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IQBAL AUR MAGHRIBI MUFAKREEN

Prof. Jagan Nath Azad Maktaba-e-Jamia, Delhi.

pp. 190 Price Rs. 10.50

This illuminating treatise focuses attention on the philosophic make-up of one of the greatest philosopher-poets of Urdu. Iqbal's genius was too ebullient to be contained by any established philosophy and though inspired by Islam and Eastern philosophers, Iqbal never shut himself up from Western thinkers and poets. In ten brilliant chapters profusely studded with illustrative Urdu and Persian verses of Iqbal, Prof. Azad takes his readers on to a delightful voyage of Iqbal's affinities with and variations from the great Western thinkers.

Prof. Azad holds that though Iqbal admits the philosophic acumen of Plato, he is critical of his Theory of Ideas because it clashes with his own philosophy of Action. Iqbal's debt to Bacon's Inductive Reasoning and the deductive methods of Spinoza and Leibniz is explored in the next chapter. Iqbal accepts Kant's view that Intellectual effort often fails to resolve the ultimate problems of life, but unlike Kant, he regards moral law not as an external command but an inner compulsion of the Ego. Fichte feels that non-Ego which the Ego strives to realise has Self as its source and Berkeley regards matter as only a form of mind. Iqbal only partially agrees with these contentions.

Prof. Azad shows that Iqbal accepts Schopenhauer's notion that nothing is more injurious for an aim than its realization because fulfilment may mean death, but he rejects his notions' about Death and women. In the chapter "Iqbal and Marx" Prof. Azad asserts that Iqbal is wrongly regarded as an "Islamic Socialist". Both Islam and Marxism denounce Capitalism but Iqbal prefers Islam because it does not negate God, Soul and Faith. Iqbal was deeply influenced by Nietzsche's contention that "Hardness is a virtue beyond all prize". There are marked similarities between Nietzsche's

Superman and Iqbal's Perfect Man, but the two are not identical. Iqbal's Perfect Man uses power and persuasion for fulfillment of his mission, but unlike Nietzsche's Superman, he is subject to good and evil. Iqbal recognizes Bergson's notions about the reality of Flux but differs with his concept of the "creative impulse" as it ignores human personality and ego.

The final three chapters deal with Iqbal and the great philosopher-poets Dante, Milton and Goethe. Prof. Azad feels that Iqbal's loved Name has much that echoes The Divine Comedy but while Dante is concerned mainly with life-after-death, Iqbal discusses life itself. Iqbal's concept of Satan is more akin to Milton's than to Dante's, for his Satan is not only an embodiment of evil, but also a dynamic personality locked in a grim struggle. Iqbal holds Goethe in high esteem for regarding Action as a potent means for realizing Reality and for perceiving Beauty in nature that elevates man out of the morass of materialistic depravity.

Prof. Azad aptly concludes that though Iqbal was well-versed in all philosophies, he never allowed any to cloud his own vision of Reality and life and his insistence on Ego and Action. He accepted, rejected or modified what Western thinkers believed according to his Oriental requirements and personal convictions Prof. Azad has brought in his extensive scholarship for bringing out a book of comparative study that can serve as a solid bed-rock for further investigation on the subject.

Prof. Azad Gulati

THE SUPERSTITION OF SCIENCE

Rene Guenon

The civilization of the modern West has, among other pretensions, that of being eminently “scientific”; it would be as well to make it a little clearer how this term is to be understood, but that is not what is usually done, for it is one of those words to which our contemporaries seem to attach a sort of mysterious power, in-dependent of their meaning. “Science,” with a capital letter, like “Progress” and “Civilization,” like “Right,” “Justice,” and “Liberty,” is another of those entities which are better left undefined, and which run the risk of losing all their prestige as soon as they are inspected a little too closely. In this way all the so-called “conquests” which the modern world is so proud of amount to high-sounding words behind which there is nothing or else something insignificant: we have called it collective suggestion; and, the illusion which it leads to, kept up as it is and shared by so many people; cannot possibly be spontaneous. Perhaps one day we will try to throw a little light on this side of, the question. But for the moment that is not what we are directly concerned with; we simply note that the modern West believes in the ideas which we have just mentioned, if indeed they may be called ideas, however this belief may have come to it. They are not really ideas, because many of those who pronounce, these words with the greatest conviction have in thought nothing very clear that corresponds to them; actually there is nothing there in most cases but the expression, one might even say the personification, Of-more or less vague sentimental aspirations. These are veritable idols; the divinities of a sort of “lay religion,” which is not clearly defined, no doubt, and which cannot be, but which has none the less a very real existence: it is not religion in the proper sense of the word, but it is what pretends to take its place; and what better deserves to be called “counter-religion.” The origin of this state,of things can be traced back to the very beginning of the modern epoch, where the ant traditional spirit showed itself at once by the proclaiming of “Tree examination,” or, in other words, the absence, in the doctrinal order, of any principle-higher than individual

