

IQBAL REVIEW

Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan

April 1979

Editor

Muhammad Moizuddin

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

Title : Iqbal Review (April 1979)
Editor : Muhammad Moizuddin
Publisher : Iqbal Academy Pakistan
City : Lahore
Year : 1979
Classification (DDC) : 105
Classification (IAP) : 8U1.66V12
Pages : 80
Size : 14.5 x 24.5 cm
ISSN : 0021-0773
Subjects : Iqbal Studies
: Philosophy
: Research



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Table of Contents

Volume: 20

Iqbal Review: April 1979

Number: 1

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. THE "PSEUDO-DRAMATIC" POEMS OF IQBAL..... | 4 |
| 2. A COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL OF IQBAL'S PERSIAN POETRY | 16 |
| 3. WHAT SHOULD THEN BE DONE, O PEOPLE OF THE EAST? | 39 |
| 4. THE EMPIRICAL-DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY OF IBN KHALDUN AND KARL MARX..... | 40 |
| 5. A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC..... | 53 |
| 6. BOOK REVIEWS..... | 76 |

THE “PSEUDO-DRAMATIC” POEMS OF IQBAL

C. M. Naim

Burdened with such epithets as the *Hakim al-Ummat*, “the Wiseman of the Community,” and the *Shā’ir-i Mashriq*, “the Poet of the East,” Iqbal has rarely received the notice he deserves as a poet-craftsman of great skill and sensitivity. Many writers have reviewed Iqbal’s ideas on Poetry and Aesthetics but very few have made note of the aesthetics and poetics of Iqbal’s own verses. One notable exception that immediately comes to mind is Professor Muhammad Sadiq, who devoted an entire section to that matter in his history of Urdu literature.¹ Another, much earlier and rather disreputable, though historically quite interesting, case is that of the anonymous reviewer in the *Avadh Punch* who wrote a lengthy series of articles soon after Iqbal’s second Urdu volume, *Bāl-i-Jibrīl*, “Gabriel’s Wing,” came out in 1935.² He castigated Iqbal for mistakes of idiom and for transgressing the traditional conventions of Urdu and Persian poetry. Needless to say that Lucknow critic remains buried in well-deserved neglect, while *Bāl-i-Jibrīl* is universally regarded as Iqbal’s finest book of poetry in Urdu. The credit for that goes to Iqbal the poet-craftsman as much as to Iqbal the thinker.

Iqbal was an innovative poet, in spite of the fact that he wrote neither free nor blank verse. He wrote *ghazal*, the conventional lyric, and *nazm*, that is poems in various stanza forms but with regular metres and rhymes. I am not concerning myself here with Iqbal’s *ghazal*, where his innovations are significant, particularly in the way he expanded the range of associations of various traditional symbols. This brief paper deals with only one of Iqbal’s

¹ Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 372 if.

² "Idbar" (Pseudonym), "*Miqraḍ-i-Idbaril dar Bal-i-Jibril*" (The Scissors of Adversity at the Wings of Gabriel), in *Avadh Punch* (Lucknow), 12 May, 1935, and several subsequent issues. The nature of the comments can be guessed at from the fact that the contentious critic deliberately „calls Iqbal's *ghazal* "nazm".

favourite modes of poetic expression in his *nazm*. Iqbal's poems are metrically conventional, yet they possess an effect of variety and freshness which is not merely of the surface. He creates this variegated effect by using different, often unusual, stanza forms, by displaying a remarkable ear for the music that choices of metres and words can create, and by creating a heightened sense of drama through dialogue. It is to this latter aspect that this paper seeks to draw attention.

Some of Iqbal's most important poems, in Persian as well as in Urdu, are exquisite examples of what may be called "pseudo-dramatic" poetry — they are poems with certain elements of drama in them and their success is essentially due to the way they are structured. In dramatic poetry, according to one writer, poets "speak through interior monologues or assumed masks; they liberate minor objects and elevate them as striking symbols; they indulge in contrasts between great and small, or private and public, or ancient and contemporary, or elegant and tawdry—in short, they strive for a heightening, not by connected discourse, but by ellipses."³ Iqbal did not write interior monologues, but he did create a "dramatic" effect through other ways, as we shall see below.

Iqbal is primarily didactic in his intentions; in his poems he is aware of an audience and consciously addresses it. Toward that end he insists on using what Eliot calls the second voice of poetry. Didactic poetry can be rather tiresome for most people except the true believer. Iqbal, however, enchants his reader and keeps his interest alive by assuming masks and by turning simple objects into potent symbols. By doing so he relieves the monotony of the didactic second voice, giving it a semblance of the third voice of authentic drama. He discards continuous discourse, and instead presents to his reader pseudo-dramatic situations of contrast and confrontation. In calling them "pseudo-dramatic" my intentions are not at all pejorative. What I wish to convey is the fact that they are devoid of bare narrative—as is proper for true drama—and yet they lack genuine action. The characters or personae do not take on the kind of three-dimensional individuality that can come through action alone, Iqbal was not writing plays. He had no models available to him for that purpose in

³ 3. John J. Enck, "Dramatic Poetry," in Alex Preminger, et al., Eds., *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (Princeton, 1974), p. 199.

any Islamic language, nor was there a viable stage in India at that time. Iqbal's "pseudo-dramatic" poems are not, however, mere lifeless tableaux, for something does take place in them, invariably through a verbal exchange. One can, therefore, call them poems of dialogue. Of course, a closer look brings out finer distinctions. In some the dialogue forms a disputation, in others a chain of inquiry. There are other variations too. In some of these poems, the poet may himself be one of the protagonists—sometimes with a mask on—in others, a mere observer or recorder of the event. But the core structure is always that of a dialogue, and, in that sense, reflects perhaps Iqbal's training as a jurist and a philosopher. Below, some such poems will be discussed under three headings. As will be evident, further subcategories can be made, but have not been made here. Neither does the discussion include all the poems that show "pseudo-dramatic" characteristics.⁴

(I) *Poems of Disputation*. In certain poems the dialogue is in the spirit of a disputation between two protagonists; in some cases, each trying to assert one's supremacy over the other. The poet simply presents the individual arguments, ostensibly leaving the verdict to the reader. As is well known, this is a fairly respectable, old genre of poetry in both Persian and Arabic, its origin lying in Middle Eastern antiquity.⁵ In Arabic such poems are called

⁴ A partial listing of such dialogue poems would include 'Aql wa Dik, 'Ishq aur Mant, Shikwah, Janab-i Shikwah, Akhtar-i Subh, Khabr-i Rah, Ek Mukalamah—in *Bang-Darā* (1924) ; *Lenin Khudā Ke Hadar Men*, *Farishtan Kā Gīt*, *Farmān-i Khudā*, *Pir-o Murid*, *Jibril wa Iblīs*, *Adhān*,—in *Bāl-i-Jibril*(1935) ; *Taqdir (Iblīs-o Yazdān)*, *Subh-i Carman*—in *Darb-i-Kalim* (1936); *Iblīs ki Majlis-i Shūrā*, *Taṣwir wa Muṣawwir*, 'Alam-i Barzakāh—in *Armughān-i Hijāz* (1938) ; *Taskhīr-i Fītrat*, *Muḥāwarab-i 'Ilm-o-'Ishq*, *Muḥāwarab-i Mabāin Khudā wa Inṣān*, *Ḥur wa Sha'ir*—in *Payam-i Mashriq* (1923); and the entire book *Jāvid Nāmāh* (1932).

⁵ Jes P. Asmussen, *Studies in Judeo-Persian Literature* (Leiden, 1973), Chapter II, "A Judeo-Persian Precedence-Dispute Poem and Some Thoughts on the History of the Genre," pp, 32-59.

Through Arabic this genre also spread into various European languages. Cf. *Streiflichtung* in German. Some of the very earliest poems by Iqbal are Urdu adaptations of several English poems for children that belong to this genre. For example, "The Spider and the Fly," "The Mountain and the Squirrel," "The Cow and the Goat" in *Bāng-i Darā*, all written before 1905.

munāzarai or *muhāwarai* and it is the latter term that Iqbal frequently uses in the titles of such poems. An excellent example would be his Persian poem, *Muhāwarah Mābain Khudā wa Insān*, “A Dispute between God and Man,”⁶ but before we look at that let us glance at a simple, early poem titled ‘*Aql wa Dil*, ‘Intellect and Heart’⁷:

One day Intellect said to Heart,

I guide those who are lost.

From the earth I range to the heavens,

Just see, how far I can reach.

I give meaning to the Book of Life;

I make visible God’s great glory.

You?—a mere clot of blood.

I put to shame the finest ruby.

Heart said, That may be true, but

See what I really am.

You merely *know* Life’s secret;

I *see* it with my eyes.

You beget learning; I, gnosis.

You search for God. I show Him.

⁶ It occurs in *Payām-i-Mashriq* [*Kulliyāt-i-Iqbāl* (Fārsī), (Lahore, 1973)], p. 284.

⁷ It occurs in *Bāng-i-Dārā*; it was written before 1905 [*Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl* (*Urdu*), (Lahore, 1973)], p. 41.

See, how high my status is, In me resides the Almighty.⁸

The final word is with Heart, so we know who the winner is in that dispute, but in the dispute between God and Man, as delineated by Iqbal, we see a stalemate: God is all powerful, but Man also plays a crucial role in the scheme of things.

God

I made this world, from one same earth and water,
You made Tartaria, Nubia, and Iran ;
I forged from dust the iron's unsullied ore,
You fashioned sword and arrowhead and gun;
You shaped the axe to hew the garden tree,
You wove the cage to hold the singing-bird.

Man

You made the night and I the lamp,
And You the clay and I the cup;
You—desert, mountain-peak, and vale:
I—flower-bed, park, and orchard; I
Who grind a mirror out of stone,
Who brew from poison honey-drink.⁹
A different kind of disputation is found in the two long “complaint”

⁸ This incomplete translation is by the author of this paper. A complete translations can be found in *Poems from Iqbal* by Victor G. Kiernan (Bombay, 1947), p. 24. The later edition of the book, however, does not contain it.

⁹ Victor G. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal* (Condon, 1955), p. 93.

poems written in Urdu, *Shikwah* and *Jawāb-i Shikwah*, “Complaint” and “Answer to the Complaint”.¹⁰ To the best of our knowledge, Iqbal did not originally plan the second poem at the same time as the first, but the immense popularity of the *Shikwah* and the logic of Iqbal’s thought both demanded a sequel, and the two now form a pair. Together they are perhaps the two most popular Urdu poems of Iqbal. In the first, the poet complains to God on behalf of all Muslims concerning their down-trodden and humiliating state in the affairs of the world. He enumerates the past deeds of the: Muslims to underscore his complaint of God’s neglect.

We erased the smudge of falsehood
from the parchment firmament,

We redeemed the human species

from the chain of slavery;

And we filled the Holy Kaaba with

our foreheads humbly bent,

Clutching to our fervent bosoms the

Koran in ecstasy.

Yet the charge is laid against us we

have played the faithless part;

If disloyal we have proved, hast

Thou deserved to win our heart?¹¹

He then continues:

Why no more are worldly riches

among Muslims to be found,

¹⁰ These poems occur in *Bāng-i Darā [Kulliyāt (Urdū)]*. pp. 163 and 199, respectively.

According to Muhammad Sadiq (op. cit.), they were written *in* 1909 and 1912, respectively.

¹¹ A. J. Arberry, Tr., *Complaint and Answer* (Lahore, 1955), p. 15.

Since Thy power is as of old beyond
compute and unconfined? .. .

All we have is jeers from strangers,
public shame, and poverty—

Is disgrace our recompense for laying
down our lives for Thee?¹²

There is much more in a similar vein, expressing the sentiments of an average Muslim, often in a delightfully playful tone. A more serious note comes in near the end, and the complaint ends in a supplication.

Grant at last Thy sore-ried people in
their difficulties ease,
Make the ant of little substance peer
of Solomon to be;...¹³

In the second poem, God responds to the complaint by pointing out the listless state of the Muslims themselves.

We would fain be bountiful, but no
petitioner is there;
When no traveller approaches, how
can We guide on the way?...¹⁴

God charges the Muslims with a lack of initiative. They are also disunited, having fallen victim to rising nationalism, and have lost the true spirit of Islam that was a combination of Faith and Action.

Nations come to birth by Faith; let
Faith expire, and nations die;
So, when gravitation ceases, the
thronged stars asunder fly.¹⁵
Who erased the smudge of falsehood
from the parchment firmament?

¹² Ibid., p. 19.

¹³ Ibid., p 29.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.45.

Who redeemed the human species
from the chains of slavery?
Who once filled the Holy Kaaba with
their foreheads lowly bent,
Clutching to their fervent bosoms the
Koran in ecstasy?
Who were they?
They were your fathers;
as for now, why, what are you,
Squatting snug, serenely waiting for
tomorrow to come true?¹⁶
Sure enough, you have your Syeds,
Mirzas, Afghans, all the rest;
But can you claim you are Muslims,
if the truth must be confessed?¹⁷
If the child learns not the knowledge
that has made his father sage,
Then what right has he by merit to
his father's heritage?¹⁸

The poem ends with a promise from God:

Be thou faithful to Muhammad, and
We yield Ourselves to thee;
Not this world alone—the Tablet and
the Pen thy prize shall be.¹⁹

(2) *Poems of Inquiry*. In such poems the dialogue consists of questions asked by the poet, speaking in the first person, addressed to some figure, historical or imaginary, and answers given by that figure. These answers essentially represent the opinions of the poet himself concerning various issues; he quotes the other protagonist or puts words in his mouth to express his own conclusions. In a poem like *Pir-o-Murid*, "The Master and

¹⁶ Ibid., p.47.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. p. 53

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 55,

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 72.

the Disciple,” Rūmī’s responses to Iqbal’s questions are Rūmī’s own verses²⁰; in other poems, Iqbal provides the words, for example in *Khiḍr-i-Rāh*, “The Khiḍr-i (Guide) of the Road”.²¹ Most of these poems are too long to quote in full; only a few selected verses from the latter will have to suffice.

Poet to Khiḍr

To thy world-ranging eye is visible the storm
Whose breakers now sleep silently beneath the sea;
The poor man’s boat, that wall of the orphan, that pure
spirit!
The wisdom even of Moses stood in awe of thee;
Thou shunnest all abodes, to tread the wilderness,
Of day and night, of yesterdays and tomorrows, free.
What is the riddle of life? what thing is kingship? Why
Must labourer and merchant bloodily disagree ?

Khiḍr to Poet

The chapter of the Kings, let me
Unriddle to your mind.—

A conjurer’s wand is sovereignty,
That conquering nations find.
If ever a little in their sleep
His subjects stir, the sure
Enchantments of the ruler steep
Their wits in night once more...
In the West the people rule, they say:
And what is this new reign?
The same old harp, the same strings play

²⁰ It occurs in *Bāl-i-Jibrīl* [*Kullīyāt* (Urdū)], p. 426.

²¹ It occurs in *Bāng-i-Darā* [*Kullīyāt* (Urdū)], p. 225. According to Sadiq, it was written in 1921.

The Empires' old refrain...²²

(3) A third category can be set up of certain poems, which, for the sake of convenience, may be referred to as *Poems of "Witnessing"*. Poems falling into this category consist of a dialogue or a series of dialogues between two or more protagonists, not involving, however, the ego of the poet and not necessarily always in the nature of a disputation. The poet is, in fact, observing or witnessing an imagined scene, which he desires to share with his readers. The scenes contain hardly any action; they consist of verbal exchanges. Even these verbal exchanges may sometime appear to be a great deal independent of each other. In other words, rather than a sustained dramatic scene, it may turn out to be a series of tableaux, somewhat static in themselves, yet capable of generating drama through their juxtaposition. Some of the important poems belonging to this category would be the trilogy consisting of "Lenin in the Presence of God," "Angel's Song," and "God's Command,"²³ or the cycle titled *Taskhīr-i-Fīrat*, "The Conquest of Nature".²⁴ I can quote here only a short poem titled *Taqdir*, "Fate".²⁵

Satan (to God)

O God, Creator! I did not hate your Adam,
That captive of Far-and-Near and Swift-and-Slow;
And what presumption could refuse to *You*
Obedience? If I would not kneel to him,
The cause was Your own fore-ordaining will.

God (to Satan)

When did that mystery dawn on you ? before,
Or after y our sedition?

Satan (to God)

²² Kiernan, op. cit., Bombay edition, pp. 43-47.

²³ They occur in *Bāl-i-Jibrīl* [*Kulliyāt* (Urdū)], pp. 398-402. An English translation can be found in Kiernan (op.cit., London edition, pp. 42-44). He does not, however, include the second poem of the trilogy.

²⁴ They occur In *Payām-i Mashriq* [*Kulliyāt* (Fārsī)], pro. 255-58.

²⁵ It occurs in *Ḍarb-i Kalīm* [*Kulliyāt* (Urdū)], pp. 508-09. A note by the poet tells that it is an adaptation from some writing of Ibn 'Arabī.

