. It was the mistake, Iqbal believes, of the Sufis to concentrate upon the exploration within, and it is the mistake of the Franks, the people of the technocratic cultures, to concentrate upon the exploration without. The acceptance of true Islam Muhammad's Islam, commits a man to both kinds of exploration if he would understand the whole world. From being a creature upon which knowledge is imposed man has evolved into a creature who demands knowledge for himself. Since both God and Man have changed, is it surprising that relations have changed too?

This is the broad metaphysical picture that Iqbal sketches. Within the details we will find his moral theory. The question which leads to the statement of a moral theory, is: how can the free creative appreciative egos of men exist within the free creative appreciative Ego of God? How can both be free? Iqbal answers as follows.

“The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to predestination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life, which is a fact of actual experience. No doubt the emergence of ego endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation of the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of God's creative freedom, whereby he has chosen finite egos to be participants of his life, power and freedom.” But perhaps this freedom is an illusion of the serializing self. Iqbal argues that we could not exist as individuals if we did not, in some sense, act contrary to the world. He says,

“The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego . . . it is present in the areas of mutual invasion, as a directive energy, and is formed and disciplined by its own experience. It is open to man as thus conceived to belong to the meaning of the universe and become immortal.” In this way Iqbal exorcises that strict determinism that had provided such an important element in Islamic moral and political theory as the doctrine of Qismat. A person comes into being only through individual striving and creative activity. The causistical consequence of the rejection of Qismat, the fixed destiny, in favour of Taqdir, the personal creation of destiny, is the claim Iqbal makes, that a man is good only by striving according to those ends which by inward meditation or empirical investigation he makes for himself. Only in this sense must men work out their destiny.

The casuistry is reinforced by a corresponding theory of immortality. It was mentioned above that Iqbal believed life to centre in the tension between mind and environment, a tension which holds an individual together and makes the centre to which his individuality can refer. A person is self-sustained, in individuality, just so far as he resists absorption in nature. Death then becomes the test for the power of self-maintenance in man. “Personal immortality,” says Iqbal, “is not ours by right, it is to be achieved by personal effort.” Paradoxically one creates oneself at the same time and by the same process as one serializes the creation of God, the world of nature. In particular the study of

the science would not be inimical to immortality on this view, but a positive assistance.

In describing this metaphysical system, my intention has been purely expository and not critical. Internal criticism of the system could no doubt be made to seem fatal to it, but would be based upon a misunderstanding of a metaphysical system's purpose and character. External criticism would require a judgement on a way of life for which it is inappropriate to ask in less than a full scale's study. My purpose in this article is to make clear what a man, whom many now follow, thought about his religion for holding the opinion he did. If these reasons and opinions have no intrinsic interest, then the metaphysician has failed altogether in his recommendations for a reformed conceptual scheme. This suggests the kind of judgement which it would be appropriate to make.

Iqbal proposed a counter-revolution within the Islamic tradition. Though the spur for his reconstructions came from study of Kant and Whitehead, he seems as one might expect to have gained some of his most characteristic attitudes and opinions from philosophers deviating little from Islamic tradition. For example, Iqbal provides an explanation of the Divine suspension of states in non-temporal duration, resolving the paradox by a distinction between intensive and extensive infinity. A never ending extensive infinity of states can be generated by some extensively limited but intensively infinite process, as an infinite series can be generated from a short formula. This distinction of

kinds of infinites is made a great deal of by the thirteenth century Persian mystic Rumi, for whom Iqbal often professed admiration as the great practitioner of enlightenment by inward exploration. Again, he takes from the tradition, and especially from Rumi, the classical notion of expressing a moral theory in a description of the perfect man. Iqbal's perfect man shows in his character the philosopher's rejection of the doctrine of Qismat. Salvation through the dissolution of self is to be replaced as a moral ideal by salvation through the assertion of self. It should be clear from the character of Iqbal's metaphysics that this assertion is not like the assertion recommended by existentialists. It is assertion of self, not by the doing of something simple for the sake of action, but a complicated and difficult process of scientific enlightenment, mystical experience and finally rational action towards those ends to which the two ways of knowledge lead us.

Finally I should like to make it clear that nowhere in Iqbal's work do we find a connected, strictly argued philosophic system. Iqbal is not a philosopher in the sense in which this term was understood in the European academic tradition. He aimed quite self-consciously to inculcate an attitude and not to argue a case. With this attitude to metaphysics we would, in our post-Wittgenstein world, agree. However, Iqbal does aim to convince, and his system is intended to be intellectually acceptable; it is not intended to be a soft philosophy. Nevertheless, I believe that we must ask of such systems not "Is it true or acceptable?" but "could I live by it?"

DIVINE WINE*

My Saki made me drink the wine
Of "There is no God but He";
From the illusive world of sense,
This cup divine hath set me free.

Now I find no charm or grace
In song and ale or harp and lute;
To me appeal the tulips wild,
The river-side and mountains mute.
Lo, the great contempt displayed,
By one, who begs at tavern's door,
When he comes to Fount of Life,
He breaks the pitcher on the floor.
My flagon small is blessing great,
For the age athirst and dry ;
In the cells where mystics live
Big empty gourds are lying by.
In love a novice I am yet,
Much good for thee to keep apart,
For my glance is restive more
Than my wild and untamed heart.
Though the pearl its station takes
Beneath the surges of the main,
Yet by dint of essence clean
Unsoiled its lustre doth remain.
The dark unfathomed caves of sea,
Hold gems of purest ray serene,
The gems retain in midst of brine,
Their essence bright and clean.
Through the poet's quickening gaze,
The rose and tulip lovelier seem,
No doubt, the Minstrel's piercing glance
Is nothing less than magic gleam.

*English rendering of a ghazal in Bal-i Jibril, pp. 19-20,

MUHAMMAD IQBAL'S SOCIAL THOUGHT

(Madam) L. R. Gordon-Polonscaya

The development of the social philosophy in Pakistan is greatly influenced by the social ideas of Muhammad Iqbal. His social thought reflected the peculiarity and duality of the social structure and social psychology of the Muslim middle class in colonial India, that is why he became really a leader of Muslim intellectuals.

The formation of the ideology of the middle strata was, every-where, closely connected with the reformation of religion.

Iqbal was the originator of the new trends in the re-interpretation of Islam. By the reconstruction of the religious thought he tried to form not only the philosophical background of the anticolonial liberation ideas but also a new social philosophy, which reflected not only the anti-imperialistic feelings of the Muslim middle class but also its anti-capitalistic aspirations. It reflected also people's utopian ideas of social equality of men not only before God but on earth.

The formation of Iqbal's social views was greatly influenced by the philosophy of three prominent Muslim thinkers: Shah Waliullah, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Jamal al-Din Afghani. Their philosophy attracted Iqbal first of all as an attempt to reconstruct Islam in a sense specific to their people and their time.

The social principles of Iqbal's philosophy were based on the main ideas of Waliullah's philosophy about the differences between the essence of religion and its dogmas, between a set of spiritual principles formulated on a definite pattern, and local religious laws interpreted in terms of time and place. Iqbal shared Waliullah's interpretation of the difference between *Klass* (particular) and *'Amm* (general), between *Nass* (a word having only one definite meaning, and no other possible meaning) and *Zahir* (outward meaning).

"The prophetic method of teaching, according to Shah Waliullah," —said Iqbal,— "is that, generally speaking, the law revealed by a prophet takes especial notice of the habits, ways and peculiarities of the people to whom he is specifically sent."²

Waliullah's ideas on *Ijtihād*, *Ijma'* and *Tavazun* exercised a great influence on Iqbal's social philosophy. Waliullah's teaching on *Ijtihād* reflected the dissatisfaction of the intelligentsia of the day with the stagnation and ignorance of the orthodox, who denied the Muslim right of independent judgement. Waliullah's teaching of *Ijma'* brought out as the most important human virtue, i.e., the feeling of responsibility vis-a-vis society. His teaching on *Tavazun*, or economic equilibrium was sterile in its

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² Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, 1954, pp. 171-172.

advocacy not of qualitative change, but of a utopian balance of what is.

These ideas of Waliullah had received its further implementation in Iqbal's philosophy of re-interpretation of Islam, and his social ideas of equality and freedom.

Iqbal developed Waliullah's idea that Islamic social laws were specific to Arabic people, and pointed out that these laws cannot be strictly enforced in the case of the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. His main idea was that the Law of Islam was capable of evolution and every people and every new generation have the right of re-interpretation of Islam. "Perhaps the first Muslim, who felt the urge of a new spirit in him was Shah Waliullah of Delhi," said Iqbal.³

Iqbal's social views were also greatly influenced by the philosophy of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the head of Muslim Enlightenment in colonial India in XIX century. Sayyid Ahmad's teaching on the common good roused the mind of Muslim educated society from its torpor. As we know, he was the coinor of two expressions: *apni madad ap* (self-help) and *qaumi ham-dardi* (national fellowship) ; the former, as he asserted, was operative from ancient days, the other the product of the age. Like Waliullah's teaching on *Ijma'* it was based on the idea of the responsibility of the men vis-a-vis the society, but contrary to Waliulah, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's concept of national fellowship

³ Ibid., p. 97.

had not a religious but a secular interpretation, for instance his ideas about reconciliation of Islam with nature. If religion, he argued, corresponds to nature it is true ; if it contradicts nature it cannot claim to be God-given. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, said Iqbal, "was the first modern Muslim to catch a glimpse of the positive character of the age which was coming... he was the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it."⁴

Sayyid Ahmad Khan's ideas of national fellowship were developed later in Iqbal's social philosophy of active man. Iqbal highly appreciated also the nechari philosophy, as a fresh orientation of Islam, although his own philosophy greatly differs from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious views.

Iqbal never shared also the pro-British orientation of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Iqbal's social philosophy even at the early stage of its development was entirely free from pro-British illusion and was directly opposed to all form of foreign oppression. This attitude reflected in Iqbal's patriotic poetry of the beginning of the century (his poem 'Taswir-e Dard' and others). In Iqbal's poetic thinking India was "the bird in the snare" and none must rest until it be freed.

In the development of Iqbal's social thought the period before the First World War was of great importance. He was closely connected with the political activities of the radical Muslim

⁴ Shamloo (ed.) Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore, Sep. 1948), p. 131.

intellectuals, who represented the interests of the Muslim middle strata. In this time Muslim progressive public thinking largely assumed the Pan-Islamic forms. Jamal al-Din Afghani and his followers among the Egyptian educators and the member of the Young Turk movement exercised a strong influence on the emergence of the Pan-Islamic views of Iqbal. First of all Iqbal was attracted by Jamal al-Din's ideas of the revivalism of Islamic traditions and their new interpretation in order to turn them into an impulse of the independent progressive development of the colonial people and a mean of consolidation of the Muslims of the World against the oppression of the West. Iqbal had given a very high appreciation of the role of Jamal al-Din Afghani in the development of Muslim social thought. 'If his indefatigable, but divided energy, could have devoted itself entirely to Islam as a system of human belief and conduct," said Iqbal, "the world of Islam, intellectually speaking, would have been on a much more solid ground today."⁵

Iqbal's own social philosophy was also based on the ideas of the reconstruction of the religious thought. He wanted to revive such traditions of Islam, which were dear to the hearts of the Muslim masses. The goal of his new interpretation of this tradition was to awake national consciousness and political activities of the Muslim masses and to give a philosophical basis to his social ideals.

⁵ Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 97.

Of great interest, from this point of view, is Iqbal's poetic message to the students of the Aligarh University, written at the time of the awakening of the liberation movement during the years 1905-1908. At a time when the chiefs of the Aligarh University tried to isolate the students from the revolutionary movement and revolutionary ideas, Iqbal called for the political activities of the Muslim intellectuals. At the same time he recognised that the new consciousness was not yet formed and the moment did not come to throw away the tradition of the past.⁶ But he was sure that such a moment will come. The awakening of the masses was, from his point of view, the sacred duty of the intellectuals.

Iqbal was the first philosopher, who speaks about the civic duty of the poet. The poet, he said, must be the "all-seeing eye of the people," closely linked with his body—the masses of the people. The intellectuals were, after Iqbal's social concept, the natural leaders of the people, and the working masses—"people's hands and feet."⁷

At the same time Iqbal's social philosophy was based on the ideas of social equality and utopian socialistic ideals. The formation of this ideal was greatly influenced by the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, by the broad participation of the masses in the liberation movement in colonial India, and last but not least by the inception of organised working class struggle in

⁶ "طلبہ علی گڑھ کالج کے نام" بانگ درا، لاہور، 1952ء، صفحہ 119

⁷ "شاعر" بانگ درا، صفحہ 53

the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Iqbal greeted the October Socialist Revolution, which set, as he said, the beginning of a new era, the era of the workers, the era of the ruin of the old orders, the end of the old World. Iqbal's poetic symbol of this change is Kuhkan—stone mason who wanted to rise to the place of Parwiz, the place of a ruler?⁸

The idea of the inevitability of the revolution was symbolized in Iqbal's social philosophy. It received a concrete form in his poem "Inqilab".⁹

دلوں میں ولولہ انقلاب ہے پیدا
قریب آگئی شاید جہان پیر کی
موت

The hearts are throbbing with a yearning for revolution. Perhaps the days of the old world are numbered.

He pointed out that after the October Revolution the peoples of the East cannot suffer further the colonial yoke. Their psychology is changing, their national consciousness must inevitably rise.

چشم بگشای اگر چشم تو صاحب
نظر است
زندگی در پی تعمیر جہان دگر
است

Open your eyes ; if you have a discerning look, See, Life is planning a New World.

⁸ "پیام" پیام مشرق، صفحہ 325-326

⁹ "انقلاب" ضرب کلیم، صفحہ 139

—he said in one of his best poems "Payām".¹⁰

In the foreword to Payam-e Mashriq Iqbal wrote, that "the East, especially the Muslim East after a longlasting somnolency had opened her eyes."¹¹ Yet, while writing so, he preferred the way of evolution.

He pointed out, that to be able to create a new World, the man must change his own nature. From his point of view, the moral perfection of Man was an indispensable condition of the social changes and the only effective way of this change was the way of Islam.

At the same time Iqbal never shared the idea of the divine pre-determination of the destiny of Man and of the passive attitude of Man in the World.

In one of his best philosophical poems *Asrār-i Khudi* he wrote:

The pith of life is contained in action,

The delight of creation is the life of life.¹²

His social philosophy was a philosophy of an active man. As one of the Pakistani scholars, Hafeez Malik, pointed out in his book, Iqbal "sees his mission in stimulating creative activity among the Muslims and imbuing the idle looker-on with restless

¹⁰ "پیام" پیام مشرق، صفحہ 325-326

¹¹ پیام مشرق، صفحہ

¹² اسرار و رموز، صفحہ 34

impatience."¹³ He calls to action in the name of Islam. He considers the chief remedy against the deterioration of Muslim society self-recognition of the man (Athbāt-i Khudi) and self-recognition of the duty of Man before society.

Life must not be contemplated but changed. "The final act," said Iqbal, "is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action."¹⁴

Iqbal's social philosophy was based on the idea of the active fight against the social evil.

In Asrār-i Khudi Iqbal contrasted the soft coal (symbol of passive Man) to the diamond (symbol of active Man). The diamond said to the coal:

فارغ از خوف و غم و
وسواس باش
پخته مثل سنگ شو
الماس باش
در صلابت آبروئی
زندگی است
ناتوانی ناکسی نا پختگی
است

Bevoid of fear, grief, and anxiety;

¹³ Hafeez Malik, Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan, Washington, p. 242.

¹⁴ Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 198.

Be hard as a stone, be a diamond!

In solidity consists the glory of Life;

Weakness is worthlessness and Immaturity. 11.1221-2,
1229-30.

Only the activity, the self-recognition. of his active possibilities can a coal into a diamond.

To Descartes' interpretation of the true being: "I think so I am" ("cogito ergo sum") Iqbal opposed his own interpretation: "I act so I am." The activity of Man was, from Iqbal's point of view, the manifestation of his free will. Iqbal tried to reconcile Kant's interpretation of the "free will" with the Sufian interpretation of an "Ideal Man". He saw the direct connection between the immortality of Man and his activity on the earth. But not all forms of activity can be recognised as true but only such a form, which is useful to society, which can aid the progressive development of society. Iqbal's interpretation of social progress was based on the idea of the struggle between the two original principles: the good and the evil. This concept was quite dialectic and was based on the realisation of the possibility of the Man to change evil into good.

On the collective activity of man depends the progress of the society.

On the thorny question of man's relationship to society he admitted the conflict, but in common with so many utopian and even reactionary theorists, he found it resolved in service to God.

But he was not a religious chauvinist. After his concept of Islamic democracy, society and state must eschew every type of religious prejudice and defend the interests of the Muslim and the unbeliever with scrupulous impartiality.

At the same time Iqbal interpreted "service to God" as the fulfilment of the moral principles and social ideals of Islam. From his point of view Man has the attributes of God and so he must be the viceregent of God on earth.

The main idea of Iqbal's social concept was, that the social order in Islam is founded on the principle of tawhid—unity of God--the essence of which is equality, solidarity and freedom.

Equality was first of all the equality of men before God. At the same time he calls also for just distribution of material wealth and social rights in the society. He was sympathetic to all the economic aspects of Socialism and shared an utopian idea that Islam and socialism can supplement each other.

Iqbal's idea of solidarity was an idea of Muslim solidarity. But his ideal of freedom included the condemnation of Western imperialism and capitalistic exploitation.

In his poetic and philosophic works Iqbal condemned the exploitation of the peoples of the East by the imperialism of the

West, the exploitation of the peasant by the landlord, of the worker by the capitalist. He ridiculed and condemned the Western democracy and denied the right of the landlord to exploit the peasant and the right of the capitalist to misappropriate the fruit of the labour.

In Iqbal, philosophy and the poet were not always of one piece' Notwithstanding such duality and weakness, his social philosophy was redolent of deep humanism. His own social duty Iqbal saw in the service to his people. In this service he saw the criterion of the truth of his philosophy and of the success of political activity.¹⁵

ملت کے ساتھ رابطہ
رکھ استوار
پیوستہ رہ شجر سے امید
رکھ بہار

The pain and anguish born of love Is like a precious ware:

I would not change my bondman's state For lordship free
from care.

How can this life or life to come A lover's heart enslave?

An endless life must pinch him there And here the fear of
grave.

¹⁵ بانگ درا، صفحہ 280

The veil that keeps your beauty hid In flames a lover's heart:
The fire of love still brighter burns If the Dear keeps apart.

On mountains bleak, in deserts waste, The hawk can find
some rest:

He thinks it as too mean and base To seek a cosy nest.

Was it the bounty of a glance

Or tutor's skill or art ;

From whom the son of Hajar learnt

To play the filial part?

The brave and firm for pilgrimage To my tomb shall wend:

For way-side dust from me hath learnt The secrets of
Alwand.

Good thoughts can spare a rhymer's art To make them trim
and smart:

To give the tulip crimson hue

Nature shall play its part.

—A. A. Shah English rendering of a ghazal in Bal-i Jibril,
pp. 21-22.

THE GENIUS OF GHALIB

Khalifa Abdul Hakim

Since the beginning of the 20th century the poetry of Ghalib has been steadily gaining in popularity and prestige and the momentum is not yet exhausted. It is a phenomenon that requires to be explained in the light of the history of culture in general and the history of Persian and Urdu poetry in particular. Ghalib is a bilingual poet and in consequence, any attempt to deal with his poetry in the two languages separately would be one-sided, empty and artificial. The genius of the two languages, especially in the style and diction of Ghalib, is so akin that in this respect the artist is not like the musician playing on two different instruments to express different moods of the Spirit, because in the case of Ghalib these instruments are not of different timbre and tone, but organs playing the same music with inessential external details. The difference between Ghalib's Persian and his Urdu is negligible from the point of view of determining his outlook on life, although, from the point of view of pure Art, his genius has expressed itself more perfectly and exquisitely in the former, so much so that in comparing the two himself, he disowned his Urdu poetry as not the true revelation of his genius.

فارسی بین تا بہ بینی نقشہائے رنگ رنگ
بگزر از مجموعہ اردو کہ بے رنگ من است

The purpose of this article is to determine Ghalib's Weltanschauung, his angle of vision and his outlook on life. For

this purpose it is absolutely essential that we first pass in brief survey his spiritual and intellectual inheritance, because in this world of causal chains and progressive evolution, phenomena are not thoroughly comprehended by studying what they are, but how they have come to be.

Before him Persian poetry had passed through various phases, advancing in some directions and retrogressing in others. With the stagnation of life forces, new matter for thought and feeling, new experiences and experiments on life were not forthcoming. The Persians were lovers of art racially and climatically, and the development of poetry with them had started with original life forces. Islam infused into them its yea-saying to life and democratic freshness. Persian poetry partly modelling itself on the simple natural poetry of the Arabs, had expressed Reality and Beauty. But being temperamentally more metaphysical and subtle than the Arabs, the Persians diverted Islam from its simple moral dynamics into a sort of transcendental statics. With growing decadence and the lack of elan vital the impoverished forces of life engaged themselves either in culling new abstractions out of words and phrases that were once living or in weaving a cobweb of evasive and bloodless feelings. The later poets wrote love poetry, not because they felt the pangs and pulsations of original experience, but because they had inherited rich phraseology which was capable of infinitely varied combinations and permutations, with the result that it became a travesty of what it was and lost all touch with life. The theme of love and metaphysical mysticism

became the fashion for nearly all poets whether they were real or pseudo-artists, as Shaykh 'Ali Hazin said:

تصوف برائے شعر گفتن خوب است

Ghalib entered into full inheritance of all the motives mentioned above and set before himself the object of not opening new vistas of life but to dig more deeply into the treasure grounds already made available by the efforts of his predecessors and to soar more loftily into the heavens that had already been revealed. He strove to assimilate this inheritance and it must be confessed at the outset that he imbibed the decadent along with the living material. In the traditional Persian poetry there is hardly anything that he discarded. Pantheistic mysticism, love poetry at its highest and its lowest, real optimism and artificial pessimism, truthful as well as hypocritical encomiums on kings, rulers and men of power and pelf, both native and foreign, and even theological controversies of his day that interested him the least, all these things claimed to be shaped by his genius and to every one of them he gave a bit of it.

One might say that consistency among all the products of a single artist is a virtue that is foreign to artistic creation. If life in its infinite Will to Live, Will to Create and Will to Power creates elements and organisms that thrive both by harmony and by conflict, why should not the same privilege be granted to an artist who is not preaching a creed but whose function is to feel and

express as many aspects of life as impress him and appeal to him to give them a habitation and a name?

You may require of a prophet to have one definite view of existence and that his expression should conform to his thought, and his deed be consistent with his words. Similarly one may require of a philosopher or a scientist to be at least intellectually consistent and to have a system which is plausibly free from internal contradiction. The only consistency that is required of an artistic creation is the unity of impression of a single piece of art. But as all the variegated creations of a single artist have at least that much unity, in so far as they all emerge out of a personality that is fundamentally one, so the entire production of a single artist must have some colours that dominate over the larger portion of the canvas and give us a clue to his outlook on life. The same Milton wrote *L'Allegro* as well as *Il Penseroso*, *Paradise Lost* as well as *Paradise Regained* but no critic would be entirely unjustified in his attempt to trace Milton's view of life in general. Ghalib has paid homage to the traditional, the conventional and the real, and has on different occasions expressed contradictory moods and conflicting views but a thorough study of him does give one a generic impression and reveal certain threads that give a special tone and colour to whatever pattern of variegated hues he may be weaving on the warp of his genius. Now we will attempt to single out certain salient characteristics in his outlook on life.