opinions. The inevitable result was intellectual anarchy; hence the indefinite multiplicity of religious and pseudo-religious sects, philosophic systems aiming above all at originality, and scientific theories as pretentious as they are ephemeral, in short, unbelievable chaos which is, however, dominated by a certain unity, there being beyond doubt a specifically modern out-look which is the source of it all, though this unity is altogether negative, since it is nothing more or less than an absence of principle, expressed by that indifference with regard to truth and error which ever since the XVIIIth century has been called “tolerance.” Let our meaning be quite clear; we have no intention of blaming practical tolerance as applied to individuals, out only theoretic tolerance, which claims to be applied to ideas as well and to recognise the same rights for them all, which if taken logically can only imply a rooted scepticism. Moreover we cannot help noticing that, like all propagandists, the apostles of tolerance, truth to tell, are vets often the most intolerant of men. This is what has in fact happened, and it is strangely ironical: those who wished to overthrow all dogma have created for their own use, we will not say a new dogma, but a caricature of dogma, which they have succeeded in imposing on the Western world in general; in this way there have been established, under the pretext of “freedom of thought,” the most chimerical beliefs that have ever been seen at any time, under the form of these different idols, of which we have just singled out some of the more important.

Of all the superstitions preached by those very people who profess that they never stop inveighing against “superstition,” that of “science” and “reason” is the only one which does not seem, at first sight, to be based on sentiment; but there is a kind of .rationalism which is nothing more than sentimentalism disguised, as is shown only too well by the passion with which its champions uphold it, and by the hatred which they evince for whatever goes against their inclinations or passes their comprehension. Besides, since rationalism, in any case, corresponds to a lessening of intellectuality, it is natural that its development should go hand in hand with that of sentimentalism, as we, explained in The last chapter¹ but either one of these two tendencies may be more particularly, represented by certain

¹ See Rene Guenon, “Civilization and Progress”, Iqbal Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, LHR, 1985. (Editor).

individualities or by certain currents of thought, and, by reason of the more or less exclusive and systematic terms in which they have come to be clothed, there may even be apparent conflicts between them, which hide their fundamental fellowship from the eyes of superficial onlookers. Modern rationalism begins, in short, with Descartes (it had even had some forerunners in the XVIth century) and its tracks can be followed throughout all modern philosophy, no less than in the domain which is properly speaking scientific. The present reaction of intuitionism and pragmatism against this rationalism, gives us an example of one of these conflicts, and we have seen meanwhile that Bergson entirely accepts the Cartesian definition of intelligence; it is not the nature of intelligence that is questioned, but only its supremacy. In the XVIIIth century there was also antagonism between the rationalism of the encyclopedias and the sentimentalism of Rousseau; both these, however, served equally to help on the revolutionary movement, which shows that each of them has its place in the negative unity of the anti-traditional outlook. If we cite this example in connection with the preceding one, it is not that we attribute any hidden political motive to Bergson; but we cannot help thinking of the use made of his ideas in certain syndicalist circles, especially in England, while in other circles of the same kind the "scientific" spirit is held more in honour than ever. Indeed, one of the great clevernesses of those who "control" the modern mentality seems to consist, as it were, in brewing a potion for the public, now of rationalism, now of sentimentalism, and now of both together, as occasion demands, and their trick of holding a balance between the two shows that they are much more concerned with their own political interests than with the intellectuality of their patient. It is true that this cleverness may not always be calculated, and we have no desire to question the sincerity of any scientist, historian, or philosopher; but they are often only the apparent "controllers," and they, may be themselves controlled or influenced without in the least realizing it. Besides, the use made of their ideas does not always correspond with their own intentions, and it would be wrong to make them directly responsible, or to blame them for not having foreseen certain more or less remote consequences; but provided that these ideas conform to one or the other of these two tendencies, they may be used in the way which we have just described; and, being given the state of intellectual anarchy in which the West is plunged, each event would seem to suggest that every possible advantage is being taken of the disorder itself and of all that contributes to the chaotic agitation for the realizing of a rigidly

determined plan. We do not want to insist on this too much, but we find it difficult not to revert to it from time to time, for we cannot admit that a whole race may be purely and simply smitten with a sort of madness which has lasted for several centuries, and there must be something after all which gives a meaning to the modern civilization: we do not believe in chance, and we are sure that every existing thing must have a cause; those who think differently are at liberty to set aside such considerations.