After, oh brightness,
Whence all the glory of all being flows.

God (to His Angels)

See what a grovelling nature taught him this
Fine theorem! His not kneeling, he pretends,
Belonged to My fore-ordinance; gives his freedom
Necessity's base title ;—wretch! his own
Consuming fire he calls a wreath of smoke.²⁶

One of the books that Iqbal published in Persian was *Jāvīd Nāmāh*, “The Book of *Jāvīd*”. All critics agree that as a brilliant achievement of poetic art it is Iqbal’s finest work. It is a dazzling panorama of shifting scenes, unusual juxtaposition, and fascinating exchanges. Its language is simple yet elegant; its rhythms and rhymes musically vibrant as well as contextually perfect. No English translation has succeeded in doing justice to it, and the task is wellnigh impossible.²⁷ Reading it one wishes some brilliant composer would set it to music, like an oratorio or a concert opera. It is a dialogue poem, but on a scale never before attempted by Iqbal. Myriads of protagonists—some historical, some mythical—carrying symbolic values, speak in it in their own as well as in Iqbal’s voice, to each other as well as to *Zindabrūd*, the mask adopted by Iqbal on that celestial journey. In short, *Jāvīd Nāmāh* is a brilliantly executed dialogue poem, and as an Urdu speaker I regret the fact that Iqbal did not find time to write something equally grand in Urdu.

Iqbal did not write a play. It is not known if he ever even planned to write one. Near the end of his life he wanted to write two long poems, one in Urdu on the story of the *Ramayana*, the other in English, “The Book of an Unknown Prophet,” modelled after Nietzsche’s *Also Sprache Zarathustra*. No record indicates that any progress was made on either of the projects. It is also regrettable that Iqbal had a very low opinion of both the stage and the screen. One cannot blame that on the poor quality of the theatre and cinema in India at that time, for Iqbal had had ample, though little availed, opportunity to experience the art of the stage while in Europe. His short

²⁶ Kiernan, op. cit., London edition, p. 64.

²⁷ The most readable translation in English is by A. J. Arberry: *Jāvīd Nāmāh* (London, 1966).

poem titled “Cinema”²⁸ reads like a fanatic’s diatribe, refusing to see in it any possibility of aesthetic and intellectual reward. Cinema, for him, is nothing but “new fetish-fashioning, idol-making and mongering”. His contempt for the theatre arises from the same impulse: acting involves a denial and suppression of one’s own selfhood, and that is the worst crime in Iqbal’s eyes.

Your body be the abode of another’s ego,
God forbid! Do not revive the mongering of idols!²⁹

It is an interesting question to ask ourselves: why did the Muslims all over the world fail to create viable theatre until quite recently? The Arabs translated Greek philosophy and sciences but completely ignored the great plays. Was it simply a matter of a difference in literary tastes? Was it because of the sexual segregation in the society? Was it due to the despotic nature of the milieu which, as Baraheni suggests, was not conducive to a true “dialogue”?³⁰ Was acting or impersonation actually regarded as a blasphemous act? This is, however, not the right place to speculate on these issues. We only know that Iqbal felt no desire to write true drama, remaining quite satisfied with the “pseudo-dramatic”. That in itself was a major contribution to Urdu poetry, for which we are grateful to him.

²⁸ It occurs in *Bal-i-Jibril*. An English translation can be found in Kiernan, op. cit, London edition, pp. 57-58.

²⁹ *Tiyātar* (Theatre) in *Darb-i-Kalīm Kulliyāt* (Urdū), p. 568.

³⁰ Reza Baraheni, *The Crowned Cannibals* (New York), p. 70.

A COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL OF IQBAL'S PERSIAN POETRY

Muhammad Riaz

‘Allah Iqbal is a versatile, thoughtful and world-recognised Persian poet, but many aspects of the exotic splendour of his art and thought have yet to be arranged and studied. One such aspect is a comparative study of over sixty Persian poets, renowned as well as less known, mentioned in his poetry and prose-works. The writer knows of no other Persian or Urdu poet-cum writer whose works may reflect such an amazing galaxy of poets of the fifth-thirteenth/eleventh-nineteenth centuries. As compared to Persian poets, the number of Arabic, English, German and Urdu poets traceable in Iqbal’s books is rather insignificant, though he knew these languages, too. The reason is obvious: Iqbal had learnt Persian with great enthusiasm³¹ and consequently emerged to be essentially a Persian poet. No doubt, in addition to about nine thousand couplets in Persian, Iqbal has versified nearly six thousand verses in Urdu, but his diction has remained explicitly Persian, as he had drunk deep at Persian’s fountain.

Iqbal’s Persian poetry started about the year 1906; till then he was quite known for his Urdu poetry in the subcontinent, but his earlier Persian poetry too is well attractive, though it doesn’t make a part of Iqbal’s regular works, now.³²

The galaxy of Persian poets reflective in Iqbal’s works has different phases: the couplets of some poets are referred to in support of the use of certain correct rhetoric figures in poetry or for depicting lexicographical meanings.³³ The meanings of certain verses are appreciated and told by Iqbal

³¹ Shaikh ‘Aṭā’ ‘ullah, Ed., *Iqbal Nāmab* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1951.), II, 343.

³² See, e.g., M. ‘Abdullah Qureshi and S. A. Vahid, Eds., *Bāqiyāt-i Iqbal*, Lahore: Aṭīnah-i Adab, 1965 (2nd ed.). 13

³³ See Sh. ‘Aṭā’ ‘ullah, Ed., op. cit. ; M. Abdullah Qureshi, Ed., *Maktūbāt-i Iqbal Banām-i Garāmi*, Karachi : Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1969 ; S. ‘Abdul Vāḥid Muṣṭafī, Ed , *Maqālāt-i Iqbal*,

in a different sense.³⁴ There are allusions to the couplets of a number of poets; the metres, rhymes or rhythms of some poets have been borrowed and used by Iqbal in his Persian and even Urdu poetry, and finally there is a good number of poets certain hemstiches or couplets of whom have been inserted by Iqbal among his verses for appreciating or even for contradicting certain meanings humorously.³⁵

Iqbal's Style. Persian poetry has been classified under four popular *sabuk* or styles, namely, Khurāsānī, 'Irāqī, Hindī and Revisory. Khurāsānī was the simple style of the poets till the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century ; 'Iraqi is the most developed style ascribed to the poets like Rūmī, Sa-dī, Ḥāfiẓ and Jāmī, whereas for Hindī style the names of Waḥshī, 'Urfī, Nazīrī, Sā'ib, Bedil and Ghalib suffice to refer. This style remained in practice out of Iran till recently, but the Iranian poets returned to the former styles by middle of twelfth/eighteenth century and adopted the Revisory style, and this reformative step is still being followed. Iqbal whom the late poet-laureate Muhammad Taqī Bahār Mashhadī (d. 1651) calls the fruit of eight centuries of the development of Persian poetry,³⁶ has been attentive to all the traditions and styles of Persian poetry and, though his poetry apparently seems to be in ' Irāqī style, on the whole he has paved a new way. The critics, mostly Iranians, describe his style as unique because of his certain originalities in technique, and also due to use of words as different terminology. Hence he is also the exponent of a new school of poetic art.³⁷ In his Preface to English rendering of Iqbal's *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* the late Orientalist, Arthur John Arberry (d. 1969) writes:

"Iqbal accepted the ghazal as he found it, with all its age-long rigidity of form and matter; and, with the true touch of genius, he took it one stage forward. While remaining absolutely true to both pattern and image, he gave the form the new meaning by making it express his individual message. The ghazal had

Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963 ; and M. Rafiq Afzal, Ed , *Gustār-i Iqbal*, Lahore : Idārah-i Taḥqīqāt-i Pakistan (Research Society of Pakistan), 1970, etc.

³⁴ E.g. "Qaṭrah-i Āb," in *Payām-i Mashriq (Kulliyāt-i Iqbal Fārsi)*, (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1975), pp. 282-83.

³⁵ See *Bal-i Jibrīl (Kulliyāt-i Iqbal Urdu)* (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam All & Sons, 1977), Lyric 12, last line; *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Kulliyāt Fārsi)*, Part I, Lyric 7, last line (refers to Sa'dī).

³⁶ M. M. Sharif, Ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1956), see article "Iqbal" by Khalīfah Abdul Ḥakīm, II, 1614-1633.

³⁷ *Majallah-i Dānishkadab-i Adabiyāt*, Tehran University, Vol. 1, No. 1.

been put to a variety of derive uses by the old masters; the panegyrists had taken the love-motive and directed it to patron-flattery; the mystics had used the language of human passion to express their devotion to God. Now for the first time the ancient form is made to clothe the body of a new philosophy. What that philosophy is, the reader . . . will find himself in a new world of thought and feeling, a world vibrant with hope and high endeavour, a world revealing the vision of a great thinker who saw in these sorely troubled times the dawn of a new age."³⁸

What Arberry wrote about Iqbal's *ghazal* applies to all his poetry in Persian. In his originalities in style, however, his love for the Persian language is also evincible—the language which, according to his hint in the *Jāvid Nāmāh*, even the Martians speak.³⁹ As Iqbal's remarks and appreciations of Persian poets are scattered in different writings, particularly in Urdu, below we put forth a gist of our glimpses of comparative studies in this regard. The poets enjoying some importance in Iqbal's art or thought are briefly mentioned earlier and the less significant have been enlisted later. The less known poets may need introduction, but, except in a few cases, this is not possible in this short article; necessary sources have, however, been added and this may lead to a comparative appraisal of Iqbal's Persian poetry, i.e. what he thought of other poets, and how he developed and elevated his own style.

Firdausī. Abu'l-Qāsim Firdausī Tūsī (d. about 411/1020), creator of the Shah Nāmāh, has been referred to by Iqbal in the use of a rhythm, and Iqbal quotes from Firdausī also.⁴⁰ In *mathnavī Musāfir*, while passing through the ruins of Ghazni, Iqbal refers to the grandeur of the reign of Sultan Maḥmūd as explicit from some verses of Firdausī in praise of the Sultan. In his *Bāl-i Jibrīl*,⁴¹ Iqbal inserts a couplet of Firdausī in support of the meanings of self-respect and self-affirmation, and narrates the importance of this *mathnavī*-master from Iran:

خودی کو نہ دے سیم و زر کے عوض نہیں شعلہ دیتے شرر کے عوض

³⁸ A.J. Arberry, Tr. (*Iqbal's Zabūr-i 'Ajām*), Persian, Psalms (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1948), pp. vii-viii.

³⁹ *Jāvid Nāmāh*, (*Kulliyāt Fārsī*), pp. 689-92: Firmament of Mars: The Martain Astronomer.

⁴⁰ Sayyid 'Abdul Vāḥid Muṣṭafī, Ed., op.cit., p.29.

⁴¹ *Kulliyāt Urdu*, p. 452.

یہ کہتا ہے فردوسی دیدہ ور عجم جس کے سر سے روشن بصر
 ”ز بہرِ درم تند و بدخو مباش تو باید کہ باشی، درم گو مباش“

[Exchange not Self-dignity for silver and gold—

A flame is not exchangeable with a sparkle.

Broad-eyed Firdausī says like this—

The one with whose collyrium, Iran is clear-sighted:

"Become not harsh and bad-tempered for drachma (wealth);

Thy Self art to remain: drachma may void."]

Manūchihri. Abu'l-Najm Manūchihri Damghānī (d. 432/1040) has mostly followed the Arab poets in his poetry; he is also famous for his *musammit*s (stanzas knit together, all the last lines of which rhyme). Iqbal inserts his couplet in his visionary journey to the Ḥijāz.⁴² His *musammit* "Nawā'-i Waqt" in *Payām-i Mashriq* shows a particular impact of Mauūchihri. Iqbal's odes in the style of Arabic poets definitely resemble those of Manūchihri.

Nāṣir Khusrau. Abu'l-Muʿin Ḥujjat Nāṣirir Khusrau Qabadiyānī (d. 481/1088), the philosopher-writer and ethical poet, had no nom de plume. In the section "Beyond the Heaven" of his *Jāvid Nāmab*, Iqbal has inserted five couplets of an ethical *qaṣīdab* (his whole poetry is as such) of Nāṣir Khusrau under the following caption: "The spirit of Nāṣir Khusrau 'Alavī appears, sings an excitful lyric and vanishes."

It is noteworthy that in the said section of *Jāvid Nāmab*, certain monarchs are being mentioned but as Nāṣir Khusrau has not praised any monarch or noble, Iqbal has shown him separately as cited above and this shows his special regard for the Ismāʿīlī poet. Iqbal's fragment "A Falcon and A Fish" in *Payām-i Mashriq* seems to be influenced by the famous fragment of Nāṣir Khusrau entitled "Flying of a Proud Hawk".

Mas'ūd. Masūd Sa'd Salmān Lāhorī (d. 515/1121) has been the most celebrated poet of his time in the Ghaznavī era. Iqbal has freely translated and elaborated his following quatrain in Urdu verse of his *Bāl-i Jibri'l*:⁴³

⁴² *Armughān-i Hijāz* (*Kulliyāt Fārsī*): "Ḥuḍūr-ī Risālat", 1st quatrain.

⁴³ Cf.:

Live with a hawk's valour and a leopard's pride;
 Good at hunting and triumphant in combat.
 Attend not to a nightingale and a peacock—
 The former is mere melody and the latter colour.

Sanā'ī. Abu'l-Majd Ḥasan Majdud Sanā'ī Ghzanavī (d. 535/ 1140), the renowned poet, has been praised deeply by later eminent poets like Khāqānī, 'Aṭṭār, Rūmī ; Iqbal too joins his predecessors. Iqbal had visited Sanā'ī's last resting place at Ghazni in November 1933, and the event is reflective in his *mathnavī Musāfir* and *Bāl-i Jibriīl*; in the *mathnavī* Iqbal appreciates and annotates certain mystic ideas of Sanā'ī and in the book, he, by following Sanā'ī's *qaṣīdah* and inserting certain hemstiches thereof, writes a detailed poem and terms it as "container of stray thoughts". Iqbal's certain lyrics too reflect Sanā'ī's influence; for example:

Sanā'ī

ای یار مقام دل، پیش آی و دمی کم زن
 زخمی کہ زنی برما، مردانہ و محکم زن

[Gambling loving friend! come forward and try luck a little;
 Your match against us ought to be manly and firm.]

Iqbal

با نشہ درویشی ساز و دمام زن

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| جی سکتے ہیں بے روشنی دانشِ فرنگ | چیتے کا جگر چاہیے، شاہیں کا تجسس |
| بلبل فقط آواز ہے، طاؤس فقط رنگ! | کر بلبل و طاؤس کی تقلید سے توبہ |

چوں پختہ شوی خود را بر سلطنتِ جم زن⁴⁴

[Like the dervish drunken be; quaff the wine cup instantly,
And, when thou art bolder grown, hurl thyself on Jamshid's throne!]

Anwarī. Auḥaduddīn Muhammad Anwarī Abiwardī (d. 587/ 1191) is one of the pillars of Persian poetry's castle. Iqbal has quoted from him and inserted many of his hemstiches and couplets in support of certain meanings for appreciation.

Anwarī's fragment decrying the usurpation of the people's rights by the aristocrats has been freely translated and versified by Iqbal in Urdu and included in *Bāl-i Jibrīl*. It is captioned "Beggary".

Khāqānī. Afḍaluddīn Fāḍil Khāqānī Shirwānī (d. 595/1199) is famous for his philosophical meanings and Iqbal was very much appreciative of the quality of Khāqānī. In two different poems of *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, Iqbal has inserted three couplets of Khāqānī with considerable praise of the poet's genius. The couplets have been taken from *mathnavī Tuḥfat al-'Irāqain*. In a poem entitled "Khāqānī," Iqbal has said:

وہ صاحبِ تحفۃ العراقین اربابِ نظر کا قرۃ العین
ہے پردہ شگاف اس کا ادراک پردے ہیں ت مام چاک در چاک!
خاموش ہے عالمِ معانی کہتا نہیں حرفِ لن ترانی!⁴⁵

[The master of *mathnavī Tuḥfat-ul-'Irāqain*—apple of the eyes of the enlightened.

His intellect unveils—all the curtains keeps aloof.

This scholar of facts is quiet, but never talks un-open.]

Iqbal has also inserted some couplets and hemistiches of Khāqānī in support of discussing meanings⁴⁶.

Nizāmī. Shaikh Jamāluddīn Abū Ilyās Muḥammad Nizāmī Ganjavī (d. circa 610/1213) has been referred to and appreciated by Iqbal in the Preface

⁴⁴ Jāvīd Nāmāh (*Kulliyāt Fārī*), p. 775. Tr. by Arberry

⁴⁵ *Ḍarb-I Kalīm (Kulliyāt Urdu)*, p. 120.

