

MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH

The Architect of Pakistan

(25 December 1876—11 September 1948)

Dr L.S. May

“I fervently pray that God Almighty make us all worthy of our past and hoary history and give us strength to make Pakistan truly a great nation amongst all the nations of the world...”⁵

Introduction

“... I, Sir, stand here with a clear conscience and I say that I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second and a nationalist last...”⁶

These words spoken by Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1925 clearly indicate where he stood during the first and greater part of his political career. He was an Indian nationalist. It meant a broader secular approach because he ignored the role of religion

⁵The Quaid-i-Azam's `Id Message, 18 August 1947 (reproduced in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964). II, 409.

⁶Mr M.A. Jinnah's 1925 Legislative Assembly speech on the Indian Finance Bill (*Eminent Mussulmans* [Madras: G.A. Natesan, 1926], p. 435).

in politics. Stressing faith as predominant in the political ordering of a people signifies a more restricted and, what has been called a communalist, orientation. The terms “patriot” and “country,” therefore, can have, and in India had, a double meaning. They may refer to loyalty to the land and its people as a whole, reflecting unitedness on the basis of a national majority consensus.⁷ Or they point to a strong affiliation with a particular community, whose faith defines its educational, social, cultural, including linguistic, and legal traditions and life. It involved geographic distribution. Such a close communal affiliation implies the elevation of one’s own group above any other. It contains the seeds of division. This in fact was the case in India where the large Muslim minority⁸ increasingly feared their suppression by the vast Hindu majority. Mr. Jinnah for a long time was a non-communal patriot. He intensely tried to stop the schismatic divisionary trend that resulted in the growing communal (Hindu-Muslim) tensions since the late 1910’s. Although he confessed in October 1920: “I have no voice or power to remove the cause...”⁹ he pleaded in the aforementioned 1925 speech:

‘I once more appeal to this House, whether you are a Mussulman or a Hindu, for God’s sake do not import the discussion of communal matters into this House, and degrade this

⁷ As in the United States of America—through secret balloting.

⁸ In 1875, British India had a 232 million total population, of whom 70 millions were Muslims.

⁹ Letter to Mr M.K. Gandhi (1869-1948).

Assembly, which we desire should become a real National Parliament. Set an example to the outside world and our people!”¹⁰

His reference to “our people” instead of “our peoples”¹¹ and his plea for “a real national Parliament” “again reflect his commitment to unity as also to “Home Rule” (swarai). Both remained his utter concern until 1937. That year marks a watershed in his thought and life. He turned increasingly separatist, formally endorsed “the Pakistan movement” in 1940 and effectively worked toward establishing the independent Republic of Pakistan on 15 August 1947! Mr. Jinnah as Quaid-i-Azam (“great leader”) would steer his now sovereign land for another year.

His life, therefore, is divisible into two main parts, namely, (1) as an Indian nationalist until 1937; and (2) as a Pakistan patriot. A discussion of the first phase of his career is essential to understand better why he changed his political viewpoint and thereby so deeply affected the Indo-Islamic community’s future course.

¹⁰ Eminent Mussulmans, p. 435.

¹¹ The Indo-Muslim modernist, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), referred to the Muslims and Hindus as “two different nations” in his 12 January 1883 Speech in Governor General’s Council. For the text, see Sir Reginald Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India (Oxford University Press, 1942), Vol. I, Appendix II).

I. Mr. Jinnah as an Indian Nationalist (1906-1935) Born of Muslim parentage at Karachi, the capital of Sind¹² which at that time was a Muslim-majority province within British India, he received his grade-school education at Bombay,¹³ then a swaraj stronghold¹⁴; went to high school¹⁵ in his native city; and, upon a family friend's advice, in 1892 sailed for London to prepare himself for the bar at Lincolns Inn. Returning home as a full-fledged barrister at the early age of twenty, he settled in Bombay about 1897. He already drew the attention of that city's political circles to him by becoming the first Indian reader in the chambers of its then Advocate General, Mr. McPherson.¹⁶ He gained some contacts and at the same time familiarised himself with legal and administrative processes grooming him for his subsequent brilliant career.¹⁷ He refused to remain in British Government

¹² Sind at that time formed part of the Bombay Presidency. For his later demand that they be separated, see below, Sec. II.

¹³ At the Gokul Das Tejpal Primary School.

¹⁴ So was Bengal where the swaraj movement may have begun as a reaction to British rule first exercised by the East India Company since its forces' victory at Plassey (on 22 June 1757) and, after the 1857-58 "Mutiny" by Great Britain's Imperial Throne. The capital remained Calcutta until 12 December 1911 when it was shifted to New Delhi.

¹⁵ Sind Madrasah High School.

¹⁶ Mr Jinnah in 1900 became Third Magistrate during the three months' leave taken by Mr Dastur.

¹⁷ He apparently also was the private secretary of the prominent Liberal Dadahai Naoroji (1825-1917) who was the first Indian

service, however,¹⁸ The reason was his preference for personal independence so that he could freely argue India's right to freedom. His political career officially started when he joined All-India National Congress¹⁹ (founded in 1885) in 1906. The press, surprised that he, a Muslim, did not join the All-India Muslim League²⁰ (set up in late December 1906) drew his response that he "was proud to belong" to the Hindu-majority body.²¹ The reasons why Mr. Jinnah felt pride in his Congress membership were:

- (a) their acceptance of him as a legitimate member;

member of British Parliament (1892-1895) and President of the All-India National Congress in 1886, 1893 and 1906, viz. in the year that Mr Jinnah joined that organisation. He already had associated himself with Mr Naoroji during his London student years.

¹⁸ It was not only a money question. His wish to earn more than offered to him again resulted from his preference to remain even financially independent and use the money he earned as he desired. It had a moral implication for he did not want to use Government wages against it.

¹⁹ Henceforth called the Congress.

²⁰ Henceforth called the League.

²¹ Congress wished to represent all Indian groups which Sayyid Ahmad Khan already opposed in his above-mentioned 12 January 1883 speech. He expressed fear that it would not adequately advocate Muslim interests. It remained above all a Hindu body, and although it had Indo-Islamic community members, they remained a minority. It also lost its Liberalism in the 1920's.

(b) his self-awareness that it symbolised a new phase in his life ;

(c) his ability to work for self-rule through an organisation established for that purpose; by signing its pledge, he formally subscribed to its swaraj platform;

(d) his preference for unitary to separatist politics, for secular to religious nationalism.

He did not immediately join the League because

(a) it appeared only toward the end of 1906, viz. it was non-existent so that he could not have entered it;²²

(b) it mainly focussed upon the Muslims' needs; and

(c) at first it was less concerned with "Home-Rule".²³ He nevertheless did not repudiate his Islamic heritage for he demanded a fund to aid the poor and orphaned children (waqf al-aulad), in his 1906 Congress speech marking his political debut It made him popular while his subsequent success in gaining the Wakf Validating Bill (in 1913) widened his Muslim contacts and support.

²² Could it also be because it was set up in Dacca by Bengali leaders and that he did not think that it would become as prestigious as Congress?

²³ please see below. For its 1911 resolution.

Running on the Muslim ticket under the 1909 Indian Councils (Reform) Act,²⁴ incorporating separate electorates²⁵ to guarantee sufficient minority representation in the local assemblies and higher Councils. he was elected in autumn of that year by his co-religionist Bombay Presidency constituents to the Supreme Legislative (Imperial) Council. In addition to his Congress and new Council duties, he accepted the invitation to participate in the 1910 Allahabad Muslim Conference called²⁶ to attain better Muslim-Hindu understanding, for the majority²⁷ disfavored the electoral principle; to work with the League Council between 1910

²⁴The 1909 Act. based on the 1892 Government of India Act, allowed for the expansion of the hitherto British-staffed Viceroy's Cabinet and Secretary of State for India Council by adding one or two Indians respectively to either organ. Under the 1858 Act, the title "Viceroy" (royal or imperial representative) was bestowed upon the Governor-Generals, while the Secretary of State for India residing in London, was set up Mr Jinnah criticised the 1909 Act for not giving adequate representation and say by Hind's people in the higher administrative bodies and government of their country.

²⁵They were demanded by a deputation led by The Aga Khan to Simla, a hill station constituting the Governor-Generals' summer residence, on 1 October 1906. The Simla Deputation as it hence became known, gained a triumph for Lord G.J. (fourth Earl of) Minto, the then Governor-General (1905-1910) acceded to their request (See also Conclusions.)

²⁶The Conference was convened by Sir William Wedderburn, then Governor of the Bombay Presidency.

²⁷See below for the Nehru Report.

and 1911; and to attend the 1911-1913 deliberations. He finally joined the League in 1913—upon the eve of the First World War—after it passed its (1913) resolution mirroring his insistence on “national unity . . . by cooperation with other communities,” viz. mainly the Hindus, but also the Sikhs and other faith minorities.²⁸ To emphasise unity and “harmonious cooperation,” for which he was lauded in that year, he remained in Congress. During the (annual) Bombay 1915²⁹ Muslim League session, Mr. Jinnah moved a very important resolution to appoint a committee having powers to negotiate with non-Muslim representatives. Even Bengal’s “Lion.” Maulvi Abul-Kasim Fazl-ul-Haq (1873-1962) and the Indian nationalist, Maulana Abul-Kalam Azad (1888-1958)—both of whom then were Leaguers—supported his resolution guaranteeing its unanimous adoption. After the new committee’s months of difficult negotiations with a similarly appointed Congress group, both approved a “Joint Scheme” of intended reforms. Mr. Jinnah, chairing the 1916 Congress-League Lucknow session, effected its acceptance by both organizations. It involved a compromise by allotting to the (Muslim) minority, where they actually constituted a majority, less seats in the

²⁸ Jains, Parsees, Christians. Sikhism and Jainism both are offshoots from Hinduism. The Parsees are Zoroastrians. India also has a small Jewish community.

²⁹ The League and the Congress yearly—and sometimes jointly—convened in different cities.