1. REVOLT AGAINST THE CONVENTIONAL

Ghalib shared this trait with all the great minds of all ages. Although in matter as well as manner, to a very great extent, he followed the traditions of Persian poetry, yet either actual divergence or at least the intense desire to deviate from the beaten tracks of thought are noticeable in his art as well as life at every step. His belief was that the conventional which means dead and unoriginal, is unworthy of a great mind. He considered it would degrade him either to think the common thought or to observe the common religion or to live a common life or to die a common death. He once put it humorously when he survived an epidemic, that although he was destined to die during that year, he held himself back because it was derogatory to his genius to perish in a general epidemic which happened to coincide with the predestined time of his death. He was loth to believe in anything simply on authority. He once indignantly remarked that people hold up as a criterion of truth everything that belongs to the past "as if there were no asses in the times gone by." His contemporaries found it hard to understand him because he would not walk in their ruts and it is known to every reader of Ghalib how he fell foul of the Persian scholars of his time, because of his attack on Qatil who was accepted on all hands as an infallible lexicographer of the Persian tongue. In the sphere of religion, too, it is not easy to label him with any denominational epithet. He does not believe in following blindly even the universally accepted, and in many places he enunciates it as a principle for men of insight.

با من میاویز اے پدر، فرزند آذر را نگر
ہرکس کہ شد صاحب نظر دین بزرگان خوش نکرد

Don't fall foul of me, O Father; look at (Abraham) the son of Azar; whoever becomes a man of insight does not like the creed of his ancestors.

He says elsewhere that heresy or heterodoxy is a divine gift that is not bestowed indiscriminately on the unworthy and is not attainable by effort:

دولت بغلط نرسد از سعی پشیمان
ش
کافر نتوانی شد ناچار مسلمان شو

O mere man, thou shalt not be able to attain that privilege; therefore despair of it and remain an 'orthodox' Musalman.

In an Urdu Ghazal he repeats the same desire of independence most emphatically:

لازم نہیں کہ خضر کی ہم پیروی کریں
مانا کہ اک بزرگ ہمیں ہمسفر ملے

It is not necessary for us to follow Khidhr (the invisible guide of Muslim tradition); at best I can take him as a fellow traveller on the road of life.

And elsewhere he puts the same theme diversely referring in the dialogue between God and Moses:

کیا فرض ہے کہ سب کو ملے ایک سا جواب
اؤ نہ ہم بھی سیر کریں کوہ طور کی

It is not necessary that God gives the same reply to everybody (that He is incapable of being seen); let us also attempt a visit to the Mount Taurus, undaunted by the failure of Moses.

Referring again to the traditional Stone-hewer Lover of Persia, Ghalib reproaches him for having followed a very common way committing suicide in despair, and deprecates the value of his martyrdom because he was not able to rise above custom and convention.

تیشے بغیر مر نہ سکا کوہکن اسد
سرگشتہ خمار رسوم و قیود تھا

One could quote numerous verses from his Urdu and Persian collections to substantiate this special trend of his mind, and one can easily see that this desire for originality and hatred of the common-place and the conventional has left its mark everywhere on his poetry as well as his prose. Even his epistolary art is a landmark in the history of letter writing in Urdu which was thus

once for all delivered from its time honoured classical shackles. When he was following the classical models by deliberately and consciously setting before his eyes certain masters and masterpieces, his real endeavour was not to imitate but to create.

2. HIS PHILOSOPHY

We will now turn to what one would call Ghalib's philosophy but which would be better expressed by the German expression Gedanken Welt, Universe of Thought. No poet is a technical philosopher or a system builder. In the strict sense of these words, he is neither a philosopher nor a prophet, though he weaves into the warp and woof of his art much of the valuable elements of both and transforms abstract truth and practical insight into Beauty. For the sake of clear apprehension, we will divide his thought-world into a kind of metaphysics on the one hand and a wealth of certain deep and everlasting stray thoughts on the other.

His metaphysics like the best philosophy among the Musalmans is mystical which is a joint product of subtilized Islamic Theism, Hellenistic Rationalism and Aryan-Neoplatonic Monism. His view of Reality is preeminently monistic or pantheistic. Reality is fundamentally and essentially One. Human knowledge and human values are piece-meal, discursive and relative. The distinction of God and the Universe, subject and object, good and bad, high and low, is only phenomenal or unreally real. This thought of the ultimate Unity of Existence

which is the greatest discovery of human intellect and human feeling, is the most fascinating intuition and faith in which art, science and religion coincide and get reconciled. This fascinating creed of Unity was endorsed and preached by the real as well as the pseudo-artists and mystics throughout the Islamic world. With the pseudo-artist it becomes only a dignified dogma, a bloodless logical abstraction, a shibboleth and a catchword. By weaving it mechanically ad nauseum with only unappealing verbal variations, one becomes sick of it. But in the hand of a great artist whose art is suggestive of the Ineffable mystery and the half revealed fundamental Beauty of Existence this lofty doctrine appears to be an eternal Spring where every flower is a new revelation of one inexhaustible Being and where the Universe changes itself into every drop of dew. This doctrine makes the universe living in every aspect and justifies the artist in his approach to Reality as the communion of Life with Life and of Soul with Soul. This intuition is not the creation of any one seer or artist; it is the product of a progressive revelation but all art and intellect is to be ultimately judged by reference to this fugitive spirit of the Unity of Life. Ghalib's poetry in this respect is sometimes the mere expression of a creed that is versified but at other times it has the exalted gaze of Wonder and the glow of an edifying Faith. As a specimen of merely rhymed metaphysics, we will take a few examples from his Urdu and Persian Divans.

ہے غیب غیب جسکو سمجھتے ہیں یہ شہود

ہیں خواب میں ہنوز جو جاگے ہیں خواب میں

ہے مشتمل نمودِ صود پر وجود بحر

یاں کیا دھرا ہے قطرہ و موج و حباب

Reality is utterly beyond Appearance; our waking in it is like waking in a dream. The ocean, as perceived, consists of appearance of Forms; the drop, the wave and the bubble have no independent, substantial reality.

The monistic analogy of the sea and its waves is traditional; here Ghalib has versified it without giving it any original touch. Similarly in a Persian quatrain he expresses it simply and directly:

اے کردہ بآرائش گفتار بسیچ

در زلف سخن کشودہ را خم و بیچ

عالم کہ تو چیز دیگرے می دانی

ذاتیست بسیط منسبط دیگر بیچ

O Thou who maketh an effort so adorn thy speech and createth beautiful curls in the locks of thy expression; the Universe that thou regardeth dualistically is One indivisible Being and nothing besides it exists.

At another place he expresses it with a simile which is more original than that of the sea and its waves:

اصل شہود و شاید و مشہود ایک ہے

حیراں ہوں پھر مشاہدہ ہے کس حساب میں

The Logos or the Word is originally One but like a swiftly revolving luminous point it creates the illusion of a continuous circle (the appearance of a round Universe).

Contenting ourselves with these examples of the mere utterance of a formula, we now proceed to cite some of his verses where he enters the Realm of Art in the spirit of wonder or honest doubt.

The reality of the knower, the known and the knowledge or the perceiver, the perceived and the perception, is one i.e. if the subject and the object are identical, I wonder how the relation of perception can arise which presupposes the duality of the knower and the known.

One of his Urdu Ghazals is entirely an interrogation of wonder at the unintelligible relation of undifferentiated primeval Unity to the multiplicity and diversity of the actual world of infinitely varied things, and beauties.

جب کہ تجھ بن نہیں کوئی موجود

پھر یہ ہنگامہ، امے خدا کیا ہے؟

سبزہ و گل کہاں سے آئے ہیں؟

ابر کیا چیز ہے؟ ہوا کیا ہے؟

یہ پری چہرہ لوگ کیسے ہیں؟

عشوہ و غمزہ و ادا کیا ہے؟

Dost thou not to mind recall, Mine early days of love ?

By the dread of whipping glance, As quiet I was as dove.

The painted dolls of present age At seats of learning taught,

Have not infidel's charm, or mould Of idols, Azar wrought.

The earth, despite its stretches vast, Hath no nook for rest:

How passing strange that this world Is neither cage nor rest !

For Thine bounteous rain await The thirsty ducts of vine:

Taverns of Persia stand

Devoid of Magian wine.

My fellow bards ascribe to spring My sudden burst of song:

How can they know the ardent strains, Poured by passion
strong?

From the blood and bones of man Thine world hast come to
life: What more can be a martyr's meed Than lasting fret and
strife?

Through Thine Grace, O Mighty Lord,

My life is sailing safe:

Against my friends I have no plaint,

Nor world can make me chafe.

A. A. Shah

English rendering of a ghazal in Bāl-i Jibril, pp. 23-24.

GHALIB AND IQBAL*

B. A. Dar

عر با چرخ بگردد که جگر سوخته ای

چون من از دوده آزر نفسان برخیزد

The heavens revolve and ages pass

That a person with a burning heart as I is born, From the stock of those who breathe fire.¹⁶

So says Ghalib about himself. He has been more than fortunate in winning recognition ,for the sterling qualities of his art which charm and please lovers of poetry both Urdu and Persian. He seems to be him-self fully convinced of the greatness of his art and was therefore greatly perturbed at the coldness shown by his contemporaries towards him. This feeling of frustration found expression in several of his verses both in Urdu and Persian.

*This paper was read at the Pakistan American Cultural Centre, Karachi, in February 1969.

¹⁶ Kulliyat-i Ghalib (Persian), p. 498. All references are to the one published by Shaikh Mubārġ 'Alī, Lahore, 1965.

نه ستائش کی تمنا نه هلے کی پروا

Neither do I desire praise nor care for reward.

And yet he was fully confident of his greatness as a creative artist. In one of his Persian verses he claims to possess the miraculous white hand of Moses while his critics are worshipping the calf of Samiri, the false prophet.

بنہای به گوساله پرستان ید بیضا

غالب بسخن صاحب فرتاب کجائی

O Ghalib, show your White Hand to these Calf-worshippers ; Can there be any other poet of such miraculous charm and beauty?¹⁷

And he was so sure of winning recognition if not during his life time then after his death.

کو کبم را در عدم اوج قبولی بوده است

شہرت شعرم به گیتی بعد من خواہد شدن

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 635. Reference is to the story of Moses who was vouchsafed a miracle of White Hand. The Qur'an, xx. 22 ; xxvii. 12, xxviii. 32. "Calf-worshippers" is again a reference to another story of Moses. Samiri the magician carved out of golden image of calf before which Israelites prostrated as if before God—an act of disobedience for which they were rebuked by Moses. See the Qur'an, vii. 148-152; xx. 87-89.

The Star of my Destiny has been in ascendance ;

The fame of my poetic art shall spread in the world after my death.¹⁸

But Ghalib wished to be recognised not only as a poet excelling in the beauty of form; he seems to have the idea that the thoughts he is expressing in his poetry, especially Persian, are original and are as valuable as those of the sacred books of revealed religions. In the introduction to his Persian Diwān, he says:

غالب اگر این فن سخن دین بودی

آن دین را ایزدی کتاب این بودی

If the art of poetry be taken as religion (din) ;

This poetical collection of mine would have been its revealed book.¹⁹

Besides being a great creative artist and poet Ghalib was a great intellectual. It is for this reason that he has been often classed as a philosopher-poet though it would be hardly proper to call him a philosopher in the technical sense, for in Ghalib we would probably find no expounding of a consistent thought-system. What one finds in him is "a keen intellectual awareness, a tendency to interrogate things, and offering fresh and often

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 609.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 663.

profound comments on them, or re-discovering old truths anew for himself."²⁰

In one of his Persian Mathnavis, Mughanni Namah, Ghalib has emphasised the important role of reason and intellect in human life.²¹ Poetry, he says, is a valuable treasure of gems but it is intellect alone which can appreciate it. It is the fountain of life which never dries up, which never grows old even in old age. If it is necessary for philosophers, it is equally necessary for the mystics.

When poetry conveys some message of great significance and when music warms up the heart of the listeners and enraptures them, it is all due to reason. It is reason again which illumines the heart with a spiritual light (nur) and leads the individual to the vision of the ultimate truth:

خرد چشمه زندگانی بود

خرد را به بیری جوائی بود

فروغ سحر گاه روحانیان

چراغ شبستان یونانیان

²⁰ Muhammad Sadiq, A History of Urdu Literature (Oxford University Press, London, 1964), p. 190.

²¹ Kulliyat, pp. 190-197.

خرد کرده در خود ظہورے دگر

دل از دیدہ پذیرفتہ نورے دگر

ز گنجے کہ بینش بویرانہ ریخت

در آفاق طرح پری خانہ ریخت

زدودن ز آئینہ زنگار برد

ز دانش نگہ ذوق دیدار برد

Intellect is the fountain of life,

Intellect makes old age as good as youth.

It provides light to the morning meditation of the Sufi,

And serves as a lamp for the philosophers during dark nights.

Intellect manifests itself anew

And the heart acquires a new light through the eyes.

The treasure that the Intellect casts into the wilderness

Lays the foundation of an abode of beauty (and peace) in the world.

Intellect rubs off rust from the mirror

And the eyes could enjoy the pleasure of Vision.

In the *tashbib* (introduction) of Qasida 19, he relates his imaginary meeting with 'Aql Fa"āl i.e. Active Intellect.²² According to Muslim philosophers, this Active Intellect is the lowest of the ten intelligences which gives individual forms to material objects and universal forms to the human intellect.²³

The Active Intellect invites all intellectuals to a meeting to discuss some problems and thus attempt to arrive at some answers to the common riddle of life.

تا به بینند که اسرار نهانی بیداست

That they might see that the hidden secrets are manifest.

Ghalib comes forward and begins to ask questions. I would only mention some of these questions asked by him. What is the secret of life? What is this world? How is One and Many related? What is the nature of free will and determinism? What is good and evil? Is it possible for the finite individual to reach the Infinite? If not, how far is our effort to reach that goal justified? It is this intellectual approach of Ghalib that distinguishes him from his contemporary poets. This aspect of his is much more emphasised in his Persian poetry than in Urdu, though glimpses of it are easily discernible there as well. The following well-known verses, for instance, speak of a great mind in search of truth but the way

²² Ibid., pp. 275-279.

²³ Encyclopaedia of Islam, II edition, Vol. 1, p. 342.

Ghalib gives expression to his thought is not that of a cold intellectual but of a creative artist:

جب کہ تجھ بن نہیں کوئی موجود

پھر یہ ہنگامہ اے خدا کیا ہے؟

سبزہ و گل کہاں سے آئے ہیں؟

ابر کیا چیز ہے؟ ہوا کیا ہے؟

Where none exist besides Thee,

O God, what is all this going around?

Whence do this greenery and flowers come?

What is cloud and what is air?

But his stature as an intellectually-oriented poet is truly revealed in his Persian verses which have not received attention they deserve.

Iqbal once tried to bring this fact to the notice of Ghalib's admirers.

In a message on Ghalib Day celebrated by Anjuman-i Urdu Punjab in February 1937, Iqbal said:

"On this day I would like to remind you of the message of Ghalib himself:

بگذر از مجموعهٔ اردو که بے رنگ من است

Leave aside my collection of Urdu poetry which lacks beauty and colour.

Ghalib invites you to his Persian poetry... While reading it, we should however note how far Baidil's philosophy of life influenced Ghalib's mind and how far he was able to understand and assimilate it ..."

In the following verses Ghalib describes how he feels constrained to give expression to ideas which belong to another world:

آتش اندر نهاد من زده اند

لاله و ارغوان نمی خواهم

بادهٔ من مدام خون دل است

ارمغان از مغان نمی خواهم

سخن از عالم دگر دارم

همدم و راز دان نمی خواهم

سینه صائم، قلندر، مستم

راز خود را نهان نمی خوابم

Destiny has made my nature fiery,
I need no tulip; nor any fruit of red colour;
Blood of the heart is my wine always,
I need no gift from the wine-seller.
My poetry is from another world,
I need no companion or sharer of secrets.

A sincere heart, a qalander and intoxicated I am I need not
keep my secret hidden.²⁴

One can easily find here similarities of phrases and ideas with
Iqbal.

Ghalib tried to create a new world for himself and for others
to contemplate and enjoy. He calls himself the nightingale of a
yet-to-be created garden that will come into being through his
songs, born out of the fire generated by his undying love for new
worlds:

²⁴ Kulliyat, pp. 412-415

ہوں گرمی نشاط تصور سے نغمہ سنج

میں عندلیب گلشن نا آفریدہ ہوں

The pleasure of the Idea fires my imagination,

And I sing as a nightingale of a yet to be created garden.

It was this fire, all-consuming and all-pervasive, which Ghalib felt in himself and which found expression in his verses:

ہے ننگ سینہ دل، اگر آشت کدہ نہ ہو

ہے عار دل نفس، اگر آزو فشان نہ ہو

If hearts is not a fire-temple

It is not worthy of my body;

My heart would feel ashamed

If my soul does not sprout out fire

In one of his Persian Ghazals he says:

دلے دارم کہ در ہنگامہ شوق

سرستش دوزخ است و گوهر آتش

به خلد از سردی پنگامه خواهم

بر افروزم به گرد کوثر آتش

It which found expression in his verses:

I have a heart that through the ecstasy of love

Its nature is Hell and its essence fire.

In the cold atmosphere of Paradise

I kindle fire all around the pond of *Kauthar*.²⁵

Another very significant feature of Ghalib's poetry is his independence of spirit, his conscious revolt against the conventional and the customary, an open mind for the new instead of the old rotten values. He has the courage to stand by his own convictions and was always ready to suffer for them. "Do not think," he says, as reported by Hali, "that whatever the ancients have written is true. Were there no asses in the times gone by?"

لازم نہیں کہ خضر کی ہم پیروی کریں

²⁵ Ibid., p.556

مانا کہ اک بزرگ ہمیں ہم سفر ملے

It is not necessary that we follow *Khidhr*;

If we meet him, we shall look upon him

As a fellow traveller and not as a guide.

In a Persian verse, he has expressed this idea with reference to the life of Abraham and his father (or uncle) Azar.

بامن میاویز اے پدر، فرزند آزر را نگر

ہر کسی کہ شد صاحب نظر دین بزرگان خوش نکرد

Don't fall foul of me, O Father;

Look at Abraham, the son of Azar.

Whoever acquires insight

Becomes dissatisfied with the faith of his ancestors.²⁶

Same idea has been expressed by Iqbal:

اگر تقلید بودے شیوہ خواب

پیمبر ہم رہ اجداد رفتے

²⁶ Ibid., p.533

Had conventional behaviour been a worthy ideal,
The Prophet too would have followed
In the footsteps of his ancestors.²⁷

His spirit of independence manifested itself most obtrusively in his comments on the reprinting of A'in-i Akbari by Sayyed Ahmad Khan. As a work of scholarship it as of course a commendable step but Ghalib's point of view reflected his conviction that the old order was bound to give place to a new order with all the possibilities of providing better opportunities to the people. In spite of his great regard for the Sayyid, he could not resist expressing his personal conviction:

پیش این آئین کہ دارد روزگار

گشته آئین دگر تقویم پار

In face of the present new prevalent order Old order has become as obsolete as last year's calander.²⁸

Thirdly, Ghalib is enamoured of life here and now, a life which is fully lived and richly enjoyed. He has a deep passion and yearning for a meaningful life in proportion to the vicissitudes and miseries that he had to suffer throughout his long career of over seventy years. He was fully aware of the intensity of pain and evil in life

²⁷ Payam-i Mashriq, p. 264.

²⁸ Kulliyat, p. 146.

and the consequent disillusionment and frustration that one meets everywhere at almost all times. And yet he was able to find not only solace but actual enjoyment out of this life because to him life qua life was worth living in spite of everything.

رونق ہستی ہے عشق خانہ ویراں ساز سے

انجمن بے شمع ہے گر برق خرمن میں نہیں

Life is enriched by Love which is a house-consuming fire;
Without lightening (that is evil) that falls on the harvest (and thereby tends to destroy it),

There would be no brightening up of human life.

Several verses can be quoted which express his great passion and zest for life. Only one or two would suffice here:

ہزاروں خواہشیں ایسی کہ ہر خواہش پہ دم نکلے

بہت نکلے مرے ارماں لیکن پھر بھی کم نکلے

ہوس کو ہے نشاط کار کیا کیا

نہ ہو مرنا تو جینے کا مزہ کیا

عشق شسے طبیعت نے زیست کا مزہ پایا

درد کی دوا پائی درد بے دوا پایا

A thousand desires and each desire more charming than the other,
Most of them are satisfied yet a great lot remained.

What a delight my ambitious nature finds in activity !

No zest in life there would be if there were no death.

Through Love I feel ecstasy in life,

A remedy for pain and yet an eternal pain itself.

This experiment with life here and now, sometimes leads man to what is religiously called sin. Should one stay one's foot merely for the fear that his footsteps may lead him astray? This is the eternal conflict of good and evil which is involved in the very determination of man to say yes to life, to accept it at its face value and to plunge deep into it —sometimes bringing out pearls of rarest beauty and sometimes plunging into darkness. But the effort continues on the part of man. It is the effort, the determination to try the hazards for achieving ends and objects, that is valuable and desirable. Man as flesh is liable to sin; these are foibles which further prompt man to try harder. To commit sin in the attempt is not as much evil as never to try. Ghalib realises this truth which he expresses thus:

خوئے آدم دارم، آدم زاده ام

آشکارا دم ز عصیان می زخم

As a progeny of Adam, I inherit Adam's temperament ; I openly confess my liability to committing sin.²⁹

For comparison I give Iqbal's following verses from the Jāvid

Nāma:

چوں بروید آدم از مشمت گلے

با دلے، با آرزوئے در دلے

لذت عصیان چشیدن کار اوست

غیر خود چیزے ندیدن کار اوست

زانکہ بے عصیان خودی ناید بدست

تا خودی ناید بدست، آید شکست

When Adam grows from a handful of dust

With a heart throbbing with desire,

²⁹ Ibid., p. 402.

He is destined to taste the delight of sin
And to see nothing besides himself ;
Without committing sin, self does not develop,
And without selfhood, life must end in total failure.³⁰

It is not that one commits sin for the sake of sin but because it is the necessary adjunct of Man's unique nature and his selfhood which involves constant struggle against difficulties and odds. And we find Ghalid ever ready to meet these challenges of life:

می ستیزم با قضا از دیر باز

خویش را بر تیغ عریان می زدم

I have been fighting with fate since long
And meeting the challenge of the naked sword.³¹

In another place, he says:

ساقی همت که صلا می دهد

باده ز خم خانه لا می دهد

همت اگر بال کشائی کند

³⁰ Javid Nama, pp. 212-213.

³¹ Kulliyat, p. 402.