⁴⁶ Sayyid 'Abdul Vāḥid Muīnī, Ed., op. cit., p. 32.

to his *Payām-i Mashriq* and in *Darb-i Kalīm* where he inserts his couplets from *mathnavī Laylā Wa Majnūn*, as Iqbal was here laying down some pieces of advice for his son, Jāvid, similarly as Niẓāmī had done for his own son. Besides referring to Niẓāmī's *Laylā Wa Majnūn and Haft Paikar*, Iqbal has responded to his famous "Wine Quatrain" through his "Kharābāt-i Farang" in *Payām-i Mashriq*, though some researchers⁴⁷ refute the ascription of the quatrain to Niẓāmī and think that it belongs to another Niẓāmī of the Ṣafavid era (tenth-eleventh/sixteenth-seventeenth century). The opening lines of both the quatrains are as under:

Niẓāmī

دوش رفتم به خرابات مرا را نبود
می زدم ناله و فریاد کس از من نشنود

[Last night I went to the winehouse, I did not get in for want of permission ;
I exclaimed to enter but none attended to my woe and cry.]

Iqbal

دوش رفتم بتماشای خراباتِ فرنگ
شوخ گفتاری زندی دلم از است ربود⁴⁸

[Last night I went to go through the wine-house of the West,
The satire of an intoxicated fellow (refers to Nietzsche) impressed me immensely.]

‘*Aṭṭār*. Shaikh Farīduddin Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ‘Aṭṭār Nishāpūrī (d. 618/1221) is the second important mystic poet after Sanāʿī, and Rūmī has particularly praised them both. Iqbal is appreciative of them all. Indications are there to show that Iqbal had gone at least through the following works

⁴⁷ Zain al-ʿĀ- bidīn Muʿtamin, *Shīʿr wa Adab-i Fārsī*, Tehran, Ibn-i-Sinā, 1332 H. Sh.

⁴⁸ *Payām-i Mashriq (Kulliyat Fārsī)*, p. 383.

of ‘Aṭṭār: *Dīwān-i Ghazliyyāt*, *Tadhkara-tul-Auliya’*, *Maṭāq al-Ṭair* and *Īlāhī Nāmāh*. ‘Aṭṭār’s one lyric seems to influence Iqbal’s poem captioned "Kashmīr" in *Payām-i Mashriq*. The opening lines are as under:

‘Aṭṭār

باد شمال میوزد، جلوۂ نسترن نگر
وقت سحر ز عشق گل، بلبل نعره زن نگر

[It blows from the North, behold the splendour of eglantine;
For love with the Hower, witness the nightingale’s melody early in the
morning.]

Iqbal

رخت به کاشمر کشا، کوه و تل و
دمن نگر
سبزہ جہاں جہاں ہیں، لالہ چمن
چمن نگر⁴⁹

[Encamp in Kashmir, and look at the hill and the vale—
Enjoy the world of greenery and the gardens of tulips.]

The phraseology of *Tadhkara-tul-Auliya’* is envisageable in Iqbal’s works. Iqbal has followed *mathnavī Maṭāq al-Ṭair* in a few cases, but his appreciation of this work was so intense that like his *Gulshan-i Rāḡ Jadīd*, written after the *mathnavī Gulshan-i Rāḡ* of Maḥmūd Shabistari, he wished to write a new *Maṭāq al-Ṭair*⁵⁰ with a new technique but, due to his preoccupation and long indisposition in old age, he couldn’t fulfil his desire.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 302.

⁵⁰ Dr S. M. Ikram. *Iqbal Dar Rab-i Manlawi*, Lahore : Iran-Pakistan Cultural Association, 1969.

‘Aṭṭār has a particular sympathetic view of Satan. The details may be seen in his *Maṭṭaq al-Ṭair*, *Muṣibat Nāmāh* and, particularly, *Ilābī Nāmāh* (*maqālah* 8th). It is interesting to note that some phases of Iqbal’s sympathetic and varied attitude towards Satan coincide with those of Aṭṭār.⁵¹

Rūmī. Maulānā Jalāluddīn Muḥammad Rūmī (d. 672/1273) who, like Nāṣir Khusrau, had no pseudonym is undoubtedly the greatest mystic Persian poet. Rūmī occupies the most important place in Iqbal’s thought and art. Regarding Rumi’s maūy-sided impact on Iqbal and the common factors in both, a number of articles and even books can be written, yet I venture herein the main points. Iqbal has praised Rūmī’s genius and quoted from him (both from *Mathnavī* and the *Dīvān-i Kabīr*) in almost all his prose and poetry works ; in his older age Iqbal used to read, after the Qur’ān and *Ḥadīth*, Rūmī’s *mathnavī* alone and this shows his special regard for the book. Excepting *mathnavī Gulshan-i Rāz Jadīd*, all *mathnavīs* of Iqbal coincide Rūmī’s *Mathnavī* in rhyme and rhythm, and in the *qāfiyah* of his earlier *mathnavīs*, Iqbal has deliberately⁵² followed Rūmī to the utmost.

In his quotations and insertions from Rūmī, Iqbal’s poem "Pīr Wa Muṣīb" (the Guide Rūmī and the Disciple Iqbal) in *Bāl-i Jibrīl* is quite important and interesting. Here Iqbal has selected couplets from all the six parts of Rūmī’s *Mathnavī* and depicted new meanings from them. Iqbal ascribes his lofty ideas every-where as directives or inspirations from Rūmī. His celestial journey, contained in *Jāwīd Nāmāh*, has been described as Rūmī’s inspirations. The mystic master is seen everywhere in Iqbal’s writings.

Iqbal has developed a number of Rūmī’s ideas and made them more popular for the modern man: love, intellect, evolution, free-will, self-affirmation and idea of perfect man come in the first row of their important topics. Rūmī had successfully opposed the irreligious and misleading philosophic and mystic views prevalent in his age; in the case of Iqbal who has been fighting against the alien ideas for the Muslims, particularly against limited nationhood, slavery, dependence, anti-religious ways and following the Westerners blindly. Hence it is quite proper that Iqbal calls himself "the Rūmī of this age," and just critics accept his claim:

⁵¹ Dr Muhammad Riaz, "The Image of Satan in Iqbal," *Iqbal* (quarterly), (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbal), October 1969.

⁵² Shaikh ‘Aṭā’ullah, Ed., op. cit., I, 96.

چون رومی در حرم دادم اذان من از و آموختم اسرارِ جان من
بدورِ فتنهٔ عصرِ کهن، او بدورِ فتنهٔ عصرِ روان من،⁵³

[Like Rūmī I called the people for prayers in Ḥaram;
From him have I learnt the secrets of soul.
Seditions of the older age he resisted
Horrors of the present age I withstand.]

The late Dr Khalīfah ‘Abdul Ḥakīm, a veteran writer on Rūmī and Iqbal, has written:

"As Rūmī's religious consciousness was paralleled with intellectual consciousness so was the case with Iqbal; both preached the gospel of a rich integrated life embracing matter, life, mind, and spirit, a life in which not only the individual and social selves are harmonized but in which the developing ego also makes an attempt to attune its finitude with the Cosmic Infinite Spirit."⁵⁴

A few of Rūmī's and Iqbal's lyrics (opening lines) are given below for comparison:

Rūmī

اگر دل از غمِ دنیا جدا توانی کرد نشاط و عیش بباغ بقا توانی کرد

[If you succeed in freeing heart from the world-worries,
You will dwell with mirth and delight in the garden of Eternity.]

Iqbal

درونِ لاله گزر چوں صبا توانی کرد
بیک نفس گره غنچه و اتوانی کرد⁵⁵

⁵³ *Armughān-i Hijāz (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 938.

⁵⁴ Khalīfah ‘Abdul Ḥakīm, "Iqbal," in Sharif, Ed., op. cit., II, 1629.

⁵⁵ *Zabūr-i ‘Ajām (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 456.

[Thou canst pass, like morning's breeze,
Deep into the anemones,
With a single breath disclose
The locked secrets of the rose.]

Rūmī

من بے خود و توبے خود ما را کہ برد خانہ؟
من چند ترا گفتم، کم خود، دوسہ پیمانہ⁵⁶

[I am senseless, you are ecstasised ; who would take us home?
Many a time I asked you to take less, two three goblets.] Iqbal

Iqbal

فرقی نہ نہد عاشق ور کعبہ و بت خانہ
ایں جلوتِ جانانہ، آن خلوتِ جانانہ

[A lover doesn't differentiate a Ka'bah and an idol-house ;
This is the presence of the Beloved and that Vacancy.]

'*Irāqī*. Shaikh Ibrāhīm 'Irāqī Hamadānī (d. 688/1289), the mystic poet and writer, has a very short echo in Iqbal's works; an epistle about "Time and Space" attributed to 'Irāqī in Iqbal's *Lectures*⁵⁷ actually belongs⁵⁸ to Shaikh 'Alī 'Ain al-Qudāt Hamadānī (d. 525/1131), and besides insertions of a few couplets Iqbal has followed 'Irāqī's most famous *ghazal* in his *Zabūr-i*

⁵⁶ *Payām-i Masbriq (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 335.

⁵⁷ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1962), pp. 124-145; Lecture V: "The Spirit of Muslim Culture".

⁵⁸ His English translation by A.H. Kamali was published by Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Karachi (now in Lahore), in 1971.

‘*Ajam*.⁵⁹

Sa’dī. Shaikh Muṣliḥuddīn Sa’dī Shirāzī (d. 691/1292) is an ethical Persian poet par excellence and, like many later poets, Iqbal has appreciated and quoted couplets from him in some of his writings. In a few verses of Iqbal, Sa’dī’s views are reflective and, in a few others, Iqbal has criticised some of Sa’dī’s lenient views, and he has rather developed some of the Shaikh’s ideas.⁶⁰ In some of his writings Iqbal has referred to some events ascribed to Sa’dī which actually do not exist.⁶¹ Out of many lyrics in which Iqbal has responded to Sa’dī, the opening lines of one are:

Sa’dī

پایان آمد ایس دفتر، حکایت ہمچنان باقی

⁵⁹ Cf.

Trāqī

| | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| نخستین بادہ کاندر جام کردند | ز چشمِ مست ساقی وام کردند |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|

[The first wine poured into glass
Has been borrowed from the Sāqī’s intoxicant eyes.]

Iqbal (*Gulshan-i Rāz Jadīd* [*Kulliyāt Fārsī*], p. 565)

| | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| فنا را بادۂ پر جام کردند | چہ بیداردانہ او را عام کردند |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|

[Death has been provided like wine into each glass,

How wantonly it has been served enmasse.]

Tr. by M. Hadi Hussain, *The New Rose-Garden of Mystery* (Lahore : Sh, Muhammad Ashraf, 1969).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., footnote 4 above.

⁶¹ Sa’dī’s lampoon of the Kashmiris and "advice of a husband to his wife to purchase necessary commodities of life from the neighbouring shop-keeper alone". See M. Rafiq Afzal, Ed., op. cit.

صد دفتر نشابد گفت حسب الحال مشتاقی

[The book has become full but the story still remains,
The love enterprise can't be contained in hundreds of such books.]

Iqbal

دریس محفل که کار او گزشت از باده و ساقی
ندیمی کو که در جامش فروریزم باقی⁶²

[The night grows late, the rout is up,
No need for saki now or cup;
Pass me thy goblet, friend of mine,
I'll pour thee the remaining wine.]

Qalandar. Bū 'Alī Sharafuddīn Qalandar Pānīpatī (d. 724/1324), whose surnames have been Bū 'Alī, Sharaf and Qalandar, is the mystic poet with an exciting *mathnavī* and a short *dīvān*. Iqbal has followed Qalandar's *mathnavī* in some parts of his *Asrār-i Khudī*, according to the wishes of his father who was a great admirer of Qalandar. The poet-philosopher was impressed by certain events of Qalandar's life,⁶³ and has thus modelled his view of "Qalandar Dervishes," i.e. all the free mystics; Iqbal is full of praise for them.

Khusrau. Amīr Khusrau Dihlavī (d. 725/1325) is one of the greatest Persian poets and writers of the subcontinent. Iqbal has appreciated and quoted from his *mathnavīs* and lyrics in a few cases⁶⁴ but on the whole Khusrau's impact on Iqbal is not much. The first couplets of a few coincidences are quotable:

Khusrau

⁶² *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 420. Tr. Arberry, *Persian Psalms*, p. 20.

⁶³ See *Asrār-i Khudī* (Tr. R A. Nicholson: *The Secrets of the Self*): V. "Showing that when the Self is strengthened by Love it gains dominion over the outward and inward forces of the Universe".

⁶⁴ *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, Part I, Lyric 16, and *Armughān-i Hijāz (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, subsection: "Ḥuḍūr-i' Ālam-i Insānī".

نازکئی کہ دیدہ ام آن رخ ہمچو لاله را
سوزم و برنیا ورم پیش وی آہ و نالہ را

[What a delicacy have I witnessed in tulip-like face;
I keep on burning, but dare not to raise hue and cry in front of that.]

Iqbal

آی کہ زمین فزودہ ای گرمی آہ و نالہ را
زندہ کن از صدای من خاک ہزار سالہ را⁶⁵

[Thou who didst make more ardent,
My sighing and my tears, o let my anthem quicken Dust of a thousand years]

Khusrāu

خطاب طلعت تو نامہ زمیں کردند فرشتگان ہمہ بر رویت آفرین کردند

[Addressing to your face is the topic of the land,
All the angels have praised your face.]

Iqbal

دم مرا صفت باد فروردین کردند
گیاہ را ز سرشکم چو یاسمین کردند⁶⁶

[Soft my breath doth pass
soft as April airs;
Jasmine-sweet the grass
Springeth from my tears.]

Hāfiẓ. Khwājah Muhammad Shamsuddīn Hāfiẓ Shīrāzī (d. 791/ 1389),
whose sweet lyrics with many-sidedness in meaning have no peer in Persian

⁶⁵ *Zabūr-i 'Ajām (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 399. Tr. Arberry, p. 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 518. Tr. Arberry, p. 114.

poetry, has influenced many later poets including Iqbal. Iqbal admits that sometimes Ḥāfiẓ's soul joins his body.⁶⁷ Besides numerous quotations from Ḥāfiẓ and adaptation of a few of his meanings, Iqbal has modelled some of his lyrics in *Pāym-i Mashriq* and a number of them in *Zabūr-i 'Ajam* in Ḥāfiẓ's popular style, and the critics opine that Iqbal has so successfully followed Ḥāfiẓ that in many cases only the meanings differentiate their styles. Iqbal, after Naẓīrī Nīshāpūrī, is the second most successful poet in Ḥāfiẓ's style—a style which he follows even in his Urdu poetry.⁶⁸ The following are opening lines of a few lyrics in which Iqbal treads on Ḥāfiẓ's path'

Ḥāfiẓ

مقام امن و می بیغش و رفیق شفیق گرت مدام میسر شود، زہی توفیق

[The state of peace, pure wine and a tender-hearted friend—
What a success if you find these for ever]

Iqbal

ز رسم و راه شریعت نکرده ام تحقیق

⁶⁷ Atiya Begum Faizi, Iqbal (Karachi : Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1960), Preface.

⁶⁸ For example:

Ḥāfiẓ

سحر با باد می گفتم حدیث آرزومندی
خطاب آمد که واثق شو بالطف خداوندی

[Early morning I enquired of the wind about the world of eagerness;
It said : "Affirm yourself with God's blessings".]

Iqbal (*Bāl-i-jibrīl* [*Kulliyāt Urdu*], p. 306)

[The endured eagerness is a priceless asset;
I won't leave up servitude status to accept masterly manners.]

جز اینکه منکرِ عشق است کافر و زندق!⁶⁹

[I have never discovered well
Law's way, and the wont thereof,
But know him an infidel
Who denieth the power of Love.]

Hāfiz

خیز و در کاسه زر، آب طربناک انداز
پیشتر زانکه شود کاسه سرخاک، انداز

[Rise up and pour merriful water (wine) is a golden cup;
Before the head's cup (skull) becomes clay, do give a cup.]

Iqbal

ساقیا بر جگرم شعله نمناک انداز
دگر آشوب قیامت بکف خاک انداز⁷⁰

[Saki, on my heart bestow
Liquid flame with flying glow;
Let the resurrection day
Dawn tremendous on my clay.]

⁶⁹ Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Kulliyāt Fārsī), p. 505. Tr. Arberry, p. 103,

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 421. Tr. Arberry, p. 103.

Hāfiz

شراب بیغش و ساقی خوش، در دام ره اند
که زیرکان جهان از کمنده شان نرهند

[The pure wine and the beautiful Saki are such two traps
That the world's wise people don't long to be free of those snares]

Iqbal

غلام زنده دلانم که عاشق سره اند
نه خانقاه نشینان که دل بکس ندهند⁷¹

[I am the slave of each living heart
Whose love is pure, refined,
Not cloistered monks who dwell apart,
Their hearts to none resigned.]

Hāfiz

ای فروغ ماه حسین، از روی رخشان شما
آب روی خوبی از چاه رنخدان شما

[Friend, the radiance of the Beauteous Moon is due to your glow.
The grandeur of Beauty is owing to the dimple in your chin (face).]