Now, taking the two chief tendencies of the modern mentality in turn to examine them better, and leaving for the moment sentimentalism to return to it later, we may ask ourselves this question: what exactly is this “science” that the West is so infatuated with? A Hindu, summing up most concisely the opinion of all the Orientals who have come across it, has said most justly: “Western science is ignorant knowledge.”² This expression is in no way a contradiction in terms and this is what it means: it is, if one insists; -a knowledge-that has some reality, since it is valid and effective in one relative domain; but it is a hopelessly limited knowledge, ignorant of the essential, a knowledge which, like everything else that belongs in particular to Western civilization, lacks a principle. Science, as conceived by our contemporaries, is nothing more than the study of sensible phenomena, and this study is undertaken and followed out in such a way that it cannot, we insist, be attached to any principle of a higher order; it is true that by resolutely ignoring everything that lies beyond its scope, it makes itself fully independent in its own domain, but this boasted independence is only made possible by the very limitation of science. Not content with that, it goes even to the length of denying what it is ignorant of, because only so can it avoid admitting this ignorance: or, if it does not venture in so many words to deny the possible existence of what does not come within its range, it at least denies all possibility of knowing such things, which amounts to the same, and it has the pretention of comprising in itself everything that can be known. Starting often unconsciously from a false assumption, the “scientists” imagine, as did Auguste Comte, that man has never aimed at knowing anything other than an explanation of natural phenomena; we say unconsciously, because they are evidently incapable of understanding that it

² “The Miscarriage of Life in the West,” by P. Ramanathan, Solicitor-General of Ceylon: *Hibbert Journal*, VII, I; quoted by Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 95.

is possible to go further, and it is not for this that we blame them, but only for their pretention of refusing to allow others the possession or the use of faculties which they themselves lack; they are like blind men, who deny the existence of sight, if not of light itself, for the sole reason that they are without it. To declare that there is not only an unknown but also an “unknowable” (to use Spencer’s word), and to turn an intellectual infirmity into a barrier which no one may pass — that is something whose like was never seen or heard before; and it is equally unheard of for men to turn a declaration of ignorance into a programme of thought and a profession of faith, and quite openly to label a so-called doctrine with it under the name of “agnosticism.” And these men, be it noted, are not sceptics, and do not wish to be sceptics: if they were, there would be a certain logic in their attitude, which might make it excusable: but they are, on the contrary, the most enthusiastic believers in “science,” the most fervent admirers of “reason.” It might well be considered rather strange to put reason above everything, to profess a veritable worship for it, and to proclaim at the same time that it is essentially limited; that is, in fact, somewhat contradictory, and though we note it, we do not undertake to explain it; this attitude points to a mentality which is not in the least our own, and it is not for us to justify the contradictions which seem inherent in “relativism” in all its forms. We, too, say that reason is limited and relative: but, far from making it the whole of intelligence, we look on it only as one of its inferior parts, and we see in intelligence other, possibilities which go far beyond those of reason. It seems then, that modern Europeans, or at least some of them, are very willing to acknowledge their ignorance, and the rationalists of to-day do so perhaps more readily than their predecessors, but it is only on condition that no one has the right to know what they themselves do not; the pretention of limiting what is, or just of limiting, knowledge fundamentally, shows in either case the spirit of negation which is so characteristic of the modern world. This spirit of negation is nothing other than the systematic spirit, for a system is essentially a closed conception; and it has come to be identified with the spirit of philosophy itself, especially since Kant, who, wishing to shut up all knowledge within the bounds of relativity, ventured to declare in so many words that “philosophy is not a means of extending knowledge but a discipline for limiting it,”³ which amounts to saying that the chief function

³ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Hartenstein, p. 256.

of philosophers is to impose on all the narrow limits of their own understanding. That is why modern philosophy ends by almost entirely substituting “criticism” or the “theory of knowledge” for knowledge itself; that is also why many of its representatives no longer claim for it a higher title than “scientific philosophy,” or, in other words, mere co-ordination of the most general results of science, whose domain is the only one it recognizes as being accessible to intelligence. In these circumstances philosophy and science are not to be distinguished, and in actual fact, since the birth of rationalism; they can only have had one and the same object, they have only represented a single order of knowledge, they have been animated by the self-same spirit: it is this that we call, not the scientific spirit, but the “scientist” spirit.