صعوه تواند که همائی کند

نثیر توفیق اگر بر دمد

لاله عجب نیست کز اخگر دمد

The Saqi of ambition gives an open invitation,

He offers you wine from the tavern of Negation;

If ambition could spread its wings

Goldfinch could become a Humā (a fabulous bird of good omen)

;

If the sun of ambition could shine

Tulip can grow out of embers.³²

These ideas Ghalib and Iqbal shared to a great extent and I feel that it was this community of ideas and spirit which led Iqbal nearer to Ghalib. Before I take up how Iqbal treats Ghalib in his works I would like to refer to some very important events in the lives of both. It is said that Ghalib met an Iranian scholar, Abdul Samad by name, who was a Zoroastrian before his conversion to Islam, and had the opportunity to live with him for two years. It was probably due to this contact that Ghalib seems to have developed interest in the philosophic heritage of Iran as

³² Ibid., p. 121.

symbolised in the system of Ibn al-Arabi and Shihabuddin Suhrawardy Maqtul, specially the latter whose system of thought draws heavily from Zoroastrian sources.

The question whether the doctrine of Unity of Being so ardently, passionately and repeatedly expounded by Ghalib in his Urdu and Persian verses in varied forms, was the product of intellectual formulation as a result of this contact or merely a product of artistic requirements or aesthetic expression of different wayward moods, as expounded in the famous sentence of Hazin that:

تصوف برائے شعر گفتن خوب است

i.e. Mysticism is the fondest expression for the poetic art—is difficult to decide. I would rather explain Ghalib's partiality for Unity of Being more the result of an aesthetic rather than intellectual need. This tendency in Ghalib must have got some intellectual support due to the influence of this Iranian scholar.

yet Ghalib was equally conscious of the incompatibility of holding this doctrine in all its implications of moral laxity and denial of human responsibility with the demands of a religious system like Islam. He expresses this contrast in a beautiful verse of a Ghazal:

زموز دین نشناسم، درست و معذورم

نمہاد من عجمی و طریق من عربی است

I do not understand the implications of din (religion);

Therefore I must be excused.

For by temperament I belong to 'Ajam (Iran),

While my faith is Arabian.³³

The disparity between the two, 'Ajam and Arab, had been the subject of a great controversy long after the time of Ghalib and still remains undecided. But Iqbal seems to accept this dichotomy and has given expression to it in words reminiscent of this very verse of Ghalib.

عجم ہنوز نداند رموز دین ورنہ

'Ajam is not yet aware of the secrets of Religion.

It was again under the influence of this Iranian scholar that Ghalib became familiar with the intricacies of Persian idiom of which he was later so proud. His inclination towards Shiaism in spite of what he says about his being a Turk, was again no doubt the result of this contact. What I have called an "inclination towards Shiaism" may be interpreted as a conscious attempt on the part of Ghalib to bring about a compromise between the two different currents of the main Islamic stream. The dichotomy of Arab and 'Ajam, the thesis and antithesis, may be so resolved that a higher and more comprehensive synthesis is evolved. One may doubt the authenticity of this fact in the case of Ghalib but Iqbal, under similar circumstances and under similar influences, did

³³ Ibid., p. 485.

make a serious attempt in this direction.³⁴ In the life of Iqbal we come across a similar personality with almost similar results. An Iranian scholar 'Abdul 'Ali Hiravi (d. 1922) happened to visit Lahore during his long sojourns. Iqbal happened to attend his religious sermons.

In one of his letters dated 31 October 1916 to Maharaja Kishan Parsad, he speaks very highly of his intellectual attainments. He says, "He is a very great scholar. Although Shia by faith, his exposition of the Qur'an and then surprisingly very profound and appealing. I attend his lectures now Iqbal's infatuation for me about him which was Ghalib published in Makhzan expression in Se when he a poem September 1901 wrote 01 and later included in Bāng-i Darā. It is one of the greatest tributes ever paid by any poet to Ghalib. It must however be remembered that Iqbal's opinion of Ghalib as expressed here is most probably confined to his Urdu poetry alone.

According to Iqbal, Ghalib's greatest characteristics are two: first a lofty creative imagination which produces several universes of beauty and imparts tongue to the dumb, life to the dead and movement to the stationary. He is in search of Beauty which lives in the form of "yearning" in the heart of everything in the world and finds expression in words which give a new significance to our life, as the sweet music of the stream by breaking the monotony of the mountains, enlivens the whole atmosphere. Secondly, his great intellectual stature which contributed greatly

³⁴ Letters and Writings of Iqbal (Iqbal Academy, 1967), pp. 4-6.

towards perfecting his poetic art and giving it a form unique in the history of Urdu literature:

لطف گویائی میں تیری ہمسری ممکن نہیں

ہو تخیل کا نہ جب تک فکر کامل ہم نشین

It is not possible to compete with you in the beady of expression,
Unless imagination and mature thought coalesce.

It is due to this wonderful synthesis of imaginative power and intellectual creativity that Ghalib, the "bud of Delhi", can rightly claim to excel the "rose of Shiraz." I may however add that what appeared to Iqbal in 1901 as a "bud" yet waiting for time to grow and mature into a flower, has now grown full bloom, spreading its fragrance to all corners of the world. The greatest tribute that Iqbal has paid to Ghalib in this poem is to rank him along with Goethe, who lies buried in Weimer.

گلشن ویمر میں تیرا ہم نوا خوابیدہ ہے

Your brother poet lies buried in Weimer.

And to Iqbal Goethe was the symbol of the greatest creative artist³⁵

In Payām-i Mashriq, Iqbal has brought together four poets of the o world in a symposium on Life, two from the West, Browning

³⁵ See Payam-i Mashriq, p. 249 footnote.

and Bbf fife, and two from the East, Ghalib and Rumi.³⁶ The bubbling wine from' Browning thinks, lacked invigoration and therefore needed support outside to make it regain its pristine fervour and energy. This led him

to seek help from Khidhr, the unerring guide of mankind in the Muslim religious tradition, who is said to have taken the legendary Alexander of Sikandar Nama to the Fountain of life. Browning would pour water taken from Khidhr into the cup and try to make it invigorating as before.

گلشن ویمر میں تیرا ہم نوا خوابیدہ ہے

But Byron would not like to be under obligation to anybody, not even to Khidhr, for it would be to stain the purity of life. The best way would be to melt one's heart into water and pour it into the wine-cup of life in order to make it more stimulating.

Then Ghalib comes forward and suggests his own prescription. To make life once more invigoration, to give it its original warmth and to make it as strong as before, Ghalib would like to render wine more bitter, more penetrative, more effective so as to reach teh inner core of one's heart by melting glass and pouring it into the cup of life:

³⁶ Ibid., p. 252.

تا باده تلخ تر شود و سینه ریش تر

بگدازم آبگینه و در ساغر افکنم

That the wine be more bitter and the chest more sore,

I melt the glass and pour into the cup.

Rumi comes in the end. His stand is quite different from that of the rest. He asserts that life in its purity does not need any admixture ; a water from the fount of Eternity or from the inner recesses of one's heart or even melting of glass would not achieve the ultimate purpose. To be truly worthy of Life, one must establish contact, direct and immediate, with the ultimate source of Being and Existence. Unless this contact is established, no half-way remedies would make our life meaningful and significant:

آمیزشے کجا گہر پاک او کجا

از تاک باده گیرم و در ساغر افکنم

Leave a side would purity of Life; it needs no admixture,

I would fetch wine direct from the plant and pour it into the cup.

Iqbal has here brought the four outstanding poets of the world together a contest on the ideological level and not on the artistic plane. It is a basic question of life and in this Iqbal feels Rumi's approach better and truer than Ghalib's and, for that

matter, than others'. But on the artistic plane, one is constrained to conclude that Iqbal was greatly struck by the aesthetic quality and beauty of Ghalib's ghazal and composed this piece of symposium after his style. I would like to beauty y h and charm;

رفتہ کہ کہنگی ز تماشا بر افکنم
در بزم رنگ و بو نمطے دیگر افکنم
نخلم کہ ہم بجائے رطب طوطی آورم
ابرہ کہ ہم بروئے زمین گوہر افکنم
راہے زکنج دیر بہ مینو کشادہ ام
از خم کشم پیالہ و در کوثر افکنم

I decided to destroy all antiquated things

And to set up a new pattern of life in this world.

I am a tree that produces songs instead of dates,

I am a cloud that showers pearls on the ground.

I have opened a way to the Paradise through the corner of the tavern,

I take up a cupful from the pitcher and pour it into Kauthar.³⁷

In the Jāvid Nama while on a journey through the skies "in quest of ever-new manifestations," Iqbal arrives at the sphere of Jupiter, where he meets Ghalib, Hallaj and Qurrat ul 'Ayn Tahira, the three pure spirits harbouring a fire in their hearts that might easily melt the world.³⁸ Their tulip-like red attires symbolise their inner yearning which has kept them in constant fervour since eternity and are so much intoxicated with the wine of their own melodies that they preferred an ever-roaming life in space to any particular allocation in Paradise.

To Iqbal, Ghalib shares with Hallaj and the Lady of Iran a common feature. He calls them all آتش نوا, musicians of the songs of fire that burns whatever is old, antiquated and unworthy of preservation; they are moved by a passion and fervour that knows no limits and brings about intoxication of a sort, a characteristic of a truly great genius that destroys in order to build anew on a strong foundation for a better future. All three of them, in short, symbolise in their person important signposts on the onward journey of the Muslim community towards its destined goal. The words they use are often provocative as if they wished to cry and shriek into the ears of the men who were unwilling to listen to them, who were un-aware of the malady they were suffering from and therefore did not feel they needed a doctor—a surgeon who knows how to apply the knife of his thought to the virtues of the

³⁷ Kulliyat, p. 576.

³⁸ . Javid Nama, pp. 133-161.

times. This provocative role created no doubt a great stir but at the same time it poured new blood into the veins of the people thus contributing to-wards a new resurrection.

Hallāj, in Muslim tradition, stands for revolution and a new world-order. His cry of Ana'I Haq (I am the Creative Truth) is "the bold affirmation of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder personality" in an age which tended to deny the very existence of human self. It was, as Iqbal says, a challenge flung against the Mutakallimin.³⁹

Hallaj, thus, stands, in the eyes of Iqbal, for revolution against the established order whether in morality, religion or in literature.

The revolutionary character of Hallaj is apparent when Iqbal calls both Nietzsche, the German thinker and McTaggart, his teacher at Cambridge (U.K.), as new Hallajes, for both, in their way, revolted against the inert and antiquated order prevalent in their days. The beautiful Lady of 'Ajam, Qurrat ul 'Ayn Tahira, whose name has grown into a legend, symbolises in her life the same revolutionary zeal to build anew on the ashes of the old. Both Hallaj and Tahira have the honour of laying down their lives for the promotion of the cause dearest to their heart.

Ghalib, though not a martyr as Hallaj and Tahira, is yet in the eyes of Iqbal an equally ardent revolutionary in the world of art. His songs and laments are a source of inspiration to the weary soul of the individual in search of spiritual peace.

³⁹ Reconstruction of Religious Thought, p. 96.

این نواها روح را بخشد ثبات

(these songs afford solace to the spirit).⁴⁰ Well could Ghalib sing with Hallaj.

ز خاک خویش طلب آتشی که پیدا نیست

تجلی دگر می در خور تقاضا نیست

Seek fire, as yet unseen, from your own self ;

Light borrowed from others cannot illumine the temple of your soul.⁴¹

And then cry out:

بیا که قاعده آسمان بگردانیم

قضا بگردش رطل گران بگردانیم

ز حیدریم سن و تو، زما عجب نبود

گر آفتاب سوئی خاوران بگردانیم

Let us change the ways of the Heaven, And the decree of the
Destiny,

⁴⁰ Javid Nama, p. 135.

⁴¹ Ibid.

By distributing a large goblet of wine.

No wonder if you and I, being devotees of Haider,

Turn back the sun towards the East.⁴²

Ghalib and Hallaj being revolutionary by nature and burning with the fire of infinite yearning, could not remain content within the confines of a Paradise which, according to the Mulla, is an abode of eating, sleeping and singing, or, you may say, wine, houries and pageboys. Anguished lovers like Ghalib would rather prefer a life of eternal wandering, strung by tumult-arousing love and seek direct vision of the Ultimate Being:

جنت عاشق تماشائے وجود

Lover's Paradise is contemplation of Being (Beauty).⁴³ or as Ghalib says:

سنتے ہیں جو بہشت کی تعریف سب درست

لیکن خدا کرے وہ تری جلوہ گاہ ہو

What we hear about Paradise may be true,

But we wish it would be your Abode of Manifestation.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 136-137. See also Ghalib's Kulliyat, p. 592.

⁴³ Javid Nama, p. 139.

In one of his Persian Mathnavis ,Ab-i Guhar Bār, Ghalib, during the course of a story, describes the traditional paradise as the dullest place imaginable, unsuitable for ardent lovers who cannot bear the monotony of drinking wine day and night at regular intervals out of the same cups:

دران پاک میخانه بے خروش

چه گنجائش شورش نای و نوش

سیه مستع ابر و باران کجا

خزان چون نباشد بهاران کجا

نظر بازی و ذوق دیدار کو؟

بفردوس روزن بدیوار کو؟

In that sacred tavern with no commotion

There is no scope for the tumults of life ;

There shall be no dark clouds and rain to brighten up,

When there be no autumn,

What charm would spring bring?

There is no prospect of stealing a view of the beloved

For there is no opening in its wall.⁴⁴

Unless there is something disturbing, something unexpected and unforeseen breaking the monotony of the routine, Ghalib and Hallaj would not like to dwell in it and therefore their decision to wander for ever and ever.

بے خلشہا زیستن بازیستن

باید آتش در نہ پا زیستن

To live without stings and pricks is no living;

One must live with fire under one's feet.⁴⁵

Muhyuddin Ibn al-'Arabi once said that the fruits of Paradise need the heat of the Hell to ripen. In other words, the paradise would be in-complete without hell; both must be brought together to afford complete and full enjoyment. As Ghalib says:

خلد میں کہیو تو دوزخ بھی ملا لیں یارب

سیر کرے واسطے تھوڑی سی فضا اور سہی

If you permit, O God, we may bring a tittle of Hell into Heaven;

⁴⁴ Kulliyat, pp. 163-164.

⁴⁵ Javid Nama, p. 140.

Let there be a somewhat different atmosphere for pleasure's sake. And the reason is that the Paradise as it is, cannot satisfy the cravings of a heart burning with ardour of love. Ghalib says:

جنت نشود چارهٔ افسردگئی دل

تعمیر باندازهٔ ویرانی ما نیست

The Paradise does not afford any solace to our sad heart ; It is too small to satisfy our inner yearnings.⁴⁶

This hell in paradise, fire in water, as Ghalib describes himself in one of his qasidas.⁴⁷

از برون سو آیم اما از درون سو آتشم

is one of the effects of what Ghalib calls a جگر سوخته a "burnt heart" in his famous verse which had been since long a subject of great controversy:

قمری کف خاکستار و بلبل قفس رنگ

اے ناله نشان جگر سوخته کیا ہے؟

The dove is a handful of ashes, the nightingale a network of colour,

⁴⁶ Kulliyat, p. 451.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 404.

O lamentation, what is the sign of a burnt heart ?

Iqbal has tried to develop the idea of Ghalib in this verse in his own way which is not much different from what Ghalib himself would have expounded.

A lamentation that rises out of a burnt heart manifests itself in the world in variegated forms. It has made the dove a handful of ashes while the nightingale has acquired through this very lamentation, a variety of colours. In every case the actuality is in proportion to the potentiality. In the case of the dove, it leads to death while in the case of a nightingale it leads to flowering of life in a multiplicity of colours. Iqbal sums up this discussion:

تو ندانی این مقام رنگ و بوست

قسمت بر دل بقدر بائر و بوست

In this station of colour and scent

The portion of every heart is determined by its lamentation and yearning.⁴⁸

It is an echo of what Ghalib has said about "the unlimited possibilities of existence:

توفیق باندازه ہمت ہے ازل سے

⁴⁸ Javid Nama, p. 145.

آنکھوں میں ہے وہ قطرہ جو گوہر نہ ہوا تھا

Divine Grace has ever been commensurate with one's ambition,
The tear in the eye is a drop of water that preferred not to be a
gem.

Much depends on one's effort which is the result of constant
prompt. ings from within one's heart, the expression of love,
search and attainment of ideals:

شوق ہے ساماں طراز نازش ارباب عجز

ذره صحرا دستگاہ و قطرہ دریا آشنا

It is desire which affords opportunity of glory to the weak,

An atom has the possibility of being a desert and a drop, the
ambition of being an ocean.

The last point which Iqbal raises with regard to Ghalib in Javid
Nāma revolves round the Mathnavi which Ghalib wrote at the
request of his friend, Fazl Haq of Khayrabad who, although a
logician of great eminence, played a reactionary role in the
religious field. He opposed tooth and nail the reform movement
initiated by Shah Ismail Shahid and asked Ghalib to write a
Mathnavi in his defence which he accordingly did.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Kulliyat, pp. 130-137.

One of the disputed points was whether God could produce another Muhammad. Fazl Haq held that God cannot and would not while Shah Isma'il held that God can but would not produce another one like him because it would go against prophet's finality. Ghalib had started writing the Mathnavi to defend Fazl Haq's stand but the logic of the argument as well as, most probably, Ghalib's own common sense led him to a stand which supported Shah Isma'il's thesis:

صورت آرایش عالم نگر

یک مه و یک مہر و یک خاتم نگر

Look at the arrangement of the universe;

One sun, one moon and therefore one final prophet.

But then he added that God in his infinite mercy can create many worlds and therefore each world can have a final prophet;

ہر کجا ہنگامہ عالم بود

رحمة اللعالمینہ ہم بود

Wherever the tumultuous clamour of a world arises, There too is a Mercy unto all beings.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Iqbal asks Ghalib to explain the verse more clearly but Ghalib expresses his inability to put in simple words the richness of ideas implied in the verse. Being pressed hard by Iqbal, Ghalib cries out:

خلق و تقدیر و ہدایت ابتداست

رحمة اللعالمینى انتہاست

Creation, shaping and guidance are the beginning, A Mercy unto all beings is the end.

It is a reference to the Quranic verse:

الذی خلق فسوی و الذی قدر فہدی

God created and shaped, determined and guided.⁵¹

God's role in the universe is to create, determine the nature of every object and then to afford it guidance from within its own self. But what is the object of this whole process of creation? It is to reach a stage of perfection that is designated *رحمة اللعالمین* "Mercy unto all," the Perfect Man. He is the final end of creation.

Round a simple verse of Ghalib which, no doubt, is pregnant with great possibilities of meaning, Iqbal has developed a philosophico-theological doctrine of Logos or the Perfect Man.

⁵¹ The Qur'an, lxxxvii. 2-3.

This doctrine was developed by Philo, the Alexandrian Jew under the influence of Greek philosophy and can hardly be said to be compatible with the conception of a theistic God present in the Quran. Between God who is Spirit pure and simple and the universe of matter there can be no direct and immediate contact. The Perfect Man is the intermediary between the two ; it is he who first reflects the light Divine and then distributes it to the universe in ever decreasing degrees. Among Muslim thinkers it was adopted first by Hallaj, then by Ibn al-'Arabi and al-Jili and since then it has become the stock-in-trade of Muslim mystics and poets. Ghalib refers to it in the beginning of the same *Mathnavi*:

جلوة اول که حق بر خویش کرد

مشعل از نور محمد پیش کرد

شد عیان زان نور در نزم ظهور

هرچه پنهان بود از نزدیک و دور

نور حق است احمد و لمعان نور

از نبی و اولیا دارد ظهور

The first epiphany of God directed towards itself

Produced a candle out of Nur-i Muhammad.

All the hidden things of the universe, far and near,

Were made manifest through this light.

Ahmad is the Light of God and reflection of this Light

Is present in every prophet and saint,

This very doctrine of Logos to which Ghalib refers in this Mathnavi has been expounded by Iqbal in explication of one of Ghalib's verses. But Iqbal makes this detailed exposition come from the mouth of Hallaj who expounded it in its mystic rather than philosophic aspect. More-over, Hallaj is not a pantheist like Iqbal while Ghalib after Ibn al-'Arabi was a great advocate of Pantheism.

To conclude with a verse from Ghalib:

در ته بر حرف غالب چیده ام میخانه ی

تا ز دیوانم که سر مست سخن خوابد شدن

Every word of mine is a tavern by itself,

So that it might intoxicate lovers of poetry.⁵²

⁵² Kulliyat, p. 610.

Once more with poppies red and bright Glow the happy hill and
dale;

My Muse is also prompted now

By the warble of nightingale

Flowers bright in the valley gay Like a host of fairies stand:

And in their vestures green and blue They look a jolly band.

The morning wind with gems of dew Has decked the blossoms
all ;

That still more glint and shine When darts of Phoebus fall.

Who can say whether the town is Full of grace or the wold,

When for the display of its charms Woods are liked by Beauty
cold ?

Know yourself, if you wish to grasp The aim and goal of life,

Your forging ties with others matters not ; With yourself have no
strife.

The world of flesh is a world Of Craft, art, loss and gain: The
realm of mind is replete With longing, zeal and pain.

The wealth of mind, if attained, Does not end and does not wane
; Whereas the riches of the world Like a shadow lose and gain.

In world of mind I did not find The kingdom of the Man of West;
The Shaikh and Brahman with their feuds Ruffle not mind's
repose and rest.

The hint of hermit bold

Struck me with woe and shame:

"If your head before others you bow, You cannot rule mind or
frame".

A. A. Shah English rendering of a ghazal in Bāl-i Jibril, 48-49.

IQBAL ON THE CONCEPTION OF MORALITY

K. G. Sadiq*

I propose to discuss in this paper Iqbal's view on the conception of morality. This study will not include an analysis of what the moral philosophers describe first-order ethical terms like 'right', 'good' etc., but will confine itself to an examination of second-order ethical terms as 'moral' or 'non-moral' when these are applied to norms, values, judgements and reasons, etc. The question that I am to discuss shall be in the form, what are the characteristics of a principle which entitle it to be called moral? or what characteristics, formal or material, are intrinsic to morality? Iqbal, it is true, did not write any treatise on morality but his works contain a number of statements which provide a lot of material to answer the question that I propose to discuss.

I

A principle for Iqbal is moral only if it is freely chosen. Further, this choice is exercised when the individual is in possession of complete knowledge about the facts. Conventional values have no place in the thought of Iqbal. Operative principles if accepted blindly or on authority lead to degeneration of the self and thus negate a material condition which Iqbal considers essential to the meaning of morality. For, a moral principle has

not only certain formal features but has also a material condition as intrinsic to its very definition. Iqbal regards integration of personality as built into the very definition of morality.

' Moral reasoning is present if the ego-integration principle is appealed to. A choice is moral if it is ego-sustaining and is immoral if it is ego-dissolving. The moral principle is a vital principle which is legislated not from the consideration of the circumstances of a particular community or people but from a plane of existence which is above spatial and temporal circumstances of a particular group, i.e. a principle is moral if it is not 'culture bound'. It transcends the cultural limitations of a group and thus has the formal characteristics of being universalizable and of being supreme or overriding and is trans-individual.