Iqbal

چون چراغ لاله سوزم در خیابان شما
ای جوانان عجم، جان من و جان شما⁷²

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 461. Tr. Arberry, p. 60.

⁷² Ibid., p. 517. Tr. Arberry, p. 113.

[Like a tulip's flame I burn
 In your pleasance as I turn;
 By my life, and yours, I swear
 Youth of Persia ever fair!]

Jāmī. ‘Abdul Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492) is the last eminent poet of the ‘Irāqī style and has been so dear to the poets of the later period, and hence Iqbal’s regard for him. Iqbal has quoted from as well as appreciated and also followed him in some Persian and Urdu couplets. The example of Iqbal’s quotations from Jāmī is as follows:

کشتۀ اندازِ ملاّ جامیم نظم و نثر او علاجِ خامیم
 شعر لبِ ریزِ معانی گفته است در ثنای خواجه گوهر سفته است
 ”نسخهٔ کونین را دیباچه است
 جمله عالم بندگان و خواجه اوست“⁷³

[I am lost in admiration of the style of Mullā Jāmī,
 His verse and prose are a remedy for my immaturity.
 He has written poetry overflowing with beautiful ideas,
 And has threaded pearls in praise of the Master.
 "Muḥammad is the preface to the book of the universe:
 All in world are slaves and he is the Master".]

Faghānī. Bābā Faghānī Shīrāz] (d. 925/1519) occupies great importance in Iqbalian studies. Iqbal has been attentive and appreciative of Faghānī’s artistic poetry throughout his literary career, and has responded to a good number of his lyrics. As late ‘Aṭīyyah Begum Faiḍī (d. 1967) tells, Iqbal had duly recommended her the deep study of Faghānī.⁷⁴ Faghānī has been a popular Persian poet for the scholars of the subcontinent and Shibli Nu’mānī (d. 1914) has given his full account in his *Shi’r al-‘Ajām*, Vol III, but Iqbal’s narrative is more attractive.⁷⁵ Tulip (Gul-i Lālah) is the most favourite flower used in the poetry of both and they long that the flower remains

⁷³ *Asrār-i Khudī (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 21. Tr. R. A. Nicholson: *The Secrets of the Self*, pp. 35-36.

⁷⁴ Iqbal’s mention of 1 April 1907.

⁷⁵ Dr Muhammad Riaz, "Faghani’s Influence on Iqbal," *In Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi, October 1968.

grown on their graves.

Faghānī

پنــــوز ســــوز دم از داغ آرزوی تـــــــو دل
گهــــی که لاله دمــــد از سر مزار مــــرا

[Still the heart burns longing for you
Would that sometimes tulip grows on my grave.]

Iqbal

چون بمیرم از غبارِ من چراغِ لاله ساز
تازه کن داغِ مرا، سوزان بصحرای مرا⁷⁶

(Almighty! when I die, develop tulip's lamp from my clay,
Make my "heart-moxa" alive—burn me in that desert.)

Faiḍī. Shaikh Abu'l-Faiḍ Faiḍī Fayyāḍī Akbarābādī (d. 1004/ 1595), the poet-laureate of Akbar the Great's court, is famous for his philosophic ideas and nice phraseology.⁷⁷ Iqbal has used certain phraseology in his couplets; he has quoted, as well as appreciated, him, and also inserted a few of his couplets. There are also a few examples of iqbal's following Faiḍī's lyrics.

'*Urḍī*. Sayyid Jamāluddīn 'Urḍī Shīrāzī (d. 999/1590), the renowned poet of Iṣfahānī or Hindī style, has a vast echo in Iqbal's writings. Iqbal praises 'Urḍī's bold style; he inserts his verses and follows some of his lyrics. An example is as under:

'Urḍī

خیــــز و بجلــــوه آب ده ســــرو چمن طــــراز را

⁷⁶ *Payām-i Masbriq (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 254.

⁷⁷ Dr S. M. Abdullah, "Iqbal's Favourite Persian Poet," in *Baḥth wa Nazar*.

آب و ہوا زیاد کن باغچہ نیاز را

[Rise up, and with your radiance, water up the fair cedar tree;
Make the climate of supplication-orchard favourable,]

Iqbal

خیز و نقاب برکشایا، پرد گیان ساز را
نغمہ تازہ ییاد دہ، مرغ نوا طراز را⁷⁸

[Rise up and unveil the hidden melody,
Teach the melodious bird newer song.]

General Discussion, Iqbal cites from and treads on the poetic path of Muhammad Husain Naẓīrī Nīshāpūrī (d. 1021/1612), Nūruddīn Ẓahūrī Tarshīzī (d. 1025/1616), Kalīm Kāshānī (d. 1061/1651), Sā'ib Tabrīzī (d. 1086/1675), 'Abdul Qādir Bedil (d. 1133/1721), Ghanī Kashmīrī (d. 1077/1666), Maḥmūd Shabistārī (d. 720/1320) and Mīrzā Ghālib Dihlavī (d. 1285/1869). There are instances where he refers to Waḥshī Bafaqī (d. 991/1583), Muḥsin Tāthīr Tabrīzī⁷⁹ (d. 1131/1719) and Ṭāhirah Babīa⁸⁰ (d. 1264/1848), but the following Persian poets mentioned or cited in different writings of Iqbal don't reflect any significant influence on him: Farrukhī Sīstānī (d. 429/1037), Qaṭrān Tabrīzī (d. 465/ 1072), Bābā āhir Hamadānī (d. about 450/1058), Khwājah 'Abdullah Anṣārī (d. 481/1088), Auṣaduddīn Kirmānī (d. 635/ 1237), Auḥadī Marāghī (d. 738/1337), Shaikh Chirāgh

⁷⁸ *Payam-i Mashriq (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 319.

⁷⁹ Preface to the First edition of *Asrār-I Khudī*. Iqbal derives the meanings of *Khudī* (his favourite term) from Muḥsin Tathīr couplet:

| | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| بود محال کشیدن میان آب نفس | غریقِ قلزمِ وحدتِ دم از خودی نزنند |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|

⁸⁰ *Jāvid Nāmāh (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 706-7: "The Sphere of Mercury".

Dihlavī (d. 757/1356), Yaḥyā Shirāzī (d. 782/1380), Kamāl Khujandī (d. 803/1400), Ghazālī Mashhadī (d. 980/1572), Mullā ‘Arshī (d. 989/ 1581), Ṣaḥabī Astarābādī (d. 1010/1601), Anīsī Shāmlu (d. 1014/ 1605), Malik Qummī (d. 1024/1615), Zulālī Khunsarī (d. 1024/ 1615), Mu‘min Akbarābādī (d. 1034/1624), Ṭalīb Āmalī (d. 1036/ 1626), Razī Dānish Mashhadī (d. 1076/1665), ‘Izzat Bukhārī (d. 1089/1678), Faraj Ṭarshīzī (d. after 1085/1674), Fauqī Yazdī, Husain Gīlānī, Rāqīm Mashhadī (all the three of eleventh/ seventeenth century), ughra Mashhadī (d. 1100/1688), Mukhlīṣ Kāshānī (of twelfth/eighteenth century), Rāsikh Sirhandī (d. 1107/1695), Nāṣir ‘Alī Sirhandī (d. 1108/1696), Mukhlis Siālkoti (d. 1165/1751), Ḥazīn Lāhijānī (d. 1181/1767), Jalāl Asīr (d. 1040/ 1630), Mahar Jān-i Jānān (d. 1195/1781), Yaḥyā Kashmīrī (d./ 1181/1706), Azar Beg Iṣfahānī (d. 1195/1781), Nishāt Iṣfahānī (d. 1244/1828) and Qa’ānī Shirāzī (d. 1270/1853). Similar is the case of contemporaries like ‘Azīz Lucknavī (d. 1334/1915) and Garāmī Jullundarī (d. 1346/1927). However, Iqbal’s image of Bedil and Ghālib is worth mentioning.

Iqbal has appreciated Bedil’s symbolic couplets; he has quoted from him and inserted several of his verses. Iqbal’s response to Bedil’s lyrics is also not negligible.⁸¹ Ghālib’s impact on Iqbal’s Persian as well as Urdu poetry is even more intense; poem entitled "Ghālib" in *Bāng-i Darā*, the firmament of Jupiter in *Jāvid Nāmab*, some couplets in *Payām-i Mashriq* and statements in *Stray Reflections* indicate Iqbal’s estimation of Ghālib. Ghālib is, no doubt, one of the greatest thoughtful Persian and Urdu poets of the subcontinent, and Iqbal rightly accepts him as his forerunner and literary model. A few examples of their different coincidences follow:

Ghālib

خودی آدم دارم، آدم زاده ام آشکارا دم ز عصیان می زنم

[Son of Adam, I am habitual as my father was;
I confess my sinfulness evidently.]

Iqbal

⁸¹ Dr Muhammed Riaz, "Bedil in Iqbal's Works," Iqbal Review, July 1971.

لذتِ عصیانِ چشیدنِ کارِ اوست
 غیرِ خودِ چیزِ ندیدنِ کارِ اوست!
 زانکه بی عصیانِ خودی ناید بدست
 تا خودی ناید بدست، آید شکست!⁸²

[Man's concern is to taste the delight of rebellion,
 not to behold anything but himself ;
 For without rebellion the self is unattainable,
 and while the self is not attained, defeat is inevitable.]

Ghālib

سوختِ جگر تا کجا رنجِ چکیدنِ دهم
 رنگِ شوای خونِ گرمِ تابِ پرییدنِ دهم

[The heart has burnt, how long to endure,
 hot blood becomes colour to be poured.]

Iqbal

مثلِ شررِ ذره را تن به تپیدنِ دهم
 تن به تپیدنِ دهم، بالِ پرییدنِ دهم⁸³

[Each atom's body like a spark,
 I set a-quivering,
 Each atom quivers through the dark,
 And soars as on a wing.]

And the following comments by Iqbal on Ghalib make an end to our quotations:

"As far as I can see Mirza Ghalib, the Persian poet, is probably the only permanent contribution that we Indian Muslims have made to the general

⁸² *Jāwīd Nāmāh (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, p. 769.

⁸³ *Zabūr-i 'Ajam (Kulliyāt Fārsī)*, 515. Tr. Arberry, p. 111.

literature. Indeed he is one of those poets whose imagination and intellect place them above the narrow limitations of creed and nationality. . . . Mirza Ghalib (and) Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil . . . taught me how to remain oriental in spirit and expression after having assimilated foreign ideals of poetry. . . .”⁸⁴

Conclusion. Iqbal’s quotations from and appreciation of other Persian poets may not be misunderstood; like his thought his poetic art is almost unprecedented and deserves to be called Iqbal’s own style (*Sabuk-i Iqbāl*).

⁸⁴ Javid Iqbal, Ed., (Iqbal) *Stray Reflections* (Lahore: Sb. Ghulam Ali & Son’, 1961), pp. 51-54

WHAT SHOULD THEN BE DONE, O PEOPLE OF THE EAST?

ENGLISH RENDERING OF IQBAL'S
PAS CHIH BAYAD KARD AY AQWAM-I SHARQ

By **LATE MR B. A. DAR**

This *mathnavi* is addressed to the people of the East. In the first two chapters, Iqbal describes the situation as it has developed in Asian lands under the influence of Western thought and mode of living. Then he clarifies the relation between Church and State on which, Iqbal thinks, revolves the future of the people of the world. The fourth chapter explains the type of man deriving inspiration from the Qur'an and the Prophet's practice ; the fifth deals with people whose outlook is this-worldly and who have no faith in life after death. The sixth to eighth chapters are an elaboration of the theme touched upon in chapter four. The next two chapters describe the type of man who can successfully guide the people and the type of man who is no more than a hypocrite. Chapter nine deals with the manifold values embodied in Islamic *Shari'ah*. Iqbal then discusses the baneful effects of slavery on man. In the next chapter, Iqbal addresses the Arab people who were divided into several Nation-States and advises them to throw off the yoke of the West, The thirteenth chapter deals with the main problem: what should the people of the East do to meet the challenge of the modern secular age?

This is the first English rendering of the *mathnavi*. The translator has provided useful explanatory notes to each chapter which help the reader in understanding Iqbal's message.

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THE EMPIRICAL-DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY OF IBN KHALDUN AND KARL MARX

Fuad Baali and J. Brian Price

Contemporary sociology has tended to think of the empirical method in the tradition of neo-positivists such as George Lundberg as the basis of theory construction within the discipline. Dialectical methodology is often dismissed as a bagary of meta-physical notion, or, in the words of C. Wright Mills, as "either a mess of platitudes, a way of double-talk, a pretentious obscurantism—or all three."⁸⁵ In part, hostility to dialectical sociology results from its being identified with philosophy; with the feeling, for example, that Marx never really freed it from metaphysics. The fact is that the dialectic of Marx can be shown to be an historical generalisation which evolves from empirical observations. This generalisation, embedded as it is in empirical reality, can be abstracted from its context and be posited as a methodology in itself; hence we may speak of an empirical-dialectical methodology.

In order to see how this methodology is developed, it is first necessary to clarify its roots in the history of social thought. In particular we can see its clearest expression in the work of Karl Marx. However, it is possible to go back to the fourteenth century to the great Arab thinker Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406, to find the beginnings of such a methodology.

Social Science and Values

⁸⁵ The Marxists (New York : International Publishers, 1947), p. 130. Although in almost the same breath Mills (p. 129, says that "[Marx's] method is a signal and lasting contribution to the best sociological ways of reflection and inquiry available". It seems that Mills is taking issue with the "laws of dialectics". In this study we simply refer to the dialectic in terms of a principle of contradiction and interconnection. For further explanation of the meaning of dialectic see, or, example, Louis Schneider, "Dialectic in Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXXVI (August 1971).

Following Furfey, we can say that the social scientist may (1) choose values as subject-matter for research; (2) introduce statements of value as postulates into his own social system; (3) assign values to some particular approach to social science.⁸⁶ The first of these—values as subject-matter for research—presents no real problem as it does not necessarily involve the introduction of bias into research. For example, Marx studied the values of capitalistic society, especially in the form of ideology; and Ibn Khaldun studied the values common to the nomadic bedouins and sedentary peoples of Arabia and North Africa. Thus, any introduction of bias is due to the values which they hold themselves, which brings us to the second point of Furfey.

There are reasons which lead one to expect normative elements in Marx's work: "(1) his image of man as an active, goal-directed being, (2) his epistemology and the interplay of theory and praxis, (3) his messianic vision concerning future society, and finally (4) his notion of human self-realization."⁸⁷ Marx was quite explicit in his commitment to humanistic values and to future communist society. This has made it fashionable for the term "Marxist" to denote some preconceived or unscientific assumption on the part of the faithful adherent of "Marxism". On the other hand, a "Marxian" scholar may point to such a theme as class struggle without being labelled as an apocalyptic visionary, i.e. he can still be scientific. Marx's humanism has led at least one writer to dub his work as philosophic sociology, as a "humanistic attempt to bring Hegelian idealism into scientific form."⁸⁸ This is the essence of the Marxian emphasis on *praxis*, adequately summed in the dictum that "the philosophers have only

⁸⁶ Paul H. Furfey, "Sociological Science and the Problem of Values," in Llewellyn Gross, Ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959), p. 509. W.H. Werkmeister also deals with values of the social sciences, values in the social sciences, and values for the social sciences, See his "Theory Construction and the Problem of Objectivity," in *ibid.*, pp. 497-507.

⁸⁷ Joachim Israel, *Alienation from Marx in Modern Sociology* (Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 67.

⁸⁸ Robert Cohen, "Marxism and Scientific Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. IV (March 1951), p. 442.

interpreted the world, the point is, to change it.”⁸⁹ In other words, Marx has rejected the speculative philosophy, but has substituted for it a form of scientific human-ism. Regardless of his philosophical beliefs, Marx was a strong proponent of the scientific derivation of truth. He had such an independent mind that he scorned the professional revolutionary who substituted dogmatic ideology for critical objective analysis, so much that near the end of his life he claimed “all I know is that I am not a Marxist.”⁹⁰ Marx and Engels’ conception of *falsches Bewusstsein* applies equally well to the dogmatic socialist. The Marxian emphasis on practical activity has led Lefebvre to admit that “Marx is not a sociologist, but there is a sociology in Marx”.⁹¹ It is especially evident that Marx became more and more the scientist in his later works such as the *Grundrisse* and *Das Kapital*, although even in his early work he states that “it is hardly necessary to assure the reader conversant with political economy that my results have been attained by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious critical study of political economy.”⁹² In emphasising the scientific quality of Marx’s work we are not alone. Consider, for example, the following views of students of his work:

“ ... It is perfectly legitimate to take Marxism as a sociological theory. ”⁹³

“The point of the Marxist predictive theory is that it claims to have found

⁸⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York :International Publishers, 1947), p. 199.

⁹⁰ Related to Frederick Engels, "Letter to Conrad Schmidt," *Basic Writing on Politics and Philosophy*, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, edited by Lewis S. Feuer (New York: Anchor Book, 1959), p 396.