We must insist a little on this last distinction: what we wish to indicate by it is that we see no essential harm in the development of certain sciences, even if we find that far too much importance is given them; it is only a very relative knowledge, but it is none the less a knowledge, and it is right that everyone should turn his intellectual activity on to what suits his natural talents and the means at his disposal. What we object to is the exclusiveness, we might say the sectarianism, of those who have been so intoxicated by the lengths to which these sciences have been stretched that they refuse to admit the existence of anything apart from them, and maintain that, to be valid, every speculation must be submitted to the methods which are peculiar to these same sciences, as if these methods, created for the study of certain fixed objects, were universally applicable. It is true that their conception of universality is something very limited which certainly does not pass beyond the domain of contingency. But these “scientists” would be most astonished if told that, without even leaving this domain, there is a host of things which cannot be got at by their methods and which notwithstanding may be made the object of sciences quite different from the ones they know, but no less real and often more interesting in many respects. It seems that men to-day have taken arbitrarily, in the domain of scientific knowledge, a certain number of parts which they have frenziedly set about studying to the exclusion of all the rest and on the assumption that this rest is inexistent; and it-is quite natural, and not in the least surprising or admirable, that they should have given these particular sciences which they have so cultivated a much larger development than could men who did not attach anything like

the same importance to them, who often scarcely even bothered about them, and who were in any case concerned with many other things which seemed to them more important. We are thinking above all of the considerable development of the experimental sciences, a domain where the modern West clearly excels, and where no one dreams of contesting its superiority, which moreover, as the Orientals see it, is a scarcely enviable one, for the very reason that it could only be bought at the expense of forgetting all that they hold truly worthy of interest. However, we have no hesitation in stating that there are sciences, even experimental ones, of which the modern West has not the least idea. Such sciences exist in the East, among those which we call “traditional sciences”. Even in the West, there were also during the Middle Ages such sciences, altogether equivalent in some respects; and these sciences, some of which even give rise to undeniably efficient practical applications, are carried out by means of investigation altogether unknown to the “authorities” of modern Europe. This is certainly not the place for us to enlarge on the subject; but we should at least explain why we say that certain branches of scientific knowledge have a traditional basis, and what we mean by this; and by doing so we shall in fact be showing, still more clearly than we have done so far, what Western science lacks.

We have said that one of the special features of this Western science is the pretention of being entirely independent and autonomous; and this can only be upheld by systematically ignoring all knowledge of a higher order than scientific knowledge, or better still by formally denying it. What is above science, in the necessary hierarchy of knowledge, is metaphysic,⁴ which is pure and transcendent intellectual knowledge, while science, by its very definition, is only rational know-ledge. Metaphysic is essentially super-rational; it must be that, or else not be at all. Now rationalism consists, not in simply stating that reason has some value, which only the sceptics contest,

⁴ With the author’s approval we have preferred to use this rarer word in translating /a metaphysique, because, although the word metaphysics means “that which is beyond the domain of physics” and is not usually considered as a plural, the ending none the less suggests a collectivity, such as mathematics, physics or economics, which may be said to have sub-divisions or branches, whereas metaphysic is one undivided and indivisible whole. However, the word pseudo-metaphysics may well be used as a plural, referring to the fantastic and mutually-conflicting theories of many modern philosophers, most of whom, despite their claims, have not even a suspicion of what true metaphysic is.