The social environment to which an individual belongs is made up of customs and traditions, do's and don't's, which were existentially' experienced in the remote past by authentic individuals. Adherence to these for the persons who conceived them was essential to the meaning of morality. With the change of circumstances and conditions which are consequent upon knowledge and experience, conventional values lose their true import. They cannot be, therefore, considered, from the point of later generations, as essential to morality. In order to have a moral point of view one has to rise above the level of conventional values, to a plane of existence which is not tinged with local hue derived from the ethos of a people. The moral law is thus

essentially enacted by a man of Vision. The moral legislator has to tear himself from the fetters of his culture and to seek contact with the roots of his own being. Such a kind of contact Iqbal describes as “Travel into Yourself.” The individual can have the moral point of view even if he remains at the level of customary morality (the stage of obedience to Law), the same point of view is available at the level of reflective morality (the stage of self-overcoming). One can also ascend to the level of creative morality (the stage of Viceregency) and, for Iqbal, a principle to be truly moral has to be enacted from this third and the highest level. When an individual legislates from the level of creative morality his choice is not arbitrary as is the case with some existentialists but is well-grounded and is trans-individual and in a way trans-milieu. This in brief is a statement of Iqbal's conception of morality. He has emphasized both formal and material conditions as essential to the meaning of morality.

II

Iqbal characterizes the moral point of view in individualistic, social and material terms. A principle or norm for Iqbal is moral only if it is freely chosen and is not accepted on authority. In fact conventional values are rejected by Iqbal. Imitation, uncritical acceptance of norms or values leads to degeneration of the self which would in turn negate the material condition or content element of morality. In Payam-1

Mashriq (p. 62), he says:

تراش از تیشۀ خود جادۀ خویش

براه دیگران رفتن عذاب است

گر از دست تو کار نادر آید

گناہے ہم اگر باشد ثواب است

Carve your path with your own axe, Following the beaten track is calamitous. if you accomplish something unique, It is virtue even if it is a sin.

Again (ibid., p. 264):

اگر تقلید بودے شیوہ خوب

پیمبر ہم رہ اجداد رفتے

Had imitation been morally good,

The prophet would have followed the practice of his ancestors.

Again (ibid., p. 64):

میاں آب و گل خلوت گزیدم

از افلاطون و فارابی بریدم

نکردم از کسے در یوزة چشم

جهان را جز بچشم خود ندیدم

In this place of mud and water I took solitary abode, I turned away from Plato and Fārābī; I did not beg for sight from any one,

I have not looked at the world but through my own eyes. Again (ibid., p. 188):

ز خاک خویش طلب آتشی که پیدا نیست

تجلی دگرے در خور تقاضا نیست

Seek from your own clay the fire that is lacking:

The illumination of another person is not worth having.

But is this free choice available to the individual? Is man free or has he to win freedom? From the fact of “guidance and directive control in the ego's activity,” Iqbal concludes that “ego is a free personal causality.” But he warns that there is a constant rise and fall in this power to act freely.⁵³ The ego is most free at the level of appreciative self. At this level it is above distinction of caste and creed, culture and nationality (ibid., p. 91):

⁵³ Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 109.

هنوز از بند آب و گل نه رستی

تو گوئی رسمی و افغانیم من

من اول آدم بے رنگ و بویم

از آن پس هندی و توارانیم من

You have not yet freed yourself from earth-rootedness, You say, I am a Rūmi and an Afghani.

I am first a being above the distinction of colour and scent, Afterward I label myself Hindi or T'titran-I.

Iqbal makes a distinction between the efficient self and the appreciative self.⁵⁴ The former is the practical self of daily life while the latter is one that we have in moments of deepest meditation, when the efficient self is held in abeyance. It is the inner centre of experience. You have freedom in the highest degree when you rise to the level of the appreciative self. Free choice is truly speaking choice exercised by the appreciative self. At this level the individual is in direct contact with the roots of his own being. His Vision of life and Values goes beyond the limitations of time and space. In *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadid*, he says:

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 47.

بخود پیچیم و برے تاب نمودیم
که ماموجیم و از قصر وجودیم
دما دم خویش را اندر کمین باش
گریزان از گمان سوئے یقین باش
تب و تاب محبت را فنا نیست
یقین و دید را نیز انتها نیست
کمال زندگی دیدار ذات است
طریقش رستن از بند جهات است
چنان با ذات حق خلوت گزینی
ترا او بیند و او را تو بینی
منور شو ز نور من یرانی
مژه برهم مزن تو خود نمایی
بخود محکم گزار اندر حضورش

Our selves are our centres and pine for manifestation, For we are Waves and rise from the bottom of Being. Lie in constant ambush against the self, Fly from doubt to faith and certainty.

The fire and ardour of love are not subject to extinction ; Faith and 'sight' have no end.

The perfection of life consists in seeing the Essence,

The way of achieving it is to free oneself from the limits of time and space.

You should enjoy privacy with the Divine Person in such a way, That He sees you and you see Him.

Become illumined by the light of “What you see,”

Do not wink, otherwise you will be no more.

In His presence, be strong and self-possessed,

Don't merge yourself in the Ocean of His light.⁵⁵

This 'sinking' in the depth of the appreciative self yields an experience which Iqbal terms as “vital way of appropriating the world.” The moral legislator views human situation from that

⁵⁵ Question 7, lines 15-28. Translation by B. A. Dar.

point of view. It is creative of norms and values. At this level the norms are intuited. In Zabur-i 'Ajam (p. 167) he says:

خوشا کسے کہ حرم را درون سینہ شناخت

دمے تپید و گزشت از مقام گفت و شنود

How happy the man who recognizes the Sanctuary in his own bosom,

Ile consumed himself for a while and passed beyond the stage of argumentation.

But when the norms and values thus discovered are given content, limitations creep in. In Payām-i Mashriq (p. 76), he says:

تراشیدم صنم بر صورت خویش

بشکل خود خدا را نقش بستم

مرا از خود برون رفتن محال است

بہر رنگے کہ ہستم خود پرستم

I carved idols after my own image,

I pictured even God after my own form.

I cannot transcend limitations of my being,

Whatever form I assume I worship my own self.

Again (ibid., p. 71):

هزاران سال با فطرت نشستم

با و پیوستم و از خود گسستم

و لیکن سر گذشتم این دو حرف است

تراشیدم، پرستیدم، شکستم

For thousand years I sat with nature,

I became tagged to her and broke away from myself.

My story is contained in these words:

I carved idols, worshipped them and broke them later on.

Thus for Iqbal a principle or norm is moral when it is freely chosen in the light of available knowledge, i.e. is not taken on authority. Those who remain at the level of custom sink to a sub-human plane. Iqbal quotes in two of his works Rumi's famous lines about a Shaykh who, in broad-day light, was roaming about with a lamp in hand in search of a real man. The followers of custom appeared animals and beasts to the Shaykh:

دی شیخ با چراغ همی گشت کرد شهر

کز دام و دد ملولم و انسانم آرزوست

زین ہمرہان سست عناصر دلم گرفت

شیر خدا و رستم دستانم آرزوست

Yesterday the Master with a lantern was roaming about the city, Crying, 'I am tired of devil and beast, I desire a man. My heart is weary of these weak-spirited companions; I desire the Lion of God and Rustam, son of Zal.'

Vision of values and norms bestow upon the individual unlimited Power. He regards his principles supreme. He says (Bang-i Dara, p. 292):

برتر از اندیشۂ سود و زیاں ہے زندگی

ہے کبھی جاں اور کبھی تسلیم جاں ہے زندگی

Life is above the consideration of profit and loss.

Sometimes it is synonymous with soul and sometimes it is surrendering the soul.

Now if a principle is moral only if it is freely chosen and is also held supreme by the individual, on what basis can it be conceived as trans-individual? It may be binding on the individual who discovers it or creates it. It is immersed in pure subjectivity.

May we not say with the existentialists that norms and values are not valid in themselves. Your norms are valid for you only. You take away my freedom when you give to your norms social currency. On what basis do you claim trans-individual validity for your judgement? At one point you condemn uncritical acceptance of norms and values and at another you consider your moral principle as trans-individual. Iqbal establishes the trans-individual character of moral law on the basis of his ontological position. The plane of appreciative self is the same for all. Moral law at that plane is universal. The appreciative self brings home to you that “we are waves and rise from the bottom of Being.”⁵⁶ It is this contact 'I with the source of all norms and values that guarantees trans-individual validity to principles subjectively discovered.

Nothing has so far been said about the material or content of the moral principle. Only formal characteristics of a moral principle have been stipulated. These characteristics are: a principle is moral if it is chosen freely in the light of full knowledge of facts, is held supreme, is universalizable and trans-individual. Iqbal believes that the moral law has a content aspect as well. For Iqbal the goal of moral activity is integration of self or personality. Iqbal conceives human personality as an act. “Thus my personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another and held together by the unity of a directive purpose.”⁵⁷ Further, he says, in the

⁵⁶ Gulshan-i Raz-i Jadid, question 7, line 16.

⁵⁷ Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 103.

English introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, “The idea of personality gives us a standard of value, it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the stand point of personality.” In a poem in *Bāl-e Jibreel* (p. 98), he says:

سرود و شعر و سیاست کتاب و دین و ہنر

گہر ہیں ان کی گرہ میں تمام یکدانہ

ضمیر بندۂ خاکی سے ہے نمود ان کی

بلند تر ہے ستاروں سے ان کا کاشانہ

اگر خودی کی حفاظت کریں تو عین حیات

نہ کر سکیں تو سراپا فسوں و افسانہ

Music, poetry and politics, literature, religion and art—All these contain in their fold pearls of a unique kind. These disciplines grow from the conscience of man. Their abode is higher than that of the stars.

If they fortify the ego they become the very essence of life, If they fail, they are mere illusion and fiction.

The social concern of the moral law is equally important. Self cannot develop in isolation. It needs a social environment and cannot exist without it. He says (Bāng-i Dara, p. 210):

فرد قائم ربط ملت سے تنہا کچھ نہیں

موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرون دریا کچھ نہیں

Individual exists by virtue of his ties with Millat, A wave can exist only in a river, Outside the river it is nothing.

This development of the individual is fully represented by the two concepts of 'Ishq and Faqr, the positive and negative aspects of La ilaha Wallah. 'Ishq stands for love and sustained devotion to the ideal and Faqr “indicates that attitude of mind which enables a man to strive, shunning all delights and all rewards except the attainment of worthy ends.” This attitude prepares the individual to fight against all forces of evil, to rescue mankind from servitude. But the real progress of society depends on mard-i hur (cf. Pas Chey Bāyad Kard). Self-centred individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They disclose new standards in the light of which we begin to see that our environment is not wholly inviolable and requires revision.⁵⁸ He says:

آگ اس کی پھونک دیتی ہے برنا و پیر کو

⁵⁸ Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 151.

لاکھوں میں ایک بھی ہو اگر صاحب یقین

His fire ignites the young and the old,

If there is only one man of faith in a multitude of thousands.

Iqbal conceives three stages in the normal development of the individual i.e. stages in the self-integration of the person. These are

(i) obedience to Law. Here the individual is required to conform to the operative values of the group. The moral law is a force that acts from outside. This stage is followed by (ii) self-control or self-overcoming. This self-control or self-overcoming is a common feature to all conceptions of morality in the ancient and the modern world. “Specific differences between particular moralities may be due,” says Walter A. Kaufmann, “to divergent conceptions not only of the aim and sanction, but also of the manner of self-overcoming. Thus the classical ideal was that reason should control the inclinations, while Kant insisted that inclination must be overcome to the extent that it may not be a co-motive of action.”⁵⁹ This self-control for Iqbal is the control of the efficient self by the appreciative self. The third stage is possible only if appreciative self rules and directs the efficient self (Darb-i Kalim, p. 71):

صبح ازل یہ مجھ سے کہا جبرئیل نے

⁵⁹ Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 187.

جو عقل کا غلام ہو وہ دل نہ کر قبول

At the beginning of life Gabriel told me:

Do not accept a heart which is a slave of reason.

The vital experience of the appreciative self is the essence while ends and objectives, values and 'norms' are its changing manifestations. In Nietzschean terminology they are mere foregrounds. The third state is the stage of Divine Vicegerency, the stage of creative morality. In my account of Iqbal's conception of morality I have considered it from the point of view of the third stage.

III

Now on the questions: (i) whether or not a claim to intersubjective validity is to be taken as essential to moral judgement and (ii) whether or not a material (individual and social) concern is to be regarded as essential to morality, Iqbal's position is quite clear. Iqbal claims intersubjective validity as essential to moral judgement. It is true that universal agreement on moral judgements may not be available, but we never make a claim that a moral judgement has no validity beyond ourselves. Our disagreement on moral judgements may be due to the difference in the levels of our moral development. The point of view at the stage of obedience to law or conformity to operative values is narrower and culture-oriented as compared with the one

you have at the stage of creative morality. This has been conceded by Ayer. If there is this difference then the intersubjective validity of moral judgement is restricted to the level of the group you belong to. Even thus understood its validity is not confined to ourselves. Again disagreement on moral matters are partly resolved with more factual enlightenment. pierce was giving expression to the faith of the moralists when he said that those who share the moral point of view will agree in the end, as those will, who share the scientific point of view. A scientist has to check his data and rearrange his facts if he finds that others in the field do not agree with his conclusion. Similarly if in morals despite agreements on facts if still there is disagreement the individual must ask himself if his judgement has really been made from the moral point of view.

As to the question whether or not material concern is to be regarded as essential to morality, Iqbal's answer is in the affirmative. As referred to above Iqbal recommends that ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality. It may be here noted that Iqbal's use of morality is a descriptive claim and not a normative claim. A descriptive claim implies that the term is actually used in the sense specified while a normative claim makes a proposal about the use of the term.

Before proceeding further one clarification about Iqbal's conception of morality is required. This pertains to the fact that individual concern is held by Iqbal as essential to morality. It may be argued that ego-centred morality is only enlightened self-

interest. To regard social concern as essential to morality may be acceptable but to confine morality to individual concern may distort morality beyond recognition. Such a line of argument will amount to a complete misunderstanding of Iqbal's position regarding the inherent unity of individuals and also the task of his mard-i hur or mard-i momin. His rider of destiny is to silence the noise of nations, has to harp the tune of brotherhood and to bring once more days of peace to the world.⁶⁰

About the unity of mankind he says:

نه افغانيم و نه ترک و تتراريم

چمن زاديم و از يک شاخساريم

تميز رنگ و بو بر ما حرام است

که ما پرورده يک نوبهاريم

We are neither Afghans nor Turks nor sons of Tartary. We are born in a garden, are from one branch. The distinction of scent and colour is forbidden for us For we are the nurslings of one spring time.

Thus the material concern essential to morality for Iqbal is individualistic and social and the charge of narrow egoism does not hold good. But even if we concede that, for Iqbal, material

⁶⁰ Cf. The Secrets of the Self, Eng. trans., pp. 83-84.

concern intrinsic to morality is social, the position is not unassailable. The followers of Kant may say that moral law is only formal, and it has no content. Thus content reference is not essential to morality. It may be urged that we do not in fact apply the term moral only to those judgements which appeal to the social concern. Some apply it even to those judgements which appeal to the will of God. Again, the intuitionists may deny that all moral duties have a social reference. Thus social concern is not in fact taken as necessary condition of morality. Nor can it be regarded as a sufficient condition for the obvious reason that without the condition of universalization there can hardly be any morality. And lastly if a person were to ask: why should I be socially oriented? there is no answer. Morality should carry its own sanction. It should, there-fore, be defined in a way that the individual cannot sensibly ask but why? Iqbal's conception of morality does not fulfil this condition.

THE ETHICAL INTENSION OF SPINOZA'S METHODOLOGY

Martin A. Bertman*

For Spinoza the supreme source of happiness resides in the fulfilment of the capacity to know the truth. This, in fact, is the essence of man. That is, the preservation of ourselves as human beings is linked to the highest fulfilment of ourselves as creatures that know. Self-love and self-striving—*conatus*—needs both a goal and a method for achieving the goal. This paper examines both the method and the goal of human *conatus* in Spinoza. "Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam—the striving by which each thing tries to persevere in its being is nothing else that, the actual essence of the thing itself."⁶¹

We will proceed not only by investigating the Ethics, Spinoza's masterpiece, but also by discussing his somewhat neglected *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding). In fact, the *Emendatione*, unimpeded by the geometric form *ordine geometrico*—of the Ethics, presents the ethical intension of Spinoza's methodology in

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⁶¹ Ethics (White and Sterling), Part iv, Appendix.

a succinct and direct manner: his view that the maturity and adequacy of human happiness depends upon the improvement and the correct use of the understanding.

In the "Prooemium," the brief introductory section of the *Emendatione*, Spinoza presents us, in a general way, through human experience, the need for searching for supreme happiness and consequently, a method for making the search. The "Prooemium" is auto biographical ; it emphasizes the frustrations and futilities of the common desires and loves of most men ; especially, it stresses the illusion of sensual experience—for it is the unreality or, more precisely, the inability to satisfy, of the experiential, finite world that gives rise to a conscious demand for truth ; and, therefore, he provides provisional rules for living while searching for the truth which is equated with the supreme good—*summum bonum*.

In this we find a marked similarity with Descartes' *A Discourse on Method* in its introductory sections. However, there is an interesting difference between the two. Whereas Descartes claims to seek merely a measure of certainty—"I ever had an exceeding desire to learn to distinguish truth from falsehood, that I might see the way clearly in my actions and walk with

confidence in life,"⁶²—Spinoza wishes for nothing less than "knowledge of the union of the mind with the whole of nature."⁶³

This knowledge will affirm that "The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God."⁶⁴ For the attainment of this "intellectual love of God"—*amor Dei intellectualis*—we must direct all pursuits. Health, wealth, pleasure of the senses, the sciences, are merely as valuable as they are helpful to this end. Those things which are not helpful are to be disdained as time consuming hindrances.

So then the "Brooemium" asserts, "All our happiness or unhappiness depends on one thing alone, the quality of the object to which we direct our love."⁶⁵ And since the true object of our love should be a "good certain by its very nature," that is what experience teaches, we must find a method to know "an eternal and infinite thing," the object of justifiable love and the source of enduring happiness: God.

With this goal before us, Spinoza is under the obligation of providing a method for the mind's *emendatio*. A method which will provide certain knowledge of the eternal essence of things. Thus, in the *Emendatione*, Spinoza proceeds to examine the various ways we know and the nature and reliability of each of

⁶² Descartes, trans., E. S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 1, (New York, Dover, 1931) p. 87.

⁶³ Spinoza, trans., J. Katz, *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1958) p. 6.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Ethics*, Part v, Props. xxv—xxxiii.

⁶⁵ *On the Improvement of the Understanding*, p. 5.

these ways of knowing, "rendering the understanding capable of the reasoning that is necessary for the goal of attaining the state of supreme blessedness."⁶⁶

The "proof" of the power and certainty of true ideas or the correct perception by the understanding of Reality⁶⁷ depends on the metaphysical awareness of the essence of ideas. We must understand that for Spinoza true ideas have a distinct metaphysical status, providing certainty rather than the uncertain status of what a Kantian milieu would later call empirical psychology. Indeed, Spinoza criticized Descartes for occupying him-self with signs and criteria of true ideas whereas for him ideas are true by their own nature. This does not mean that true ideas do not conform with the things that they represent but rather that the representation with its finite quality does not provide the eternal and essential character of true ideas: ideas are self-evincing, they alone guarantee themselves. It is therefore, by the logical dependencies of ideas and not their psychological or historical sequences that one finds "the knowledge of the union of the mind with the whole of nature."⁶⁸

Spinoza calls the ultimate metaphysical principle God Who may be thought of as the total possibility and expression of the universe, understood as logical necessity. It is Spinoza's constant reference to God, in this logical sense, that emphatically presents

⁶⁶ . Ibid., p. 7.

⁶⁷ Cf. Martin A. Bertman, "Philosophical Notes on the Usage of Reality" Rendezvous, 1968.

⁶⁸ Ethics, Part i, prop. xv.

God as the ultimate principle of explanation. "From the supreme power of God, or from his infinite nature, infinite things in infinite ways, that is to say all things, have necessarily flowed, or continually flow by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles."⁶⁹ Therefore, we have the methodological precept that all things must begin with the idea of God, since we are given to understand that all things are connected and conceived as continuous by and in God.

It is therefore no surprise that in the Ethics the initial and crucial principles concern the nature of God and upon these the entire system depends. God is the living symbol and power of the intelligibility of things. There are no nuggets of unattached or unattachable existence; all things relate to and interact with each other in a logical and necessary unity. The existence of God is further validated by the logical order of ideas derived from the idea of God which finds a confirming reference in the representation of objects. Obviously psychological or historical experience (*experientia vaga*) cannot give us knowledge of the unity of things; the origin of this knowledge, Spinoza asserts, is in impressions modifying the body. This gives us only partial and mutilated knowledge. The principle of unity (which leads us to truth) must therefore be of an internal rather than an external character. Thus a knowledge of eternal essences, a knowledge

⁶⁹ Ibid., prop. xvii, Scholium. Spinoza, trans., A. Bople, Ethics (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 68.

necessary for the fulfilment of our conatus, must explore the operations of our mind.

It is consequently necessary to demarcate the possible ways of knowing and their distinctive character since not all of the ways we know may be adequate for providing true knowledge. Spinoza (Ethics ii. 40, note 2)⁷⁰ lists in a tripartite division the ways we know; in the *Emendatione*, he divides them into four parts. Since, in both works the substance of the listings is equivalent, I will merely quote the *Emendatione*.

We have knowledge (*perceptio*) in the following ways:

1. Through hearsay or some arbitrary sign (*ex auditu*).

2. Resulting from uncritical experience, that is, from experience which has not been subject to full reasoning, so that we accept the evidence of random events without testing one experience by the others (*ab experientia vaga*).

3. By inferring the essence of one thing from another, but not adequately, either when we infer a cause from some effect or when it is concluded from some general proposition is accompanied always by some property (*ratio*).

4. By comprehending a thing through its essence or proximate cause (*scientia intuitiva*).⁷¹

⁷⁰ On the Improvement of the Understanding, p. 7.

⁷¹ Spinoza, trans., R. H M. Elwes, *The Chief Works*, of Spinoza vol. 2, (New York, Dover, 1955) p. 316.

The first, *ex audito*, is obviously incapable of giving us adequate knowledge of the nature and power of things or of their relationships to one another. Consequently, we may immediately dismiss it, as it certainly will never achieve true ideas except in a random and accidental manner. In the Ethics this kind of knowledge is combined with *experientia vaga*. It is there called knowing from *opinio* or *imaginatio*.

It follows then that the second kind of knowledge, *experientia vaga*, is rejected. In Epistle X to De Vries, Spinoza says, "Experience does not teach us the essence of things; the utmost which it can effect is to determine our mind so that it thinks of certain essences of things."⁷² It is in the same letter to De Vries that he says, "We do not need experience in the case of those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence."⁷³ Thus we see the basis for dismissing this kind of knowledge is that we are seeking eternal truth, truth where essence and existence are not distinguishable.

When most men talk about experience they mean something whose nature is accidental and arbitrary. Such a view of experience is due to a certain kind of mental operation, since mind is the only thing that and when it knows imperfectly it is because it can function in that manner. The reason that mind does function in that manner we find in a long discussion in the Ethics, Part 2. The explanation given there is that the human body is of a

⁷² Ibid., p 317.