Legislatures than numerically justified (principle of underweight age). The percentage-wise proportion was as follows:³⁰

Punjab ³¹	50 %
United Bengal	40 %
Bombay Presidency	33k- % (one-third)
United Provinces	30%
Bihar	25 %

The Hindu stress on “a majority with joint electorates” dissatisfied him as much as other Muslim leaders for fear that the Hindus might impose their will. About one-fifth of the British Indian population, estimated at circa 283 million (1901), and reaching circa 300 million by 1920, were Muslims. The proportion rose to a little under one-fourth in the following decades.

Madras Presidency	15%
Central Provinces	15%

³⁰ Cf. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 15. I rearranged the table according to the percentages. This Pact’s other conditions included a three-fourth quorum in the councils.

³¹ Despite the Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the Muslims only had 40% of the vote. Cf. Jinnah’s brief September 1931 Bombay visit speech (MM. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah, A Political Style* [Karachi: Elite Publishers, 1962], p. 157).

The famed Lucknow Pact as it became known is the high-water mark in twentieth-century Hindu-Muslim relations. It raised Mr. Jinnah's already considerable prestige as "an ambassador of unity" and out-standing Muslim "parliamentarian". But the future course of events would disillusion him. Two measure known after their sponsor, Sir Sidney Rowlatt, as the Rowlatt Act(s), promulgated on 21 April 1919 —after the end of the First World War³²—permitted instant arrest and imprisonment without due process of law of anyone suspect of conspiring against the British raj. Free speech, press, and assembly were forbidden. The results were mass jailings including of nearly all Hindu leaders, communal riots,³³ "passive resistance" (satyagraha), between 1919 and 1922,³⁴

³² 28. A major reason for British policy undoubtedly was to subdue Indo-Muslim pro-Caliphate feelings (amongst mostly the middle class) at a time when the huge Turkish-centred State was dismembered by Great Britain and France after the War. Although India never formed part of the Caliphate, its fall meant the tearing apart of their freedom symbol ! Mustafa Kemal Pasha (alias Ataturk) formally abolished the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.

³³ Cf. Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Faber and Faber, n.d., but Preface dated "Oxford, November 1919"), p. 49, gives communal riot statistics and cites Dr B.R. Ambedkar's view (stated in the latter's *Pakistan*, [Bombay: 1947], pp. 152 ff.) that the 1920-1940 period actually saw a Hindu-Muslim "civil war" with some "brief intervals of armed peace".

³⁴ Initiated and led by Mr Gandhi with full Congress approval at its December 1920 Nagpur session. Mr Jinnah and Dr M. Iqbal

and bloody British reprisals.³⁵ The 1919 Government of India Act containing Devolution Rules permitting presumably independence to a Provincial Government within a diarchy or double-headed State seemed an attempt to bypass the central issue of Federation and “distribution of powers”.³⁶ The British neither granted self rule nor true representation, for which reasons Congress refused to enter the new Government installed in February 1921. Meanwhile, Mr. Jinnah presiding over the Muslim League’s special meeting held on 7 September 1920 at Calcutta, forcefully spoke out against British policies:

“One thing there is which is indisputable and that is that this Government must go and give place to a complete responsible

(1877-1938) disliked it because they feared that sweeping up the irrational emotions could have disastrous consequences. History proved them right.

³⁵ Cf. the Amritsar massacre caused by General Dyer’s order to his troops to shoot into a crowd assembled to hear a speaker ; 1200 persons were killed ; 379, wounded.

³⁶ S.C. Dash, *The Constitution of India*, Allahabad : Chaitanya Publishing House, 1960. The Act’s many other provisions included direct instead of indirect election ; a 0% minimum elected membership, ranging between 139% in Bengal to 53% in Assam, in the representative bodies ; residency and property qualifications (not applicable to University bodies) ; but the British Government led by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State retained control over defence, foreign affairs, and even budgetary matters so that the provincial assemblies had very little effective authority,

Government... One degrading measure upon another, disappointment upon disappointment, and injury upon injury, can lead a people to only one end It led Russia to Bolshevism... May it lead India to freedom.³⁷

His disagreement with Congress on satvagraha as the best way to make the Indians' will known to the colonialist rulers led to his resignation after his fourteen-year membership. He furthermore refused to “enter the legislature till the Congress lifted the boycott”. He nevertheless did not give up hope for better times. Despite the installment of more Conservative Viceroy. Lord Reading (1921-1926)—and Lord Peel (1867-1937) as Secretary of State—asserting that autonomy (Dominion Status) was out of the question. Mr. Jinnah convened a Muslim League meeting at Lahore in May 1924. He stated as its aims:

to discuss the constitutional issue; improve Hindu-Muslim relations particularly in the Punjab; and to effect “an amicable settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims, as was done at Lucknow in 1916.”³⁸

³⁷ Also quoted in my (L.S. May) book entitled *Iqbal, His Life and Times* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1974), p. 136. Original source: *Englishman*, 8 September 1920.

³⁸ After the March 1924 All-India Muslim League Council meeting at Delhi to discuss the agenda of the forthcoming League session Cf. M H. Saiyid, *op. cit.*, p. 101 Cf. S.M Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan (1858-1951)* (Lahore: Sh

This wish furthermore is enshrined in his 1925 speech, cited above. He nearly succeeded in his attempt to revive the spirit of the Lucknow Pact through his Delhi (Muslim) Proposals presented during the League's (annual) 1926 Delhi session. Its Resolution,³⁹ moved by him, insisted on: (1) "adequate and effective representation of the minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even to equality"; (2) communal representation "by means of separate electorates as at present provided" with the option granted to any community "to abandon its separate electorates in favour of a joint electorate"; (3) "any" possibly needed 'territorial redistribution... shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province"; (4) "liberty of belief, worship ... propaganda, association and education shall be guaranteed to all communities"; and (5) a three-fourth quorum for passing any "bill or resolution or any part thereof . . . in any legislature". It furthermore demanded "the speedy attainment of full responsible Government," a further examination to make the necessary "amendment" of "the present constitution of India,"⁴⁰ and Sind's separation from the Bombay Presidency. In his lengthy speech, Mr. Jinnah insisted upon the revision of the 1919 Act to assure a more democratic government

Muhammad Ashraf, 1965), p. 247. (Note.—In March 1924, the Caliphate formally was abolished ; see above, footnote).

³⁹ See Sayyid *op. cit.*, pp 115-16, for the Resolution and p. 117 for a summary of Mr. Jinnah's "long speech".

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 117 39.

and asserted that League and he, personally, rejected non-cooperation and obstruction to effect the required constitutional reforms. His grateful Bombay constituents re-elected their unopposed able and fearless spokesman to the Assembly in November 1926. If the Punjabi Muslims rejected giving up representation through the electoral principle, the Hindus generally gave a lukewarm reception to the said Proposals. While the League approved them⁴¹ and the Congress Working Committee recommended them to the All-India Congress Committee, Congress affirmed rather than “welcomed” them during its (annual) Madras convention. Amidst high praise from Hindu and Muslim quarters for his zeal and hard work to promote the two causes of Indian unity and freedom, there was critique.⁴²

After the All-India Congress Working Committee’s unanimous acceptance of the Muslim Formula,” the matter was referred to an All-Parties Conference which held meetings between February-March and December 1928.⁴³ After the earlier discussions, it was passed to the Nehru Committee—so called

⁴¹ So did the Khilafat Conference. Cf. Ikram, *op. cit.*, p. 247. This Conference founded in reaction to the Ottoman Caliphate’s end (see above note) first met on 23 November 1919. It also stood for *swaraj*.

⁴² . From the “influential” Hindu newspaper, *The Hindustan Times*, for instance, which asserted that the Muslims’ demand for separating Sind to make it a Muslim majority province might provoke the Hindus’ insistence upon readjusting the Punjab’s and Bengal’s borders “to eliminate Muslim majorities from these two provinces” (Sayyid, *op. cit.*, p. 119).

⁴³ Other meetings were held during May 1928 in Bombay.

because it was chaired by Motilal Nehru (1861-1931), father of the later Indian Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru (1889-1964)—for further study. The Nehru Report published in August 1928, that is, while Mr. Jinnah was in England on holiday,⁴⁴ was negative because it preferred a united instead of a federated India and rejected the separate electoral principle. It further asserted that the Muslims form a large minority, and that “religious liberty... and cultural autonomy” would solve the “communal problem”.⁴⁵ While it acknowledged Muslim fears concerning harassment by “the majority,” the Report nevertheless countered the Indo-Islamic community’s preference for a weak rather than a strong centre, an issue which would remain a thorn in all future discussions and negotiations.

Upon Mr. Jinnah’s return, he nevertheless joined with Congress in opposing the Simon Commission⁴⁶ (November 1927-Spring 1930) which did not include one single Indian and which Mr. Jinnah amongst others boycotted because “we are denied

⁴⁴ Mr. Jinnah often went to England on shorter or longer vacations.

⁴⁵ See Nehru Report, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁶ Headed by Sir John Simon (1873-1954). It is also called the Statutory Commission. Cf. Simon Report. For further details, see, for example, Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, A Political History (1858-1947)* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1959); *Parliamentary Debates* ; M. Shafi, *Some Important Indian Problems* (Lahore: 1930) ; M.H. Saiyid, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: 1948), apart from innumerable newspaper and other journalistic reports.

equal partnership”.⁴⁷ He furthermore continued his deliberations with not only Muslim, but also Hindu, politicians, attending the Unity Conference called by the Khilafat Committee and held between 20 and 31 August 1928, at Lucknow, as well as December 1928 All-Parties Conference which met during the last week of December 1928 at Calcutta. Mr. Jinnah insisted on one-third Muslim representation in the Central Legislature whose distribution of seats should be left to the Muslims; the provinces should have full “federal and residuary powers”; Sind’s and the North-West Frontier Province’s separation. His demands for adequate Muslim representation were keyed to his certainty that adult suffrage on a truly national⁴⁸ scale would not become a reality so soon. His suggested amendments, despite receiving some Hindu support,⁴⁹ were rejected⁵⁰

A “heart-broken” Jinnah confessed to Karachi’s future mayor, Mr. Jamshed Nusserwanji, who had brought him to the train: “Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways.” It was a prophetic

⁴⁷ Cf. The Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, II, 451. Also my cited work on Iqbal, pp. 171 ff.