but in maintaining that there is nothing above it, or, in other words, that there is no knowledge possible beyond scientific knowledge; thus rationalism necessarily implies the negation of metaphysic. Almost all modern philosophers are rationalists, more or less narrowly and more or less outspokenly; among those who are not, there is only sentimentalism and voluntarism, which is no less anti-metaphysical, because having reached this state, if they admit anything other than reason, it is below reason that they look for it, instead of looking above; true intellectualism is at least as remote from rationalism as modern intuitionism can be, but it is so in exactly the inverse direction. In these circumstances, if a modern philosopher claims to be concerned with metaphysic, one may be sure that what he so names has absolutely nothing in common with true metaphysic, and such is indeed the case; we can only allow these pre-occupations the title of “pseudo-metaphysic,” and if none the less some valid considerations are occasionally to be found amongst them, they belong really to the scientific order pure and simple. The general features, then, of characteristically modern thought are these: complete absence of metaphysical knowledge, negation of all knowledge that is not scientific, and arbitrary limitation of scientific knowledge itself to certain particular domains, excluding the rest; such is the depth of intellectual degradation to which the West has sunk since it left those paths that the rest of mankind follows as a matter of course.⁵

Metaphysic is the knowledge of the universal principles on which all things necessarily depend, directly or indirectly; in the absence of metaphysic, any other knowledge, of whatever order it may be, is literally lacking in principle, and if by that it gains a little in independence (not as a right, but as a matter of fact), it loses much more in import and depth. That is why Western science is, as it were, all on the surface. While scattering its energies among countless fragments of knowledge, and losing its way among the innumerable details of fact, it learns nothing about the true nature of things, which it declares to be inaccessible in order to justify its powerlessness in this respect; thus its interest is much more practical than speculative. If there are

⁵ These comments were written in the first quarter of the 20th century when the cultures of the East were not as decadent as they grew in the later part of the century. Statements that made towards the end of his life indicate that he had re-evaluated the matter and had come to the realization that the Oriental civilizations had also succumbed to the onslaught of the Western secularist humanism, scientism and anti-intellectual tendencies. (Editor).

sometimes attempts to unify this eminently analytical learning, they are purely artificial and are never based on anything but more or less wild suppositions; and they all collapse one after the other, until it seems that no scientific theory of any general bearing can last more than half a century at the most. Besides, the Western idea which would make synthesis a sort of result and conclusion of analysis is radically false; the truth is that a synthesis worthy of the name can never be reached by analysis, because one belongs to one order of things and the other to another. By its very nature, analysis may be carried out indefinitely, if its field of action is expansive enough, without one's having got any nearer to a general view over the whole field; it is still less surprising that it should be utterly ineffectual in establishing a connection with principles of a higher order. The analytical character of modern science is shown by the ceaseless growth in the number of "specialities" the dangers of which Auguste Comte himself could not help pointing out. This "specialization," so gloried in by certain sociologists under the name of "division of labour," is the best and surest way of acquiring this "intellectual short-sightedness," which seems to be among the qualifications demanded of the perfect "scientist," and without which, moreover, "scientism" itself would have scarcely any hold. And the "specialists" once brought outside their own domain, generally show themselves to be unbelievably ingenuous; nothing is easier than to impose on them, and this is what contributes in good part to the success of the most idiotic theories, provided that care is taken to call them "scientific." The most idle suppositions, like that of evolution for example, take the rank of "laws" and are held for proven; and though this success is only temporary, their riddance means that their place has been taken by something else which is always accepted with equal readiness. False syntheses which are bent on extracting the superior from the inferior (a strange transposition of the conception of democracy), can never be anything more than hypothetical: true synthesis, on the contrary, starting from the principles, partakes of their certainty; but it is of course true principles which must be the starting point, and not mere philosophic assumptions in the manner of Descartes. In short it may be said that science, in disavowing the principles and in refusing to re-attach itself to them, robs itself both of the highest guarantee and of the surest direction that it could have; there is no longer anything valid in it except knowledge of details, and as soon as it seeks to rise one degree higher, it becomes dubious and vacillating. Another consequence of what we have just said about the

relations between analysis and synthesis is that the development of science, as the moderns understand it, does not really extend its domain; the amount of fragmentary knowledge may increase indefinitely within this domain, not through deeper penetration, but through division and subdivision carried out always more and more minutely; it is indeed the science of matter and multitude. Besides, even if there should be a real extension, as may happen exceptionally, it would always be within the same order, and it would not enable this science to rise any higher; in its present state it is separated from its principles by an abyss which, far from being bridgeable, cannot even be made the least little fraction less.