⁷³ Ethics, p. 46.

certain nature which comes into contact with other bodies that modify it and this modification is then translated into mental awareness. "The object of the idea constituting the mind is the body, and nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind" (Ethics, ii, I2.)⁷⁴

It is further apparent that common experience cannot deal with the eternal essence of things but merely with their properties in time and even here in an inexact manner. Thus the judgments we make here are uncertain and their claim for truth cannot be included in an adequate ordering demanded by a rational epistemology. The knowledge given by common experience suggests the need for a more certain exposition of the truth of things—for a rational science. Spinoza implies that we would know more of the properties of finite things if we returned to experience after having achieved knowledge of the eternal essence through *scientia intuitiva*. Since we would then return to experience armed with a knowledge of the basic structure of reality when we come upon a property of a finite thing we would no longer be uncertain as to whether it belongs to the essence of that thing.

The third kind of knowledge, *ratio*, furnishes us with extremely general, true ideas of things. It serves to check knowledge *ex audito* and *ab experientia vaga*, by testing them for coherence and non-contradiction. However, it can more easily deal with *ex audito* than with *ab experientia vaga* since the latter can

⁷⁴ Ibid , p. 65.

sometimes be outside of the therapeutic range of ratio. Ultimately, ratio fails in the necessary advancement of the understanding, for it is limited in its exact deduction of essences and properties. Its premises are rooted in the imagination rather than in the understanding. Spinoza gives an example of the knowledge ratio provides as "that there is an awareness of the connection of mind and body." In Ethics, ii, 38.1 Spinoza is concerned to establish the universality of the knowledge "certain ideas or notions are common to all men."⁷⁵

Thus there seems to be the implication that men grasp by an encounter with experience some certain truths; that is, some truth can be grasped through the addition of an outer element as well as intrinsically. Nevertheless, an extrinsic understanding upon which it seems ratio has its basis is neither complete nor exact enough for knowledge of God or of "the mind in its relationship to nature."

The truth which has its basis intrinsically not only has a grasp of the nature of individual things in an exact manner, but seems to imply the necessity and therefore the exact awareness of actual existence. For instance, the knowledge of proportionality is not merely having the Euclidean demonstration of it, but of having a knowledge of it somehow at once both reasonable and actual .

Therefore the adequate knowledge of things, *scientia intuitiva*, involves intrinsic truth which enables us to:

⁷⁵ On the Improvement of the Understanding, p. 10.

1. Establish correctly the differences, similarities, and opposition of things,

2. Determine exactly the extent to which things can or cannot be acted upon,

3. Compare the nature and powers of things with those of man. In this way the highest perfection to which man can attain will easily become apparent.⁷⁶

To ask why *sicentia intuitiva* enables us to understand adequately is in a sense superfluous; it is self-evincing. "He who has a true idea, knows at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt of the truth of the thing" (Ethics, ii, 43).⁷⁷ For Spinoza, God, existence *causa sui*, is the exemplar of an adequate idea. It has a supreme necessity to it and thus a 'simplicity'. Spinoza finds Truth is both evident with itself and consistent with itself at all points.⁷⁸ Consequently, a basis, a *grundlage* is made possible for an adequate or true method since "those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it" (Ethics, ii. 40).⁷⁹ Furthermore, clarifying his position, Spinoza states: "It is the nature of reason to consider things not as contingent but as necessary" (Ethics, ii, 44),⁸⁰ and "it is through the imagination alone that we look at things as

⁷⁶ Ethics, p. 69.

⁷⁷ Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (New York, Meridian Press, 1958) Ch. XV, XVI.

⁷⁸ Ethics, p. 66.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

contingent both with reference to the past and the future."⁸¹ If we grant this formaliter character of truth, Spinoza has the obligation of discussing the relation wherein objects depend on ideas or, to be more exact, the adequate mapping of objects by ideas. Spinoza is aware that there is no adequate empirical methodology for discussing "facts"; he has already accepted the position that objects can only be known by our ideas of them. He presents the thesis that it is only through our idea of ideas, *idea ideae* or *cognito reflexia*, that this difficulty is overcome. Thought, when it thinks about itself and its operations, understands that knowing conceives the known adequately.

This may be more easily understood if we have a true estimation of the substantial identity of the attributes: body and mind. "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body of a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else" (*Ethics*, ii, I3).⁸² Therefore, we must examine reflexive knowledge under the attribute of body. It would seem that reflexive knowledge, which in Spinoza's thought allows for the possibility of adequate method is directly connected to modifications of the body and, some clear native ideas, which are provided because our bodies are of a certain nature. But the relationship of mind and body is clearly stated—"The mind and body are the

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

same individual considered under one and then, the other attribute" (Ethics, ii, 21, note).⁸³

That a true idea has a distinct essence from its ideatum but that it is not entirely different from it is evident in that it adequately re-presents the ideatum. Further, an idea of an idea of an object also includes the object, but more indirectly since its immediate object is the idea of the object. Thus, Peter, the idea of Peter, and the idea of the idea of Peter, are each distinct in its own essence. When the idea of Peter is adequate, certainty is affirmed of the actual object; Peter is known. There is no need to find how we know that we know, *ad infinitum*.

However, let us consider the case where the idea of Peter is inadequate. We may know that it is inadequate. We know it is inadequate by considering the idea of Peter; thus, in other words, the idea of the inadequate idea of Peter may itself be adequate. Reflexive knowledge has the character of self-appraisal.

Spinoza speaks of ideas that appear certain but are false; these ideas are seen to be inadequate by reflexive knowledge. Now we might ask how these certain ideas, the appraising ones that are reflexive, are also not merely apparently certain, *ad infinitum*. It would seem that Spinoza is paradoxically saying that we are aware that even when we have a certain idea it may be uncertain. This is nonsense. What he does seem to be saying is that the nature of reflexive knowledge is to draw implications which show it to have

⁸³ On the Improvement of the Understanding, p. 14.

or not to have logical and ontological validity. The establishment of certainty would ultimately seem to be rooted in the ultimate principle of unity, the essence of God. Spinoza says as much in the following: "From the point that an idea must agree in all respects with its formal essence, it is clear that in order that our mind may represent a true example of nature, it must produce its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of all nature, so that it may become the source of other ideas."⁸⁴ This indeed might be considered an indirect proof for the existence of God, having Him as the necessary condition of adequate knowing. Thereby, God is presented before the mind in an idea which it cannot doubt and still continue to remain an instrument capable of knowledge.

The usual way to reflexive knowledge and the conception of eternal essences, including God, is to reflect upon some true native idea. But, we might ask, as Spinoza puts it, about that "skeptic who remains in doubt about the existence of a first truth and about all the deductions that can be made following the standard set by this first truth."⁸⁵ Such a person, the answer is now apparent, can have no criterion for truth at all; if nothing is accepted as a simple certainty there is no basis to hold any intelligible order of conceptions together. The logical laws lose every validity to establish knowledge, since they also are set upon as uncertain, at least in the sense of intrinsic or ontological necessity.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

This ontological necessity is demanded if we accept Spinoza's reasoning about the substantial unity of the attributes. "If is to be noted that ideas have the same character in the realm of thought that their corresponding objects have in reality."⁸⁶ Nevertheless, it is to be observed that an idea does not have to agree with external perceptions; whether or not empirical experience confirms the self-evidencing truth of ideas should not change the judgement of their adequacy. This may be understood from what has been already shown: "It is by reasoning well that we prove the adequacy of reasoning and continue to prove it."⁸⁷ In other words one comes to adequate ideas by what it essentially is and not by what it recalls as external experiences ; its experiencing cannot be dirempted from the powers of the mind in its presentation of experience. The mind never experiences itself ; it experiences an idea of itself. It is aware of its own essence through its power of cogito reflexivia, but to experience itself in the sense of a direct spontaneous awareness of its operations is out of the question. Likewise, Spinoza implies, to experience God directly is not possible though we can experience our understanding of His eternal essence. Therefore "The intellectual love of God" is a grasping of our own essential nature both in the striving, its conatus, and in the eternal essence, its necessary dependence on and expression of the principle and power of all reality, God.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

⁸⁷ James Collins, A History of Modern European Philosophy (Bruce, Milwaukee, 1954), p. 208.

What Spinoza presents as an ethic is, in the words of James Collins, "To seek the idea of God is to seek to know oneself in the most radical way, as an expression of the divine thought: the human mind not only has but is an idea of God."⁸⁸ Furthermore, since Spinoza asserts that "each body, in so far as its existence is subject to certain laws, has to be considered as a part of the whole universe, has to be in accord with the whole of it, and finally has to be connected with the other parts"⁸⁹ therefore each human being can find supreme happiness—*summum bonum*—only by a method that presents the rational order of the universe or nature; so we have it—*Deu sive Natura*. "God is the immanent cause of all things."⁹⁰ This ontological insight becomes for Spinoza the highest ethical goal, providing supreme blessedness.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Spinoza, *Correspondence*, edited by A. Wolf (London, 1928), Letter xxxii to Henry Oldenburg.

⁸⁹ *Ethics*, Part i, prop. xviii.

⁹⁰ Cf. Martin A. Bertman, "The Ethical Hedonism of M. Schlick," *Studies in Philosophy and History of Philosophy*, vol. v, for the problems besetting an empirical ethics.

⁹¹ Also, Martin A. Bertman, "Camus: From Indifference to Commitment," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, accepted for 1970, for an existential ethics.

METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TRACTATUS ON SPACE AND TIME

A. H. Kamali

‘Ayn al-Qudat Hamadani, a Persian scholar, wrote a Tractatus on Space and Time in Persian, known as Ghāyat al-Imkān fi Darāyat al-Makān. Iqbal obtained its manuscript copy through the courtesy of Maulānā Anwar Shāh of Deoband. In the absence of any clear indication, Iqbal took it as the work of ‘Irāqi and used it as such in his Re-construction of Religious Thought in Islam. The Iqbal Academy has got the whole Tractatus translated into English, which is expected to be published soon.

Besides the translation, the translator has given in the second part a detailed historical and philosophical account of this important problem. The following is the first chapter of the second part.

This Tractate on Space and Time is a very thought provoking contribution by Abu’l Ma’ālī ‘Abdullāh b. Mohammad b. ‘Ali (d. 525 Hijra) in an hour of crisis in Muslim thought and culture.

The philosophies of Fārābi (d. 339. A.H.) and Avicenna (d. 428 A.H.), in sympathy with the Karamites and Bātiniya movements meant a total metamorphosis of Islam by making its fundamental outlook amenable to the principles and premises of ‘Mediationism’ as necessary chain in the structure of reality from

God to man.⁹² The endogamous trends of Islam, the Ash'arites as much as the Mu'tazilites, felt the danger inherent in this movement against the foundations of Islam, which permit no intermediation between God and man. It was in this context that Ghazāli (d. 505 A.H.), mostly by rebuilding the principles of the Ash'arite philosophy, advanced a refutation of Avicenna and al-Fārābi in his book *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*. His *Tahāfut* however went beyond what was warranted by Islam and touched the opposite extreme of arbitrarism in the universe, a world-view which could hardly be justified from the point of view of Muslim Theology. It erased nearly every thing rational, and put the entire reality, one and all concrete existent, at the mercy of an unprincipled will with little scope of orderliness in the world and nature ; and reduced everything, its essence, its property and its characteristics, to mere accidents, which may appear here and there without an intelligible order or plan. Avicenna, however, had preserved the order, but, it too was under a schema which never could be reconciled with Islam. He limited the First Principle (God) to a Generality which does not touch, or move, the concrete manifestations of the sub-lunary world, thus making a series of intermediaries inevitable. The First Cause created or to be more exact, produced, the first effect, which in turn created the second effect, and so on till the elements of the sub-lunary world were produced with their concrete principles of change and effects, generation and corruption. Thus God, in Avicenna, is removed far away from his creation, i.e., the concrete individuals and the temporal entities,

⁹² Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Najaf* (Egypt, 1938), pp. 448-55.

which duly attain an intelligible order, based on the axiom that 'Nothing proceeds from the one except one.'⁹³

Al-Hamadāni's *Tractatus on Space and Time* was fundamentally addressed to this problem, which demanded a workable synthesis of the rational order and Divine immediacy as necessary bases for the development and consolidation of the theoretical system of Islam. Al-Hamadāni's *Tractatus* was exactly written in this background. The metaphysical inquiry thus pervading its choice of terms was sharply focussed on two issues: (1) how does the Temporal proceed from the Eternal First? and (2) how does the First comprehend the particulars? These two questions had laid down guide line for Ghazali's *Tahafut*, and the same orientated the problems of Averroes' *Tahāfut al-Tahāfa*, a century later (d. 595 A.H.). By expounding three categories or grades of space and time, al-Hamadāni made a most original contribution in the history of Muslim thought.

Al-Hamadāni was a pupil and disciple of Abu'l Futuh Ahmad al-Ghazālī (d. 520 A.H.),⁹⁴ who is known to have paraphrased the *Ihya al-'Ulam al-Din* of his elder brother, Abu Hāmid al-Ghazālī, to whom he succeeded as leader of the school. Thus, al-Hamadāni was thoroughly trained in the ways of and alive to the problems of this school and contributed his own theory in the light of Islam and the Rationalism natural to it. His theory of space and time was meant to overcome the shortcomings of Ghazali's *Tahāfut*,

⁹³ Ibid ; *Kitāb al-Shifā*, vol. vi (Teheran 1885), p. 6.

⁹⁴ Rahim Fermentish, *Ahwal wa Athar 'Ayn al-Quṣat*, (Tehran, 1338 Shamsi), pp. 12-26.

which for the preservation of Divine Immediacy as basic principle of Islam, denounced all kinds of natural and efficient causality as to be of the nature of a spur of will, with no guarantee of its certitude and continuity in future.

The issues involved in the controversies between the philosophers (Fārābi and Avicenna) and the Ash'arites (Mutakalimin and Ghazālī) around the problem of Divine Immediacy and World Order might be best stated by reproducing from No. X11I of the *Tahāfut*. Ghazālī writes, "They are all agreed on this. Those who believe that God knows nothing but Himself are obviously committed to it. But even those who hold that He knows the other—the position adopted by Ibn Sinā—assert that He knows things by a universal knowledge which does not fall under Time, and which does not change through the Past, the Present, and the Future. And in spite of this, it is asserted, (by Ibn Sinā who represents the latter) that "nothing--not even as much as a particle of dust, in the heavens, or on the earth—is hidden from His knowledge--only that he knows the particular in a Universal manner."⁹⁵

Ghazālī criticises this theory. Later, Averroes confirms much of his criticism, assails Avicenna and then expounds the proper position in this respect. Ghazālī said that if God's knowledge of a temporal and transient body is uninfluenced by Time and change, and He knows it only by a changeless knowledge, then he does

⁹⁵ *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, English translation Sabih Ahmad Kamali, (Lahore, 1958), p. 153.

not know it at all. "Thus, at the time of an eclipse, it cannot be said that He knows that it exists now. Nor after the eclipse, can it be said that He knows that now it has cleared away. For nothing which is necessarily defined in relation to Time can conceivably be known to Him for such knowledge would necessitate a change in the knower."⁹⁶ In modern terminology, Avicenna meant that God's knowledge is nomothetic and not idiographic. Ghazālī made the same objection as Windleband (d. 1334/1915) made about the nomothetic knowledge that it cannot catch hold of the individual things and events.⁹⁷ According to Avicenna's statement, "He knows everything universally. As far as the person of Zaid is concerned, it is distinguishable from that of 'Amr only for the senses, not for the intellect. For the basis of distinction is the designation of a particular dimension, while the intellect apprehends only the absolute and the universal dimension, or the universal space. When we say, 'This and this', we allude to a relation which is perceptible object vis-a-vis the percipient because of its being near to, or far from, him or being situated in a particular direction. And this is impossible in the case of God."⁹⁸ The above point of view is based on a very noble motive, namely, to state the nature of Divine Knowledge in keeping with the Divine Nature that God is changeless and Eternal and that His Existence is free from the directions of 'here' and 'now'. It led Avicenna to infer that Divine omniscience is of universal manner.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 154.

⁹⁷ Heinrich Rickert, *Science and History*, Eng. trans., George Reismann (New York, 1962), pp. 56-61.

⁹⁸ *Tahafut al-Falāsifah*, loc. cit., p. 155.

But this solution sets a limit of another type on God. It confines Him to the knowledge of universals only, allowing Him no knowledge of the particulars as they are. Ghazālī rehabilitated divine knowledge of the individual things in the individual way (idiographic) by stating that the knowledge of temporal or transient object does not involve a change in the Divine Essence. This solution, however, could not meet the philosophical difficulties that knowledge of a temporal and spatial entity involves its temporal and spatial relations with the knowing essence, and that there should be some position at which the subject is in the relation of ‘here’ and ‘now’ with it. It means ascribing of hither and thither to God. Thus, both Avicenna and Ghazālī failed one way or the other in representing the First Essence in relation with the perceptible objects. Shortcomings of their respective premises were exposed by Averroes in *Tahāfut al Tahāfa*.⁹⁹

Knowledge of the individual entities, that is idiographic knowledge, in the case of God, cannot be denied. It is clear that Universal know-ledge cannot replace it. But, it demands a spatio-temporal frame of reference which relates the knower and the known. Hamadāni was then in the right to have deduced a Divine Space and a Divine Time, which would make the idiographic knowledge of God as a metaphysically acceptable proposition. But, before we could appreciate it, it seems desirable to explore the discussions of Ibn Rushd on this problem.

⁹⁹ Also *Fasl al-Maqāl*, Urdu trans. ‘Ubaidullah Qudsi, (Karachi, 1967), *Kit mā b’ ad al-Tabi’yah* (Hyderabad, 1365 A.H.), pp. 119-126.

Ibn Rushd acknowledges Ghazālī's analysis which brings to light that the concrete awareness (idiographic or individual) is irreducible to abstract awareness (universal or general knowledge). He thoroughly repudiates Ibn Sinā and his forerunner al-Fārābī on the score, but at the same time, assails Ghazālī's conclusions as mere sophistry or dialectic, based on either tradition, or popular opinion, and not on the first principles, nor on self-evident truths and clear demonstration. To offer his own solutions, he denies the possibility of comparison between divine knowledge and the human perception of the transient thing. "It is impossible, according to the philosophers, that God's knowledge should be analogous to ours. He who believes this makes God an eternal man, and man a mortal God."¹⁰⁰ Ibn Rushd holds that Divine knowledge cannot be like universal knowledge, for universalization is a human act and consequence of man's intellectual faculty. Nor can it be like individual knowledge, for it is also a human faculty. He says, "The most competent philosophers therefore do not call God's know-ledge of existents either universal or individual, for knowledge which implies the concepts of universal and individual is a passive intellect and an effect, whereas the First Intellect (God) is pure act and a cause, and His knowledge cannot be compared to human knowledge."¹⁰¹ It may be noticed that human perception is brought into activity by appearance of the object. Human knowledge, be it universal or individual, is there-fore an effect of the known object. Divine

¹⁰⁰ Tahafut al-Tahāfah, vol. I, Engl. trans. Simon van Dan Berg. (Oxford 1954), p. 280.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 281.

knowledge, on the other hand, is not an effect; its being lies in its being an act in itself, and as such, it is of the nature of cause to which the individual objects, or contents of knowledge, stand as effects. Knowledge, by its very nature is attached to the existents. Thus, the Divine knowledge is such that it is attached to the existents; it had to be attached either in the way our knowledge is attached to it, or in a superior way, and since the former is impossible, this knowledge must be attached in a superior way and according to a more perfect existence of existents than the existence of existents to which our intellect is attached. For if true knowledge is in conformity with existent, then there must be two kinds of existence, a superior and an inferior, and the superior existence must be the cause of the inferior. It is impossible that God's knowledge should be like the knowledge of man, that is, the things known should be the cause of His knowledge and their occurrence the cause of the fact that He knows them, just as the objects of sight are the cause of visual perception and the intelligible, the cause of intellectual apprehension."¹⁰²

In this way Ibn Rushd repudiates both Ibn Sinā and Ghazāli, and proves how they are entrapped in nothing more than the different kinds of human knowledge—one in the abstract knowledge of the universal type, the other in the concrete knowledge of the sensuous type—and ascribe to the First Principle, the kind of human knowledge, they respectively hold, while the First is Active Principle of all existence and is cause

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 284.

without being an effect. Divine knowledge, as Ibn Rushd holds, is above the general and particular. Both the general and particular are subject to the limitations of Time and Space. The particular is individualized through its being at a definite moment of Time and at a definite position in Space. The general, however, is subject to the conditions of Time in general and absolute Space. But divine knowledge is not subject to these conditions. The human percipient must be contemporaneous with the entity-in-becoming and be within a certain neighbourhood to behold, hear, and touch it. Divine knowledge cannot be characterized with these kinds of change in position and direction which would imply limitation upon it. But the condition of compresence, understood both in its time-aspect and space-aspect, is a pre-requisite to the consciousness of concrete things, necessitating the existence of Divine Time and Divine Space, in which this compresence, designated by Ibn Rushd as knowledge in a superior way, is realized. Hamadāni's concepts of the Space of God and Time of God are thus logical implications of the Divine compresence with the concrete things wherein Divine knowledge does not undergo the processes of induction or deduction from particular to general, or from general to particular; since, the First knows every thing unmediatedly, it means a unique modality of His co-existence with the concrete entities. This modality must be actualized in Divine Time and Divine Space. Divine Time comprehends every accident and Divine Space contains all things. There is no moment of Divine Time which has not yet begun, and there is no moment which is not yet past. It is all actuality; all

of its parts are synchronized. Being present in it, every accident is an immediate object of the divine knowledge. The topography of Divine Space is also such that not a single particle of the world is farther away than any other in its closeness to God. Since there is no 'left' and 'right', 'below' and 'above', 'here' and 'there' in Divine Space, and, since there is no 'after' and 'before' in Divine Time, quantity and division do not pervade them. Divine knowledge does not, therefore, admit of multiplicity. It is single knowledge which comprehends all in all, allowing no comparison with human knowledge.

Avicenna had also a sense of higher Time order if not of higher Space order. He designated it as *sarmadiyah*.¹⁰³ But it had no correspondence with Hamadāni's notion of Divine Time. *Sarmadiyah*, in Avicenna's philosophy, is just like Platonic universal, which by its very nature, is abstract and cannot attain to the plane of corporeal things. It is an object of intellect and only an intelligible form, while, in the Divine Time, every accident and transient entity is comprehended in one sweep and immediately. *Sarmadiyah* is indeed derived from a sophisticated philosophical system—Emanationism. It has its necessity in the First Emanation and in itself is Possible. It projects the eternity of the First Effect as necessary manifestation of the Divine Agent. It is posited as an aspect of self-consciousness of the First Effect in its being the Universal Possibility of all plurality. On the contrary, Divine Time is all actuality with God. Thus it is not an idea but a

¹⁰³ Sobel M. Afnan, *Avicenna, His Life and Work*, (London, 1956), pp. 214-1:

reality in which all actuality is posited in the unmediated presence of God, the First Principle. Avicenna's Sarmadiyah cannot be consequently equated with the order of Divine Time.