⁴⁸ Two major problems affected the voting in India at the time: (a) the lack of political consciousness amongst the rural masses forming the majority of the population ; and (b) the will of those inhabiting the many semi-autonomous States (such as Hyderabad and Kashmir) could not prevail over their respective rulers’ preference. Kashmir Province’s 93% and Jammu’s 53% Muslims had to follow their Hindu Maharaja’s choice to join India in 1947.

⁴⁹ Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1949), an erstwhile member (1920-1923) of the Viceroy’s Council, and President of the National Liberal Federation of India (1923, 1927) particularly urged the acceptance of Mr Jinnah’s “Fourteen Points”.

⁵⁰ Their rejection was due to the argumentation against them by the Mahasabha leader, M.R. Jayakar, who won over the Congress majority. The extremist Mahasabha, “the right-wing group within Hinduism,” rejected “com.

statement! He still clung to the hope of effecting better Hindu-Muslim understanding and “harmonious cooperation”. He summarised the last year’s events before the Central Legislative Assembly’s March 1929 hearings on the Nehru Committee Report, but was disillusioned in the Hindu “counter-proposals” which he felt were against the “letter and spirit” of his recommendations. Undaunted, he (apparently) formulated his “Four-teen Points”⁵¹ shortly after the All-Parties Conference, held at Calcutta during the Christmas week of 1928. Submitted by him to another All-Parties Muslim Conference, held in January 1929 at New Delhi, they once more stressed adequate minority representation through separate electorates, thus assuring the smaller religious blocs a voice in the lower and higher legislatures in a free federated India. The last clause of its resolution moved by Sir Muhammad Shafi (1896-1932)⁴⁸ asserts “separate electorates,” vowed to get the imperialists out of India and retain control over its Muslim population. Cf. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Muslim Islam in India* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), p. 186.

The resolution’s third paragraph (viz. what resolution containing the said “Fourteen Points”) refers to “the attitude taken up by the Hindu Mahasabha” which “from the commencement through their representatives at the Convention was nothing short of an ultimatum”(cf. Sayyid, M. A. Jinnah, p.137) They again stress a federal set-up “with the residuary powers

⁵¹ For their full text, consult amongst other works, Sayyid, M.A. Jinnah, pp. 137-40.

vested in the provinces” (1). They shall be granted full autonomy (2) ; “not . . . less than one-third” representation for Muslims in the Central Legislature (4) ; the option to any province to abolish separate electorates which for the time being would continue ; ‘ at least one-third Muslim Ministers” in any “cabinet, either Central or Provincial” (13) ; safeguards for full religious freedom, worship, and all other, including educational and legal, aspects related to the continuance of Muslim life and thought (7 and 12). The alternative provisions to these Points also state that “the question of excess” Muslim representation “in provinces where they are in a minority is to be considered hereafter” (p. 140 in Sayyid, M.A. Jinnah).⁵² Sir Muhammad Shad had already disagreed with Mr. Jinnah by preferring cooperation with the Simon Commission. This policy advocated during the previous century by Sayyid Ahmad Khan had as its main reason these leaders’ feeling that it would protect their community against particularly the more extremist Hindu groups. It led to the All-India Muslim League split, which deepened by 1929 when The Aga Khan headed a bloc. called the National Convention; another named the All-India Nationalist Muslim Party (formed in July 1929), contrary to the National Convention, accepted the Nehru Report; a fourth seceded from the League on the Delhi (Muslim) Proposals because it rejected joint electorates; and a fifth, headed by Mr. Jinnah himself, urged Muslim and Hindu-Muslim

reconciliation, League and national unity and cooperation, while refusing its unconditional support to the Nehru Report that:

“This Conference emphatically declares that no constitution, by whomsoever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian Mussulmans unless it conforms with the principles embodied in this resolution.”⁵³

Meanwhile, the author of the Fourteen Points, for which he again was highly praised, wrote in his 19 June 1929 letter addressed to England’s (then) Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald:

“...there is a section in India that has already declared in favour of independence, and I may tell you without exaggeration that the movement for independence is gaining ground, as it is supported by the Indian National Congress. . . .”⁵⁴

Total independence rather than Dominion Status had been advocated by the more revolutionary Hindu politicians⁵⁵ even at the beginning of this century. Amongst the Muslims, Sayyid Fadlul-Hasan Hasrat Mohani (1878-1951) insisted in his December 1921 Ahmedabad Congress speech: “ ‘Swaraj can have only one

⁵³ . Cf. Times of India, 2 January 1929.

⁵⁴ 4950 L.S. May, op. cit., p. 178 ; p. 145 in Sayyid, M.A. Jinnah, which, on pp. 141-47, contains the letter’s full text. The textual quotation also is taken from it.

⁵⁵ Amongst them Mr. Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) who asserted in his May 1907 Madras speeches that “self-government under British paramountcy” was impracticable (B.C. Pal, Swadeshi and Swaraj ; he also edited a monthly called New India). In his 1887 National Congress speech, he had “welcomed the British Government in India” because of his conviction that it would lead his country to democracy and independence

meaning and that is complete independence.”⁵⁶ On 1 January 1922, he again pounded on the need for a clearer, viz. such a, definition of swaraj and on a thorough transformation of the Indian administration by declaring it a Republic “similar to that of the United States,” but with this difference that “the United States of India” should have “a parallel government”⁵⁷ (viz. a dyarchy) so that “the Hindu majority in Madras, Bombay, and the United Provinces will not be allowed to overstep the limits of moderation against the Mussalmans.”⁵⁸ Al-though he still proposed a federal structure, the Punjabi politician, Mr. Lajpat Rai (1895-1928), immediatly concluded: “ ‘It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.’ ”⁵⁹

That a Hindu and a Muslim autonomous Government within federated Indian Republic would not work was stated in 1923: “ joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense, which under no circumstance can exist. . . . The reason is that every State is ultimately dependent on its customs, its national languages and its nation history.”⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Report of the Thirty-sixth Indian National Congress, 1921, p. 50.

⁵⁷ The Indian Annual Register, 1922, Vol. I. Appendices, pp. 68-77.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Appendices, pp. 71-72.

⁵⁹ Sayyid, M.A. Jinnah, p. 109. Mr. Lajpat Rai together with Dr M.A. Ansari (1880-1936) had been appointed as special Committee members by the Christmas

⁶⁰ Indra Prakash. Where We Differ, as quoted by F.K. Khan Durrani in Meaning of Pakistan (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), pp. 98-99. quotation has been put in reverse.

The two-nation theory which it already implies had been given political expression by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the nineteenth century.⁶¹ It was crystallised by Dr Muhammad Iqbal in his 29 December 1930 Presidential Speech to Allahabad session of the League:⁶²

“I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny, of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”⁶³

Although he gave the option concerning Dominion Status,⁶⁴ he seemingly preferred complete freedom from any “British paramountcy”, Mr. Jinnah in his previously cited 1929 letter expressed himself (other) wise:

⁶¹ Cf. L.S. May, *Evolution of Indo-Muslim Thought after 1857* (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1969), p. 83, for Sayyid Ahmad’s 12 January 1883 speech given in the Governor-General’s Council. He added: “To hope that both could in a Hindu-dominated land ‘is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable.’ remain equal” That Mr. Lajpat Rai therefore did not “pioneer” the schism idea (contrary to Sayyid’s speech), seems borne out by the historical record.

⁶² Mr. Jinnah had succeeded in re-unifying the League in February 1930. See above note for its divisionism.

⁶³ “Shamloo,” *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore : Al-Ma Academy, 1948), p. 12. Italics in the original.

⁶⁴ The term “Dominion Status” first appeared with regard to India in 1919.

“I would most earnestly urge upon you at this moment to persuade His Majesty’s Government without delay to make a declaration 1922 Congress to devise a National Pact. Their report presented to the 191 Cocanada Congress silently died. Mr. C.R. Das at the same time had reached politico and religious agreements with the Muslim leaders; but the same (1923) Congress rejected them because it felt that they included too many concessions. Sayyid statement (M.A. Jinnah, p. 108) that Mr. Lajpat Rai in his analysis went beyond the federation proposal presented by Hasrat Mohani would imply that some non Muslims agreed that separation was the only solution that Great Britain is unequivocally pledged to the policy of granting to India full responsible government with Dominion status. . . .”⁶⁵

That his, apart from other leaders’, urgent plea carried some weight in the British Government decision for Dominion Status announced on 31 October 1929, is not unlikely. That he disagreed with any separatist idea is clear from his early September 1931 Bombay declaration: “I am an Indian first and a Muslim afterwards”⁶⁶ By then he had settled in London whither he had sailed to attend⁶⁷ the first Round Table Conference (12 November

⁶⁵ Saiyid, M.A. Jinnah, p. 145.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 156.

⁶⁷ So did other Indian notables and the Viceroy Lord Irwin. Messrs Gandhi, Nehru, twenty other prominent Congressmen and a host of dissidents had been jailed on 5 May 1930 and freed only on 26 January 1931. The reason was Gandhi’s call and he December

193C-19 January 1931) called. by the Government to hammer out India's future constitution. Its relatively successful conclusion caused Mr. Jinnah to reassert his long and deeply felt Indian nationalism on his few days' cited visit to Bombay. He nevertheless returned to London, which now was his home and where he practiced before the Pnvy Council. His hope for a settlement lessened because the second (7 September-1 December 19:1) which he attended,⁶⁸ and the third Round Table Conferences (17 November-24 December 1932), to which last one he was not invited, failed to solve the thorny communal representation issue. He further-more did not fully approve the British Government's

1929 Lahore resolution of the Congress for a second satayagraha campaign, announced by him in his 2 March 1930 letter to Lorn Irwin. This Viceroy gained his freedom and a Pact with Mr. Gandhi—also called the Delhi Pact—concluded on 4 March 1931, under which the Mahatma promised to call off his civil disobedience campaign and recognise the Round Table Conferences. The British, in turn, promised to release many political (Indian) prisoners. Satyagraha was suspended in 1934.

