

# THEISTIC ONTOLOGY IN RADHAKRISHNAN AND IQBAL

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Whenever people face problems, their best opportunity of finding a solution lies in their ability to discover what is real for that problem and for its resolution. This is particularly true for value questions concerning what is good or beautiful or true. Questions of what is "real" have been under critical scrutiny in the contemporary world, not so much for its existential meaning but more for the metaphysical implications that it carries. Nevertheless, the two cannot be separated. If I am to find a solution to the problem of what I "ought" to do when confronted with a begging child, I must formulate a value principle in terms of which I come to a decision. I may decide not to give into my feelings of compassion because I know or strongly suspect that behind the child stands a racket or organization that my money will really support and hence, prolong the child's slavery. If I press the question further then my theistic convictions arise and these will either confirm or refute the decision. Hence, the ontological question arises out of the ethical question. The same could be said for the aesthetic, the epistemological or other areas of human experience.

In this paper I wish to examine the characterization and nature of ultimate reality as understood by Muhammad Iqbal, a provocative and important thinker out of the contemporary Islamic tradition and S. Radhakrishnan, a renowned and penetrating scholar of Hinduism. Both are concerned with- Onto-logical issues but they are also concerned with the practical realm of people. Both have done their important theistic philosophy within the first half of the present century. Both were aware of many currents

of thought in the West and addressed themselves to a synthesis of these ideas with their own traditions and both developed penetrating and powerful theistic ontologies.

Although they were contemporaries and from the same country (although this changed), they did not evaluate one another's works - so far as I have been able to find. They develop their thought independent of one another and though they have some common sources, such as Bergson and Whitehead, their thinking does not develop out of dialogue with one another. It is the purpose of this paper to develop such a dialogue. Finally, what emerges out of the first part of the paper is that both need to be more adequate in dealing with the absolute, Radhakrishnan more than Iqbal. This is reflected in their dealing with particular social issues. We shall first deal with the nature of the Ultimate as set forth by both men and then turn to an evaluation of these concepts and how they can help us to deal with our contemporary situation.

It might be noted in passing that though the separation of Pakistan and India has religious foundations (also political and economic reasons), these do not necessitate an unresolvable contradiction between Islam and Hinduism. And if such contrasts as do remain - and there are differences! - I believe that our chances of resolving them lies in our working out the ontological issues to see where the differences arise and what possible solutions can be formulated. I believe that this can be done by the use of the theistic ontology of Iqbal and Radhakrishnan.

## **II. THE NATURE OF THE ULTIMATE**

The nature of the ultimate is to be understood in terms of the nature and existence of God for both men. For Radhakrishnan the ultimate can best be understood in terms of the Absolute and God or, in Hindu terminology, The Absolute, Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva.<sup>1</sup> It will be noticed that the

supreme is complex and not simple, that is, The Supreme has the three poses of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva or God and The Absolute. The effort here is not to over-simplify the nature of deity or the supreme but to achieve an adequate description of that which is ultimately real. Brahman is the word that stands for the absolute in the Vedanta and it is derived from the root word "Brih" which means to grow, to burst forth.<sup>81</sup> The absolute is that which stands beyond or transcends the changing flux of everyday experience: it is absolutely permanent or, the same thing, it is incapable of increase or decrease or change of any kind. Since the absolute is "pure consciousness, pure freedom and infinite possibility . . . it is the foundation and prius of all actuality and possibility. "<sup>82</sup>

But a description of the supreme is not to be limited by this brief account. Indeed, Radhakrishnan would have us to see the absolute as positive and he does not altogether agree with Samkara's negative descriptions. Rather, the absolute is the "inexhaustible positivist of God that bursts through all conceptual forms" because it is beyond all such descriptor's.<sup>83</sup> The absolute furnishes for the religious person that guarantee of permanence and unchangeability that is essential for the religious life. Without such permanence religious trust would lack confidence.

God, on the other hand, is bound up with the world and whereas the absolute is marked with permanence, God is involved in change. In this way God is "subject to the category of time" and His work is limited by the freedom of people.<sup>84</sup> If people are free then their decisions must be their own and they must determine something of reality. Hence, God is limited to the extent that people can make decisions and are thus creative of novelty. God is best characterized as wisdom, love and goodness and such a descriptor on

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<sup>81</sup> The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, (N. Y., Tudor Publishing Co., 1952), "Reply to Critics", pp. 796-97. (Hereafter : Schilpp, P. S. R.)