When we say that the sciences, even experimental sciences, have in the East a traditional basis, we mean that, unlike Western ones, they are always attached to certain principles; these are never lost sight of, and what is contingent seems only worth studying in that it is a consequence and outward manifestation of something which belongs to a higher order. True, there remains none the less a profound distinction between metaphysical knowledge and scientific knowledge; but there is not an absolute discontinuity between them, such as is to be noticed in the present state of scientific knowledge in the West. We can take an example even within the Western world, if we consider all the distance which separates the standpoint of ancient and mediaeval cosmology from that of physics as understood by the moderns; never, until the present epoch, had the study of the sensible world been regarded as self-sufficient; never would the science of this changing and ephemeral multiplicity have been judged truly worthy of the name of knowledge, unless the means had been found of connecting it, in some degree or other, with something stable and permanent. According to the ancient conception, which the Orientals have always kept to, a science was less esteemed for itself than for the degree in which it expressed after its own fashion and represented within a certain order of things a reflection of the higher immutable truth which everything of any reality necessarily partakes of; and, as the features of this truth were incarnated, as it were, in the idea of tradition, all science appeared as an extension of the traditional doctrine itself, as one of its applications, secondary and contingent no doubt, accessory and not essential, constituting an inferior knowledge, but still a veritable knowledge none the less, since it kept a link with that supreme knowledge which belongs to the order of pure intellect. It is clear that this

conception is absolutely irreconcilable with the gross practical naturalism which shuts up our contemporaries within the sole domain of contingency, one may even say, to be more exact, within a narrow portion of this domain;⁶ and as the Orientals, we repeat, have not varied in this conception and cannot do so without denying the principles on which all their civilization is based, the two mentalities appear to be decidedly incompatible; but since it is the West that has changed, and since it never ceases to change, perhaps a moment will come when its mentality will be modified for the better and become open to a wider understanding, and then this incompatibility will vanish of itself.

We think we have shown clearly enough how far the Orientals' appraisal of Western science is justified; and, under these conditions, there is only one thing which can explain the unbounded admiration and superstitious respect that is lavished on this science: this is its perfect harmony with the needs of a purely material civilization. There is, in fact, no question here of disinterested speculation; those minds which are altogether engrossed by outward things are struck by the applications that science gives rise to, and by its above all practical and utilitarian character; and it is especially thanks to the mechanical inventions that the "scientist" spirit has had its development. These are the inventions which have aroused, since the beginning of the XIXth century, a positively delirious enthusiasm, because their objective seems to be the increase of bodily comfort, which is clearly the chief aspiration of the modern world. Moreover, there were thus created unawares in addition more new needs than could be satisfied, so that even from this very relative point of view, progress is most illusory; and, once launched upon this course, it seems no longer possible to stop, as there is always some new want to be supplied. But how-ever that may be, it is these applications, confused with science itself, which more than anything else have made for its credit and prestige; this confusion, which could only arise among people ignorant of what pure speculation is, even in the scientific order, has become so usual that to-day, on opening no matter what publication, one finds constantly under the name of "science" what ought properly to be called "industry"; the

⁶ We say practical naturalism, because this limitation is accepted by people who do not profess naturalism in its more particularly philosophical sense. In just the same way there is a positivist mentality which does not in the least pre-suppose adherence to positivism as a system.

typical “authority” is, in most minds, the engineer, the inventor or constructor of machines. As for scientific theories, they must be considered much more as profiteers from this state of mind than as the causes of it; if those very people who are least capable of understanding them accept them with confidence and receive them as veritable dogma (and the less they understand the more easily they are deluded) it is because they look on them, wrongly or rightly, as closely bound up with these practical inventions which they deem so marvellous. Actually this closeness is much more apparent than real; the more or less inconsistent “scientist” hypotheses play no part in these discoveries and these applications, on the interest of which opinions may differ, but which have in any case the merit of being something effective; and, inversely, all that can be realized in the practical order will never prove the truth of any hypothesis. Besides, in a more general way, there could not, properly speaking, be a verification of a hypothesis by experiment, for it is always possible to find several theories which explain equally well the same facts. Certain hypotheses may be eliminated when they are seen to be in contradiction with the facts, but those which are left remain always mere hypotheses and nothing more; this is not the way that certainties could ever be arrived at. However, for men who accept nothing but hard facts, and who have no other criterion of truth than “experience,”-by, which they simply mean the noticing of sensible phenomena, there can be no question of going further or of proceeding otherwise, and, for such as these, there are only two attitudes possible: either to take one’s tone from the realization that scientific theories are hypothetical, and to renounce all certainty higher than mere sensible evidence; or, refusing to admit that they are hypothetical, to believe blindly everything that is taught in the name of “science.” The former attitude, assuredly more intelligent than the latter (always remembering the limitations of “scientific” intelligence), is that of certain “authorities” who, being less ingenuous than the others, refuse to be the dupes of their own or their fellows’ hypotheses. Thus, except for what is immediately practical, they arrive at a state of more or less complete scepticism or at least at a sort of probabilism: it is “agnostic-ism” no longer applied simply to what goes beyond the domain of science, but extended even to the scientific order itself. They only emerge from this negative attitude by a more or less conscious pragmatism, having regard, like Henri Poincare, no longer to the truth of a hypothesis but instead to its convenience; is that not an admission of incurable ignorance? Meanwhile, the second attitude, which may be called