⁹¹ Henri Lefebvre, *The Sociology of Karl Marx* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 33.

⁹² Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 63.

⁹³ G.A.D. Soares, "Marxism as a General Sociological Orientation," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX (December 1965), p. 366.

similarities in the flux of apparently dissimilar social facts ... operationally close to Popper's own description of natural science procedure. . . ."94

. The general inclination of Marx's work, when it is traced from his earlier . . . clearly away from . a scientific theory of society, in the precise sense of a body of general laws and detailed empirical statements."95

These quotes, which represent only a few of many, attest to the growing awareness of the theoretical and scientific relevance of Marxian thought.

The third point of Furfey—assigning value to some particular approach in social science—appears to be an unavoidable part of any social science. Marx and Engels assigned obvious value to their own empirical-dialectical methodology but were quick to criticise the person, who, like Duhring,

“ ... offers us principles which he declares arc final and ultimate truths, and therefore any views conflicting with these are false from the outset; he is in possession not only of the exclusive truth but also of the sole strictly scientific method of investigation, in contrast with which all others are unscientific.”96

This, of course, is one of the core problems of metasociology, and, more generally, of the sociology of knowledge. Just as there is some problem in determining Marx's status as a scientist or reformer, there is conflict over whether or not Ibn Khaldun can be considered a social scientist. Mahdi interprets Ibn Khaldun as a disciple of the Islamic Platonic tradition of political philosophy:

“Ibn Khaldun seems to be the only great thinker who not only saw the problem of the relation of history and the science of society to traditional political philosophy, but also attempted to develop a science of society within the framework of traditional philosophy and based on its principle s.”97

Essentially Mahdi thought that Ibn Khaldun considered the end of the science of society to provide information to help the

⁹⁴ Cohen, op. cit., p. 454.

⁹⁵ T.B. Bottomore, "Karl Marx : Sociologist or Marxist?" *Science and Society*, Vol. XXX (Winter 1966), p. 15.

⁹⁶ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dubring* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p_ 36.

⁹⁷ Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 286.

beneficent king rule. But Ibn Khaldun was quite conscious of his bread with the past. After explaining his new science of human society he says:

“It should be known that the discussion of this topic is some-thing new, extraordinary, and highly useful. Penetrating research has shown the way to it. It does not belong to rhetoric . . . the subject of which is convincing words by means of which the mass is inclined to accept a particular opinion or not to accept it. It is also not politics, because politics is concerned with the administration of home or city in accordance with ethical and philosophical requirements, for the purpose of directing the mass toward a behavior that will result in the preservation and permanence of the (human) species. The subject here is different from those two disciplines which, however, are often similar to it. In a way, it is entirely original science.”⁹⁸

In addition to this, Walzer has contrasted the political thought of al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldun and concluded that the former followed the Platonic tradition of concern with the perfect or ideal state, while Ibn Khaldun represented the Aristotelian conception of political theory based on empirical reality.⁹⁹ With these points in mind we hold that Mandi’s thesis understates the scientific emphasis of Ibn Khaldun’s thought.

A more difficult criticism to handle is the accusation that Ibn Khaldun let religious values enter into his work. This is articulated by Gibb who claims that Ibn Khaldun believed that “the course of history is what it is because of the infraction of the *sharia* (religious law) by the sin of pride, the sin of luxury, the sin of greed”; and, therefore, Ibn Khaldun’s “pessimism” has “a moral and religious, not a sociological, basis.”¹⁰⁰ However, this does not appear to be a biasing factor in Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah*. Although not denying the

⁹⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd Ed., 1967), I, 77-78.

⁹⁹ Richard Walzer, “Aspects of Islamic Political Thought: Al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldun,” *Orient*, XVI, 40-45,

¹⁰⁰ H.A.R. Gibb, “The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldun’s Political Theory”, in Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk, Eds., *Studies in the Civilization of Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 173-74. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Ali Wardi, “A Sociological Analysis of Ibn Khaldun’s Theory: A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge”—a dissertation, University of Texas, 1950.

influence of the super-natural in worldly affairs, Ibn Khaldun restricted his analysis to the social effects of religion¹⁰¹—he was essentially secular in his science of society, but held religious values. He did not attempt to realise his moral values through the use of science; he rejected, as we have seen, the notion of using science for the realisation of the “good” state.

Karl Marx: Methodology

In rejecting the abstract, speculative method, Marx turned to the materialism of Feuerbach. But at the same time he could not accept that aspect of Feuerbach’s materialism which says human activity is a flood of atomic perceptions: Marx simply wanted to portray man as a product of more earthly economic and social foundations and not as an instrument of pure thought. History is essentially a class struggle based on material interests¹⁰²; Feuerbach’s

¹⁰¹ Ibn Khaldun believes that religion strengthens group solidarity (*‘asabiyyah*). This idea is to a great extent similar to that of Machiavelli’s which “recognized the importance of religion in keeping people united”. Mohamed Abdel Monem Nour, “An Analytical Study of the Sociological Thought of Ibn Khaldun”—a dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1953, pp. 193-94. See also Umar Farrukh, *The Arab Genius in Science and Philosophy* (Washington, D. C.: The American Council of Learned Societies, 1954), p. 139 ; and Heinrich Simon, *Ibn Khaldun Wissenschaft Von der Menschlichen Kultur* (Leipzig : Otto Harrassowitz, 1959), p. 92.

¹⁰² It is important, however, that Marx not be labelled as an economic determinist, and as such, having a closed system of thought. Even when Marx says that social being determines consciousness, social being is not made synonymous with economic existence. See “Preface” to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economics*, in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow : Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), p. 362. In the statements below we can see the sociological element in Marx’s thought:

"By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of co-operation, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and their mode of co-operation is itself a 'productive force' " (*The German Ideology*, p. 18).

We have to juxtapose the opposing ideas of determinism and free will and see them and their dialectical relationship to one another. As Israel states : "Man is certainly a product of social, especially economic, conditions, but it is man himself who creates and changes these conditions. There exists a dialectical interplay, seen in a historical perspective, between man

materialism is “mere perception” and “mere sensation”. For this reason Marx’s work can be called historical empiricism.¹⁰³ “Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production, . . . This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions.”¹⁰⁴

Succinctly stated Marx’s modification is that “Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thought, wants empirical observation, but he does not conceive the sensible world as practical, human sense activity.”¹⁰⁵ Marx’s respect for empiricism is also evident in the questionnaire which he published in the *Revue Socialiste* in which he exhorts workers to reply to the questionnaire “with full know-ledge of the evils they endure”. But his appeal is addressed to “socialists of all schools, who, claiming reform, must also desire *exact* and *positive* knowledge of the conditions in which the working class, the class to which the future belongs, lives and works.”¹⁰⁶ Here we see a curious example of his attempted synthesis of empiricism to a radical critique of society. This empiricism, more specifically, is the methodology of the natural sciences wedded to the dialectical method. In 1885 Engels wrote:

“Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history. But a know-ledge of mathematics and natural science is

as active, self-creating subject, and man as object of the conditions he creates” (op. cit., p. 68).

¹⁰³ O. Loyd Easton, "Alienation and Empiricism in Marx's Thought," *Social Research*, Vol. XXXVII (Autumn 1970), pp. 402-27.

¹⁰⁴ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 13-15.

¹⁰⁵ Karl Marx, *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*. Ed. T.B. Bottomore (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 68.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 203,

essential to a conception of nature which is dialectical and at the same time materialist.”¹⁰⁷

Marx used the dialectic to universalise the class struggle and the progressive transformation of human nature to full individual self-realisation. The class struggle is something which was subject to empirical observation and verification ; the transformation of human nature postulate is more philosophical and speculative in nature. Easton considers Marx’s use of dialectic as an example of rationalism and places it in opposition to his (Marx’s) empiricism, saying that at different times and in different writings Marx would favour one or the other.¹⁰⁸ However, this is subtly mis-leading as empiricism and rationalism are integrally related in the work of Marx. McKinney writes that with rationalism “the criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive. Rationalism assumes the universality of natural laws; hence it appeals to sense perception only in its search for particulars.”¹⁰⁹ Indeed, Engels has defined dialectics as “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of Nature, human society and thought.”¹¹⁰ However, Marx’s use of the dialectic is analogous to rationalism only in that it makes use of rationalistic mental constructs which have been formed after perception of empirical reality. The goal of any science is to find, eventually, that there are general laws in human history, but Engels goes further than Marx in claiming that these are identical to the laws of nature. We have established that Marx’s use of the dialectic was not wholly deductive but is rooted in objective social conditions of man and did not, as with Hegel’s use of it, “descend from heaven to earth”. In other words, empirical methodology alone makes the dialectical framework meaningful. At times there was a noticeable tendency for Marx and Engels to postulate the dialectic almost as a metaphysical principle of contradiction in nature. This was not their intention, however. The element of conflict in the

¹⁰⁷ Engels, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁰⁸ Easton, op. cit , p. 410.

¹⁰⁹ John C. McKinney, "Methodology, Procedures, and Techniques in Sociology," in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, Eds., *Modern Sociological Theory* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1957), p. 190.

¹¹⁰ Engels, op. cit., p. 155.

dialectic is derived from observation of the class struggles: the dialectic did not create the class struggle.¹¹¹

Ibn Khaldun: Methodology

For our purpose here, it is a useful distinction to designate the term “methodology” as a body of philosophical principles underlying research and the term “methods” as more the specific procedures of carrying out the research.¹¹² It is possible to speak both of the methodology and the methods of Ibn Khaldun more so than is the case with Marx. Both of these will be discussed below.

In terms of methodology, there would be little sense in imposing upon the *Muqaddimah* an eighteenth-century philosophical scheme such as empiricism or idealism and discussing it in those terms. But for lack of more adequate terms we can use them for heuristic purposes to see how Ibn Khaldun handled the equivalent trends of his time. In his refutation of philosophy Ibn Khaldun rejects the abstract, speculative philosophy:

“There are (certain) intelligent representatives of the human species who think that the essences and conditions of the whole of existence, both the part of it perceivable by the senses and that beyond sensual perception, as well as the reasons and causes of (those essences and conditions), can be perceived by mental speculation and intellectual reasoning. They also think that the articles of faith are established as correct through (intellectual) speculation and not through tradition, because they belong among the intellectual perceptions. Such people are called ‘philosophers’... Philosophers think that happiness consists in arriving at perception of all existing things, both the *sensibilia* and the (things) beyond sensual perception, with the help of (rational) speculation and argumentation. . . . It should be known that the (opinion) the philosophers hold is wrong in all its aspects the insufficiency lies in the fact that conformity between the results of thinking—which, as they assume, are produced by rational norms and reasoning—and the outside world, is not unequivocal.”¹¹³

¹¹¹ See, for example, Irving M. Zeitlin, *Marxism: A Re-Examination* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 8.

¹¹² Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler 1964), p. 23.

¹¹³ Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., IIf, 246-51.

Ibn Khaldun's empiricism, like that of Marx, is rooted in the concrete social and economic conditions of man.¹¹⁴ The science of society has as its object the study of all human social behaviour.¹¹⁵ The empirical *methods*, or principles of historical criticism, used to determine the record of human society are delineated in Ibn Khaldun's exposition on the sources of error in historical writing. These errors include exaggeration, partisanship towards a creed or opinion, overconfidence in one's sources, the failure to understand what is intended, a mistaken belief in the truth, the inability to rightly place an event in its real context, and the desire to gain favour of those of high rank.¹¹⁶ This is analogous to the critical thinking expressed by Marx. The most important error, however, is

“...ignorance of the laws governing the transformations of human society. For every single thing, whether it be an object or

an action, is subject to a law governing its nature and any changes that may take place in it. If, therefore, the historian understands the nature of events and of changes that occur in the world, and the conditions governing them, such knowledge will help him more than anything else to clarify any record and to distinguish the truth it contains from falsehoods.”¹¹⁷

For this reason, Ibn Khaldun criticised the “tradition-bound” historians who “disregarded the change in the conditions and in the customs of nations and races that the passing time has brought about.”¹¹⁸

Although an analysis of the substantive contributions of Ibn

¹¹⁴ This is indicated, for example, in Ibn Khaldun's statement that "difference of conditions among people are the result of different ways in which they make their living" (ibid., I, 249).

¹¹⁵ Ibid., I, 13-14, 77-78, 79-93. See also Charles Issawi, *An Arab Philosophy of History* (London: John Murry, 1950), pp. 36-37; Nathaniel Schmidt, *Ibn Khaldun: Historian, Sociologist and Philosopher* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 27-33; Howard Becker and H.E. Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (New York: Dover Publication, 1961), I, 271-76; Sati al-Husari, "La Sociologie d'Ibn Khaldun," *Actes du XVE Congress Inter-national de Sociologie* (Istanbul, 1952), pp. 285-91; Abd El Aziz Ezzat, *Ibn Khaldoun Science Sociale* (Cairo: Imp. C. Tsoumas and Co, 1947), pp. 55-63 ; P.A. Sorokin, et al. *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1930), I, 54-55.

¹¹⁶ Issawi, op. cit., pp. 27-29.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

¹¹⁸ Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., I, 9.

Khaldun and Karl Marx to the study of social change is not central to this paper, some discussion is necessary. We are relatively familiar with Marx's dialectical conception of the transformations which take place in human society in different historical epochs. Western scholars are less familiar, however, with the conflict approach to social change of Ibn Khaldun. Essentially, Ibn Khaldun analysed the change in the mode of living from *badawa*, or nomadic desert life, to that of *badara*, or sedentary life. The clash between nomads and sedentary people results in a cyclical rise and fall of dynasties which is also dialectical in that each new stage arises from the conflicting contradictions of the previous stage.¹¹⁹ The change in dynasties is due to a complex dialectical interplay between the economic base of society and such factors as *'asabiyyah*, usually translated as group solidarity.¹²⁰ No strict causal determinism can be found in Ibn

¹¹⁹ Ibid.. pp. 344-55 ; Muhammad Mahmoud Rabie, *The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun* (Leiden, Netherlands : E.J. Brill, 1967), p. 42 ; Mohammed Aziz Al-Hababi, "Isalat al-Manhajyya ind Ibn Khaldun," in *Ibn Khaldoun: Colloque* (Casablanca: Faculte des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Universite Mohammed V, 1962), pp. 11-12. Rabie (op. cit., p. 45) sums these conflicts concisely :

"This theme can be found in the background of many of his arguments. There is first his principal conflict between primitive and civilized ways of living . From it several subordinate conflicts spring. Primitive groups collide till the one which leads the roughest way of life and thereby acquires the strongest feelings of group solidarity, wins and presides over other groups. The next conflict is that taking place between this newly unified tough group and a neighboring established civilized culture, which sooner or later results in a take over by the more vigorous and dynamic group. Personal ambitions and unfamiliar situations facing their newly founded political regime, en-gender a new conflict of power rivalries within the group itself. This unavoidably leads to estrangement between the members of the group and their leader who tries to consolidate and monopolize power in his hands. To strengthen his power against his own kinsmen, he imports mercenaries for military support. The new situation brings another conflict into being, i.e, between the excluded group and the mercenaries. This last conflict proves to be fatal since the old group not only withdraws its support and devotion to the common cause, but it becomes increasingly involved in conspiracies with other forces in order to effect a new change to its own benefit. Economic chaos and troubles aggravate the situation, which offers ample opportunity to another fresh and tough group seeking glory and urban luxury. With the downfall of the state and its conflicting factions, a new regime establishes itself in power, and the cycle goes on."

¹²⁰ On another level of analysis the relationship of ideational, political, religious, and economic variables to each other in the process of change in a theoretical problem in itself.

Khaldun's study of *'asabiyyah* (group solidarity) in the *badalt'a* (nomadic life) and *hadara* (sedentary life). In the transition from *badawa* to *hadara* causes become effects and effects become causes.¹²¹ In Marxian theory, this is formulated as the difference in the material base of society and its superstructure. Suffice to say that for Ibn Khaldun there are two basic conditions underlying the dialectical basis of change:

(1) There should be a sort of polarisation in the value systems of the two cultures between which the dialectical interaction takes place. Each culture should possess certain characteristics that the other normally lacks. Thus, a cyclical movement may arise as a result of the desire of each culture to seek in the other what it lacks in itself.

(2) There should also be a polarisation, within each culture, between what it possesses and what it lacks...¹²²

Conclusion: Convergence in Methodology

Thus, Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx converged in their scientific methodology, which can simply be called empirical-dialectical. This methodology is abstracted from their analysis of the material, or empirical, base of society and the interaction between this base and non-economic factors such as *'asabiyyah* (group solidarity), which, in turn, is wedded to a conception of change and contradiction in society. Sociology has in the last decade¹²³ emphasised again the importance of social change and conflict in society. However, empiricism alone has not provided us with a methodology which can adequately be used to study the flux of society. Speaking of the consequences of employing the dialectical reasoning, Tucker writes:

“Many of our theoretical problems could be solved if this method were used. The first problem is attributing universal ‘cause and effect determinism’ to social behavior. If one takes the dialectic seriously, this *type* of determination is seen as impossible. One becomes concerned with a process of relationships. A concern with how *relationships* affect other *relationships* eliminates the interest

¹²¹ Rabie, op. cit., pp. 54-55 ; Mandi, op. cit., p. 268.