<sup>82</sup> Radhakrishnan, S., The Principle Upanisads, (London, George Allen and Unwin L. T. D., 1968, p. )2. (Hereafter : Radhakrishnan, P. U )

<sup>83</sup> Radhakrishnan, L. V. L., pp. 101-102.

<sup>84</sup> Op cit., 1. V. L. p. 342.

satisfies the religious demand.<sup>85</sup> When dealing with the concept of God, Radhakrishnan sets forth the triple character of God as "Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the Redeemer and Shiva the Judge"<sup>86</sup> God is immanent in the world, the guide of people's strivings; God is the suffering companion who cares. Hence, the nature of God is complex and shares in the evolving development of the universe.

Radhakrishnan is opposed to those who merely describe God as Creator or as unchanging or as Father; God is all of these but more. Yet we need to press the question: how are we to characterize the supreme? Is God the best over-all description of the supreme since deity has both relations and non-relations? But there is a certain preeminence of the absolute in Radhakrishnan. In the end the absolute is all in all. On careful reading of Radhakrishnan it seems that the supreme is the overall description of the ultimate and that Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva are merely three poses of the absolute. Hence, the absolute stands beyond any description. This raises the question, what is the nature of the supreme? There seems to be a tension between the absolute and God in Radhakrishnan that is not completely overcome. How are those two sides of the supreme related? Before further comments are made on this we must set forth the way in which Iqbal deals with the ultimate.

It is clear that for Iqbal the best way to describe the ultimate is in terms of Ego.<sup>87</sup> Iqbal is eager to satisfy both the intellectual and the pragmatic tests of religious experience.<sup>88</sup> We must consult experience and religious experience indicates to us that ultimately the supreme is a directive will. This directive will can best be conceived as ego. But Iqbal distinguishes between the ultimate ego and ordinary egos He selects the word ego because it refers

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<sup>85</sup> Op. cit., L. V L., p. 342.

<sup>86</sup> Op. cit., p. 338 ; p. 342.

<sup>87</sup> Iqbal, A. M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Publisher, 1965), pp. 62, 63. (Hereafter R. R. T. I.)

<sup>88</sup> Iqbal, R. R. T. I., p. 62.

to a center of experience .and all experience must have a center if it is to be distinguished as experience. This individuality of experience is given the proper name 'Allah" in the Koran. Allah as a distinct individual or person must be conceived in terms of "pure duration" and it is in terms of pure duration that we can conceive of "thought, life and purpose," and hence, to exist in pure duration gives an ultimate organic unity which can be called a self.<sup>89</sup>

To be a self is to say "I am" and thus to have personal identity. The ultimate ego or self has a uniform mode of behavior which always is and can never be changed into something else. Hence, the permanence, structure of stability of the universe is accounted for in terms of the absolute or ultimate ego. For Iqbal the best characterization of Allah is as the ultimate or cosmic personality. Allah, as a person, has both a relative, evolving and changing nature as well as a permanent character. This is analogous to people's personality: we have a relatively permanent character that is exemplified in various experiences. Yet a person can act out of character whereas Allah cannot. Hence, the nature of the ultimate or supreme can be best understood in terms of personhood.

Iqbal is quite clear that the absolute does not stand beyond the ultimate ego.<sup>90</sup> In terms of personhood we can discern that which is absolute but we do not find the absolute separated from Allah. For Iqbal the absolute can be integrated through personality in terms of the absolute ego. But for Radhakrishnan such integration is not as clear: we have seen that the absolute is the non-relative part of God. Yet there is a tension between the Absolute and God that is not overcome in his thought. We shall say more of this later. But for both men, it seems to me, the relation between the absolute and the relative could be greatly clarified if they would adopt the principle of 'inclusive contrasts.' We need to think in "triads": the relative and inclusive

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<sup>89</sup> Op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>90</sup> Op. cit., p. 56. Iqbal uses the terms "Absolute ego" and "Ultimate ego" interchangeably. See pp. 56, 58.

term, the non-relative and external term, and the over-all characterization of the relation. Hartshorne states the principle clearly when he says that the "relative includes and exceeds the absolute,"<sup>91</sup> hence, the relative is the whole of the reality but as a whole it includes the absolute.