⁶⁸ So did Mr. Gandhi and Dr Muhammad Iqbal who also participated in the third Conference. Jawaharlal Nehru was jailed for the sixth time between 26 December 1931 and 30 August 1933 ; rearrested “5 months and 13 days later” (Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru A Biography [New York : The Macmillan Co., 19361, p. 207) and freed on 4 September 1935. Mr. Gandhi was rearrested on 4 January 1932, when he began his ‘ fast unto death,’ while the mass struggle for independence was resumed across India. He was freed shortly.

1932 Communal Award announcement⁶⁹ because it legitimised the schism for which he held his co-religionists and the Hindus responsible. He in fact criticized during his brief 1932 Oxford visit⁷⁰ the “spineless people” found “in the Muslim camp” and accused the Hindus for being “short-sighted and I think incorrigible.” He asked: “Where is, between these two groups, any place for a man like me?”⁷¹ “The reason for his verdict was the former’s, including the nationalist Muslims’, insistence on a communal solution to assure adequate safeguards in all elected bodies, and the Congress refusal to come to any immediate decision which, announced only in June 1934, favoured

⁶⁹ The Award which lessened Muslim representation in the Punjab, for instance, was announced by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. The British Government, taking advantage of Hindu-Muslim disagreement, thus declared communalism to be “politically valid,” thereby embarrassing Congress. Cf. W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 174. A more conservative Lord Willingdon meanwhile had been appointed as Governor-General (1931-1936), succeeding Lord Irwin.

⁷⁰ Mr. Gandhi had spoken at Oxford in October 1931.^{67. 68. 69.}
⁷⁰ Was he “in the pay of the India Office”? Cf. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, note 20, p. 327, putting the word “student” between quotation marks and asserting that his “means of support were not obvious”.

⁷¹ Ikram, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

“neutrality” on this key issue.⁷² Mr. Jinnah brooding over his country’s situation in London still rejected schism, which apparently was favoured by the British Government by 1933, and probably earlier.⁷³ Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, while at Cambridge University, circulated a pamphlet, entitled *Now or Never*, on 26 January 1935. It for the first time contained the name “Pakistan”! Did it reflect Government’s official view?⁷⁴ As late as 1935, Mr. Jinnah would denounce “the Pakistan movement” as “a crazy scheme”.⁷⁵

A few months later, in April 1933,⁷⁶ a joint parliamentary committee began its review of the London Conferences and the

⁷² Cf. W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 174 and 215, stating further that Congress began to lose many Muslims who either joined existing or founded new institutions—e.g. the Kirshak Proja Party in Bengal and the Ahrar Party in the Punjab.

⁷³ Cf. *Minutes of Evidence Given Before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 1932-33)*, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1934), He, 1496. Cf. Khan A. Ahmad, *The Founder of Pakistan, Through Trial to Triumph* (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd.), p. 16, mentioned by Cantwell Smith, in *op. cit.*, note 20, p. 327; *cr.* his statement on p. 254.

⁷⁴ Was he “in the pay of the India Office”? Cf. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, note 20, p. 327, putting the word “student” between quotation marks and asserting that his “means of support were not obvious”.

⁷⁵ K.A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁷⁶ The All-India National Congress in December 1929 resolved on another civil disobedience campaign which Gandhi initiated in

Simon Commission's proposals so as to develop a draft constitution; it ended its work on 22 November 1934. The voices for Mr. Jinnah's return to India meanwhile had grown so insistent⁷⁷ that he no longer could ignore them. The reasons were: the League's nearly defunct state; the death or retirement of other prominent Muslims⁷⁸ leaving Islamic India leaderless; his Bombay Muslim constituency's preference for him as their legislative representative; and the nation-wide recognition of his political and parliamentary qualifications, the respect in which he was held, and his popularity. Although he sailed home in April 1934,⁷⁹ and was re-elected in that year to the Bombay Legislature,⁸⁰ he did not return finally until the beginning of 1935, to take his seat.

March 1930. Cf. his 2 March 1930 letter to the Viceroy Lord Irwin ; Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁷⁷ Dr Muhammad Iqbal had pressed for his return while attending the London Conferences. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, Pakistan's future first Prime Minister, carried a formal invitation to Mr. Jinnah to come back home from London in 1933

⁷⁸ Sir Muhammad Shafi died in 1932; Muhammad Ali and his brother Shaukat Ali respectively died in 1930 and 1937; Dr Muhammad Iqbal feeling ill concentrated on writing and would die in 1938.

⁷⁹ Saiyid, *M A Jinnah*, p. 161. Cf. I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics* (Karachi Ma'aref Ltd., 1972), p. 346, giving "the end of 1934" for Mr. Jinnah's return. 'net probably is correct as the newly elected Assembly first convened in January 1935.

⁸⁰ Mr. Jinnah accepted the renomination; his papers were examined on 11 October 1934 ; they showed that he was the only

The expert administrator began to reorganise the All-India Muslim League at the centre, but its revival actually is dated in April 1936 when it reconvened under Sir Wazir Hasan's presidency at Bombay and authorised Mr. Jinnah to set up and preside over Its Central Parliamentary Board with branches to "fight the elections"⁸¹ under the new Government of India Act⁸² announced on 2 August 1955 and taking effect on 1 April 1937. Mr. Jinnah travelled across the land to found the said branches and to win support for the League from the provincial Muslim

nominee and thus was the uncontested candidate. Cf Saiyid, M.A. Jinnah, p. tel.

⁸¹ Ikraal, op cit., p.234

⁸² This Act, based on the Round Table Conferences and the Simon Commission Report, divided British India into eleven provinces (Aden and Burma were detached), each to be led by a (British) governor and an appointed executive council. It furthermore provided for: dyarchy's abolition in the provincial legislatures ; the creation of a bicameral legislature in six provinces, a unicameral legislature in one ; separate electorates ; a widening of the franchise to thirty million voters out of 295 million, of whom about eighty million were Muslims (in British India) ; Princes willing to enter the Union to sign an "Instrument of Accession". The Governor-General retained control over defence, foreign affairs; the provincial governors were to supervise the budget, etc., and remained accountable to the Governor-General rather than to the legislative bodies. Cf. also the 1939 "Amendment" to the 1935 Government of India Act. The Act (and the "Amendment") were very unpopular Its federal portion never was implemented.

leaders.⁸³ It nevertheless fared badly.⁸⁴ In the 1936 elections. Congress triumphed,⁸⁵ causing Jawaharlal Nehru to state that the Congress and the British were the only two parties in India. A disagreeing Mr. Jinnah added the Muslims and the Indian Princes.⁸⁶

He said on the eve of the National Convention of the Congress

held in March 1937 called by its President, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, at Delhi:

“I have often said that I am trying to see that Muslims should wholeheartedly and sincerely adhere to the policy and programme of the All-India Muslim League, which is both national and patriotic, and we shall always be glad to co-operate with the Congress in their constructive programme. . . . In conclusion, I say: Let us now concentrate on those causes which stand in the

⁸³ Sir Sikandar Hayat, the Unionist Party head, and Fazl-ul-Haq, the Krishak Proja head, did not tolerate League interference in their provinces at that time.

⁸⁴ Their parties won in these elections, showing the strength of provincialism in politics. The League attracted under 5% of the 30% Muslim electoral vote.

⁸⁵ 81. Although it held a minority position in Bengal, the Punjab and Sind.

⁸⁶ Saiyid, M.A. Jinnah, p. 172.

way of a united front.”⁸⁷ Although he stressed that the League was the only truly national Muslim representative body, which he decided needed to be trans-formed from a middle class into a popular organ, he nevertheless kept alive his long hope for settling outstanding issues amicably with Congress. By late July 1937 he said: “...nobody will welcome an honourable settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims more than I, and nobody will be so ready to help it...”⁸⁸ Until that time, he had resisted “the two-nation theory” causing Dr Iqbal to ask him in his letter of 28 May 1937: “Don’t you think the time for such a demand has already arrived?”⁸⁹ When Congress rejecting his co-operation offer installed its ministries,⁹⁰ it crushed his hope for reaching a work-

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 178-79. The National Convention was held during the third week of March 1937. Congress and League were contesting a League seat at Bharaich fallen vacant through its occupant’s death.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 180.

⁸⁹ Richard V. Weekes, *Pakistan, Birth and Growth of A Muslim Nation* (Princeton : D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p. 84, citing from one of Dr Iqbal’s many 1937 letters to Mr. Jinnah, trying to convince him, as he had done in 1930-32, of the need for an independent Indo-Islamic State.

⁹⁰ sardar Vallabhnbhai Patel offered the Bombay Muslim ministry seat to a Congress Muslim although no Muslim Congressman had been elected in that Presidency. Sir Sikandar Hayat, on the other hand, invited the Mabasabha President, Raja Narendra Nath, to occupy his provincial ministry’s Hindu seat. Mr. Nath declining the offer because of his age, he nominated instead Sir Manohar Lai.

able compromise with Hindu leadership. He, therefore, followed Dr Iqbal's suggestion—made right after the Congress President's speech:

“You should immediately hold an All-India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this Convention you must re-state as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unity in the country...”⁹¹

The Muslim Conference was held at Karachi in October 1938. Its Sind Resolution showed the new way by asserting “that Hindus and Muslims were separate nations.”⁹² The Conference members also suggested to the League (President) that it (he) “review” the constitutional question. A sub-committee then wrote a Report stating that the only solution was to create an independent Islamic State whereby it followed the trend of political thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Hasrat Mohani, Lajpat Rai and Dr Iqbal. Mr. Jinnah after some hard thinking finally accepted its recommendation. He publicized his new stand in 1940! II. Mr. Jinnah, the Pakistan Patriot (1940-1948)

“No power on earth can prevent Pakistan.” That famed Lahore Resolution⁹³ pronounced by him as League President

⁹¹ Ibid.,

⁹² Ibid.,

⁹³ Ibid.,

during its (annual) March 1940 session—it was moved by Fazl-ul-Haq who once again accepted the League as the national Indo-Muslim representative organization—indicates the fundamental change in Mr. Jinnah’s thought. It meant his acceptance of the “Pakistan scheme”. It deeply would affect Islamic India’s (and even Hind’s) future. It shook Congress whose members⁹⁴ well understood its implications.