Hamadāni's theory makes a safe voyage through the contradictions of Ghazālī's philosophy. The fallacies of Ghazālī's dialectical arguments are most pronounced in his discourses on the finitude of Time. The philosophers, Fārābi and Avicenna, championed the cause that there is no initial term of time, and there is no last term either. Let it be emphasized that Ghazālī's refutation of the philosophers' belief in the eternity of the world, time, and motion, was not accepted by any thinker of worth in the tradition of Muslim Culture. Theorists, like Fakhruddin Rāzi (d. 606 A.H.) and Averroes, continued to be in agreement with Fārābi and Avicenna and with the Aristotelean tradition in holding that there is no beginning of Time, and that it has no term which does not imply another one before it. This is the doctrine of the 'beginninglessness of Time', in which Ghazālī wrongly apprehended a danger to the doctrine of Islam. It may however be conceded that though his plea of the finitude of Time was fallacious in its arguments, yet his discussion was not totally devoid of meaning. What he could not properly appreciate was that the discourse on the beginning lessness of Time belonged to a plane which does not come in conflict with the world-consciousness of Islam. The fault was not totally his. It had its origin in the treatment accorded to this problem by Fārābi and Avicenna. Hamadani coped with the issue by discovering in its scales a discourse in which different planes of being are implicit.

He explicated them by positing the concepts of the chronological time (the times of material and immaterial realities), and the Time of God.

Hamadāni cannot be properly understood without first bringing to notice the contradictions pervading Ghazālī's argument on the problem of time. It was Averroes who by a systematic examination exposed how the former had failed to distinguish between different levels of reality in his proof to establish that Time is not without an initial term. Ghazālī sought to denounce the idea of the beginning lessness of time as a fiction by comparing it with space. Just as there is no actually infinite body, and by that reason space has limiting terms beyond which there is neither an empty space nor is an extension out there, so also, he argued, there is no stretch of Time before that from which it commences. "Time did have a beginning; and it was created. And before Time there was no time whatsoever."¹⁰⁴ The infinite extension of time, viz., existence of a prior time before every beginning leading to its extension in the past ad infinitum, according to him, results "from the inability of imagination to apprehend the commencement of a being without something before it. This 'before' which occurs to the imagination so inevitably, is assumed to be a veritable existent—viz. Time." And the inability of the imagination in this case is like its inability to represent to itself finitude of the body. Hence its assumption that beyond the world there is Space—either a plenum or a void. After

¹⁰⁴ Tahafut al-Falāsifah, loc cit., p. 36.

it Ghazālī fervently argues as follows: "It is possible to deny the truth (judgement) of the imagination's supposition of a void or space of infinite extension above the world. It may be said that just as extension in space follows body, so does extension in Time follow motion. For this is going-on of motion, just as that is the spread of extension. Just as the demonstration of the finitude of body prevents one from affirming spatial extension beyond it, so should the demonstration of the finitude of motion in either direction prevent one from supposing temporal extension beyond it."¹⁰⁵

Ghazālī completes his argument by adding that there is no difference between before and after and above and below. "... If you say, the commencement of an existence, which had no before is unintelligible, the rejoinder will be, 'the extension of finite body which has no extension is unthinkable.' If you say, 'Its outside is its own surface whereby it is bounded off' we will say; 'In like manner, its before is beginning of its existence, whereby it is limited in that direction'."¹⁰⁶ He concludes: The comparison we have drawn here has enabled us to refute the philosophers. Time is finite and is limited by a beginning and an end in both of its directions."¹⁰⁷

To test the thesis let us put the question, Was it possible for God to create the world sometime earlier? According to Ghazālī, the question is superfluous, having no correspondence to any

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁰⁷ . Ibid., p. 41.

datum of reality. Time is created and finite. There was no time before the creation; he says. The force of his argument rests on two premises: (1) Time is either movement or measure of movement; and (2) movement as a series of cause and effect must commence from a Prime Mover. Fallacy of Ghazālī lies in his reducing the entire reality to a single plane of becoming or temporal transition, of which the Prime Mover, as cause of its movement, is the initial term. The Mover sets the ball rolling which passes through generation and corruption and moves towards a last term, producing history of the world, or stages of its temporality. The Unmoved Mover thus functions as the indispensable prime member of the temporal chain of causes and effects till it terminates at an effect beyond which there is no causation. Thus the first term of time is Unmoved Mover, Uncaused Cause and the last term is an uncausing effect, the un-Moving Moved from which no movement proceeds any more. Between these two terms, the first and the last, lies the span of time, wherein lies the succession of relative causes and effects, i.e. transition of elements which are effects of anterior elements and in turn are causes of posterior elements generating before and after as the terms of the time. Thus Ghazali's effort to renounce the eternity of world unceremoniously came to end by bringing God to the plane of world as if He were engine of the chronological train of its events.

The Multiple order of Space and Time, Luminous in Hamadāni's intuition, is also an immediate intuition of the multiple order of cause and effect. It means generic difference of

Divine Causality from the temporal Causation inherent in the world. Divine Space and Time are orders of existence of the Divine order of Causation, while the spaces and times of corporeal and incorporeal things unfold the natural causation, we observe in the things of the world; it is temporal causation. Ghazālī's main failure in this problem was that he could not differentiate between Divine causality and temporal causality. The failure was all the more serious, as it meant a complete obliteration of systematic theology, rational sciences, and knowledge of the world. It was all due to his failure to understand clearly how the Temporal proceeds from the Eternal. Hamadāni seemed to be acutely aware of this failure of Ghazālī. In this, he was not unlike Ibn Rushd who reached and spelled out the superb intuition that the temporal beings are preceded and followed only by other temporal beings. The relations between the temporals, according to the latter, are those of accidental causality while the Divine Causality works in essential way. Averroes further pleaded that there is no contradiction in one thing proceeding from another *ad infinitum*, in accidental causality. "You must understand that the philosophers permit the existence of a temporal being *ad infinitum* in an accidental way."¹⁰⁸ The anterior perishes and the posterior arises out of it, and you can imagine this activity continuing *ad infinitum*, All this constitutes a distinct plane, not inconsistent with any valid principle, as, for instance, with the finitude of actual body. The principle of generation and corruption repeatedly produces change unendingly in the finite

¹⁰⁸ Tahafut al-Tahāfa, loc. cit., p. 33.

substratum, which by nature is not unlimited. At this plane of accidental causality every movement is caused by the anterior movement, and causes the posterior movement.¹⁰⁹ The world, as totality of these movements, may be conceived of as an unlimited series of accidents in this way.¹¹⁰ If time is movement, or a measure of movement, then accidental time does not need a term, before which there was no other term, or after which there will be no term. The first Principle (God) or its activity is not a member of this totality of accidents, concluded Ibn Rushd.

One of the deeper implications of his theory, more relevant to our age of science, is that the world viewed as a system of accidents denotes such causal relations (of accidental character) which have one and the same plane of becoming, with no gaps for a super-natural intervention or ingredient in their explanation. This Averroesian principle is crux of scientific theory-building in our age. Another implication is that the time-series of the world and their totalities being generically homogenous to one another are not elements of and comparable with the Eternity of God and His acts.

Thus, from Averroes' analysis it appears that if Eternity is viewed as time, it is Divine Time, which, as was done by Hamadāni, should be discriminated properly from the temporality of the world, i.e. from the Accidental Time. Though the latter may not have a term before which there was no other term and

¹⁰⁹ Ibn Rushd, *Kitab ma b'ad al-Tabiya*, loc. cit., p. 126 f.

¹¹⁰ *Kitāb al-Sumā-'a al-Tab'iyyi*, (Hyderabad, 1366 A.H.), p. 46 f.

likewise no term after, it can never be Eternity. The generically Eternal and the generically Temporal are categories of different order. No sum of the generically temporal simulates the nature of the generically eternal. In this way Averroes corrects Ghazālī and his predecessor Avicenna on the Essential Causality of the Prime Mover, and on the difference of that causality from the accidental causality. He said: "This Mover exists simultaneously with each thing moved, at the time of its motion for a mover existing before the thing moved—much as man producing a man—sets in motion accidentally, not essentially, but the Mover who is the condition of man's existence from the beginning of his production till its end is the Prime Mover."¹¹¹ And likewise His existence is the condition for the existence of all beings and the preservation of heaven and earth and all that is between them. Thus, the Divine Agent is not related to the world and its movement as number one is related to all the numbers which follow it in succession.

The Divine relationship with the world is of a different mode. God is related not only to the first, but to every element of the series till the last, and He is cause of every one and all of it in essential way. This is how Eternity is related to the temporal entities and essentially determines their being and existence in the everlasting change of the accidental time. "There are two kinds of existence," says Averroes, "one in the nature of which there is motion and which cannot be separated from time, the other in the

¹¹¹ Tahāfut al-Tahāfa, loc. cit., p. 34.

nature of which there is no motion and which is eternal and which cannot be described in terms of time.... Therefore the priority of the one entity over the other is based neither on a priority in time, nor on the priority of that kind of cause and effect which belongs to the things in motion, like the priority of a man to his shadow. Any one who compares the priority of the Unmoved Being to the thing in motion to the priority existing between two things in motion is in error, for it is only true of each one in pairs of moving things that, when it is brought in relation to the other, it is either simultaneous with it or prior or posterior to it. It is the latter philosophers of Islam who made this mistake... so the priority of this one being to the other is the priority of the unchanging timeless existence to the changing existence which is in time, and this is an altogether different type of priority.¹¹²

As to Ghazali's comparison between the spatial magnitude and time Averroes could not hold any other opinion but that it belongs to the class of sophistical arguments. It is indeed a sophistry, for conceiving of a spatial magnitude 'to increase and end in another spatial magnitude' is a conception which has no harmony with the definition and nature of the essence (the spatial magnitude).¹¹³ On the other hand, to think of posterior and anterior in time and movement 'is exactly to think in terms of the essence which belongs to it.'¹¹⁴ One cannot represent in time an initial term, which has not been the final term of another time,

¹¹² Ibid., pp. 38-39.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 44.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

"for the definition of an instant is that it is the end of the past and beginning of the future; and this is the present which is necessarily in the middle of the past and the future, and to represent a present which is not preceded by a past is absurd. This, however, does not apply to the point, for the point is end of the line."¹¹⁵ Moreover, one can imagine a point which is the beginning of a line without its being the end of another line. "But the instant cannot exist without the past and the future, and exists necessarily after the past and before the future, and what cannot subsist in itself cannot exist before the existence of the future without being the end of the past."¹¹⁶ Averroes attributes the error of comparison between point and instant, as in Ghazālī, to a common feature of theirs, that any two points are not coincidental, and likewise, any two instants are not simultaneous. But a point is inert, having no demand for another point beyond it, while an instant exists only after and before other instants and thus necessarily demands a beyond. Here lies their fundamental difference. "He who allows the existence of an instant which is not a present, or of a present which is not preceded by a past denies time and the instant."¹¹⁷

Now, we can take up the question: what was there before the world? The answer is: It was not God, who preceded the world; it was 'Adm (non-existence) which was before it.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

To the Ash'arites, 'Adm is absolute nothingness, but actually it was existence of those things (accidents) in the past which perished subsequently in the emergence of world which followed it. Thus, there was a time when the world was not; then there is a time when the world is; then there will be a time, when the world will not be. Time was, is, and will be as the world changed from non-existence into existence, remains as such, and will go from existence into non-existence. Thus existence and non-existence of a thing are contraries which may succeed each other as accidents of temporal transition. Averroes remarks that this temporal process has no initial term, but to call it 'timeless eternity' is senseless.¹¹⁸ Eternity is existentially different from it. The accidental time has no imprint of it.

The philosophical objection that an actual infinite is impossible, according to Ibn Rusted, does not apply to the temporal becoming so as to limit it in either direction. The nature of accidental time is such that its past accidents are perished and future accidents are yet to be actual. So the objection is invalid, though it is valid for spatial magnitude, which consists of actual points. Thus space cannot be in existence without being actually bounded by its sides in all directions. Just as an infinite actual number is impossible so also an actually extended body in infinity is impossible. But time does not share this property with it in either side. Beyond the being of its present moment, no part of it is now actual. "Therefore, it is not a totality, although its parts are

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 50-54.

totalities."¹¹⁹ Only the parts of time which are limited by time in both directions can enter the past,¹²⁰ but from the existence of an infinite series of bodies no actual infinite follows.¹²¹

About the nature of Divine order Averroes says; "The Eternally Existent does not enter past existence since no time limits it."¹²² There is no difference, however, between act and existence, Divine Activity consequently does not enter time. It is timeless, eternal, generically different from temporality which is extended to infinity in the past.

The greatest blunder of most of the thinkers of Islam, according to Averroes, lies in their construing emanations from God as of the nature of temporal movements. Thus they represent as if the Absolute Agent caused the first effect, which in turn caused the second effect and so on till the sub-lunary world came into being, thus separating the world from God through a series of emanations. Even, the idea of taking these emanations as mere logical (not temporal) order of anterior and posterior becoming does not protect them from intermediationism. Averroes wholeheartedly supported Ghazālī in repudiating it. He said: "The act of Him, whose existence time cannot measure nor comprehend in either direction, cannot be comprehended in Time nor measured by a limited duration. He, therefore, who assumes that from the Eternal there proceeds only a temporal act

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 71.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 163.

¹²² Ibid., p. 72.

presumes that His act is constrained in certain way."¹²³ Averroes' further critical remarks on the subject are worth reproducing. "About this statement that out of the one only one proceeds —all ancient philosophers were agreed. When they investigated the first principle of the world in a dialectical way they mistook this investigation, however, for a real demonstration and they all came to the conclusion that the first principle is one and the same for every thing and that from the one only one can proceed. . . . But when the philosophers of our religion, like Fārābi and Avicenna, had once conceded to their opponents that the agent in the Divine world is like the agent in the empirical and that from the one agent there can arise but one object (and according to all the First was absolutely one), it became difficult for them to explain how plurality could arise from it."¹²⁴ According to them, the first effect proceeded from the Divine Agent and the first effect implied duality of aspects in its nature as possible in itself and as necessary by otherself. Now, this duality was uncaused, had it not been contained in the Divine Act itself. Thus Ghazali won his point against them. The fundamental mistake of Avicenna and Farabi was that they made the statement that from the one only one can proceed and then assumed a plurality in the one which proceeds. The second mistake was that the second effect, according to them, with its entire plurality proceeded from the first, and so on.¹²⁵

¹²³ Ibid., p. 56.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 106-107.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 148.

Averroes had to re-state the theory. His reconstruction of it is one of the everlasting marks of his genius. He changed its entire complexion and raised it on the basic tenets of Islam. "From the Divine agent," he said; "it is not the one effect, which proceeds," but the *absolute* effect, the entire plurality, in its complete totality, *"for the First Agent in the Divine world is an absolute agent, while the agent in the empirical world is a relative agent, and from the absolute agent only an absolute act which has no special individual object can proceed."*¹²⁶ Thus, those who believe that the Divine Activity caused only the Logos, the First Intellect, or the Essence of Mohammad as Ibn al-'Arabi later put it, are mistaken. There is no individual content of the act of the First Agent. The entire world with all its diversity is its content. It is only through it that everything is conjoined. Thus, the First by His absolute act is the cause of the plurals, and is cause of their unity. "And since everything con-joined is only conjoined through unity in it, and this unity through which it is conjoined must depend on a unity, subsistent by itself and be related to it, there must exist a single unity, subsistent by itself, and this unity must of necessity provide unity through its own essence. This unity is distributed in different classes of things according to their natures, and from this unity, allotted to the individual things, their existence arises."¹²⁷ It is evident, therefore, that there is a unique entity from which a single power emanates through which all beings exist. Thus, "there is in them one single spiritual force which connects the spiritual and bodily potencies

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 108.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

and which permeates the universe in one and the same penetration."¹²⁸ If this were not the case, no order and proportion would exist. "And this way, it is true that God is the creator and preserver of everything and to this the Divine word apply; 'Verily God supports the heavens and the earth, lest they should decline (al-Qur'an: xxxv. 41).'"¹²⁹

Averroes further explicates the relation between God and the world, the Eternal and the Temporal. "There are two kinds of agents," he said, "the agents to which the object is attached so far as it is in the making, and the agent from which nothing proceeds but the activity and the object is convertible with the activity."¹³⁰ God is not maker of the world in the first sense of the agent, which truly applies only to the artisans in our every day experience. The work of the artisan stands dissociated from his artifice after its completion, and the latter, by virtue of its being dissociated from its maker, becomes something in its own right. The artisan, then, is an accidental cause, anterior temporally, and earlier than his work. The word "production" does not adequately apply to his work, which continues to exist though he might have perished. But God is that agent 'whose act is uncreated and everlasting, and whose object is identical with its act.' We may however understand it on the likeness of the work of a singer; his song is not more than singing and thus is convertible with the activity. The world does not confront God as his other but is

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 137.

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 156-57.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 156-57.

identical with his activity. Ibn Rushd expounds its nature thus: "It is act of God; ... God's act proceeds from Him through knowledge, not through any necessity which calls for it, either in His essence or outside His essence, but through His grace and bounty."¹³¹ The world may be truly called as the production of God, because a production, in contrast to a work of the artisan, exists by virtue of and through the activity itself, and has no being apart from it. In this way the world is God's product, "and the word 'production' is even more suitable than the word eternity."¹³² He is its causing agent. "The causing agent is always connected with the effect. The world is, during the time of its existence, in need of the presence of its agent for both reasons together, namely because the substance of the world is continually in motion and because its form through which it has its subsistence and existence is of the nature of a *relation*, not of the nature of *Quality*, i.e., the shapes and states.... A form which belongs to the class of quality and is included in it is, when it exists, and its existence is finished, in no need of an agent. All this will solve the problem for you."¹³³

Similar views have been forcefully expressed by Iqbal in our time, who reached the same conception of the Ultimate Reality. The Universe which seems to us to be a collection of things,' said Iqbal, 'is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but an

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 157. (0. Ibid., p. 90.

¹³² Ibid., p. 97.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 101.

act.¹³⁴ 'It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour and as such organic to the Ultimate Self.'¹³⁵ Averroes had concluded that it is "through the emanation of this power (Divine causality that), the World in its totality becomes a unity, and it is . . . through this power (that) all its parts are connected so that the Universe aims at one act as happens with the one body of an animal."¹³⁶ Iqbal further remark "Finite minds regard nature as a confronting other, existing *per se*, which the mind knows but does not make. We are thus apt to regard the fact of creation as a specific past event, and the Universe appears to us as a manufactured article, which has no organic relation to the life of its maker and of which the maker is nothing but a mere spectator. All the meaningless theological controversies about the idea of creation arose from this narrow vision of the finite mind The real question which we are called upon to answer is this: Does the Universe confront God as His other with space intervening between Him and it? The answer is that from the Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event having a before and an after. The Universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him. This view of the matter will reduce both God and the world to the separate entities confronting each other in the empty receptacle of an infinite space. . . . It is, in its real nature, one continuous act, which

¹³⁴ Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore, 1962), p. 51.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

¹³⁶ Tahāfut al-Tahāfa, loc. cit, p. 136.

thought breaks up into a plurality of mutually exclusive things."¹³⁷ Averroes' words may be added: "Therefore, the term eternal becoming is more appropriate to the World than the term eternity."¹³⁸ This clarification might be significantly read along with Iqbal's comments on the notion of predestination in relation to this eternal becoming. 'If history is regarded merely as a gradually revealed photo of a predetermined order of events, then there is no room in it for novelty and initiation. Consequently, we can attach no meaning to the word creation, which has a meaning for us only in view of our capacity for original action. The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to predestination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life."¹³⁹ As eternal becoming, the world is eternal activity of God, and the divine activity has no predetermination. Therefore, the eternal becoming is not an unfoldment of pre-conceived idea. It is continuously original production.

Viewed in the mode of accidental causality, eternal becoming looks like an infinity of accidents one after another, with no beginning in the past. But this temporal infinity cannot form a self-contained whole. In fact, it is an external experience of the movement, i.e. passing from *one* accident to another, to which Iqbal's words veritably apply: 'If flow, movement, or passage is the last word as to the nature of time, there must be another time to time the movement of the first time, and another which times

¹³⁷ Reconstruction, loc cit, pp. 65.66.

¹³⁸ Tahāfut al-Tahāfa, loc. cit. p. 104.

¹³⁹ Reconstruction, loc. cit., p. 79.

the second movement, and so on to infinity.¹⁴⁰ *We* have already seen that Ghazali faced the same problem, but dismissed it as an irresistible instigation from imagination, which should be brought under control on the ground that rational thought does not permit infinite extension of the spatial manifold in a similar case of imaginative projection. This solution of Ghazali is naive as it completely overlooks the fact that there is no comparison between spatiality and temporality, the latter being characterized by non-actuality on both of its sides, past and future, while the former is all actual. There is undoubtedly an apprehension of infinite regress in the nature of time. It cannot be overcome at the plane of temporality itself, except by realizing that the temporal infinite cannot be a self-contained whole, and thus consequently, in its being has a necessary demand for a higher order of reality. This higher order is posited in an essential time, with an essential causality, as identical with the Absolute Act, the Single Act, which is undifferentiated and unmultipliable. It was Hamadāni, who intuited and contributed the idea of Divine Time as mode of His Absolute Act. Iqbal fully realized this contribution as he explained it in a lengthy passage: "It is clear that if we look at time from a purely objective point of view (i.e., accidental point of view in Averroes' analysis),* serious difficulties arise ; for we cannot apply atomic time to God and conceive Him as life in the making, as professor Alexander appears to have done in his lectures on *Space, Time and Deity*. Later Muslim theologians fully realized these difficulties. Mullā Jalal-ul-Din Dawwani in a passage of his *Zoura*,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 74.

which reminds the modern student of Professor Royce's view of Time, tells us that if we take time to be a kind of span which makes possible the appearance of events as a moving procession and conceive this span to be a unity, then we cannot but describe it as an original state of Divine Activity, encompassing all the succeeding states of that activity. But the Mullā takes good care to add that a deeper insight into the nature of succession reveals its relativity, so that it disappears in the case of God to whom all events are present in a single act of perception. The Sufi poet 'Irāqī (Iqbal mistook Hamadani as the celebrated poet 'Iraqi of the seventh century Hijra) has a similar way of looking at the matter. He conceives infinite varieties of time, relative to varying grades of being intervening between materiality and spirituality Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach Divine time, time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity; it has neither beginning, nor end. The eye of God sees all the audibles in one indivisible act of perception. The priority of God is not due to priority of time; on the other hand, the priority of time is due to God's priority; Divine Time is what the Qur'an described as the 'Mother of Books' in which the whole of history freed from the net of causal sequence is gathered up in a single super-natural now.^{141"}

Now, it may be explained that, the Ash'arites and Ghazali made God something of an accidental cause of everything. On

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 75.

each occasion God's intervention becomes a necessary factor, to them, in the corruption and generation which fills the concrete succession of the things of the world. Thus, in their representation, they levelled all the grades of being to the same plane. What they lacked is the discrimination of Divine Time, and its essential typological difference from the Accidental Time. As necessary consequence of this defect, Ghazālī was forced to deny the reality of Time altogether, and refused to give any significant meaning to *was*, *is* and *will be*, as features of the world in becoming. He reduced them to the conceptions of soul, having no outer or objective reference. In this way, he anticipated Kant who explained them away as forms of perception. But it was all against the tradition of Islam. Reality of Time, in Islamic thought, was once again rehabilitated by Averroes, who said that *was*, *is* and *will be* are not interchangeable in any sense, and that they have denotable objects so far as temporal succession is concerned. According to him, past, present, and future are incessant, ever arising relativities, which cannot be dispensed with. They are thus not rooted in imagination or perception. They are parts of time, and the time of which they are parts is existentially real as an accidental infinite having no actual position. Divine Time does not persist as a perspective of this accidental infinite, but exists as an order of reality in its own right. Dawwānī's passage in *Zouira* does not preserve this subtle point which is necessary to attribute reality to time. He does not distinguish Accidental Time from the Time of God in his remark that the past and future of time cease to exist in the case of God. Royce's view of time is also like that

of Dawwani, who makes the accidental infinity of Time at its bottom to be identical with the eternity of God. By discovering its varieties and hierarchies, Hamadani emancipated the idea of Time not only from this confusion as we have noticed in Dawwāni and Royce but also from the pitfall of subjectivism and perspectivism, i.e., the different views of the same object.