The absolute is unchanging and complete, in so far as it does not increase or decrease but it is only a part of the relative. The personhood of God has an absolutely fixed character but is also involved in the change of the universe. Since God is inclusive of all then there is nothing beyond God. We do have a sense of rest and completion when we fix our attention upon the absolute aspect of God's nature but we also have a sense of companionship when we experience that God is involved in our struggles and decisions.<sup>92</sup> Hence, I suggest that we take person hood as the characterization of God and that we seek to integrate both relativity and absoluteness within that concept. Since both men use the absolute-relative concepts in their description of ultimate reality, I do not see this as a massive over-hauling of their concepts. It is merely a sharpening of the categorical relations of these ultimate notions. Hence, it makes for greater integration of the notion of ultimate reality and also it removes any taint of inconsistency. We can then avoid what I would call the "double doctrine" of the supreme.

What I mean by this is that for Radhakrishnan the Absolute is the prius of the actual and possible and is also the prius of God. Radhakrishnan describes God as absolute and relative but he means by this the God of this world. The Absolute is beyond such description; it is not personal nor is it actual or possible. It can only be referred to symbolically; it is mystery. It is permanent and unchanging; it just is what it is.' We shall not further pursue this line of thinking but it should be pointed out that it compromises the ultimacy of creativity that Radhakrishnan holds and it does not escape the Buddhist criticisms of "substance" thinking. This is a topic for another,

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<sup>91</sup> Hartshorne, Charles, *The Divine Relativity*, (New Haven, Yale Press, 1964), p. IX.

<sup>92</sup> For a discussion of the Absolute in 'Radhakrishnan, see I. V. L., pp. 248 ff, particularly p. 271 ff.

paper. However, since, Radhakrishnan holds that God is the God of the world and that God creates, that God is permanent and change, then we can compare this with what Iqbal holds. Both of them hold to a dipolar doctrine of God.

Here we must seek to avoid a misunderstanding to say that God is absolute yet related to all, that the relative exceeds and includes the absolute does- not entail that we know everything about God. Nor to claim that God is the supreme cosmic person must not lead to the conclusion that God is simply a person. Both of our thinkers stress the mystery of deity and they both claim that we know very little about God. But whereas Radhakrishnan would locate this mystery within the absolute, the absolute is "inexpressible relationless mystery" and so stands beyond logic and reason, Iqbal would hold that the mystery is to be understood in terms of the personal relations between Allah and people. In other words, for Iqbal there is an I-Thou relation between the ultimate ego and ordinary egos but for Radhakrishnan this subject-object relation is suspended. All is completed in the absolute and this leads to the doctrine of identity. When the subject-object relation no longer holds then oneness is the result.

On the other hand, for Iqbal - there is the subject-object relation and here the best description is in terms of communion. Hence, the absolute stands beyond the subject-object relationship for Radhakrishnan but the same cannot be said for Iqbal. Whereas Radhakrishnan locates the mystery within the absolute, Iqbal locates the mystery within personality. It is my conviction that all the mystery one can legitimately hold can be found in personality. It is not the absolute that is mysterious but the becoming nature of God.

This confirms my suspicion that the absolute as beyond is exempt from all categorical description. I suggest, along with Hartshorne, that the absolute is the abstract feature of personality and hence, the mystery lies in the becoming nature of God about which we know the next thing to nothing. If

Radha krishnan would take personality more seriously than he does then he could avoid "disintegration" or at least tension in his ultimate concepts. Here is where I see the real strength of Iqbal's position; Iqbal takes personality not merely to be the empirical experience of people or even the rational and empirical natures of people as does Radhakrishnan but the whole being of the person. In God the ultimate of personality is embodied; people are only ordinary exemplifications of personality. Hence, the absolute or abstract can be known not because it is the whole of the supreme but because it is only a part of personality. It is that part that is permanent, absolutely in deity but only relatively permanent in people and thus it can give us the self identify that we strive for. Hence, we can retain everything in Radhakrishnan in terms of our interpretation in relation to God.