Mr. Jinnah now worked harder than ever to obtain Muslim mass support for the League and convince as yet uncommitted provincial co-religionist leaders of the need to back it rather than their own par-ties His efforts would bear fruit. He also made it clear to everyone, including the Hindus and the British, that they would have to consider his organization as the only one nationally representing India’s Muslims and that it was fully committed to “the Pakistan scheme”,⁹⁵ He nevertheless continued his talks with other groups in order to obtain agreement concerning the division of powers guaranteeing proper Muslim status at the Centre in a federated India’s Constituent Assembly⁹⁶ The League nevertheless joined the Congress in observing “Deliverance Day” on 22 December 1939, and in rejecting the proposals presented by the

⁹⁴ Many diverse proposals for a division between Hindu and Muslim India were given since 1939

⁹⁵ . Cf. L.S May, *Evolution*, pp 286 ff

⁹⁶ Cf. his 2 August 1940 and other meetings of that time with the new Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow (1936-43), Hindu leaders and his 1942-47 correspondence.

Cripps' Mission⁹⁷ which reached and left India respectively on 22 March and 12 April 1942, that is, amidst the Second World War.⁹⁸ The Congress reasons were its insistence upon the immediate rather than the post-war withdrawal of the British troops; and its objection to the provision of granting the option to any province or State to remain out of the "Union of India" and with British Government help devise a constitution giving it "similar status" to Hind. On the same day that Sir Stafford broadcast his "draft declaration," viz, on 11 April--his first announcement came on 30 March—the League Working Committee passed and Mr. Jinnah publicised its resolution rejecting "one Indian Union" and "that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones; and it will, therefore, be unfair to the Muslims to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union..."⁹⁹ He complained "that 'the talks had been carried on with the Congress leaders over the heads of the Muslims, and other parties had been utterly ignored.'"¹⁰⁰ He thereby consistently

⁹⁷ So called after its head, Sir Stafford Cripps, sent to India by the late Sir Winston Churchill's 11 March 1942 order to the House of Commons.

⁹⁸ May 1940-45. The Japanese attacking Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 forced the then isolationist United States of America into that war.

⁹⁹ See the Muslim League Working Committee Report, II April 1942.

¹⁰⁰ V P. Menon, *op. cit* , p 1W Mr. Gandhi apparently "begged Cripps not to publish the declaration". Cf. Robert Eric Frvkenberg, "The Partition of India: A

followed his March 1940 declaration that they constitute a separate nation and the said Lahore Resolution. His reiteration of the League stand in response to the Cripps' Mission provoked the Hindu feeling that Sir Stafford's declaration was "an open invitation for Muslims to create a Pakistan,"¹⁰¹ The reason for its withdrawal was lack of "sufficient support," implying that the British Government itself was not prepared to back up Sir Stafford. After the Congress Working Committee's 6 July 1942 Wardha resolution approving "the Quit India movement,"¹⁰² Mr. Jinnah severely criticised it for "blackmailing the British and coercing them to concede a system of government and transfer power to that government which would establish a Hindu Raj immediately . . ., thereby throwing the Muslims and other minorities and interests at the mercy of the Congress Raj."¹⁰³ These words reflect his anxiety, shared with many of his compatriots, that Hindu supremacy resulting from immediate independence would blot out the League and give the deathblow to its programme which at least since 1942 was supported by all

Quarter Century After," *The American Historical Review*, LXXVII/2 (April 1972), 467.

¹⁰¹ Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

¹⁰² Mr. Gandhi after 15 July 1942 started to harpen weekly on "Quit India". Cf. his articles written in his journal entitled *Harijan*. He and many Congress Working Committee members were re-arrested on 9 August 1942, soon followed by the jailing of all prominent Congress leaders.

¹⁰³ Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

non-League Muslim parties¹⁰⁴ as well. How strong that organisation had become between 1942 and 1943 is clear from (a) its gaining by late 1942 such important members as the Sindhi, Mr. Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, who succeeded in pushing a resolution affirming that India's Muslims form a separate nation and therefore are entitled to their independence through his provincial legislature in the fall of 1942; (b) the inclusion of two Leaguers—apart from one non-Leaguer and two Hindus—in his ministry installed at about the same time ; and (c) the establishment of its ministries as a result from the 1937-1943 provincial by-elections in Bengal¹⁰⁵ on 24 April and in the North-West Frontier Province on 25 May 1943.¹⁰⁶ Feeling the need for its reorganisation at the Centre and in the provinces in order to respond better and give further leadership, the League set up a Committee of Action and a Planning Committee during its December 1943 Karachi plenary session. Their job was to devise

¹⁰⁴ Amongst them the Khuda'i Khidmatgars or "Servants of God" founded by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan; and Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah's Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. His hope that his friend, the later Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, would permit a fully autonomous State motivated him to join India against the will of the vast Muslim majority.,

¹⁰⁵ After Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq's 28 March 1943 resignation from Bengal's Provincial Assembly, causing that province to fall under Governor's rule until 24 April of that year.

political and economic policies.¹⁰⁷ “Why should we not undertake planning ?” Mr. Jinnah had asked during his presidential speech. His question partly was motivated by the growing division,¹⁰⁸ and partly by the economic “clash between Hindu and Muslim interests,” causing many amongst the urban Muslim middle class “to work as labourers” or in petty Government jobs.¹⁰⁹ The aggravated Muslim-Hindu schism was apparently encouraged by

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Menon During 1942-43, the League’s motto was: “Buy from Muslims!” He also founded the All-India Muslim Students’ Association., *op. cit.*, pp. 147 *if.*, for the provincial developments during these years.

¹⁰⁸ See Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 151, quoting Sir Tej Bahadur’s comment concerning his country’s greater division since Lord Linlithgow’s administration.

¹⁰⁹ W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 2-4, and notes 40-41, pp. 327 and 328,

quoting from “M.R.T.,” “Protection Versus Separatism,” *Eastern Times*, Lahore, 5 January 1940. It was republished in India’s *Problem of Her Future Constitution*, pp. 35-37. Cf. Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 151, concerning “economic distress” due to rising prices and scarcity “of essential commodities”. Hindu-Muslim competition also was mentioned by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and regarding the Punjab by Dr Muhammad Iqbal (cf. my *Iqbal*, *op. cit.*, p. 170) showing his interest in industrial development. However, the Hindu “Banias” controlling “trade and commerce” also were buying up landed properties “pledged as securities for loans” (Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 320). In Calcutta (a Hindu majority centre) 356 Muslims versus 2237 Hindus were land-owners, Weeks, *op. cit.*, p. 97).

the Viceroy¹¹⁰ who undoubtedly supported by his Government actually forbade League-Congress negotiations by late 1942.¹¹¹

The British nevertheless insisted on conserving India's "territorial unity". They thus practiced a double policy respectively of "divide and rule" and by professing the need for retaining the Union. Mr. Jinnah during the afore-mentioned December 1943 League session had reformulated the Pakistan Resolution in capsule form: "Divide and Quit".¹¹² It responded to the country's general longing for swaraj, within or without Dominion Status, and to the consensus of many Muslims except for those remaining Indian nationalists,¹¹³ that separatism was the answer. To this end, he conferred with Mr. Gandhi between 9 and 27 September 1944.¹¹⁴ They apparently disagreed on four major issues:¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Lord Linlithgow whose seven and a half years' regime was replaced by Lord Wavell on 20 October 1943.

¹¹¹ W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 271 and note 58, p. 328, stating that Mr. "C. Raj gopalacharya, able apostle of Congress-League agreement," was forbidden by "the Government . . . shamefully . . . to see Gandhi. (See *The Tribune*, Lahore, 13-11-42)".

¹¹² Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

¹¹³ Amongst them Maulana Abul-A'la Maududi regarding Islam "incompatible" with nationalism, although he, like many Indo-Muslim theologians, later accepted Pakistan where he resides.

¹¹⁴

¹¹⁵. See W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 281 *if.*, culled from Mr. Jinnah's

(1) “a provincial government” to supervise a referendum in those provinces to be divided; partition; and boundary adjustments—rejected by Mr. Jinnah fearing that a Hindu administration in a free India might not honour such a commitment ;

(2) a referendum to be held amongst those provinces’ Muslim and Hindu inhabitants—Mr. Jinnah insisting on a Muslim plebiscite only in the affected regions ;

(3) “matters of common interest,” meaning “defence, foreign affairs” and “internal communications”—Mr. Jinnah asserting that they can be agreed upon only after separation; and

(4) the boundary issue, Mr. Gandhi envisaging a Pakistan consisting of “contiguous” Muslim-majority “Districts” embracing Sind, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, parts of the Punjab and Bengal, and “one District in Assam”—Mr. Jinnah complaining that “ ‘the present boundaries of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only) with the husk.’”¹¹⁶

Mr. Gandhi asserting that he did not really represent Congress, whose members since July 1942 again had been jailed, gave Mr. Jinnah, despite his assertion that Mr. Gandhi

23 and 25 September 1944 letters to Mr. Gandhi.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 284, citing Mr. Jinnah’s 25 September 1944 letter to Mr. Gandhi.

nevertheless acted in such a capacity, the opportunity to claim that any settlement reached with him, therefore, would not be binding on that Hindu organisation.¹¹⁷ Fearing virulent attacks upon him because these conferences failed, Mr. Gandhi instead was criticised severely by a “very bitter” Mahasabha, the angry Punjabi and Bengali Hindus, and the Sikhs un-happy at the prospect of their stronghold’s (Punjab’s) division without their consultation and consent. The Mahasabha leader, Mr. V.D. Savarkar, cuttingly remarked: “The Indian provinces were not the private properties of Gandhiji and Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to anyone they liked.’ Despite their strong resentment,¹¹⁸ the partition tide could not be stopped. Mr. Jinnah announced on 27 September his deep regret that he could not come to terms with the Hindu party because, as he already had written in his 25 September letter to Mr. Gandhi, the Lahore Resolution’s main principles had been rejected. He added, however: “We trust that this is not the final end of our efforts.”¹¹⁹ While the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell, was intent on pursuing the setting up of an

¹¹⁷ The League at its 30 July 1944 Lahore meeting gave him formal permission to conduct these talks (Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 163). It and The Hindustan Times published them.