In the light of Ibn Rushd's discussion and that of Iqbal's exposition, generic contents of the different kinds of Time are distinguishable. Being accidental infinite, our realm of temporality is characterized by a particular logical structure of causation. It has in its fold, as contents of its essence, natural causation found in inorganic bodies and also has voluntary causation found in human agents consisting of the sequence of want and satisfaction. It is empirical world. Matter and form are its principles. Everything in this empirical world comes into being as a consequence of the intermediary principles, which too owe their being to the First Principle (God). The First holds the things and the intermediary principles thereof directly in His own causative sweep. The order of reality having adequacy with His causation or His Absolute Act is Divine Time and Divine Space. The Ash'arites and Ghazālī could not realize this ontological gradation of causality and confused natural and voluntary causation with Divine causation. Divine causation, to quote Averroes, is superior to any kind of causality. Even the voluntary causality, we behold in rational beings such as man, does not assimilate His causation: "The First Agent cannot be described as having either of these two actions (i.e. of natural agents and

voluntary agents). For he who chooses and wills, lacks the things, which he wills; and God cannot lack anything He wills God is still farther distant from natural action for the act of a natural thing belongs to its entelechy."¹⁴² "They are not the (only) possible ways—the act of God can proceed from Him neither in a natural way nor in a voluntary, in the sense in which it is understood in the sublunary world What proceeds from God proceeds in a nobler way than the voluntary, a way which nobody can understand but God Himself."¹⁴³ Ibn Rushd denies human kind of volition in His case. It does not mean denial of Divine Will, as he said, "And the proof that He wills is that He knows the opposites, and if He were an agent in absolutely the same way as He is knower, He would carry out the two contrary acts together, and this is impossible and therefore it is necessary that He should perform one of the two contraries through choice."¹⁴⁴

Thus, the sublime plane of the act of God is distinct. It has its own space and time, sharply different from the spaces and times of creation. His will is indivisible, numberless and unmultipliable and is explicit with its own space and time, which comprehend all those spaces and times which belong to the spiritual entities and the corporeal things.

¹⁴² Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, loc. cit., p. 88.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 272.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

NEW IQBAL MATERIAL

B. A. Dar

The Iqbal Academy has been trying to collect all available material bearing on Iqbal's life and thought from all possible sources. We have so far published 2 collections, one in Urdu entitled *Anwār-i Iqbal* in 1967 (pp. 350) and the other in English entitled *Letters and Writings of Iqbal* in 1967 (pp.130). Both these books contain several letters, statements and articles of Iqbal hitherto not contained in any collection of Iqbal's writings. Since then another very important publication in Urdu in this field is Mr. Rafiq Afzal's *Guftar-i-Iqbal*, The editor has taken great pains to collect this material from daily newspapers. It is a rich contribution to Iqbal Studies.

The Academy has acquired some further material in this field, both English and Urdu. We are giving below material in English only. The Urdu material will be given in the next issue of Iqbal.

Below is given a letter of Iqbal addressed to somebody with the title of Mir. It does not reveal the identity of the correspondent. The original was presented by Sardar Rashid Ahmad to the Lahore Museum as reported in the *Pakistan Times* of 13 February 1969. The Academy is grateful to Dr. F.A. Khan, Director, Department of Archaeology, Government of Pakistan, through whose courtesy its photostat copy was received for the Academy's record.

Lahore

10th February, 1914

Dear Mir Sahib,

Your friend must put himself in correspondence with the Secretary Advisory Committee Lahore if he wishes to proceed to England in March. He will have to go through the committee and it is on the Committee's recommendation that they will admit him there. He should send an application with two certificates from men of position who are in a position to say that the applicant has been known to them for more than a year, and that he bears an excellent character,

When his application comes up before the committee I shall see to it.

I have just written to the Secretary to send you a copy of the rules if he has got spare copies.

Yours ever Sd/-

MOHAMMAD IQBAL

P.S. For other particulars about journey etc. my knowledge has become rather antiquated.

Sd/-

MOHAMMAD IQBAL

The following letter is addressed to Sayyed Fasih Allāh Kāzmi (b. 1895) of Allahabad (U.P., India). He wrote a book, Urdu-i-Fasih which remained for 12 years a prescribed text book in the Patna University.

Lahore

22nd July, 1919

I have glanced through Mr. Fasih's book called Urdu-i Fasih. The collection of passages from prose and poetry is careful and judicious. It seems that the author has taken pains over his work, and I have no doubt that his book will be useful to the students of Urdu.

Sd/-

MOHAMMAD IQBAL

Baristar-at-Law Lahore

A special issue of Modern Review, Calcutta (India), appeared in 1925. It contained messages of eminent people. Below is reproduced message of Iqbal which deals with the problem of education of the new generation. This message has a particular

relevance for us now, as we are struggling to evolve a new policy of education in our country.

We are indebted to Mr. Ikramul Haq (Retd. C.S.P.), Advocate, Multan, for this material.

The spirit of Ancient India aimed at the discovery of God and found Him Fortified by this valuable possession Modern India ought to focus her forces on the discovery of man as a personality—as an independent whole in an all-embracing synthesis of life—if she wants to secure a permanent foundation for her New Nationalism. But does our Education today tend to awaken in us such a sense of inner wholeness? My answer is, no. Our Education does not recognise man as a problem; it impresses on us the visible fact of sentiplicity without giving us an insight into the immensity of life, and thus tends to make us more and more immersed in our physical environment. The soul of man is left untouched and the result is a superficial knowledge with a mere illusion of culture and freedom. Amidst this predominantly intellectual culture which must accentuate separate centres within the 'whole', the duty of higher minds in India is to reveal the inner synthesis of life.

The acceptance by the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow in August 1928 of the Nehru Report, a document proposing a future constitution for India, as envisaged by the Indian National Congression, proved a turning point in the political history of the Sub-continent. It reveals in no unmistakable terms how the mind of the Hindu community was working and to which even liberal

Hindus like Moti Lal Nehru fully subscribed. The amendments to these proposals suggested by the Muslim League led by Mr. Jinnah, who was willing to cooperate fully with the Hindus against the British in boycotting the Simon Commission, were rejected outright by the All-Parties National Convention at Calcutta in the last week of December 1928. The situation is aptly described by M. Jamshed Nusserwanjee, a friend of Mr. Jinnah:

"One man said that Mr. Jinnah had no right to speak on behalf of the Muslims, that he did not represent them. He was sadly humbled, and he went back to his hotel.

"About half-past eight next morning, Mr. Jinnah left Calcutta by train, and I went to see him off at the railway station. He was standing at the door of his first-class coupe compartment, and he took my hand. He had tears in his eyes as he said, 'Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways.'" [Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, p. 95].

Iqbal had arrived as early as 1927, at this conclusion which the Quaid-i-Azam's historic pronouncement of "parting of ways" describes.

In a conversation with Hakim Muhammad Hasan Qarshi in that year, Iqbal said:

The Hindu leaders are not interested in reaching an understanding with the Muslims. The frequent communal riots that are taking place in different parts of India these days, are deliberately engineered by the Hindus for two purposes: (1) to

frighten the Muslims into submission to the Hindu majority rule, and (2) to boost up the morale of the Hindus and convince them that their aggressive attitude towards the Muslims will pay them without any fear of serious reprisals.

Hakim Sahib intervened:

If Hindus and Muslims unite against the British, it will be beneficial to Muslims of the Muslim world which is at present under the heels of the British. For the sake of the Muslim World, we should try to come to terms with the Hindus against the British and cooperate with them.

Iqbal: But the fact is that the Hindus do not wish that the British should leave India. They want internal autonomy under the protective shield of the British bayonets and this is not the type of independence that the Muslim World needs or for that matter, the Muslims of India desire. It is the Muslims who desire complete independence while the Hindus visualise an India under British rule where they are free internally to rule over the minorities.

As a result of these developments, different groups of Muslims joined together and an All-Parties Muslim Conference was held in Delhi on 31 December, 1928 under the Chairmanship of the Agha Khan. It adopted following demands:

1. The only form of government suitable to Indian conditions was a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the provinces ;

2. Separate electorates were to continue ;

3. Existing weightage for the Muslims in the Hindu-majority provinces was to continue ;

4. Muslims should be given "their due share" in the central and provincial cabinets ;

5. A due proportion of seats should be given to Muslims in the public services and on all statutory self-governing bodies ;

6. There must be safeguards for "the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws, and Muslim charitable institutions";

7. "No Constitution, by whomsoever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian Musalmans unless it conforms with the principles embodied in this resolution."

Iqbal participated in this conference and made a speech in support of this resolution. Urdu version of this speech of Iqbal has been given by Mr. Rafiq Afzal in *Guftar-i-Iqbal*, pp. 72-73. Below is given a report of Iqbal's speech in English from the records in the Academy's files dated 21st September, 1956. Most probably it is taken from some newspaper.

In supporting the resolution, Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal said that the experience which Muslims had been gaining for the last three or four years was very useful and full of consequence. What they only surmised formerly about their brother countrymen had all come to their knowledge with perfect certainty. He averred the

reality that the line of action which the late Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had chalked out for Indian Muslims half a century back was quite right and, after bitter experiences, they were realising the importance of that policy. He declared in clear terms that if Indian Muslims wanted to live in India as Muslims, they ought forthwith to endeavour for their betterment and progress and prepare their own separate political programme. They know that in some parts of India the Muslims were in a majority, while in other parts they were in minority. In those circumstances, there was a dire necessity for their preparing a separate political programme. Every community in the country was then endeavouring to safeguard its rights. He wondered why Indian Muslims should not try to safeguard their particular rights. The resolution which that day had been unanimously put forward in that Conference was very proper. For its propriety, Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal said, he possessed a religious argument. It was their Holy Prophet (be peace and God's benedictions on Him) who had said that never would the consensus of his followers' opinion concentrate on a misleading issue. (loud shouts of Allah-o-Akbar and continued applause).

This letter is taken from Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore, for April 21, 1951 (p. 3) from the fascimili supplied by the late Shaikh Ata Ullah. Its Urdu translation was included in his Iqbalnama, II, pp. 283-285. From its perusal, it seems that this letter was not completely reproduced in the Civil & Military Gazette.

22nd May 1932

My dear Miss Farquharson,

Thank you so much for your letter which I hasten to reply to as I am likely to be too busy for correspondence next week. Even in London last November some of us suspected that there were differences inside the Cabinet. However let us wait and see what comes out of it.¹⁴⁵ Personally I am feeling very pessimistic about the future of India,

The Bombay riots which are still going on have upset me.¹⁴⁶ My fear is that democracy in India will bring nothing in its wake but blood. shed which will only prepare ground for the kind of unrest which nobody would like to see developing in this country. Some people are beginning to think that India must pass through blood-shed to some sort of Soviet form. It is my belief that even the best-informed Britisher does not quite realise what is going on beneath the surface of events. And the Indians who are promoted to high offices and thus come into closer contact with British policy are most of them job hunters, and though in some cases clever are men of no vision. Let us however hope for the

¹⁴⁵ As a result of discussions in London during Round Table Conferences about the problem of Muslims' rights in an independent India, the British Prime Minister at last announced the Communal Award on 19 August 1932 and thus removed the misgivings expressed in this letter.

¹⁴⁶ These riots which were engineered by the Hindus against the Pathan Muslims of Bombay, were the result of Hindu conspiracy to frighten Muslims to submission before they gained independence. In an Urdu letter dated 8 June 1932 to Maulvi Mohammad Irfan (*Anwar-i Iqbal*, p. 209) Iqbal expresses the same feeling about these riots.

better. I am thinking of making another trip to Europe, North Africa and Turkey and Spain. In a month or two I hope to be able to decide the matter finally.

Old Shaukat Ali has married a young English girl. He is now proceeding to America. The marriage has been the subject of much controversy in the Hindu press.

Hoping you are well and thanking you for all the work you are doing for the Muslims.

Yours sincerely

Mohammad Iqbal

The following is a letter of Iqbal addressed to Dr. Riazul Hasan who had written an essay on "Economic Theory in Islam." This letter was published in the April 1968 issue of Iqbal Review along with the comments of the correspondent.

29th May 1933

Dear Sir,

I am extremely sorry I have no time to read your essay. But I could suggest that you should make a careful study of the ideas of Mussolini. The essence of Islamic Economics is to render the growth of large capitals impossible. Mussolini and Hitler think in the same way. Bolshevism has gone to the extreme of abolishing capitalism altogether. In all aspects of life Islam always takes the middle course. Says the

Quran:

و كذالك جعلنا كم امة و سطا لتكونوا شهداء على الناس و يكون الرسول عليكم
شهيذا¹⁴⁷

The subject of the of Islam is only a recent discovery in Europe. Its importance is likely to attract the attention of European scholars. Indeed some German scholars have already begun to work at it. You may also read with advantage a book called the Sociology of Islam. I forget the name of the author.

yours truly

Muhammad Iqbal

The following letter is addressed to Lord Lothian who was a well-known liberal peer. He was for quite some time editor of Round Table and then British ambassador in the U.S.A. In July 1938 while on a visit to India he delivered convocation address at the Muslim University, Aligarh. He took active part in Round Table Conferences held in London (12 November 1930-November 1932).

He was a great admirer of Iqbal. It was through his efforts that Iqbal's Lectures (first published in Lahore in 1930) were printed by the Oxford University Press in 1934. In the Lahore

¹⁴⁷ ii. 143: And thus we have made you an exalted nation that you may be the bearers of witness to the people and (that) the Messenger may be a bearer of itness to you.

edition there were six while the Oxford edition contains seven, the seventh lecture was delivered before the Aristotelian Society, London.

It was again through the efforts of Lord Lothian that the Rhodes Trustees requested Iqbal to deliver a series of 3 or more lectures to the Oxford University. Iqbal decided to speak on the important topic of "Space and Time in Muslim Thought" but unfortunately for us due to illness could not do so.

We are grateful to the Pakistan High Commission in London through whose courtesy we were able to get a photostat copy of this letter. 17th March 1933

My dear Lord Lothian,

Thank you so much for your kind letter which reached me yesterday on my return from Dehli. I left London on the 30th of December 1932 and after making some halt at Paris I left for Spain where I spent nearly three weeks. I reached India about the end of February. This is the reason why your letter reached me so late. I am so glad to learn that you liked my book of lectures. Mr. Thomson Edward of Oxford to whom you had written wrote to me to the same effect and I have sent him two copies of the book. In case the Oxford University decides to print and publish these lectures I should like to make a few alterations here and there and perhaps add the lecture "Is Religion Possible?" which I delivered to the Aristotelian Society of London. I had very interesting time in Spain and France. During my stay in Paris I met Bergson. Our

conversation on modern Philosophy and Civilization lasted for about two hours. Part of the time we talked on Berkeley on whose philosophy the French Philosopher made some very interesting observations.' In Spain I came into contact with many professors of Arabic who are enthusiastic about the culture of Islam. The Madrid University requested me to address the University on "Spain and the Intellectual World of Islam."¹⁴⁸ My address was very much appreciated. Professor Asin, the well-known author of Divine Comedy of Islam, presided. The new Government of Spain is aiming at turning Granada into a kind of cultural Macca for the world of Islam.¹⁴⁹ I think it is high time that England should take some serious interest in cultural side of Islam. As a matter of fact Islam as an Economic system is much more interesting and likely to suggest much more practical solutions of our present difficulties.

The White Paper is coming out today. The Muslims of India are extremely anxious about their position in the Centre.¹⁵⁰

1. Extract from a letter of Iqbal to Sir William Rothenstein as published in BA. Dar (ed.), Letters and Writings of Iqbal, Karachi, p. 103:

¹⁴⁸ Sociology of Islam by Professor Reuben Levy.

¹⁴⁹ "White Paper" refers to the White Paper issued by the British Government in March 1933. It embodied recommendations of the Round Table Conferences held in London. It was the first step towards the passing of the Government of India Act 1935.

¹⁵⁰ See Ibid., pp. 77-79 for a detailed account of Iqbal's stay in Spain.

The substance of Berkeley's philosophy is that in perception matter reveals the whole of itself without a remainder; not so the case with the mind. This is a way of putting Berkeley.

2. See Ibid., pp. 77-79 for a detailed account of Iqbal's stay in Spain.

3. Extract from Iqbal's Statement of 26 February, 1933 in Shamloo (Ed.), Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore, September 1948), pp. 189-190:

I visited Cordova, Granada, Seville, Toledo and Madrid and besides seeing the historic mosque at Cordova, and the Alhambra in Granada, I visited the ruins of Madinatuz Zehra, the famous palace built on a mountain by Abd-ur-Rehman for his wife Zehra, where excavations are still going on. It was there that the first demonstration of a flying machine was given in the twelfth century by a Muslim inventor. I had the privilege of meeting, among others, the Education Minister of See Page 91

Iqbal presented a copy of his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, first published at Lahore in 1930, to Sir Montagu Butler. He was a member of the Indian Civil Service and belonged to the Panjab Commission. He was the father of Mr. R.A. (now the Right Hon'ble Lord) Butler who was born at Campbellpur during his father's service.

Sir Montagu rose to be the Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar before he retired from service. It was while Sir Montagu

was at Nagpur that Iqbal sent him this book on 5th May 1930. Sir Harcourt Butler, another member of the I.C.S., who served as governor of U.P., was one of Sir Montagu's cousin.

This copy of Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, bearing the autograph of Iqbal, was later presented by Sir Montagu to Professor Arberry under his signature below that of Iqbal. Besides the book he wrote a forwarding letter to Professor Arberry the Spanish Government, an exceedingly courteous gentleman with a breadth of vision hardly to be expected in a country like Spain, and Professor Asin, the well-known author of Divine Comedy and Islam. Under the directions of the Education Minister the department of Arabic in the University of Granada is being greatly expanded. The head of this department is a disciple of Professor Asin.

The Spaniards living in the south of the country are proud of their Moorish origin and of the great monuments of Islamic culture which are to be found there. A new consciousness is steadily growing in the country and will further expand with the development of education. The movement of reform started by Luther has not yet exhausted itself. It is still working quietly in different European countries and the hold of priesthood, especially in Spain, is gradually loosening.

On 20 March 1933, Iqbal issued a statement about the White Paper which is reproduced below:

It is of course impossible for a document of this kind fully to satisfy all sections of people, especially in a country like India. Whether a community would be willing to give a trial to the proposed scheme in spite of its unsatisfactory character depends on a multiplicity of actualities which would have to be carefully examined.

Muslims would be greatly disappointed by the proposed composition of Federal Legislature. In the Lower House the Muslims have been guaranteed only 82 seats out of a proposed total of 375. The Muslims' share works out at 21'8 percent of the total House. Indian States which on a population basis are entitled only to 25 per cent seats in the Federal Legislature have been given 33'3 per cent which means a weightage of 8 per cent. Such a weightage should in fairness have gone to Muslims as an important minority community and not to the states which are in
See Page 92

We are grateful to Mr. Riaz Ahmad (Peterhouse, Cambridge) who sent photostat copy of the fly-leaf bearing the autograph of Iqbal, Sir Montagu Butler and Professor Arberry. We are equally grateful to Professor Arberry who apprised Mr. Riaz Ahmad about it. I am giving below a few relevant portions from Mr. Riaz's letter:

"I am enclosing herewith photostat copies of a letter of Lord Montagu Butler addressed to Professor Arberry. As you will see, the letter contains some important information about Allama Iqbal and is worthy of notice. It is preserved with an autograph

copy of Allama Iqbal's lectures on Reconstruction of Islamic Thought in the Trinity

College Library. The book was presented by the author to Lord Montagu Butler on 5 May 1930 and by him to Professor Arberry on 5 May 1948.

When the present Lord Butler became the Master of Trinity, Professor Arberry presented the book to the Trinity College Library, where it is preserved now .. .

The letter and the autograph copy were brought to my notice by Professor Arberry during a recent meeting."

The autographs on the fly leaf read as under:

no sense a minority and whose interests are in no danger of encroachment. The present scheme amounts to packing the Central Legislature with practically nominated members at the expense of Muslim minority which had demanded Federation for the protection of its own as well as the other minorities' interest.

The allocation of 9 seats to women as a 'special interest' is another undesirable feature of the Federal Legislature. The electorate for these seats will be predominantly non-Muslim and it will be impossible for Muslim women to be elected. Muslim women ought to have been considered part of their community. In this respect Sir Mohammad Yakub's note of dissent to the Franchise Committee's Report has been completely ignored.

In the Upper House the system of a single transferable vote to be exercised by members of provincial Legislatures introduces the principle of joint electorates and would fail to secure a due proportion of seats for Muslims.

Under the new scheme ministers in the provinces will be as little responsible to the legislature and as much responsible to Governor as they are now. The special responsibilities of Governors cover a very wide field.

The scheme proposed for Baluchistan will never satisfy the Baluchis or the Muslim community in general. Nor do I find in the scheme any adequate safeguard for the personal law of Muslims.

The White Paper demands serious consideration by the Muslim community. I hope the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference will fully consider it and give the community a clear lead.

Presented to

His Excellency Sir Montagu Butler

Nagpur

and by him to his friend and colleague Professor A.J. Arberry
Litt. D. 5th May 1948

Muhammad Iqbal

Barrister-at-Law

Lahore

5th May 1930

Montagu Butler

and by A.J.A. (Professor Arberry) to Trinity College

Library to mark the Mastership of Lord Butler

A.J. Arberry

30 April 1966

Below is reproduced the letter of Sir Montagu Butler addressed to Professor Arberry which says something important about Iqbal:

The Lodge

Pembroke College,

Cambridge

Tel. 4763

7-5-1948

Dear Arberry

Here is the book with some recent cuttings about Iqbal. We were real friends, in my Lahore days especially, and it was on my

suggestion that he was decorated. I wanted a Persian title revived for him, but the precedent was feared and he was knighted. He had magnetism and stirred his hearers powerfully when declaiming his poems. Politically he was the inspirer of the Pakistan idea—always within the British Commonwealth—and I should have said it was he who invented the name, but de Montmorency doubts this and attributes the name to Rahmat Ali here in Cambridge. As with the American tourists and the Archbishop of York "we shall never know".

Ever yours

M. Butler

On the death of Iqbal on 21 April 1938, the following note appeared in the Times, London.

This extract is reproduced here through the courtesy of Mr. Ashiq Husain Batalavi.

Sir Mohammad Iqbal, of Lahore, whose death at the age of 62 is announced by a Reuter message from Lahore, was the greatest Urdu and Persian poet of his day, and his reputation in the West might have been comparable to that of his great Indian contemporary Tagore, had translations of his work into English been more frequent. He exercised an enormous influence on Islamic thought, and was an eloquent supporter of the rights and interests of his fellow Indian Muslims.

Iqbal was greatly influenced as a student at Lahore University by that ripe Islamic scholar, Sir Thomas Arnold, and for seven years he was Professor of Philosophy at the Government College, Lahore.