¹²² Wardi, op. cit., pp. 459-560.

¹²³ This paper was written in 1972-Ed.]

regarding which is the 'cause' and which is the 'effect'."¹²⁴

This methodology in particular avoids the dilemma of functionalism by emphasising more historical, or changing, variations in society. Unlike dialectical sociology, functionalism sees society as the independent variable, or objective reality, with emphasis on social institutions and social structures as components of society. In this sense functionalism is a reified methodology.¹²⁵ Karl Marx and Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, proceed from a dialectical synthesis of sociological and psychological assumptions and are non-reified in their approach, yet still avoid any psychologistic or reductionist tendencies. From this perspective, functional and dialectical sociology are not mutually exclusive approaches to the study of social phenomena, but differ as to the level of critique of which they operate.

Karl Marx and Ibn Khaldun used an empirical-dialectical methodology with great success in the historical epochs in which they lived. Modern social science can benefit immensely by refining this methodology to the point where it could lead to the development of a social theory more isomorphic to changing societies.

¹²⁴ Charles W. Tucker, "Marx and Sociology: Some Theoretical Implications," *Pacific Sociological Review*, Vol. XII (Fall 1969), p. 90.

¹²⁵ See Israel, op. cit., p. 328 ; Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," *History and Theory*, Vol. IV (1965), p. 196.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC

H. Z. Arif

Hegel's philosophy inevitably inspires mixed reactions; even his worst adversaries cannot help honouring and admiring him, "for having willed something great, and having failed to accomplish it" (Kierkegaard); while, on the other hand, even the most ardent of Hegelians are forced to voice their perplexity at, and reservations on to, some of his extravagant leaps. Yet the aspect of Hegelian philosophy which, if it sometimes intrigues and charms us, at others, it vexes us, is precisely that it breaks loose from the straitjacket which our ordinary logical thought has imposed upon itself, and to which previous philosophical thought had been kowtowing, and legitimises, on the one hand, precisely these leaps of thought and on the other hand invests us with the hope that great things cannot only be willed but also accomplished. This Hegel achieves by the most thoroughgoing criticism of the ordinary notions and categories of thought: notions such as substance and properties, quality, quantity and relation, space and time. self, causation and the rest. The notion of the dialectic rises as the "phoenix" out of the ashes of the ordinary categories and the traditional philosophy which uncritically operates with the ordinary concepts. In both its extent and intensity the criticism of ordinary thought which Hegel proffers has no parallel in the history of philosophic thought. A failure to appreciate that this criticism forms the backdrop against which Hegel makes his dialectical moves has been the source of much perplexity for interpreters of the dialectical movement of thought proffered by Hegel. One may plausibly claim that this criticism is definitive of the nature of Hegel's dialectic.

In its extent, Hegel's criticism applies to each and every ordinary category of thought. Before Hegel many a philosopher had noticed and argued the inadequacy of our ordinary notions. But this criticism was limited to certain categories only. Hegel's position that all ordinary notions that we

come across in our ordinary sciences involve us in contradictions is clearly brought out in his discussion of Kantian Antinomies:

"In the first place, I remark that Kant wanted to give his four cosmological antinomies a show of completeness by the principle of classification which he took from his scheme of categories. But profounder insight into the antinomial, or more truly into the dialectical nature of reason demonstrates any Notion whatever to be a unity of opposed moments to which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions could be given. Becoming, determinate being, etc., and any other Notion, could thus provide its particular antinomy, and thus as many antinomies could be constructed as there are Notions. Ancient scepticism did not spare itself the pains of demonstrating this contradiction or antimony in every notion which confronted it in the sciences."¹²⁶

While Kant failed to see that all the ordinary categories of thought involve contradiction or "pass over into its opposite," however, with respect to the nature and necessity of contradiction Kant was right. Kant had shown that our notions of time, space, matter and causal dependence are such that reason must *necessarily* come up against contradiction. And this, Hegel thinks, is an important view.¹²⁷ Before we discuss why this is important, it should be of some value to discuss some of the manifestations in ordinary thought wherein it holds on to the truth of assertions which are contradictory. One such example is the assumed absolute separation of being and not-being, and yet along with this the ordinary thought also assumes such notions as coming-into-being and passing-away, which notions imply relatedness of being and not-being. As Hegel puts it:

"Ordinary reflective thought which accepts as perfect truth that being and nothing only are in separation from each other, yet on the other hand acknowledge beginning and ceasing to be equally genuine determinations but in these it assumes in fact the unseparatedness of being and nothing."¹²⁸

While ordinary thought, unaware of the contradiction, holds on to both the notions of "separatedness" and "unseparatedness" of "being" and "non-being," understanding makes a fool of itself. Concerned with "consistency," and "making identity its law," formal thinking¹²⁹ considers that contradictions are unthinkable. To it "being" and "not-being" are entirely

¹²⁶ W.11. Johnstone, Tr., *Hegel's Science of Logic* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1912), p. 191 ; see also *Hegel's Lesser Logic* (Humanities Press, 1974), p. 99.

¹²⁷ Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p. 197.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 104.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 835.

exclusive.

But finding in actual fact, things coming into being and passing away, it tries various manoeuvres. It sometimes tries to maintain that the contradiction is the result of unsophisticated vulgar thought, and that the truly scientific thought shall not impale itself into contradiction. At others it tries to separate the contradictories into "space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and reciprocal contact".¹³⁰ At still others, it lends itself into kinds of reasoning which are mere

sophisms. Thus we hear arguments of the following sort;

"It is impossible for anything to begin, either in so far as it Is, or in so far as it is not; for in so far as it is, it is not just be-ginning, and in so far as it is not, then it also does not begin. If the world, or anything, is supposed to have begun, then it must have begun in nothing, but in nothing—or nothing—is no beginning; or a beginning includes within itself a being, but nothing does not contain any being. Nothing is only nothing. In a ground, a cause, and so on, if nothing is so determined, there is contained an affirmation, a being. For the same reason, too, something cannot cease to be; for then being would have to contain nothing, but being is only being, not the contrary of its elf."¹³¹

This entire argument and similar pre-Kantian scholastic sophisms hang upon the dogmatic presupposition of the truth of the separation of being and not-being, as well as an unsubstantiated denial of coming-into-being and ceasing to be.

"With the absolute separatedness of being from nothing pre-supposed, then of course—as we so often hear—beginning or becoming is something incomprehensible; for a presupposition is made which annuls the beginning or the becoming which yet again is admitted, and this contradiction thus posed and at the same time made impossible of solution, is called incomprehensible."¹³²

Understanding, which thus operates with the law of identity, has a distaste for anything loose and untidy and sets about a clear definition of concepts, in a manner where each concept simply entails itself and is clearly distinguished from the other. In its zeal for clarity and avoidance of confusion it defines its concepts and gives them neat and clean boundaries.

"In the study of nature, for example, we distinguish matter, forces, general and the like, and stereotype each in its isolation. Thought is here acting in its analytic capacity, where its canon is identity, a simple reference of each

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. -6

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 104.

¹³² Ibid.,

attribute to itself."¹³³

While Hegel assigns provisional merit to the successes achieved by Understanding, in a manner which Marx was later to employ in the tongue in cheek complements he gives to Capital- "ism in his Communist Manifesto, he soon turns to demonstrate the quagmires it lands itself into. Just as Marx's acclamation of Capitalism is the best known testimonial to that mode of production, so too Hegel excels all known approbations of Under-standing as a mode of thought. He maintains:

". Understanding is visible in every department of the objective world; and no object in that world can ever be wholly perfect which does not give full satisfaction to the canons of Understanding."¹³⁴

While this may be so, Hegel moves on to maintain that in attempting to erect facile boundaries of concepts, which have the semblance of a no-trouble clear coast. understanding abstracts from the particularity and diversity of ordinary thought, and invests its subject-matter with the "form of Universality". Each science carves out one aspect of reality for itself, and treats of it in its abstracted isolation: its *sine qua non* is that it treats of its subject-matter "given everything else is equal". It comes to have concepts which are fixed, distinct from one another, abstract as opposed to concrete, opposed to one another, universal as opposed to particular. But these convenient and comfortable dichotomies and classi-fications, all their advantages notwithstanding, soon appear to burst at the seams. We can thus have too much of a good thing. In law and morality there are endless examples of this. Thus *summum jus summa injuria*, which means to drive an abstract right to its extremities is to do wrong¹³⁵ It is as if these concepts, each one of which represented a *cul-de-sac*, while it worked very well so far as it went, becomes in certain circumstances a hindrance, a stumbling block which needs to be jumped over, yet understanding clinging to its law of identity, committed to its errand of guarding the boundaries of concepts would not budge.

The dialectician of a particular brand, practising the negative art has in this circumstance hi s heyday. He shows that each and if every finite concept of understanding leads to antinomy, that it passes over into its opposite ; and he too, clinging to the law of identity, fails to comprehend this passing

¹³³ *Lasser Logic*, op.cit., p. 114.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

over into the other, and therefore declares them unintelligible. This dialectic, according to Hegel, is external¹³⁶ and contingent,¹³⁷ is practised as an adventitious art¹³⁸ as though it rested on a subjective talent.¹³⁹ This is the dialectic of understanding¹⁴⁰ in which the result is a negation. It leads to sophisms, which is "an argument proceeding from a baseless presupposition which is unthinkingly and uncritically adopted".¹⁴¹ According to Hegel, this dialectic proceeds in the following form:

"It is shown that there belongs to some subject-matter or other, for example, the world, motion point, and so on some determination or other, for example, (taking the objects in the order named), finitude in space or time, presence in this place, absolute negation of space ; but, further, that with equal necessity the opposite determination also belongs to the subject-matter, for example, infinity in space and time, non-presence in this place, relation to space and so spatiality. . . . Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the *contradiction* and nullity of the assertions made. But this conclusion can be drawn in either of two senses—either in the objective sense, that *subject-matter* which in such a manner contradicts itself cancels itself out and is null and void . . . ; or in the subjective sense, that cognition is defective."¹⁴²

When confronted with these results arising out of the fixed, distinct and determinate categories of understanding, philosophers set about to disentangle themselves in either of the two ways.

Firstly, they may totally deny understanding and point out that categories set up by the understanding are "limited vehicles of thought, forms of the conditioned, of the dependant and the derivative."¹⁴³ Instead they may wish to stick to the ordinary thought and the immediacy of empirical assertions. Thus Diogenese, when a dialectician pointed out that motion was impossible or involved contradiction, silently walked up and down in answer. But as Hegel points out "such assertion and refutation is certainly easier to make than to engage in thinking and to hold fast and resolve by thought alone the complexities originating in thought. . . ."¹⁴⁴ The trick here consists in setting up the immediacy of ordinary sensuous consciousness against the mediacy,

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 116

¹³⁷ 12. Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p 831.

¹³⁸ *Lesser Logic*, op. cit., p. 116.

¹³⁹ Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., is, 831.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 105; see also *Lesser Logic*, p. 117.

¹⁴² Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., is, 831.

¹⁴³ *Lesser Logic*. pp. 95-863.

¹⁴⁴ Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p. 198; see also p .832.

derivativeness, etc., of Understanding ; the concreteness of sensation as against abstractness of Understanding. But Hegel would not be a party to such criticisms of understanding, and points out that the dialectic of the understanding, at least, has the merit that it is self-consistent.¹⁴⁵ This appeal to immediacy is also, Hegel points out, characteristic of the proponents of Immediate or Intuitive knowledge.¹⁴⁶ In this appeal to immediate knowledge, Hegel argues, all the determinations and distinctions between Idea and Being, and all its other categories are rejected as finite in their import. But, Hegel argues that while philosophers should indeed welcome such an endeavour to prove unity of thought and being, subjectivity and objectivity, the asseverations of immediate knowledge (and Jacobi) need to be wholeheartedly rejected. It itself fixes a total separation of immediate and mediate knowledge, which Hegel, in the chapter on "Doctrine of Essential Being" in the *Science of Logic*, shows - are intrinsically united. There is, according to Hegel, no such thing as purely immediate knowledge; moreover, immediate knowledge, to the exclusion of mediate knowledge, can only tell us that God is but not what he is; it holds the fact of immediacy of consciousness to be the criterion of truth and thereby allows all forms of superstition and idolatry to pass for truth. What is required, Hegel argues, is not to set up immediacy of knowledge against the mediacy of understanding, in order to negate the latter, but that we must:

reject the opposition between an independent immediacy in the contents or facts of consciousness and an equally independent mediation, supposed incompatible with the former."¹⁴⁷

A second move, in the face of the incomprehensibility of the determinateness and the consequent negation of its fixed scheme of categories and concepts, is made by the understanding itself. Herein understanding itself rejects the finiteness of its own concepts, all the determinations of being and non-being, quality and quantity, essence and existence are negated to arrive at an indeterminate Infinite. But Hegel retorts: This Infinite as thus posited over against the finite, in a relation wherein they are qualitatively distinct from each other, is to be called the spurious Infinite; the Infinite of the understanding for which it has the value of the highest, the Absolute Truth. The understanding is absolutely satisfied that it has truly reconciled these two, but the truth is that it is entangled in unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contradiction.¹⁴⁸ The Infinite which is posited by the understanding is set above or beyond the finite, it is the mere negation of the finite, is separated from it, and thus the finite and Infinite both retain their places and limit each other. Understanding even here clings

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 104.

¹⁴⁶ *Lesser Logic*, pp. 95-112.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁴⁸ Johnston, Tr., op.cit., p. 139.

to its law of identity and defines each, the Infinite and the finite, as the "unity of itself," and therefore distinct from an Other, the "finite" which is identical with itself, but distinct from the "Infinite". This, moreover, according to Hegel, leads to an infinite regress, because out of each separatedness a new limit arises, which needs to be transcended.¹⁴⁹ As well Hegel argues that this supposed separatedness of finite and in-finite once again generates the process of reasoning that we have seen in the negative dialectic, which asks questions like: "how does the infinite become finite?" With the supposed separatedness of the two, no comprehensible answer or solution can be forthcoming. In a similar vein Hegel criticises the understanding's notion of God who is free of all determinations, an absolutely indeterminate nothing, who is separated from and exists over against the determinate finite world. The understanding's continued operation of fixed determinate concepts is the cause and ground of dualistic metaphysics.

Hegel's conclusion is, therefore, that understanding which operates with the law of identity is totally inept to get beyond its determinate concepts, and yet such going beyond is necessitated by the fact that by themselves these concepts and categories lead into incomprehensibility. Scepticism is the understanding's ultimate result. "Scepticism, made a negative science and systematically applied to all forms of knowledge, might seem a suitable introduction, as pointing out the nullity of such assumptions."¹⁵⁰ From this it does not follow (as was already mentioned) that we should reject the determinateness, the universality, of the understanding and turn instead to the immediacy, undeterminateness, and particularity and concreteness of immediate knowledge. The major task of philosophy, for Hegel, is that of overcoming opposition, not only between the various categories of understanding, but also the opposition between understanding and immediate knowledge. Understanding itself is totally inept to achieve such a task, and philosophies which hold on to understanding with its law of identity are bound to fall over their own feet. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel writes: "Once dialectic had been divorced from demonstration, the conception of philosophical demonstration was in fact lost."¹⁵¹ A return to

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁵⁰ *Lesser Logic*, p. 111.

¹⁵¹ J.B. Baillie, Tr., *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: G. Allen & Unwin/Macmillan Co., New York, 1931), 2nd Ed., p. 53.

dialectic as a positive science gives philosophy a mode of philosophical demonstration which has nothing to fear from scepticism, for it "includes it as a subordinate function of its own".¹⁵²

The examination of the understanding thus necessitates that all oppositions need to be overcome, but this is not to be done in a way in which any one of the sides of the opposition is rejected in favour of the other. We cannot merely undo all oppositions and return to a primitive indeterminate unity. In the dialectical mode of thought these are sublated. Sublation is the core notion that needs to be understood for an appropriate understanding of the unique element in Hegel's thought that distinguishes it from all previous philosophical modes of argumentation, despite the fact that Hegel insists that this is one of the most important notions, of philosophy and occurs throughout philosophy. He finds its traces particularly amongst the ancients, who, unlike the moderns had not completely divested their abstract universal concepts from the concrete plurality of the empirical world.¹⁵³ Sublation, according to Hegel, has a two-fold meaning:

"On the one hand, it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to... Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved."¹⁵⁴

The opposed and determinate categories exclude each other; in the resultant third category, wherein they are sublated they are not annihilated but receive an equilibrium. The resultant category has in itself the determinations of the categories from which it originates. It has their opposition and contradiction within itself.

The dialectic which consists of the movement of reason in which seemingly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously, a movement in which disparate presuppositions sublate themselves, is itself viewed by Hegel as not opposed to understanding and sensuous consciousness, but as their sublation, which retains the immediacy, concreteness and particularity of the latter, and the mediateness, universality, determinateness and abstractedness of the former.