¹¹⁸ This may have caused some diminishing of Mr. Gandhi’s popularity, particularly amongst the Mahasabha held responsible for his assassination on 30 January 1945, or less than six months after secession took place.

¹¹⁹ Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 166, citing from Mr. Jinnah’s 27 September letter to Mr. Gandhi. Doesn’t it show that he still hoped for a settlement? (See also Conclusions.)

acceptable “transitional government,”¹²⁰ Sir Tej Bahadur and Mr. Gandhi took the initiative in calling for a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Non-Party Conference¹²¹ on 19 November 1944, when it was decided to found a special committee “to examine the whole communal and minorities question from a constitutional and political point of view”¹²² and consult all parties concerned. Sir Tej, commissioned to appoint this “conciliation committee,” assured the press also on 19 November—after the session—that no member of a political party or anyone else known for his public statements on the communal issue would be appointed so as to lift it above partisan

¹²⁰ See above note for his take-over as Viceroy. During his August 1944 conference with the provincial Governors, he asserted that his Government pre-occupied with the war had little time to devote to Indian affairs, but that he nevertheless was prepared to proceed with solving constitutional and other issues upon the Governors’ unanimous recommendation. (For details and British Government disagreements, cf. Menon, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-73.)

¹²¹ It first met in the middle of March 1941 at Bombay upon the initiative of Sir Jagdish Prasad, a former member of the Governor-General’s Executive Council

¹²² Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 173. Mr. Jinnah had objected to Mr. Gandhi’s proposals in part also because they implied a “redistribution of communal minorities and majorities,” which formed the substance of most of the then suggested solutions. He was not altogether wrong as the subsequent massive Muslim and Hindu exodus from their respective habitats into their specific majority regions during partition showed. He undoubtedly wished to prevent it.

politics.¹²³ His request for a December meeting with the League President was declined. Mr. Jinnah frankly stated that he could recognise neither the Conference nor any of its committees, because their members mostly were Hindus, including Mahasabhais, while the few Muslims belonging to it were unrepresentative non-Leaguers.

Lord Wavell's four Simla Conferences, held with a select group of communal representatives at the Viceregal Lodge between 25 and 27 June, and on 29 June 1945, too, were fruitless. So were his 27 June evening and 11 July¹²⁴ private talks with Mr. Jinnah. The chief stumbling blocks were his refusal to accept the Muslim leader's demands for (a) the inclusion of five Leaguers instead of the Viceroy's insistence upon four plus one independent Punjabi Muslim in the proposed Executive Council ; and (b) safeguards through possibly a three-fourth Council

¹²³ Upon the advice of Mr. Gandhi whose backing he urgently needed to effect his desired cooperation with the League and, more personally, its President.

¹²⁴ Mr. Jinnah had convoked the Muslim League Working Committee on 6 July 1945. He informed Lord Wavell on 7 July that a panel—which the Congress Working Committee convening on 3 July had completed on the 6th—could not be submitted ; the recommendations must be discussed privately, hence the 11 July meeting with Lord Wavell ; and that Leaguers only could sit in the Executive Council. He furthermore advised the Viceroy on 11 July that the Committee could not compromise its principles.

quorum to protect minority interests. The Britisher furthermore gave Mr. Jinnah to understand that, not as yet having consulted with Congress, he was uncertain whether that organisation would agree to his arrangements, including a double “parity” respectively between League and Congress, Muslims and Hindus in the said Council. During the last 14 July Simla gathering,¹²⁵ the Viceroy formally announced the failure of these Conferences. The line had been drawn! Islamic India’s mood can best be gauged from the joint non-League and Congress Muslims’ March 1945 memorandum to the Sapru Committee asserting “that they ‘concede the right of Self-Determination on a territorial basis.’”¹²⁶ Additional efforts made toward “the end of August 1945” by the nationalist Abul-Kalam Azad (1888-1950,¹²⁷ to effect “a communal settlement”¹²⁸ again floundered on the key issues of the composition of the Executive Council and Interim Government—Mr. Jinnah again insisting on Leaguers only—

¹²⁵ It was decided on 29 June to adjourn until 14 July.

¹²⁶ W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 271, and p. 328, note 56 (a) giving as reference : “Dawn, Delhi, Late Dak edition, 10-6-45.”

¹²⁷ He had been Congress President in 1923, 1940, and remained in India after 1947, where he became Minister of Education in January 1947 until his death on 27 February 1958. (See L.S. May Evolution, pp. 185-95, for a brief synopsis. of his life and thought.) Cf. Mahadev Desai, *Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad* (London: 1941) and, amongst his own works, *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay : 1959).

¹²⁸ Menon, *op. cit* , p. 22..

distribution of powers and adequate minority safeguards in these supreme bodies. India's Muslims by fall 1945 were closer than ever to "their goal of a separate State."¹²⁹

The Congress nevertheless still refused to acknowledge that the Union could not be saved.¹³⁰ Mr. Azad's attempts timed with Lord Wavell's 21 August 1945 announcement¹³¹ that elections would be held "in the cold weather," in preparation for independence, which the Indian leaders hailed. Mr. Jinnah touring mostly North-West India urged his constituents chiefly concentrated in that part of Hind and in Bengal: "Vote for a Muslim Leaguer even if it be a lamp-post!"¹³² The results

¹²⁹ Ikram, op. cit., p. 262, giving 1942 as "the first indication" of this goal's eventual realisation.

¹³⁰ Cf. the Congress Working Committee's September 1945 swaraj resolution's elder. The All-India National Congress rejected secession at its plenary session.

¹³¹ He left on 24 August 1945 together with Mr. Menon and Sir Evan Jenkins for consultations in London.

¹³² Weekes, op. cit., p. 86. The Punjab League Ministry had been out between 4 February and 14 March 1945. Nazimuddin's Bengal League ministry lost on 28 March 1945, when the Governor under the 1935 Act's Section 93 took over that province; Dr Khan Sahib's Congress coalition party ruled the N.W.F.P. ; and the Punjab's Unionist Party (whose head, Sir Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan had died in 1942 and had been succeeded by Malik Khizr Hayat Khan) had loosened its League association : only in Sind and Assam were League ministries in control at that time. (See below for the July 1946 elections) For the situation during and after the 1937 elections, also cf. Cantwell Smith, op. cit., pp. 250-

announced by late December 1945 showed League triumphs, for it won all of the thirty Muslim seats in the Central Legislative Assembly,¹³³ and 427 out of a combined total of 507 such seats in the provincial parliaments.¹³⁴ The All-India Muslim League declared 11 January 1946 as its Victory Day. Its President, for whom its sweep was a personal success, undauntedly declared to a (British) Parliamentary Delegation having arrived on 5 January his conditions for entering an Interim Government, namely: its acceptance of (a) Pakistan; (b) “parity” as stated by Lord Wavell during their previous year’s private meetings; and (c) two constituent assemblies (respectively for Pakistan and India). The Viceroy in his 28 January seven-minute address to the newly elected Central Legislature announced his Government’s intention to set up one such body. Mr. Jinnah on 4 April pointed out to the

51, also stressing the strength of the provincial parties, and further stating (on p 251) that the League coalition in Assam “broke up in 1938” and was replaced by “A Congress coalition ministry... for a year”.

¹³³ Weekes, *op. cit.*, stating also: against 25 at outgoing time; cf. Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 226 , and W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.* , p 271, note.

¹³⁴ Weekes. *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87. It failed in the N.W.F.P. ; it won 78 out of the 175 seats in the Punjab resulting in the Unionist Party-Congress-Sikh coalition. The non-Muslim constituencies were won by the All-India National Congress.

Cabinet Mission,¹³⁵ which had reached New Delhi on 24 March and would leave on 29 June, that they, the Secretary of State for India and Parliament, ignoring India's composite nature erred in regarding Hind as one indivisible land. He furthermore stood by the 1940 Pakistan Resolution. His stand was re-affirmed by the 8 and 10 April (1946) Delhi-held Muslim Convention—Composed of then recently elected legislators—which passed a resolution moved by the Bengali minister, Mr. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (1893-1963), favouring a v holly independent instead of an autonomous Indian-Union-contained Pakistan. They furthermore agreed that “ ‘the zones comprising Bengal and Asam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely, Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State.’”¹³⁶ Their resolution embodied and further crystallized all previous proposals for Pakistan's geographical composition.¹³⁷ It would bear fruit exactly thirteen months after the July 1946 elections to the provincial assembly with this difference that the Punjab and

¹³⁵ It again was headed by Sir Stafford Cripps ; its other two members were the senior ministers, Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Mr. A.Y. Alexander.

¹³⁶ Ikram, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

¹³⁷ Cf. Mr. Gandhi's afore-mentioned suggestions. Kashmir was excluded also from the April 1946 Muslim Conference resolution as it was from Dr. Iqbal's proposed plan, which, however, had excluded Bengal.

Bengal would be divided. It consequently could form ministries in Bengal¹³⁸ and in Sind,¹³⁹ but for lack of a full majority could not do so in the Punjab¹⁴⁰ and in the N.W.F.P.,¹⁴¹

Where Hindus out of their numerical proportion and strong provincialism formed obstacles. As future events showed, their Muslim constituents were pro-Pakistan. Yet, the 16 May 1946 Cabinet Mission statement (“Plan”) rejected partition, preferred a “Union of India” with single executive and one legislature, advanced the principle of a Federal and Province-grouping each

¹³⁸ In Bengal, the League captured 113 out of 119 Muslim seats. Congress won 87. Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy then formed his League ministry.