This may seem to over-look what Radhakrishnan calls "the highest spiritual experience we have" in the "sense of rest and fulfillment, eternity and completeness"<sup>93</sup> but these can be experienced in terms of the absolute as I have described it. There is the sense of permanence and bliss, of serenity and assurance because of the absoluteness and everlastingness of deity. Radhakrishnan admits that "The great problem of the philosophy of religion has been the reconciliation of the character of the Absolute as in a sense eternally complete with the character of God as a self-determining principle manifested in a temporal development which includes nature and man."<sup>2</sup> If the absolute be conceived as the abstract feature of reality and if reality is conceived as the becoming of new events - both of our authors assert this - then the question of "inclusiveness" is important. Though the absolute cannot include other aspects because of its permanence, change can include aspects that do not change and in the case of God and only God, deity includes an absolute essence that is the abstract feature of God's cosmic personality.

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.



We have dealt with the nature of God from the standpoint of both Iqbal and Radhakrishnan; they also deal with the question of God's existence. What is the existence of God and is this an important question for religious experience? Neither Iqbal nor Radhakrishnan have much faith in theistic arguments and those they examine even in a cursory fashion are found unsatisfactory. They briefly examine the cosmological, the teleological, the moral, and the ontological arguments but find serious defects with each. For Iqbal the main problem of the cosmological and the teleological arguments is that they begin with the finite and seek to prove the infinite.<sup>94</sup> In the cosmological argument the mind is looking for the cause of effects and continues this search until finally one asserts a first cause. An infinite regress is impossible ; from the finite one can only derive the finite ; to assert that one member of the causes is to be elevated above all the others is to violate the "law of causation". Hence, the argument tries to reach the infinite through the finite and it fails in toto. "The teleological argument is no better." It tries to find the nature of effects as having purpose, foresight and adaptation. Since these are personal characteristics, they therefore point to a cosmic person. The argument is built on the analogy between the cosmic person and the ordinary person and the cosmos and ordinary works. But the differences are so great that such an analogy does not apply and it fails to understand the organic interdependence of the universe, An external though skillful contriver is not God. Once again we cannot move from the finite to the infinite. Hence, the argument has "no value at all." Iqbal does not deal with the moral argument but he does examine the ontological, He states it in Descartes way that an attribute is contained in the nature of a thing and therefore necessary existence is contained in the nature or concept of God. Again, we have an idea of a perfect being which can only come from God; Hence, the idea of the necessary existence of God is made known to us by God. His objections are that concept of existence does not prove objective existence and that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two.

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<sup>94</sup> R. R. T. I., pp. 28-30.

Furthermore, the argument is circular and thus moves from logical to real existence. Hence, the argument fails.

Radhakrishnan claims that logical arguments fail to reflect our deepest convictions.<sup>95</sup> He is particularly concerned with the ontological argument. The argument seeks to derive the existence of God from the experience of God, that is, the idea of God is result of our experience of God. If we think of perfection as merely a projection of our fancy then we contradict ourselves. Anselm argues that the idea of a perfect being necessarily involves the existence of that being.<sup>96</sup> Hence, the proof for the existence of God rests upon religious experience. Yet when one examines the arguments one must admit that they are not proofs and that our best insights come from prophetic souls.<sup>97</sup> But the real strength of the ontological argument and all other arguments such as the moral,<sup>98</sup> is that they point us to the depths and meaning of our religious experience.<sup>99</sup> The idea of God is not an invention or discovery but the self-revelation of God in the soul and our deepest convictions give us a trustworthy knowledge of ultimate reality, "perhaps the only knowledge possible!"<sup>100</sup> Hence, one needs to communicate the reasonableness of one's religious experience.

Though there is a negative evaluation on the above arguments, both men hold that there can be an argument for the existence/reality of God from religious experience. The argument can be stated in the following manner:

The existence of God is eternal and everlasting. Therefore, God necessarily exists or necessarily, religious experience occurs and God

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<sup>95</sup> Radhakrishnan, S., I. V. L. p. 173.

<sup>96</sup> Op. cit., p. 176.

<sup>97</sup> Op. cit., p. 175.

<sup>98</sup> Op. cit., p. 175.

<sup>99</sup> Op. cit., p. 176.

<sup>100</sup> Religious experience is an immediate intuition into ultimate reality.

necessarily exists as the adequate terminus of that experience.<sup>101</sup> Both men, then, would hold that religious experience is the foundation of our knowing the existence of God. It is not knowing simply that God exists since that is a central part of the experience but rather what kind of existence can be ascribed to God and how that existence differs from all other existing things. Here, it seems to me, the ontological argument is valuable as developed by Hartshorne in his *Logic of Perfection and Anseim's Discovery*. That which is the adequate object of dynamic/religious experience is that which is necessarily somehow actualized. This is what the ontological argument establishes and which clarifies the argument from religious experience. The cosmological argument begins with the proposition that something exists, that existence may be either necessary or contingent. God, as the adequate object of experience, necessarily exists. The argument from cosmic design to the cosmic designer follows the same order. In short, the arguments clarify the nature of the existence of God and so they clarify our own existence.