The essentialities of the determinate categories of understanding are its laws of identity, difference and excluded middle. In this sublation of

¹⁵² *Lesser Logic*, p. 119.

¹⁵³ *Goddamer*, p. 9.

¹⁵⁴ *Johnstone*, Tr., op, cit., p. 107.

understanding these essentialities are also sublated. The law of identity is expressed in the form of the tautology $A=A$; the law of contradiction in the form $\neg(A \cdot \neg A)$ " and their absolute separation is asserted by the law of excluded middle " $(A \vee \neg A)$ ". Hegel's contention that the sublated category holds the opposed categories together has been the source of much criticism, and has resulted in the charge that he transgresses the law of identity. But such a criticism, Hegel believes, betrays one of the fundamental prejudices of logic and of ordinary thinking, which it is itself forced to qualify. First of all it is shown in its own admission that the law of identity asserts nothing, it has no content and is a tautology¹⁵⁵; moreover, it is admitted that it expresses onesided determinateness, that it contains only a formal truth, which is abstract and incomplete; finally, that in experience, in its concrete application the law of identity has its relevance only in its connection of the simple identical with a manifold that is different from it.¹⁵⁶ Difference expresses itself in diversity and opposition, but is in both cases already a contradiction. Hegel argues that even a little reflection would show that if something has been defined as positive and one moves from this basis then straightaway the positive has secretly turned into a negative, and, conversely, the negative determined into a positive, and then reflective thinking gets confused and contradicts itself in these determinations.¹⁵⁷ All the innumerable instances of the employment of the negative external dialectic of the sceptic wherein he demonstrates with respect to specific categories as to how these self-identical categories lead into their opposite may be viewed as diverse manifestations of the fundamental insight that the law of identity leads into the law of contradiction. Yet understanding considers contradiction to be a subjective error, thinks that only the identity is objective, while contradiction is subjective. But Hegel argues that "truth consists only in their relation to one another".¹⁵⁸ We need to enunciate it as a law that everything is inherently contradictory, which is the sublation of the law of identity and opposition. Now when an ancient dialectician argues that there is contradiction in motion we can grant him this, but it does not follow that motion is impossible; on the contrary, we should maintain that motion

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 413.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 414-15.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 436.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 438.

is existent contradiction itself.¹⁵⁹ And not only with respect to motion, but we can retort him with respect to all the categories wherein he points out there is contradiction by pointing out that these are existent contradictions. "Contradiction is ... immediately represented in the determinations of relationship."¹⁶⁰ The sublation of identity and opposition into contradiction "shows" and "shines" through all the determinations of categories as self-identical and different from others, and it is only the understanding which sharpens "the blunt difference of diverse terms, the mere manifoldness of pictorial thinking, into essential difference, into opposition".¹⁶¹

The recognition that all the determinate categories of understanding together with the opposition between the law of identity and contradiction itself, which are the basis of the opposition between the various determinate categories, pass into each other, and are all sublated, is the fundamental insight of Hegel's philosophy. Ultimately this recognition is the task of philosophy, which apprehends the Absolute Idea that shines through all the determinate categories, and is the final and full sublation of all the determinations of logical thought, and contains all the determinations and oppositions within itself. It has shown itself not only through all the determinations, but 'through each one of them. This "Absolute Idea alone," for Hegel, "is *being*, imperishable *life*, self-knowing truth, and is *all truth*". All else, Hegel tells us, is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour, caprice and transitoriness. The Absolute Idea, which contains within itself the richness of all the determinations of manifold categories, their oppositions, as also the immediacy of sensuous consciousness and the mediacy of understanding is the most staggering Idea. It needs to be clearly distinguished from the Being of the Eleatics which is pure Being and as such is opposed to nothing; furthermore, the latter is indeterminate and contains no determinations is self. Hegel's absolute Idea which has a rich content, which contains all the oppositions and at the same time their resolution, cannot be confused with this impoverished, indeterminate being which stands opposed to nothing. Nor should it be confused with the God of rational theology, which conceived of God as a purely indeterminate Being. Even when attributes were assigned to God these were exalted into infinity, such as omnipotence,

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 440

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 441

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 4442

omnipresence, etc., thus forming them into indeterminateness.¹⁶² As Hegel argues:

"Instead of being rich and full above all measure, it is so narrowly conceived that it is on the contrary extremely poor and altogether empty. . . . When the notion of God is apprehended only as that of the abstract or most real being, God is, as it were, relegated to another world beyond: and to speak of a knowledge of him would be meaningless. Where there is no definite quality, knowledge is impossible. Mere light is mere darkness."¹⁶³

Here It would be worthwhile to say a word about the relationship between the Absolute Idea and the Geist or the Spirit. A number of interpreters and commentators of Hegel seem to have misunderstood the essential unity of the Absolute Idea and the Spirit. At the end of his monumental *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel argued: "The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as Absolute Mind."¹⁶⁴ And yet, as Goddamer argued, "amongst others Dilthey and Trendelenburg find fault with Hegel and attribute to him the view that he tried to deduce the system of logical relationships contained in the entirety of the world and yet without a conscious soul observing this movement, i.e. without a foundation such as Fichte had in the conscious self-intuition of Ego."¹⁶⁵

In the *Phenomenology*, however, Hegel endeavoured to show how the opposition between Man and Nature, Man's rational will and his desires, inclinations, etc., Man's self-consciousness and the consciousness he has as a member of his community, how the opposition between finite spirit and infinite spirit, in short between the autonomous subject and fate is resolved in the *Geist*. It is this conclusion, according to Hegel, that is presupposed in the *Science of Logic* wherein he sets about to discuss only the pure determinations of Notions. As such the notions here employed are already seen as straddling the opposition between subject and object. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel had argued that the Absolute Spirit is the free subject which out of its own rational necessity, to be aware of itself, posits embodied finite spirits, and the plurality of the kinds of living things, as well as inanimate nature. In the *Science of Logic*, where this movement is

¹⁶² Lesser Logic, p. 57.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 58,

¹⁶⁴ Baillie, Tr., op. cit., p. 316,

¹⁶⁵ Goddamer, p. 10.

presupposed, Hegel's problem is specifically to demonstrate that if the world is posited out of rational necessity by the self-knowing spirit, then this rational necessity must be evident in the movement of pure thought and the logical Idea.

We must also clearly understand the relationship of the Absolute Idea with the Notion and the Dialectical Method. A failure to see the essential unity of these led Findlay to say that the "Dialectic is not, however, for Hegel the end of philosophising: it is only a 'moment,' an aspect of philosophical thinking. If it overcomes the hard-and-fast notions and fixed presuppositions of the understanding, it must itself be overcome in the higher thought of Reason, or, as Hegel also calls it, speculative thought."¹⁶⁶ This, however, is far from correct. Though Hegel at times speaks in a manner that would give some credence to the view that the Absolute Idea, the Notion and the Method stand in an order of hierarchical ascendancy, a closer scrutiny, however, shows that these are all various aspects of the Absolute Idea. Thus, though Hegel says that the "logical aspect of the Idea may also be called a mode of it,"¹⁶⁷ yet when he turns to the issue again, he says that the Absolute Idea has for its content the form which is the Notion and that, therefore, to understand the Absolute Idea we need only concentrate on the universal aspect of its form, the method. As he puts it:

More exactly, the Absolute Idea itself has... merely this, that the form determination is its own completed totality, the pure Notion. . . . Therefore, what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form —that is, the method."¹⁶⁸

It would indeed be alien to Hegel's system if, within the Absolute Idea, a distinction remained to be made between its content, the determinations contained in the Idea, and its form its logical aspect, the Notion or the concept which shows itself to be Dialectical. In the Absolute Idea there is an essential fusion of the form and content, so that the Dialectic, far from falling short of knowing the Absolute Idea, is in fact viewed as knowing itself, reflecting upon itself.

".. also that merely was it impossible for a given object to be the foundation to

¹⁶⁶ J,N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination (Humanities Press, 1464),

p.66.

¹⁶⁷ Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p. 825.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

which the absolute form stood in a merely external and contingent relationship but that, on the contrary, the absolute form has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and ultimate truth. From this course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion that has itself, as the absolute, both as the subjective and the objective, for its subject-matter, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as the concrete existence that is Notion itself."¹⁶⁹

The "pure correspondence" of form and content, of the Notion which is the pure logical form, and the Absolute Idea with its rich content of all the determinations, is a cardinal principle in Hegel's philosophy, on which rests the guarantee that the formal self-explication of Notion in the dialectical process would also unfold the rich content and all the determinations of the absolute. While, on the one hand, the Notion stands in a pure correspondence with the Absolute Idea, the method and the Notion too stand in pure correspondence. In ordinary cognition, the method is treated as the instrument through which a subject becomes aware of the object. But this is not true of the Dialectic as a method:

"In the cognition of enquiry, the method likewise occupies the position of an instrument, of a means standing on the subjective side by which this side relates itself to the object. . . . In the true cognition on the contrary, the method is not merely an aggregate of certain determinations but the Notion that is determined in and for itself."¹⁷⁰

Or again:

"The method is this knowing itself, for which the notion is not merely the subject-matter, but knowings own subjective act, the instrument and means of the cognising activity, distinguished from that activity, but only as that activity's own essentiality."¹⁷¹

The fusion, therefore, of the Absolute Spirit, the Absolute Idea, or Notion, of the Dialectic, and Philosophy at the apex of Hegel's system is its cardinal principle. Though it may be most difficult to comprehend, yet if Hegel's view that determinations of all kinds have shown themselves to be incomprehensible is allowed, one cannot see any other alternative to extreme scepticism. This is exactly how Hegel viewed his system. The threat of the sceptic is the backdrop against which Hegel recommends his own staggering system. In his hands the sceptic has an advocate of unsurpassable

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 826.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 827.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

genius ; scepticism is a monster which in his hands has been strengthened beyond all control, yet in his system it is thoroughly domesticated:

"Even to this day scepticism is often spoken of as the irresistible enemy of all positive knowledge, and hence of philosophy, in so far as philosophy is concerned with positive knowledge... It is only the finite thought of Understanding which has to fear scepticism, because it is unable to withstand it. Philosophy includes the sceptical principle as a subordinate function of its own."¹⁷²

In view of the pure correspondence brought out, there is nothing which is not everything else. Thus when the Method reflecting on the Notion, that is upon itself, exposes itself in various logical forms, it is at the same time manifesting the determinations, the rich content of the Absolute Idea, and it is also nothing but Absolute Spirit positing itself in its concrete embodiment. Similarly, when the Absolute Spirit in its freedom and necessity expresses itself in finite spirits and the variety and diversity of nature, this positing shows itself to be dialectical. It is only in this background that we can understand Hegel's various pronouncements that the Dialectic is the movement of the Notion itself; that it is an activity. It is his fusion of the logical with the ontological, the metaphysical, and the spiritual, that distinguishes Hegel's logic from the formal logic as traditionally conceived, or even from the transcendental logic of Kant. The dialectic is conceived of as a logical movement of Notion which is the result of or, more correctly, itself a movement of the Absolute Spirit becoming aware of itself in its various" determinations.

"Accordingly what is to be considered here as a method is only the movement of the Notion itself. . . . Notion is everything and its movement is the universal absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realising movement. It is therefore soul and substance, and anything whatever is comprehended and known in its truth only when it is completely subjugated to the method; it is the method proper to every subject-matter because its activity is the Notion. . . . It is therefore not only the highest force, or rather the sole and absolute force of reason, but also its supreme and sole urge to find and cognise itself by means of itself in everything."

When we consider that the method is considered by Hegel that "highest," the sole and absolute force, when we consider that "everything is

¹⁷² *Lesser Logic*, p. 119.

completely subjugated to it," and other such remarks, it becomes evident that Findlay is clearly wrong in thinking that the Dialectic method is not the end of philosophising. Similarly, when we consider that the method is activity, it is the substantiality of things, it is the sole urge of consciousness not only to cognise but also find itself, it becomes clear that criticisms of Dilthey and Trendelenburg are off the mark.

Thus confident that the method is everything, we may turn to enquire into the nature and significance of the determinations in which the Dialectic unfolds itself. Both through the *Science of Logic* and also through the *Lesser Logic*, Hegel gives an exposition of an ascending dialectic which, starting from the simplest, indeterminate immediate pure Being terminates in the Absolute Idea. Towards the end of both works, however, where Hegel takes up the problem of explication of the method, he gives us a view of a circular movement of method wherein the beginning and the end fuse together. In consequence it implies that the problem of an appropriate beginning which has so much vexed philosophers is also superfluous.¹⁷³ Basically, Hegel's attitude appears to be that one can start anywhere. One can start with any category by which we designate a pervasive aspect of reality—"being," "essence," "universality," etc. For him it is sufficient for the beginning that it is immediate and that it is simple universality.

Hegel's reasons for starting with an immediate Universality appear to be several. First of all he wishes to show that the dialectical movement of concepts is necessary, Hegel himself would probably have no aversion to starting with concepts such as "becoming," "determinate being," etc., but then it may be argued that these have a determinate-ness of content as also of form, and hence necessarily lead over into their others.

Moreover, it may be argued that if these categories show themselves to be leading to contradiction, these may be replaced by other categories. We, therefore, start with a category which seems to be indispensable, and yet at the same time shows itself to be incoherent. It is for this reason that Hegel himself starts with "Being" the emptiest of all concepts, which has no determinateness of content, and which is immediate, and allows that one may start with any concept which is universal and immediate. If Hegel can show that even these categories necessarily involve a contradiction and necessarily lead to the deduction of a new category, then this new category

¹⁷³ 48, Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p. 841.

will retain this aspect, since it is introduced as the only way to resolve the certain contradiction.¹⁷⁴

Moreover, such immediate universals, apart from having no determinateness of content, show themselves to be the necessary beginning of both sensuous consciousness and the understanding. As Hegel argues: "When it means immediate being, the beginning is taken from sensation and perception. . . when it means univereality it is the beginning of the scientific method."¹⁷⁵

As immediacy and simple Universality are the two necessary and sufficient conditions for any beginning, though Hegel has shown the operation of the method with respect to such beginnings as "Being," "Essence," and how these necessarily lead to the deduction of other determinateness, yet in the last chapter, he demonstrates the operation of the method with respect to simple universality which we already know from his discussion of the Notion is nothing but the pure simple Notion.

Universality is pure simple Notion, and the Notion is pure universality. The immediate of the beginning, however, is itself deficient, and is endowed with an urge to carry itself further. The method, "as consciousness of the notion, knows that Universality is only a moment and that in it the Notion is not yet determined in and for itself".¹⁷⁶ The absolute method finds and cognises the determinations of the universal within the latter itself, and posits it as an other. Now

"a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the Universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, is the first negative."¹⁷⁷

This negative, however, is not to be considered as merely an other of the first immediate; it in fact contains the first, and is its other. It is mediate determination, and contains the determinations of the first within itself. But at the same time it is also to be construed as the mediating determination. "Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), p. 119.

¹⁷⁵ *Lesser Logic*, p. 204.

¹⁷⁶ Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p. 829.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 834

consequently is also only implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is implicit in it." In this moment, the first negative, acting as a mediating determination, sublates itself and its positive whose other it is and their opposed determinations into a single determination which Hegel calls the individual. "As self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality, for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, is immediately the positive, the identical, the universal."¹⁷⁸ As the simple immediacy and the universality, it is also the realization of the Notion, which has reasserted itself, and by so sublating the oppositions in which it had divided itself has now become united with itself and has restored its absolute reality, its simple relation with itself. The dialectic thus essentially consists in restoring the unity of opposites, in which the Notion, the immediate universality had separated itself, into a Notion which, according to Hegel, is also the truth of those separated determinations. In so far as this Individual—the sublated immediacy—is a return to the Notion, it is in the image of the absolute. It is essential to the Hegelian doctrine that the Dialectic moves from a totality to a totality, wherein each stage reflects the absolute more or less adequately, depending upon its proximity to the Absolute Idea.

The notion arrived at through the sublation of the first immediacy and its other sets itself up as a new immediacy, and is, therefore, in the image of the first starting point. However, there is, according to Hegel, a difference. The difference consists in the fact that while in the first beginning there was only its form for its content from which the other emerged, in this new immediacy the content has appeared. "Through the movement we have indicated, the subject-matter has obtained for itself a determinateness that is content, because the negativity that has with-drawn into simplicity is the sublated form, and as simple determinateness stands over, against its development, and first of all over against its very opposition to universality."¹⁷⁹ The negativity that, in the sublation, was thus extinguished becomes the source of the extinguishing of the sublated immediacy itself.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 836.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 838-39.

The arrived at immediate must, therefore, itself burst asunder, to be sublated again in the Notion, and so on, until it returns into the Absolute Idea.