¹³⁹ In Sind, the League won 27 seats and gained another when an independent Muslim joined that organisation. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, its League chief, headed that Province’s ministry.

¹⁴⁰ In the Punjab, the League won 79 of the total 86 Muslim seats; Congress captured 51; 42 went to other groups, including 22 to the Panthic Akali Sikhs, with whom the League could not reach an agreement. A Congress-Sikh-Unionist coalition led by Malik Khizr Hayat Khan resulted. He resigned on 2 March 1947, in the wake of Prime Minister Attlee’s 20 February statement making a coalition extremely difficult. On 5 March, the Punjab Governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, took over under Section 93 of the 1935 Government of India Act.

¹⁴¹ The N.W.F.P. had a Muslim League ministry between 23 May 1943 and 12 March 1945, when it lost by 24 to 18 votes and Dr Khan Sahib upon the provincial Governor’s request set up a new ministry which held office until the July 1946 elections, when the League won 17, Congress, 30, of which 19 were Muslim seats, resulting in another Khan Sahib-led coalition ministry (Note.—cf. Menon, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-32 for further details on the July 1946 provincial elections’ statistics.)

province being allowed to have its own “executives and legislatures”.¹⁴² Communications a foreign affairs and defence were to remain under Central control; while the “group government” would deal with subjects delegated to them by the respective provincial assemblies. Congress already having resolved at its 6 July 1946 Bombay session to enter the new Constituent Assembly--after ratifying its Working Committee Resolution—rejected the grouping principle.¹⁴³ Toward the end of that month, elections to the 290-seat Constituent Assembly had taken place. Lord Wavell wrote a letter to Messrs Nehru as Congress¹⁴⁴ and Mr. Jinnah as League President on 22 July asserting that (a) each party will “have an equitable share of the most important portfolios”; (b) once they have submitted names of their respective candidates and entered the Government, such a portfolio distribution would be made; (c) a coalition could work only if both parties assent to iron out the “major communal issues”.¹⁴⁵

Mr. Nehru, asserting that the Cabinet Plan could be changed as Congress wished and that foreign affairs included currency,

¹⁴² Section “A” comprised Hindu provinces ; “B,” the N.W.F P., Sind and Punjab ; “C,” Assam and Bengal. British Baluchistan still was a special problem; see below.

¹⁴³ L.S. May, *Evolution*, p. 293.

¹⁴⁴ He took over the Congress presidency from Abul-Kalam Azad during the 6 July 1946 meeting.

¹⁴⁵ Menon, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-86.

customs and even foreign trade, invited criticism from Mr. Azad and put off the League and its President. Its Council, therefore, and because of fear of Hindu control, rejected the Cabinet Plan at its 27 July Bombay meeting when it also decided on direct action and on renouncing the titles of all of its members. Mr. Jinnah replying on 31 July to the Viceroy's 22 July letter formally advised him of the League Council decision. Lord Wavell answering on 2 August expressed his regret, re-assured his eminent Muslim correspondent once more concerning adequate minority representation and safeguards—although he could not promise a three fourth quorum as one way to effect that no measure would be adopted against the will of any small group - and informed him at the same time that he had asked Congress to initiate steps toward forming an Interim Government. On 16 August, three days after Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru had accepted this request, the League organised "Direct Action Day". Its President nevertheless continued his conferences with the British authority and Hindu leaders. He wrote to the Viceroy on 13 October¹⁴⁶ that since his request for the inclusion of five Leaguers in the Interim Government, installed at New Delhi on 2 December with Mr. Nehru as its President, and it would be contrary to "interests of

¹⁴⁶The Viceroy, after his 4 October conference with Mr. Nehru, still insisted upon the inclusion of one non-Leaguer, but promised Mr. Jinnah that he would nominate a Leaguer as Cabinet president—which post he also held—in his absence ; and that he would consult the All-India Muslim League and Congress before filling any vacancies.

Mussulmans and other communities . . . to leave the entire field of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress... we have decided to nominate” them.¹⁴⁷

After his ensuing interview, in which Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan (1895-1951)¹⁴⁸ accompanied him, with the Viceroy, Mr. Jinnah appointed the Leaguers¹⁴⁹ on 14 October. A formal press communique publicising the League’s decision to enter the Interim Government—which was reconstituted to accommodate its new members on 15 October was released on that same day. It was welcomed “with relief” and raised the hope that the Union still would be saved. Now the question of portfolios had to be straightened out. The Viceroy suggested that either the Home or External Affairs or Defence portfolio ought to be transferred to the League. The Congress leaders objected.¹⁵⁰ They instead

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

¹⁴⁸ Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, serving as Secretary of the A11-India Muslim League between 1930 and 1947, became Mr. Jinnah’s closest associate and acted as Pakistan’s Prim Minister between 1947 and his death in 1951. The Pact that he apparently had made with Mr. Bhulabhai Desai in 1945 and which aimed at preserving the Union, was rejected by Congress and subsequently by Mr. Jinnah because it had been made without that Hindu body’s or the League’s authority.

¹⁴⁹ They were: Messrs Liaqat All Khan, I.I. Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogendra Nath Mandal; the last-named person was a Bengal Muslim League minister and represented the Scheduled Castes.

¹⁵⁰ Mr. Nehru objecting to giving up External .Affairs ; Sardar Patel, to granting the Home portfolio to the League. Cf. Michael Beecher, *Nehru--A Political Biography* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 324.

offered Law, Communications, Health and Finance, believing “that the League would not be able to manage Finance and would have to decline the offer”.¹⁵¹ Mr. Jinnah half-heartedly accepted the Finance portfolio because he was not sure whether anyone in his Cabinet could handle this awesome responsibility. When Chaudhry Muhammad Ali of the Finance Department heard the news, however, he “immediately” called his chief, told him that it was an unexpected “windfall” and promised to assist in these duties. Mr. Jinnah thereupon consulted and appointed Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan as his Finance Minister.¹⁵² Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan not only could scrutinise every single measure, but could control appointments, meaning interference in “every Department,” and, holding the veto, he could dictate Government policy. It thus gave him extraordinary powers.

The new Interim Government, including the Leaguers, formally took office on 26 October. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, however, said that it ““consisted of a Congress bloc and a Muslim bloc, each functioning under separate leadership””.¹⁵³ The League obviously rejected Mr. Nehru’s presidency. Although it now formed part of the transitional Government, it still had not entered the Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy advised Minister

¹⁵¹ Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore : Longmans, Pakistan Branch, 1961), p. 370,

¹⁵² Abul-Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 167; cf. Ikram, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

¹⁵³ . Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 32 I.

Liaquat Ali Khan on 20 November that the League could not stay in the Government without also joining the Assembly. A final London conference¹⁵⁴ held on 2-6 December—attended by him and Mr. Jinnah as League representatives and Messrs Jawaharlal Nehru and Baldev Singh as Congress delegates—Mr. Singh being the Sikh emissary—failed to produce any concrete results. Amongst the chief reasons were the Congress leaders regretting their Finance offer trying to change their previous commitment and Mr. Nehru’s said redefinition of foreign affairs. The League rejecting this approach remained insistent on necessary safeguards, so that no law contrary to the well-being of Muslim or other minority, and preference, would be passed, and on an adequate balance of power in the Assembly as at the Centre. The British Government had no choice but to announce the intensive Conferences’ failure on 6 December. The problem also was that each party gave its own interpretation¹⁵⁵ to the principles of the Cabinet Mission Plan and that section of the 6 December “statement” referring to “part of the country,” which Mr. Nehru understood in terms of “parts of a province”. The League consequently was absent from the opening (9 December) and subsequent sessions of the Constituent Assembly.

¹⁵⁴ Messrs Liaquat All Khan, Nehru, Baldev Singh were invited to attend that Conference during their 26 November meeting with the Viceroy. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan transmitted the invitation to Mr. Jinnah.

¹⁵⁵ L.S. May, *Evolution*, asserted by Mr. Nehru in his 21 February 1947 conference with Lord Wavell.

During 1947, two years after the end of the Second World War, the events in India¹⁵⁶ rushed to their conclusion. The Congress-League¹⁵⁷ dissent continued. That Hindu body sent its first demand that the League, because of its refusal to join the constitution-making organ, resign from the Interim Government, to the Viceroy on 5 February. Mr. Nehru repeated this demand in his 13 February letter to Lord Wavell and added the Congress threat that it would leave both unless the League withdrew. He had created an “either/or”¹⁵⁸ situation. The Congress nevertheless did not follow up its threat and the said Assembly proceeded with its constitution-drafting work. It and the British leader(s) admitted, however, that such a Charter “could not be imposed on the unwilling Muslim-majority provinces.”¹⁵⁹ Prime Minister Attlee’s¹⁶⁰ 20 February 1947 statement to Parliament¹⁶¹ announcing the desire of King George V to grant independence to India not later than by June 1948, and that a new Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, sympathetic to his cousin’s preference, would

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¹⁵⁷ Cf. the 5 January 1947 All-India Congress Committee (meeting in Delhi) resolution (Menon, *op cit.*, pp. 332-33) and Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan’s 25 January statement (*ibid.*, pp. 333-34).

¹⁵⁸ Title of a book by the German existentialist philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855).

¹⁵⁹ Menon, *op cit.*, p. 70.

¹⁶⁰ A new Labour Government had come to power after the elections in England.

¹⁶¹ See Menon, *op. cit.*, Appendix IX, for its full text.

oversee the “peaceful transfer of power,” augured in the last months of hectic negotiations toward that end. Immediately upon his arrival¹⁶² at New Delhi on 22 March, he began his innumerable consultations, including another 8-10 May round of Simla Conferences. He meanwhile had received a new plan¹⁶³ replacing the Cabinet Mission Proposals, from London. The “Mountbatten Plan,” as it became known, provided for: partition between Islamic and Hindu India, as well as between the Punjab and Bengal; the right of every province to seek its own destiny; of the States to secede, become fully independent from the Indian Union, and have their own respective constitutions. It further involved the setting up of a new successor Dominion, viz. Pakistan Government, in addition to the existing Indian Dominion Administration; the creation of a second Constituent Assembly; and the development of an interim Charter. Mr. Jinnah and the League objected¹⁶⁴. The January 1947 unrest in the Punjab provoked by the Government’s forbidding its voluntary Muslim National Guards corps also affected the N.W.F.P. to provincial division on a communal basis; Mr. Nehru and Congress¹⁶⁰ rejected those provisions particularly relating to the options given

¹⁶² Lord Wavell left on 23 March.