Once this characterization of ultimate reality is made, then we can ask "How can it help with the pressing issues that confront people today?" Also what can be said about the relation of the world religions and how can this help us in terms of our pressing problems of divisions from one another?

For Radhakrishnan the relation between the world religions is one of our most urgent problems. If religion embraces that which is of ultimate value and if such value needs to be heard in terms of our pressing political, military and social problems, then there must be a united voice to express that value. The various religions must dialogue with one another not only to show where there are similarities but also to show how differences can be dealt with. I wish to further develop this last point on the proper attitude that diverse groups and alternative positions can take in terms of the value questions of people.

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<sup>101</sup> Ultimate reality is the self - revelation of God in the soul.

For both Iqbal and Radhakrishnan the spiritual ideal of life is fundamental. It is the spiritual dimension of life that needs to be cultivated and to be expressed if people are to understand themselves and the world in which they live. For Radhakrishnan, "self-discovery, self-knowledge and self-fulfillment" are the destinies of people and the task of religions is to set forth these ideals for all people.<sup>102</sup> For Iqbal each person must sink deep into her/himself and there discover their identity as a child of God's.<sup>103</sup> Such discovery will lead to the spiritual person. It is the spirit in people that religion must bring out and this spirit in people is to be realized in relation to the supreme or deity. Both men appeal to God as the ground of the spiritual dimension of life. All people have the capacity or possibility of spiritual experience. The aim is to make a person truly a person. Can this common ground be used to unite various religions to one another?

In face of the plurality or variety that exists among the world religions and even between Islam and Hinduism, I answer that it can be a common ground. The attitude toward this relation is well expressed by Radhakrishnan in terms of tolerance. But in the case of Iqbal this tolerance is not as clear. As can be seen in the division of Pakistan and India, Iqbal changed. In the beginning Iqbal thought that differences could be worked out, that each community could keep its own self-identity and still have mutual relations.

But later he urged separation

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, (N. Y., Galaxy Book, 1959), p. 35.

2. Iqbal, R. R. T. I., p. 12.

because he feared that Islam was losing its identity as the community of Allah. Hence, there was separation and intolerance. But was Iqbal being true

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<sup>102</sup> Op. cit., p. 175.

<sup>103</sup> See Iqbal, R. R. T. I. pp. 31 ff, 15—27 ; Radhakrishnan, I. V. L., pp. 66 ff, particularly 97—99, 173—175.

to his own vision of one God and one community? Dialogue rather than force is the answer and tolerance leads to such dialogue. Differences there may be and this shows our limited vision but when such harrow perspectives become ontologically "True" then, not only is there ontological misplacement but also existential confusion. Hence, I suggest that we go back to Iqbal's original vision, which is more in line with his ontology, and that from that vision we can evolve the tolerance that we need to build a universal community. It is God who binds the various communities together and through our spiritual experience of deity we can see and appreciate the values that others have found in a different way. Hence, in Radhakrishnan and Iqbal, tolerance is not simply blind but is based on a strong doctrinal similarity between the two that can lead to Transcreative positions.

If the object of religious experience, deity, has the nature we have argued for above then the tolerance that is recommended is greatly strengthened. We have seen that the nature of deity as held by both men has both an absolute aspect as well as a relative aspect and that this doctrine is both philosophically defensible as well as religiously significant. God as the supreme cosmic being is fundamental in the thought of both men and is the basis for the self-realization of people. Hence, we have gone far in working out the ontological differences that seem to exist between Islam and Hinduism. If the ontological differences can be worked out then, as I have argued, the existential differences can not only be accepted but also they can be encouraged. Existential reasons are peculiar to different people in different places and times. And if this be accepted then it leads us on to the view of a world community.

Religions must think in terms of the union of all people. All people have the potential of spiritual self-fulfillment. But such fulfillment is a process and different people achieve it at different times and on different levels. The method to be used by all people is that of persuasion, hence, tolerance and not of force; it is a matter of transcreative integration of differences where religion is the matter of winning the allegiance of the person; of committing

the person to the ideals of a world community. But though there is a unity - all are committed to deity as the object of one's religious convictions; - still there is diversity in the existential working out of this religious commitment.