He went to Cambridge in 1905 and read Western Philosophy at Trinity College, under the direction of the late Dr. McTaggart, for the philosophical Tripos, in which he obtained his degree by research work. In 1908 he was called to the Bar by Lincoln's Inn and did some practice in Lahore. The Munich University conferred on him the Ph. D. for a dissertation on The Development of Metaphysics in Persia. He developed a philosophy of his own which owed much to Nietzsche and Bergson, while his poetry often reminded the reader of Shelley. The *Asrar-i-Khudi* (Secrets of the 3 elf), published in Lahore in 1915, while giving no systematic account of his philosophy, put his ideas in a popular and attractive form. Professor R.A. Nicholson, of Cambridge, was so impressed by it that he obtained the leave of the poet to translate it into English, and the rendering was published in 1920.

Western readers found him to be an apostle, if not to his own age, then to posterity, and after the Persian fashion he invoked the Saki to fill his cup with wine and pour moonbeams into the dark night of his thought. He was an Islamic enthusiast, inspired by the vision of a new Mecca, a world-wide theocratic Utopian State in which all Muslims, no longer divided by the barriers of race and country, should be one. His ideal was a free and independent

Muslim fraternity, having the Ka'ba as its centre and knit together by love of Allah and devotion to the Prophet.

In his *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* (The Mysteries of Selflessness) (1916), he dealt with the life of the Islamic community on those lines and he allied the cry "Back to the Koran" with the revolutionary force of the Western philosophy, which he hoped and believed would vitalise the movement and ensure its triumph. He felt that Hindu intellectualism and Islamic pantheism had destroyed the capacity for action based on scientific observation and interpretation of phenomena, which distinguished the Western peoples and "especially the English". But he was severely critical of Western life and thought on the ground of its materialism. Holding that the full development of the individual pre-supposes a society, he found the ideal society in what he considered to be the Prophet's conception of Islam. In 1923 he published *Payam-i-Mashriq* (The Message of the East) and addressed the modern world at large in reply to Goethe's homage to the genius of the East. Two years later came *Bang-i-Dara* (The Call to March ?) a collection of his Urdu poems written during the first twenty years of the century. This was followed by a new Persian volume of which the title stood for "Songs of a Modern David."

A poet with his gifts and his theme could not fail to influence thought in an India so politically-minded as that of our day. He took some part in provincial politics being a Member of the Punjab Legislature in 1926-28. He was on the British Indian

delegation to the second session of the Round Table Conference in London in 1931. His authority was cited, not without some justification, for a theory of Islamic political solidarity in Northern India which might conceivably be ex-tended to adjacent Muslim States.

In 1930 he publicly advocated the formation of a North-West Indian Muslim State by the merging of the Muslim provinces within the proposed All-India Federation. But his real interests were religious rather than political. A notable work published in 1934 reproduced a series of lectures by the poet on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Therein he sought to reconcile the carrying out of modern reforms, as in Turkey, with the claims of Shari'at. The lectures went to show that soundness and exactitude of historical judgment were not his special endowment. The fact was that in maturity as in youth he sought to reconcile the most recent of Western philosophical systems, into which he gathered up the latest scientific conclusions, with the teaching of the Koran. Like his earlier work the book was marked by penetrating and noble thoughts, though the connection of his argument was somewhat obscure.

He was knighted in 1923 and the Panjab University made him an Honorary D. Litt in 1933. He was elected Rhodes Memorial Lecturer at Oxford University for 1935. For a long time he had been in indifferent health, and he became increasingly dreamy and mystical.

REVIEWS

The Philosophical Life of the Senses (Sensibility-Existentialism) by Donald Burton Kuspit. Philosophical Library, Newyork, 1969. Pp. 126 Price \$ 3.95.

This is a hard to classify little book, some times serious: "science wants to end the difference between men to suit the convenience of its task to minimize variables so as to maximize predictables" (See 26 p. 38) ; often witty: "The infinity in the sage i.e. the maze the rat runs for the reward of reason" (see 22 p. 56) ; and at places, down right obscene: "Suppose Socrates had gone to bed with Alcibiades . . . would the profane Alcibiades in bed with the holy Socrates profane Socrates or would Socrates sanctify Alcibiades ? . . ." (see 33 p. 23) or "Modern art is a eunuch urinating" (see 27 p. 85). The whole book is a collection, but pretty haphazard, of epigrams, epithets and sneers. The writer moves affluently from poets, writers, philosophical and religious systems to open and shut obscenity.

The book is divided into five chapters, each chapter having a number of parts further divided into numbered sections. However, the question remains whether the book is philosophical. The list of contents promises seriousness and heaviness. Familiar topics like: 'Mind', 'truth' 'Solitude and Clarity', 'Mind over Matter', 'Sensing and knowing', 'Beyond Philosophy', etc. suggest philosophy. But soon after these follow titles such as: 'The Self-sufficiency of the Statue', 'The Love life of the Statue', 'The Stare of the Statue'. One wonders what is philosophical about them.

In chapter one: The Birth of Philosophy, Kuspit glosses over many things. He passes judgments over English, German, American philosophies and many individual philosophers too. "In English philosophy a great number of manners, an elaborate code of politeness, give the illusion of mind" (see 5 p. 4) ; again, "English philosophy is only interested in traditional tea, the worn out form of touch, the clink of cup against saucers" (see 6 p. 4).

Similar assertions are made about other philosophies and philosophers. To cite two: 1) "The German starts with the depths before he knows the surface. Thus in the end he thinks the most common things astonishing novelties and anomalies. The start: Hegel ; the end Heidegger" (see 9 p. 7). 2). "The American's consciousness is purest because it is empty" (see 10 p. 8).

The chapter two is captioned: The Identity of the Philosophers. And here, Kuspit does appear to be saying something that makes sense. He has, however, not argued his point. As usual he makes wide comments but the picture that emerges has a familiar ring about it. This chapter read in conjunction with things said in the first and the last chapter (pp 116-117, 122, 123) shows Kuspit's dissatisfaction with the traditional philosophy. Kuspit, I think, believes that traditional philosophy has become too dry and barren. Those who do this philosophy are cut off from the stream of life and there is an essential detachment in their outlook. Even philosophical style, which is prosaic, suffers from this detachment. "All prose is philosophical because it distances man from his own feeling" (see

57 p. 116). In fact, Kuspit believes, man shows his "mastery over the universe just by virtue of his feelinglessness. Man thinks he can turn his whole attention to reality once he is without feelings (see 57 p. 116).

Philosophy teaches this feelinglessness to achieve universality. Instead of showing man a way of life, Philosophy "beguiles him into searching for a purpose of life—a goal to replace the actual living, an eternally distant potentiality (called knowledge, later salvation) to distract from the intimacy of one's happiness with oneself" (see 31 p. 22).

The so called wisdom, Athena, or philosophy, "teaches man to distrust his nature" for the sake of "first principles of the universe" by teaching him detachment, i.e., teaching him not to love and abound . . . , teaches him futility (natural consequence of not loving and fructifying) in the form of universality, gives him an illusion of god-likeness, immortality" (pp.22-23).

These observations about the traditional philosophy make Kuspit declare: "Philosophers are mediocre men—the children of doom " (see 55 p. 115). What philosophy teaches and the philosopher professes is dead and colourless. For the sake of universality, philosophy has done away with emotions and deep feelings (see 75 p.119). This Kuspit finds in Marxism and also in philosophies opposed to Marxism. Kuspit does not argue his point yet he does bring out an important fact. He asks: "What has Marx done ? He has put the destiny of Society before the destiny of individual experience. What has the bourgeois done ? He has

put the destiny of power before the destiny of individual experience.

What has philosopher done ? He has put the destiny of ideas before the destiny of individual experience" (see 66 p.42). Kuspit now makes a telling observation: "But to be social, to have power, to think are consequences of the quality of life, not that quality itself ; and are characterizations of individual experience, not that character itself" (see 66 p. 42).

However, Kuspit thinks that, the richness of human, individual, experience is recognised in; what he believes to be, Indian philosophy. In this philosophy, which for him is also an art of life, Kuspit finds "Trust in the Universe, without losing trust in man, self-respect: man as the gist of the Universe without being universal" (see 12 p. 12). Here Kuspit sees "Life-consciousness without the predatory bestiality of analycity, yet with the deft penetration to the core from which the life can be seen without its being hidden by the veil of its consciousness" (See 12 p. 12).

Once a person has grasped the foregoing observations, he can, then, very well understand what Kuspit says in the third chapter on senses, which is in fact on 'Sensulity' and from there he can turn to chapters fourth, and the fifth on: Man's fate and Man's heart. As against pure abstractions of thought, Kuspit emphasises the worth of sense/sensuality in life.

Familiar grounds are felt at the list dealing with 'Art' but the con-tents some-time are misleading, some sections are

informative: "Taste is the limit of the mind's capacity to let itself go in life, to lose itself in life. . . i.e. a work of art inspiring an art of life" (sec. 3 p. 77). While others are sweeping and indefinite: "Art squeezes the poison out of the fangs of feelings" (sec. 4 p. 77). But from these observations emerges a picture that has its merits. Kuspit rightly sees the value of art in life and how it enriches life. The automation that has come into our social life can be counter balanced by being aware of the beauty of life and nature. Nature for Kuspit is all lyrical, picturesque. "City life is inevitably totalitarian. Only art aids individuality in the city ; love of art is self preservation, the works of art are imported countryside" (see 80 pp. I21-I22).

It is apparent that the writer has written with full throttle to his stream of consciousness. His approach is not precisely with an eye on the possible criticism. He just writes, gliding from poetry, philosophy and art to the question of free love. No one can doubt his involvement with the book, which is not a pure book of philosophy though some parts touch certain philosophical problems, or deal with certain problems philosophically.

In the end, I repeat that Kuspit's concern with Man is genuine. Yet I also believe that he could have shown his concern without being bizzare ; he could have argued his point instead of being frivolous.

The Essentials of Modern Materialism by Charles S. Seely. Philosophical Library, New York, 1969. Pp. 64 Price \$ 3.50.

The book, claims the author, provides "a clear, concise easy-to-understand, explanation of the basic principles of Materialism (Realism)" and is, it is further held, "the most exhaustive and thorough study of human activity ever made by one person" (p. 9). This is a big claim, neither justified by the work itself nor supported by the literature on the subject. A person has only to remind himself of F.A. Lange's classical 'The History of Materialism in this regard, not to mention the writings on materialism published since then, to show that Seely is writing with an avoidable lack of scholarship. This can not be condoned even if Seely, very candidly, confesses that this 'study' is based, not on what he has read or was told on the subject (p. 11), but on what he has seen during many of his travels round the world in the last fifty-nine years (pp. 9-10) ! As such, the book is not strictly a 'philosophical treatise' but an account of "personal observations made over a long period" (p. 11).

The book is divided into three chapters captioned (i) General Principles (pp. 19-26) (ii) Theory (pp. 27-41) and (iii) Objectives (pp. 43-64), plus the Foreword (pp. 13-17).

The author's main contention is that philosophical systems, philosophies men and nations live by, fall under two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive theses, namely, Idealism and Materialism, of which the later has contributed much to the advancement of human genius and welfare. Modern, twentieth century materialism, it is held, has roots deep into the past (p. 15) and its origin can be traced back to Thales and his fellow

Milesians (p. 17). Since then there has been a continuous and progressive development of the materialistic thought (p. 27), understood in the widest sense of the term, covering socio-economic, cultural, physical and biological phenomena. Basically, it is a thought 'invented' (p. 16) by people who had "ample economic security" (p. 16) yet wanted to contribute to human welfare. However, the rich and "the religious leaders of the period" always tried to "discredit" this thought by justifying economic differences and by denying change. Materialism has always been a reaction against economic disparity and, an argument for economic equality, and the reality of change (p. 16).

With these observations to provide the background, Sealy enumerates the "Principles" of Modern Materialism which are thirteen in number. To name a few: Materialism holds that the Universe is an unlimited material entity (p. 20), while matter is anything that has extension or "occupies space" (p. 28). It further contends that the universe is governed by natural laws of cause and effect (p. 20) ; that these laws are discover-able by sensory experience (p. 20) and "senses are the only source of knowledge" (p. 21). Modern Materialism takes "man to be 'measure' of all things" (p. 20) ; does not allow anything to obstruct human progress ; holds that all matters pertaining to human affairs be settled by negotiations or by "parliamentary means" (p. 21).

After stating these "General Principles" of Modern Materialism, Sealy goes on to give an account of eight fundamental concepts of the theory under discussion. They are:

Truth, Matter, Thought, Change, Opposites, Environment, Organization and Cooperation. I find nothing illuminating in this chapter which at places is down right misleading and sometimes very imprecise and-vague.

For Seely, 'truth' is "objective reality, or the nearest thing to objective reality" (p. 27, our italics). It is not 'permanant' but 'prelative'. "Truth emerges when an experiment is carried through to its final ("true") conclusion. . . ." (p. 28). One arrives at the 'final' or 'true' conclusion through the dialectical (Hegelian !) process. This true, or the 'final conclusion', for Seely, is a 'higher' level of reality.

Seely gives the example of parliamentary debates in this regard where from a clash of opinions of opposing speakers 'truth' comes out. I wonder if Seely has really established his case here, not to talk of a very eccentric use he has made of the concept of truth.

As is usually understood, 'truth' is the 'property' of statements and when statements fulfil certain conditions, they are said to be 'true'. Truth-claims are neither settled by 'parliamentary procedures' or by a show of hands by the majority party. At best, parliamentary procedures make the participants in the debate arrive at a decision for a certain course of action. But we must remember that decisions are neither 'true' nor 'false'. They can, of course, be right or wrong. I believe Seely has overlooked certain important logical distinctions and introduced some loose

expressions such as "truth is objective reality or the nearest thing to objective reality" (our italics) etc.

Seely has invoked the concept of dialectic to explain change and movement, scientific investigation, truth, etc. By 'dialectic' he understands a tension between opposing elements being resolved at a higher level. This movement is inevitable and there is no escape from it. Nothing is at rest, neither thoughts nor things. In fact, things change and concomitantly, thoughts undergo changes. There is nothing new about this thesis.

Seely is giving the kind of epistemology Plato wanted to refute in his *Theatetus*. However, there is something more to it. Thought, the argument goes, is a 'function of matter' in the sense that it is produced by mind which in its turn is "produced by brain" (p. 28) and brain is "a highly specialized" matter (p. 28). From what is said here, one gathers that there is an asymmetrical relation between Matter and Thought, Brain and Thought. What is true of the former is true of the latter, but not vice-versa.

I take exception to such conclusions. I believe that the properties which are ascribed to the brain and matter (e.g. that it occupies space) cannot be ascribed to thoughts. We can always talk about brain phenomena occurring at a given time and place, thus located, it does not make much sense to say that thoughts are located somewhere, or are spaced out the way nerve fibers are.

As has already been said above, for Seely, change is real. He cites examples of change from different regions of experience and in this attempt he is so much carried away by his enthusiasm that he overlooks scientific facts. He, for example, talks about pre-historic days when due to 'abundance of food' there were large bodied animals. From this follows that when the supply of food declined, the animals shrank to their present condition ! I am not saying that this is actually what Seely has said, but this is the natural conclusion a person can draw and this is highly misleading.

I now come to the third and final chapter of the book: Objective.

The ultimate objectives of Modern Materialism, according to Seely, are Freedom and Democracy. They can, however, be realized only when optimum in Health, Peace, Justice, Equal Opportunity for all, and Universal Education, is reached. But this in its turn depends upon people becoming more responsible towards their civil duties (p. 43). How this state of affairs can be brought about, is not explained.

The objectives of Materialism described in the book need not be disputed. What is to be disputed is the belief that only modern material-ism can realise these objectives and these ends are particular to it and not shared by Idealism, or religions like Islam and Christianity and Buddhism. Seely holds that religious leaders:have always fought against the ideals of materialism (p. 16). I wonder if it is a historical fact. One has only to study the lives of

Jesus and Muhammad to realize that Seely has not gone deeper into his material.

Seely has made an impassioned appeal to realize the virtues of materialism. I, however, believe that people have not always striven for material gain, economic security or worldly riches, but have fought and died for objectives not reducible to or measurable in materialistic terms.

The Theory of Auto-Deism: Evolutionary chain in Ontological Terms by Alberto Cernuschi. Philosophical Library, New York, 1969. Pp. xi, 59, Price \$ 3.50.

This is a small book with a long intimidating title written by physicist-mathematician on a problem that is as personal as universal: where do I come from? where am I going? (p. 1) Cernuschi believes that different religions and philosophical systems originated as various attempts to answer this question (pp. 1-3, 4, 6) by pointing to some-thing beyond. But both religion and philosophy failed in the long run to satisfy man in this regard. Religion failed because its central source, the Temple, withered away. Philosophy failed due to its conflicting systems and preoccupation with a "tiny fragment of the eternal problem" (p. 5). But every failure takes man beyond to a higher stage and man evolves new faiths and new philosophies (pp. 7-8). Accordingly, Cernuschi argues, our age "necessarily must give birth to a spiritual movement which will attempt" to satisfy man's urge to know the final answer and that is to be god (pp. 8-9). This, Cernuschi thinks, is going beyond the Sartrean thesis.

For Sartre man is desire to be for-itself i.e. God. Since this is an impossibility, this desire becomes an ontological illusion and all life becomes a pursuit for the impossible. Cernuschi wants to break this wall of impossibility by arguing that man is "moved by his vital necessity for God. Like a new dawn in the sombre night, the vision of a new faith arises in Man, of a great faith in himself, in his limitless possibilities, in his infinite and glorious ascent towards the final goal, which is God" (p. 9).

This is all very poetical but Cernuschi does not think it to be pure fancy or mere sentimentalism (p. 28). He regards this evolutionary urge to be present in the scheme of things, finding its most profound expression in man (p. 13). But the evolution does not end here. Man is not

the "peak of the chain of evolution" (p. 49). He is only a link in the evolutionary chain" (p. 50). On the earth, which represents a determined age, we find innumerable manifestations of organic life, with the respective states of evolution, whose end is Man. The other part of the chain from Man to God, may exist in the infinity of worlds with their distinct ages (p.48). The movement of progression is in perfect continuity, even when the physiological stage ends to give way in turn to the initiation of the incorporeal (p. 49).

Cernuschi calls this incorporeal entity soul. It is also called 'Spirit, Spiritual force' and 'psychic energy.' "It is an invisible force, without media of transmission and without conductors, which does not belong to the categories of waves which we know (p.

28). But, Cernuschi hopes, the day is not far when scientists will make a gadget to sort out and classify such invisible forces or energies (p. 28). Should we take this invisible energy or soul as immortal? Cernuschi is not sure. But whatever it is he thinks that, it is also subject to the law of evolution (23). Soul's association with body is its 'period of pregnancy" (p. 23). With the death of the body it is born. It, then, commences its life outside the maternal cloisters, and is now independent (p. 23; also p. 26). It enters into psychic development (p. 23). This evolution, Cernuschi says, will lead man to his destiny, which is God (p. 23). For Cernuschi, Man, then, becomes God. This is his theory of Autodesim. The question is: How far it is Cernuschi's theory?

The theory of Ego-Evolution, as I would like to call it, is as old as Rumi's (d. 1273 A.D.), Ibn Maskwaih's (d. 421 All./1030A.D.) and as recent as Iqbal's (1877-1938) and, not only in outline but also in details. I will first give an account of Ibn Maskwaih's theses as developed in his *Al-Fauz al-Asghar*,¹ then I will refer to Iqbal's *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* 2

In the section on Prophethood in his *Al-Fauz al-Asghar*, Ibn Maskwaih refers to the fact of evolution experienced in nature. There is a hierarchy of beings from the lowest to the highest upto man. However, the evolution does not end here (Cf. Cernuschi pp. 48-49). Man goes on to attain a level of existence higher than that of the human beings (p. 98 Cf. Cernuschi pp. 48-49) It is possible for the evolution to continue even after the

annihilation of the corporeal because all through the evolution has been of the incorporeal (Fauz al-Asghar pp. 54-75). The corporeal has been a mere tool ('The submissive' of Cernushi, p. 20)

1. All references are to Fauz al-Asghar as Translated by Hakim Mohammad Hasan [Aligarh Muslim University Press, 19231.

2. Iqbal. M. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam [Lahore, August 1962]

of the Incorporeal ('The Dominant' of Cernuschi p. 20. Cf. Fauz al-Asghar, pp. 39-40).

Ibn Maskwaih then goes on to argue why the incorporeal or the spiritual should survive the corporeal. He gives the example of human body (a corporeal substance) which has many parts to perform different actions and they perform these actions for an agent other than them-selves (Part II sec. V, pp. 54-57, also II, sec. I, p. 39).

This agent can not itself be a part of body, be corporeal, or it will be an instrument too, then there will be one particular organ to perform its set functions. Since there is no such organ, this agent is incorporeal and uses the corporeal for its ends or purposes. And since annihilation or dissolution is the characteristic only of the corporeal, the incorporeal survives body and the corporeal (Fauzul Asghar, pp. 54-57). Iqbal in his Reconstruction (pp. 121-123) develops this thesis further. He believes that "in

view of the past history of man it is highly improbable that his career should come to an end with the dissolution of his body."

Iqbal argues that certain verses of the Qur'an suggest that it is possible to maintain a sort of individuality to further human action "even after the disintegration of what appears to specify his individuality in his present environment" (p. 122). It is only the contemporary theory of evolution that has brought "despair and anxiety, instead of hope and enthusiasm for life, to the modern world" (p. 121). And the reason behind this is the "unwarranted modern assumption that man's present structure, mental as well as physiological, is the last word in biological evolution, and that death, regarded as a biological event, has no constructive meaning" (p. 121).

As can be seen, Cernuschi has not gone far in his thesis from Ibn Maskwaih (A.D. 1031) and Iqbal (1877-1938). He echoes them, not only in outline, but also in detail and at places in almost the same language. It is thus clear that Cernuschi's claim to give a "new ideology" is not borne out by facts. More than nine hundred years before his time Ibn Maskwaih had already worked out this thesis and in the immediate past Iqbal had added some new arguments to the original theory in the light of contemporary scientific research.

I now come to certain remarks made by Cernuschi while developing this theory. To take one example: "The distance between the force that moves the world and Man himself, was not so great as it was in monotheism" (p. 15). This "great" distance,

according to Cernuschi, makes it look impossible to reach the Divine. However, "When the image of Olympus with its divinities and a God similar to Man is more

real and closer to us, fewer difficulties face us in reaching Divinity" (p. 16). From this follows, paradoxically enough, that one can reach the Divine only by being a pagan.

That there is no great distance between man and God is borne out by two things (illustrating from Muslim religious experience):

1. The spiritual Ascension,

2. The word of the Qur'an: Man is the representative of the Divine (2: 28 ; 6: 165).

The ascension shows that the distance can be covered and the Qur'an shows how it can be covered and that it doesn't take long to traverse this distance. My second judgment: Cernuschi has not been careful in making historical assessments.

There are a number of misprints. Some of which are:

p. 6 line 11, read 'resigned' for designed ; p. 14 line 10 read 'cycle' for cycles ; p. 17 line 15 read 'once' for 'one' ; p. 20 line 13 read 'replaced' for 'replacing' ; p. 21 line 12 read 'nor' for 'or'.

Kazi A. Kadir