¹⁶³ He first showed this new plan to Mr. Nehru on 10 May.

¹⁶⁴ The Congress Working Committee had passed a resolution on 5 March 1947, recommending the Punjab’s division, which could be extended to Bengal. Copy of this resolution (and two others respectively welcoming the Government’s declaration for India’s independence and requesting the League to cooperate in effecting Dominion Status) were submitted to Lord Wavell on 9 March.

to all provinces and States to secede as they would undermine India's geographical and political unity and endanger some of its strategic areas. He warned that it would arouse enmity between his country and Great Britain. Both leaders, as well as the then Congress President, Mr. J.B. Kripalani, and Mr. Baldev Singh, apart from other notables,¹⁶⁵ not only accepted the Plan after the conference held at the Viceroy's House on 2-3 June, but also Lord Mountbatten's suggestion that the independence date should be predated to 1947 in accordance with the "Statement's" new clause under paragraph 20 headed "Immediate Transfer of Power". Other questions discussed related to "notional partition," to safeguard Sikh interests, referendum inclusive of Calcutta, the tasks of the Boundary Commission, devolution of power on a Dominion basis. The Viceroy then broadcast over India Radio on the evening of 3 June the decisions taken, after a brief review of his consultations; Messrs Jinnah, Nehru and Baldev Singh respectively on behalf of the A11-India Muslim League, ALL-India National Congress, and the Sikh community followed him to publicise their consent to the new proposals. The League Council and Congress ratified the 3 June Plan, as it also became known, respectively on 10 and 14 June. Prime Minister Attlee simultaneously broadcast His Majesty's Government decision¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Also participating were Mr. Patel representing Congress ; and Messrs Liaqat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar, on the League's behalf (Menon, op. cit., p. 371).

¹⁶⁶ See Menon, op. cit., Appendix X for the "Statement Made by His Majesty's Government, 3 June 1947".

that failing any League-Congress agreement, “partition becomes the inevitable alternative”. Its next step was to draft the “Indian Independence Bill”.¹⁶⁷ Having passed the Commons on 15 July and the House of Lords on the next day, it received Crown assent on 18 July. It stipulates “the fifteenth day of August, 1947” as the Day on which “two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan”. Meanwhile, a referendum was held in the legislatures of the affected provinces. Its results are well known: the Punjabi¹⁶⁸ and Bengali,¹⁶⁹ Muslims, together with those of and Sind,¹⁷⁰ opted to join Pakistan. And so it came to be that they officially formed the sovereign the N.W.F.P.,¹⁷¹ Baluchistan¹⁷² Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 1e August. Lor Mountbatten, having appointed Mr.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., Appendix XI. Power was transferred under the 1935 Government of India Act; also pp. 390 if.

¹⁶⁸ 164. The Punjab Legislative Assembly voted by 91 to 77 votes in favour of Pakistan.

¹⁶⁹ The Bengal Legislative Assembly on 26 June opted by 126 to 90 votes to join Pakistan and its new Constituent Assembly. The East Bengali Muslims voted 106 to 35 in favour.

¹⁷⁰ The W.W.F.P. 6-17 July referendum (50% voting) showed 289,244 versus 2874 to join Pakistan and its Constituent Assembly.

¹⁷¹ . The Shahi Jirga and Quetta Municipality members (seven Parsis and Hindus not attending) unanimously voted likewise.

¹⁷² The Sind Legislative Assembly convening on 26 June similarly opted by 30 to 20 votes. Sylhet’s early July referendum showed 239,619 against 184,041 in favour of joining East Bengal. (For additional particulars, cf. Merlon, op. cit., pp. 387-90).

Jinnah as their country's first native Governor-General (with the King's blessings), had flown from New Delhi to Karachi on 14 August to inaugurate the newly independent country's Constituent Assembly.

The 15th of August was the greatest triumph for Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah who drove amidst a jubilant crowd through Karachi. It was a personal homecoming for the architect of Pakistan. His grateful people honoured him during his life by bestowing upon him the title of Quaid i-Azam and post-mortem by building his magnificent mausoleum overlooking his native city and by celebrating his birth centennial!

Conclusions

Two diverse currents bore on the Quaid-i-Azam's thought formation. He was born under Islam conceiving of socially concerned and responsible humans being as God's vicegerents on earth. It, therefore, teaches not only obedience to His Revelation, but also active involvement in life. It spawned the zest of the entire free Muslim generations resulting in their attainment of eminence in the sciences as in law and government, in literature as in manuscript illumination, in music as in architectural design.

English education involving politics and law, philosophy and (Western) history, literature and social sciences, stressed independent and critical analysis as well as the individual's worth and rights, and Eulogized a free and moral society. The Muslims,

too, had self-esteem and exercised these faculties. If the Mongol onslaught had undermined their rationalistic spirit, colonialism dampened their creativity and their hope, Western schooling revived the critical faculty and its daring novel reconstruction¹⁷³ of the Qur'anic principles. Modernism, in fact, implied a total re-analysis. Although Mr. Jinnah was not a philosopher, he nevertheless was influenced by this Muslim school of thought emerging during the nineteenth century.¹⁷⁴ European training furthermore stirred in him (as in others who experienced it) a strong desire to strive toward selfhood (khudi). Dr Muhammad Iqbal defined it in terms of self-respect, involving also taking a new attitude, and of intensive activity.¹⁷⁵ The Western stream of thought thus released and reinforced the Islamic doctrine and conception of the individual. Mr. Jinnah being a sensitive and brilliant student deeply absorbed the said aspects of his own and foreign tradition. He furthermore belonged to the new Muslim middle-class intelligentsia which began to develop as a result of participating in this novel European training toward the end of the nineteenth century. They took the initiative that led to the first

¹⁷³ Cf. Dr Muhammad Iqbal's 1926 University Lectures entitled: *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1962), It has gone through many editions. A new annotated one is now being prepared in connection with his birth centennial celebrations.

¹⁷⁴ In Egypt, Turkey, India particularly at first.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. my article, entitled "Iqbal's Doctrine of Khudi," Iqbal (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbal), XVIII (3), Jan.-Mar. 1971, p. 55 if.

Simla Deputation in 1906, demanding safeguards through separate electorates for their co-religionists, and, by that year's end, to the founding of the All-India Muslim League to give them their own nation-wide representation. Mr. Jinnah's association with Congress, instead of this League, between 1906 and 1913, meant his total acceptance of that Hindu body's platform: swaraj. He joined the League only after it incorporated independence in its resolution. His continued Congress membership (until 1920 reflected his other main desire: to retain Hindu-Muslim cooperation and Indian unity, to which the 1916 Lucknow Pact attests. His resignation from Congress did not mean his abandonment of this aim, which he nourished even after his change of mind in 1940. One facet of his personality must be stressed: his unflinching adherence to a principle once he had embraced it. That was as true of swaraj and unity, as it was, after 1940, of his full dedication to the Pakistan Resolution. He henceforth gave all his talents, energies, efforts, and time to rebuilding the League and in shaping it into the most respectable national Muslim organisation for the purpose of carrying through its new platform. It is furthermore to his credit that he won the confidence of the most eminent and fiercely independent provincial Muslim leaders during the 1940's (and even before). Their willing cooperation helped carry the All-India Muslim League platform to victory in 1947! Nearly thirty years have now passed. Much has been said and written about the Quaid-i-Azam and the many leading—mostly deceased—personalities whom he knew personally. What ultimately caused the Muslim-Hindu

disagreements? Mr. Jinnah as early as 1920 held the British Government intimately responsible for sowing discord. He accused Lord Wavell of changing the balance of power in the Cabinet by adding one more non-Muslim than originally agreed upon, implying that the British did not always keep their promises. Indian notables even today point to the British divide-and-rule policies, including the holding of private interviews with and making contrary promises to one and then another individual.¹⁷⁶ Communalism sparked by colonialism in any case blocked the development of a secular two-party system—possibly

¹⁷⁶ Cf. L. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London : Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), pp. 101-02; Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London : Robert Hale, 1951), pp. 144, 146, for Lord Mountbatten's special friendship with Mr. Menon, whose draft in (he formed the Plan's basis; cf. Menon, *op cit.*, p. 360 ; cf. *ibid.*, p. 358 for his reference to "a lengthy discussion" which Mr. Menon had "late in December 1946, or early in January 1947 . . . with Vallabhbhai Patel. A united India under the Cabinet Mission Plan was I suggested, an illusion...." Cf finally P. Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto and Windus. 1961), p. 1334, calling Mr. V.P. Menon "Sardar Patel's right-hand man". The implications are that Messrs Menon and Patel previously settled what Lord Mountbatten later would implement and, hence, that they followed a much earlier analysis made by Dr Muhammad Iqbal and Mr. Lajpat Rai, and the above-mentioned 1933 British Government's Pakistan orientation. Lord Mountbatten originally had preferred the union to remain intact. (Cf. the Cripps Plan !)

desired by Mr. Jinnah—similar to that found hitherto in the United States of America.

The final question: Could partition have been prevented? remains.

If one takes the view of history that no human can oppose, but must swim with, its tide, then what occurred had to happen. If one assumes the opposite view that individuals with leadership qualities play an active role in shaping the events, then the conclusion is that particularly the 1940-1947 years were a kind of chess game in which each player made his moves and tried to overcome his opponent. Mr. Jinnah won, for an independent Pakistan came to be:

“Such glory shall the man of clay

Own far above the angels’ light

That with big star of destiny

He’ll make the earth like heaven bright.”¹⁷⁷

NOTES

¹⁷⁷ Muhammad Iqbal, Javid Namah, lines 161-64—English translation; Pilgrimage of Eternity by Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1961), p. 8.