Methods of worship, ritual, prayer, songs, and pilgrimages all have a concrete meaning that lends significance to the religious life of particular individuals, in particular places. Hence, religious practices can vary and do vary but the underlying unity allows for such variety. Iqbal claimed that the Islamic community must sink deep into itself to discover itself. A part of that discovery has to do with the brother-sisterhood of all people. Brothers and sisters can differ from one another in what they do if they accept the fact that they are brothers and sisters because they are committed to deity which has been shown to be the ground of their true life. What is required is a strong feeling of unity, a similarity of vision about the ultimate nature of values that can bind us together. What this does rule out is exclusiveness: if we focus upon our existential differences and claim them to be essential then dialogue is ruled out. But if there is an ontological similarity then transcreative dialogue can be genuine and we can work out differences by means of change or by means of acceptance.

I would like to conclude this paper with consideration of some objections. An extreme objection would be that there is no possibility of such transcreative dialogue as I have suggested above. What we really confront when we compare and contrast the theistic ontology of Islam and Hinduism as well as existential practice is contradiction. Since both religions are complex and have received complex developments over the years there is a certain plausibility to this criticism, and it could be supported by the use of different sources. But what I have tried to show is that two renowned contemporary thinkers from each religion have developed strikingly similar ontologism. Though there is no absolute agreement between Iqbal and Radhakrishnan - this would be asking too much for finite minds like ours to reach such agreement - still there is a rough similarity between the two. People's knowledge is limited and we need to continually correct and update

our knowledge. Though our two authors do not seem to have dialogued with one another during their life-time and they thus developed their thought independent of one another, it adds strength to my argument of the striking similarities between them each saw the nature of reality in a comparable similar way. They had a mutual influence from currents of Western thought and sought to re-interpret their religion in light of that influence. This would rule out the first objection.

Another objection might be that there is no need for such transcreative dialogue since basically there are no differences. This would be to see too much similarity and would not take seriously the divergences. As has been pointed out, the absolute would have to be re-worked in Radhakrishnan and the exclusiveness of Iqbal would have to be redone. Hence, not to see differences between the two men is not to see the two men.

This leaves us with the third possibility, namely, there are striking similarities but there are also differences. I have contended that this is the most viable option. Furthermore, if transcreative dialogue is to be meaningful, then we must deal with the ontology of each man. For if ontological matters can be shown to have a rough agreement then existential concerns will be enriched. too often in such comparisons the practices of the various groups are compared and the conclusions reached are decidedly negative. My contentions have been that there may be a variety of differences on the existential level but there can be an essential agreement concerning the nature of ultimate reality. God is more complex than we often wish to admit and there are a variety of ways by which deity can be approached. It is here that tolerance is required: one practice may be good for one people in one location of the world and quite another somewhere else.

Lastly, the claim is not that all Muslims or Hindus would accept the above. Rather the claim is that two prominent thinkers of these two great religions have striking theistic positions that should be further pursued. In a day and time when the stress is upon the differences that exist among people

and when we are dangerously close to the use of nuclear weapons to deal with these differences that will spell the end of human civilization as we know it, then it is a time when the world religions need to take one another more seriously and need to have a united voice that will point up the value of people as people and will work out ways in which people can live together.

Akbar, the great Muslim leader of the sixteenth century in India, at his fort by Agra, had a hall built for the dialoguing of the various religions. It is called the seat of Akbar and has four spoke-like paths that lead out from the center and various participants from various religious persuasions would come to discuss their differences face to face. It is this kind of ideal that is needed in our world where different religions will be afforded the opportunity of coming together and discussing their agreements and disagreements and various ways of transcreative integration.<sup>104</sup> It is only hoped that we will be given the opportunity and the desire to bring about such dialogue.

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<sup>104</sup> One can only rejoice in the recent decisions that have been made between the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches to unite in feeding the hungry, clothing the naked and seeking to serve the displaced and suffering in the world. It needs to be done on a larger basis where all religions will combine for such beneficial social and personal "relief" programs. But such programs need to have more doctrinal grounding "emergency drive" outlook and set forth the basis for a world community. We need to struggle on both levels.