This progressive expression of the Notion until its return, and its implications, shall concern us in a moment. We should pause, however, to consider further the nature of the third, which sets itself as an immediate, though as an immediate that is "deduced and proved," for Hegel regards this as the "turning point of the movement of the Notion".¹⁸⁰ In passages which are probably the most perplexing in his Logic, he says:

"It is the simple point of the negative relation to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true ; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublating of the opposition between Notion and reality and the unity that is truth. The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is . . . the innermost, most objective moment of life and spirit, through which a subject, a person, free being, exists."¹⁸¹

This sudden introduction of the subject, the self as the source of activity, is, to say the least, perplexing, and there appears to be little or no justification for it. It may be recalled here as well that in the beginning of the Logic where we begin from the simple, indeterminate, immediate "Being," Being and "Not-Being" pass over into a "Determinate Being," and then into "Something" which is the first negation of the negation. Here, too Hegel apparently quite suddenly introduces self and the subject, and regards "this determination as of supreme importance."¹⁸²

This apparent perplexity can perhaps be dissolved if we remind ourselves that the dialectical movement in Logic is not to be treated as the movement of dead and bare formal categories of formal Logic, but is to be viewed as the formal aspect of the self-awareness of the Absolute spirit which of its own necessity posits itself in finite spirits and all the diversity of nature. As the Absolute Idea, Hegel tells us, enjoys itself as Absolute spirit, so the first substation of immediacy and its Other, the first negation of the negation, augurs the positing of the Absolute spirit into a finite spirit, a subject, which, as pure contradiction, absolute negativity, now serves as the

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 835

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 115.

motor of the dialectical movement. The third term is thus subjectivity embodied—the necessary medium of Geists' self-expression. Hegel repeatedly tells us that where there is contradiction, there is life, and where there is life there is contradiction. "It is not a quiescent third, but, precisely as this unity is self-mediating movement and activity it is the individual, the concrete, the subject."¹⁸³

The negation of the negation, which thus, as self-mediating activity, posits itself in the image of the Notion, as immediacy and universality, has, as we said earlier, in the negativity that it extinguishes and sublates, the germs of its own annihilation. This union, as we said, destroys itself, and bursts asunder in its own negations. Even a cursory inquiry of all the negations and contradictions shows, however, that the senses in which the second term is the other of the first, or is its opposite vary from triad to triad. Thus even the two cases—universality and Being — we have considered, appear to present two different senses of negation. Particularity cannot be said to be a negation of universality, in the same sense in which nothing is the negation of being, and so on. This led McTaggart and Findlay to say that Hegel's use of the word "negation" is unsystematic.¹⁸⁴ But on Hegelian terms the criticism would appear to be unjustified: first of all in Hegel's sense contradiction includes both diversity and opposition as he has shown in his treatment of the law of identity and contradiction.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, Hegel argued that for the Method it is immaterial what kind of negation or determinateness exists between the first two terms of the triad: "for the method it is a matter of indifference whether the determinateness be taken as determinateness of form or of content. . . . For since it is the absolute form, the Notion itself and everything as Notion, there is no content that could stand over against it and determine it to be a one-sided form."¹⁸⁶ It is important to realise that the dialectical movement does not operate merely because the first and second determinations stand opposed to each other, but because the Notion as absolute form cannot tolerate them standing over against itself. Not only this, but Hegel himself would accept a much greater variety of negations, oppositions and contradictions than any of his critics

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 837.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Findlay, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73 ; J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Dialectic* (New York ; Russell & Russell, 1964), Chapter 4.

¹⁸⁵ Johnstone, *Tr.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 431-39.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 839-40,

realise. Thus Hegel argues:

"At each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself."¹⁸⁷

A picture such as the one Hegel offers here appears to involve that in each progressive step we are confronted with a new determination, for it implies all the previous determinations plus more.

The variety of determinations with their various differences appears even to contribute to the picture that Hegel offers of the intensity with which the subject, the pure personality in a mighty dialectical moment, grasps the absolute within itself as the first immediacy and universality which holds and contains everything. Thus each new stage of accumulating determinations is also a stage of withdrawal into the notion, and the greater the richness of determinations the greater and higher the intensity of their resolution in the Notion. The highest stage is, therefore, the one in which the pure personality embraces and holds every single determination within itself and returns to its first immediacy and universality. The circular movement of the dialectic consists in precisely this: in the process in which the Notion posits itself into opposed determinations it none the less asserts itself at each stage and returns into the Notion. As such also the dialectic movement knows no infinite regression, for "what at first may appear to be different, the retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the progressive further determining of it, coincide and are the same."¹⁸⁸ This, however, is also a circle of circles; for the rich absolute which is grasped in all its immediacy and universality in one intense moment of reflection into itself, unfolds itself into its various determinations. As Hegel puts it: "... in returning into its beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member".

In the end we may enquire as to what is the relation between the Dialectic method on the one hand, and understanding and sensuous consciousness on the other. We have seen that Hegel's justification for the Dialectic method emerges in his criticism of the understanding and sensuous consciousness. Now that we know that the Dialectic is the method of pure thought, it would be interesting to inquire as to what is left of the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 840.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 841.

understanding and the perception of ordinary thought. It would at first appear, as suggested by Hartmann, that given the Hegelian system understanding and sensuous consciousness would be impossible.¹⁸⁹ If the Notion is what determines the movement of the determinations, this movement being irresistible, it should be totally out-side of the powers of understanding to arrest this movement, and rest content with fixed and determinate notions. Understanding itself would be impossible. This, however, is incorrect in the light of Hegel's conception of his system, wherein understanding and sensuous consciousness themselves are seen as expositions, determinations of the dialectic, and the dialectic is seen as the sublation of the sensuous consciousness and understanding. We must once again point out here that Hartmann's objection seems to be rooted in his inability to see that Hegel's system presupposes a unity of the logical and the ontological, wherein as the Notion posits itself into opposed determinations, the Dialectic too unfolds itself into the opposed determinations of the understanding and sensuous consciousness which, in their various ways, reflect upon the opposed determinations ; but as the opposed determinations are sublated into their notion, so the sensuous consciousness and the understanding are sublated into the Dialectic, which is the Notion's method of reflecting upon its own nature. It is for this reason that Hegel consistently argues that the Notion shows itself in opposed determinations, and the Dialectic shows itself only when, through the understanding, the opposed terms have been driven to the point of contradiction. Thinking reason, according to Hegel:

"sharpens the blunt difference of diverse terms, the mere manifoldness of pictorial thinking, into essential difference, into opposition. Only when the manifold terms have been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active and lively towards one another, receiving in contradiction the negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of self movement and spontaneous activity."¹⁹⁰

The Hegelian system, viewed as culminating in the Absolute wherein all the determinations are contained in an immediate and a universal, would appear to contain a safety mechanism against all criticism. For any criticism would appear to contain demands that can be shown by Hegel to be determinate and hence leading over into their negation. For example,

¹⁸⁹ Hartmann, B. I I, p. 6.

¹⁹⁰ Johnstone, Tr., op. cit., p. 442.

Popper's criticism that talk of the Absolute is meaningless for it is not falsifiable can be easily shown by Hegel to be dependent upon a criterion which leads into its negative. That is, the proposition that only statements that are falsifiable are meaningful, in order to serve as a criterion, must itself not be falsifiable. Similarly, the logical positivist criterion of verifiability would lead, according to Hegel, into the negative. Moreover, presumably statements that shall be considered by Popper as meaningful (empirical hypothesis, generalisations, etc.) shall on Hegel's view, that all empirical statements can be shown to be antinomial, turn out to be involving their contradiction.

There is none the less a difficulty with Hegel's view ; the system seems to be the jacket that shall fit any body of knowledge, any content whatsoever. Hegel had himself criticised the notion of immediate knowledge (as presented by Jacobi) on the ground that since it makes the fact of consciousness the criterion of truth it has for its corollary, that all superstition or idolatry is allowed as to be truth. Similarly, since Hegel's subject is the embodied subjectivity of the Absolute spirit, who thinks in the necessity of the Notion and spirit, whose understanding and sensuous consciousness is the mirror image of the Dialectic, all superstitions and idolatries would constitute the inner determinations of the Absolute, wherein they shall be preserved alongwith all the other ideas, in equilibrium. In so far as the contradictions are resolved in Hegel's system in a manner, where the opposite determinations are both impartially preserved and assert themselves in the sublated category, constitute its source movement, and are carried over into its further determinations until the highest stage, the system appears to retain a curious impartiality to truth and falsehood. Such a criticism would probably not stick to Hegel for he reckons that the contradiction itself is the truth. But, firstly, Hegel nowhere in his system adequately accounts for error, illusion, etc. As well he considers contradiction only in the sphere of experience and understanding, where those contradictions would not be reckoned as contradictions, but, as he himself says, would be spread over time and space. Secondly, as we indicated above, he himself criticises Jabobi's system on account of his failing to distinguish between superstition and truth.

It is of the nature of Hegel's system that it will fit any body of knowledge. It is for this reason that, though in his *Philosophy of Nature* he

made innumerable mistakes,¹⁹¹ none the less every-thing falls neatly into its place in his explication of the manifestation of the Absolute in the sphere of Nature. Of course, here we should not be misunderstood as criticising Hegel for holding the view which is ascribed to him by some Hegelians, and by some critics, that the particular laws of Nature can be deduced from the categories of Logic. Our criticism should not be confused with that of Krug who challenged Hegel to deduce his "pen" from the categories. A reading of Hegel's various works should suffice to dispel such misconceptions. Hegel's own way of dealing with the data of natural sciences, as Petry points out, "simply involves the structuralisation of the data provided by informed common sense, by means of the principle of the dialectic".¹⁹² Our criticism concerns this later view; even as a principle of structuralisation of data, and not of its generation, the dialectic should fail for it provides a structure which can be fitted on entirely different bodies of data. It is the magical cap that fits all the heads.

¹⁹¹ See. M.J. Petry, Tr., (Hegel's) *Philosophy of Nature* (Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 40-63.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 62

BOOK REVIEWS

Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) K.A. Rashid, *Historical Dissertations, Vol. H.* Lahore: Progressive Books, 1978. Derry 8vo., 165 pages. Rs 35.00.

Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) K.A. Rashid ranks high among thoughtful researchers of Pakistan. He has held many important military as well as civil assignments, and side by side this he has written books and articles in English, Persian and Urdu. His *Tadhkirah-i Talib 'Amili* (Urdu), *Tadhkirah-i Shu'ara'-i Punjāb* and articles on Iranian artists have been sources of attraction for the Persians. Besides, he has been personally associated with a few Iranian scholars, e.g. the late Professor Saeed Naficy (d. 1966). It is also said that Lt.-Col. Rashid possesses a good personal library.

The first volume of the book under review was published by the Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, in 1962. It contained thirteen articles. The present volume has sixteen articles. The articles included in these volumes have already appeared in various periodicals of Pakistan. In the first volume the author had noted the periodicals in which the articles appeared, but this information has not been given in the present (second) volume. However, all the articles have, as the author also tells, already been published in different periodicals. I read the first article on Ranikot Fort in Sind, which is the largest fort in the world, in the quarterly *Iqbal Review* of April 1965.

The volume under review has articles on coinology, archaeology, painting, calligraphy, medieval as well as con-temporary history. These research articles have not only been supplemented with authentic sources and references but also with necessary pictures and sketches, and this places the *Historical Dissertations* among the rare works published in Pakistan.

Col. Rashid had participated in military archaeological excavations in the Middle East during World War II perhaps this added to his interest in

archaeology. *Historical Dissertations* contains three articles on archaeology. The volume consists of author's two interesting visitations to Maulānā Abul Kalām Āzād and Maulānā 'Ubaid ullah Sindhī. Articles on calligraphy are also informative and research-provoking.

Article fifteenth in the book is captioned: 'Allamah Iqbal and the Ancestry of Napoleon Bonaparte". It has only four pages but this very article suffices to show the deep interest Col. Rashid has in research. Iqbal had once told his son Jāvīd Iqbāl (now Dr Justice) that Napoleon Bonaparte's ancestors originally hailed from Arabia. Col. Rashid mentions his own visit to Iqbal in 1936 alongwith Sayyid Nadhīr Niyāzī and others when the 'Allāmah had said: "Spain had been conquered by the Muslims before Tariq landed at Gibraltar and this General's strategy was to go through Corsica in which an Arab tribe called Banu Faras had made advance guard. ... Napoleon was a descendant of this tribe." Col. Rashid narrates his efforts to make the 'Allāmah's point vivid. He had been consulting many books and scholars, both in Asia and Europe, for about three decades. He confirms in this article that Spain was conquered by Muslims, led by Ṭarīf before Ṭarīq b. Ziyād entered that land and Napoleon came from Corsica however, the origin of the French leader's ancestry is still to be pursued, though signs are there that his forefathers belonged to Banū Fāras tribe of the Arabs. Napoleon is said to have been born in Bonibascio, the capital of Corsica, and Col. Rashid rightly refers to the etymological harmony of the words Bonibascio, Banū Fāras and Bonaparte. The last, sixteenth, article entitled "Islam and Islamic History" shows the writer's deep concern with Islam and Muslims.

Historical Dissertations has been printed with a nice get-up. The volume is surely a solid contribution to Islamic culture and all those interested ought to have it in their personal collection of books. It is a must for research libraries of the country.

—(Dr) Muhammad Riaz

Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) K.A. Rashid, *Iqbal, Qur'an and the Western World*, Lahore: Progressive Books, 1978. Demy 8vo., 100 pages Rs 25.00.

Lieut.-Col. (Rtd.) K.A. Rashid is a renowned non-professional scholar and writer. He is the author of a number of books and research articles. He has compiled his already published articles in English and Urdu in the form of books.

Iqbal, Quran and the Western World contains seven articles. The first detailed article entitled "Iqbal and the Role of Philosophy in Religion" has been divided into two sections. On the whole, the book is a valuable contribution to Iqbal studies and also to scientific observations. The remaining six topics are as under: "Iqbal on Modern Theories of Science," "Recent Advances in Science and Concept of Life and Death," "Quranic Cosmogony," "The World of Islam and the Western World," "Iqbal and Ouspensky," and "Iqbal and Martin Buber".

The first article is based mainly on Iqbal's *Development of*

Metaphysics in Persia, and *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. The first part of the last paragraph of this readable treatise is reproduced below:

"What is required today is an independent study of the Quran and not speculative and traditional thought ; for the Muslim nation has withdrawn from the true teaching of the Quran. It is far removed from the true meanings of the Quran. In order to progress in this cosmic age, we need to follow the Quran more closely and try and understand the meaning of such verses which are as yet unestablished (Mutashabihat)."

It may be noticed that the writer advocates to try to understand the meanings of mutashābihāt verses of the Qur'ān whereas God has warned us

not to do so (iii. 6) and He says that the true comprehension of the meanings of the established verses (muḥkamāt) are sufficient for the eternal guidance of the believers.

In one article, the author has compared a few thoughts of Iqbal with his Russian contemporary, P.D. Ouspensky. Iqbal has referred to him in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Ouspensky was a pupil of G.I. Gurdjieff. Iqbal was attracted by his views on *Space and Time*. It would have been worthwhile to add his detailed life account too in this article.

Martin Buber (1878-1965) was another contemporary of Iqbal: he was a well-known philosopher, and Iqbal has quoted him in a number of his writings. Col. Rashid has very ably traced the resemblance of the thought of both the philosophers in a number of topics.

Buber had studied in various universities of Germany for ten years; during his study decade in Germany, Iqbal was also there as a re-search scholar; however, it has not yet been established that the two philosophers ever met. Col. Rashid writes about the Jewish philosopher:

"Martin Buber, who is classified as an existentialist, does not like being called one. Iqbal on his part never mentions himself in that category. Buber is a great believer in God and human freedom, and he takes existence as Creator's non-repetitive art, and I am inclined to liken him to Iqbal and class them both as non-Deterministic Theistic Existentialists.... It is a strange phenomenon that although ranked as the greatest Jewish philosopher, the Jews disclaim him (with rare exceptions) and discount him as an eccentric. Perhaps this is due to his attitude towards the Palestine problem. Just before his death, he criticised the Israeli leaders for not reaching an agreement with the Arabs" (p. 97).

Col. Rashid's one remarkable article included in this anthology is entitled "Recent Advances in Science and Concept of Life and Death". It has appeared in the January 1978 issue of the quarterly *Iqbal Review* (Lahore). It

also contributes mainly to Iqbal studies. I remember that Chaudhary Muzaffar Husain, Director, All-Pakistan Islamic Educational Congress, Lahore, had touched this topic well in Urdu once, but Col. Rashid's dealing is quite exhaustire for the English readers.

All the seven articles of the book are thought-provoking. The book is a valuable contribution to the study of the Holy Qur'ān, Iqbal, scientific fields and East versus West. It is a must for scholars interested in deeper studies.

—(Dr) *Muhammad Riaz*

BOOK REVIEWS

We have expert arrangements for reviewing books in *Iqbal Review*. Publishers are requested to send two copies of their Urdu and English books for this purpose to the Editor.

Scholars are also requested to send their reviews on books they have recently studied for publication in the *Review*. The Iqbal Academy pays remuneration to the reviewers.

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