dogmatic, is maintained with more or less sincerity by other “authorities,” but especially by those who believe themselves bound for the needs of education to be affirmative: to appear always sure of oneself and of what one says, to cover up the difficulties and the uncertainties, never to give anything out under a dubitative form is indeed the easiest way to make sure of being taken seriously and to acquire authority in one’s dealings with a public that is generally incompetent and incapable of discernment, whether it is pupils that are being addressed, or whether the task in hand is one of popularization. This same attitude is naturally taken up, and this time with incontestable sincerity, by those who receive such an education; also it is commonly the attitude of what is called “the man in the street,” and the “scientist” outlook can be seen in all its fullness, with this characteristic blind belief, among men who have only been semi-educated, in circles reigned over by that mentality which is often qualified as “primary,” although this mentality is not confined to those who have had a “primary” education.

We spoke just now of “popularization”; that is another thing altogether peculiar to modern civilization and in it may be seen one of the chief factors of this state of mind which we are trying to describe. It is one of the forms taken by this strange need for propaganda which animates the Western mind, and which can only be explained by the predominant influence of sentiment; no intellectual consideration justifies proselytism, in which the Orientals see nothing but a proof of ignorance and incomprehension; there is a complete difference between simply expounding the truth as one has understood it, with the one care not to disfigure it, and wishing at any price to make others share one’s own conviction. Propaganda and popularization are not even possible except to the detriment of the truth: the pretention of putting it “within everyone’s grasp,” of making it accessible to all without distinction, necessarily involves diminishing and deforming it, for it is impossible to admit that all men are equally capable of understanding anything; it is not a question of the greater or smaller extent of education, it is a question of “intellectual horizon,” and that is something which cannot be modified, which is inherent in the very nature of each human individual. The chimerical prejudice of “equality” goes against all the best established facts, in the intellectual order as well as in the physical order; it is the negation of all natural hierarchy, and it is the debasement of all knowledge to the level of the limited understanding of the mass., People will no longer admit anything

which passes common comprehension, and, in fact, the scientific and philosophic conceptions of our epoch are, all told, most lamentably mediocre: modern “authorities” have succeeded only too well in wiping out all that might have been incompatible with the concern for popularization. Whatever anyone may say, the constitution of any elect cannot be reconciled with the democratic ideal, which demands that one and the same education shall be given to individuals who are most unequally gifted, and who differ widely both in talents and temperament; inevitably the results still continue to vary, in spite of this education, but that is contrary to the intentions of those who instituted it. In any case such a system of teaching is assuredly the most imperfect of all, and the indiscriminate diffusion of scraps of knowledge is always more harmful than beneficial, for it can only bring about a general state of disorder and anarchy. It is such a diffusion that is guarded against by the methods of traditional teaching, as it exists throughout the East, where there will always be far more conviction of the very real inconveniences of “compulsory education” than of its imagined benefits. As if it were not already enough that the knowledge which is available to Westerners is entirely untranscendent, it is still further diminished in the works of popularization, which only treat of its most inferior aspects, and that too with distortions in order to make them simpler; and these works insist complacently on the most fantastic hypotheses, having the effrontery to give them out as proven truths, and accompanying them with those inept declamations which so please the mob. A half-knowledge acquired by such reading, or by an education whose elements are all drawn from hand-books of a like value, is far more injurious than pure and simple ignorance; better for a man to know nothing at all than to have his mind encumbered with false ideas, often ineradicable, especially when they have been inculcated from his earliest years. The ignorant man retains at least the possibility of learning if he is given the opportunity: he may possess a certain natural “common sense” which, together with the consciousness that he ordinarily has of his own incompetence, is enough to save him from much folly. On the contrary, the man who has been half taught has nearly always a deformed mentality, and what he thinks he knows makes him so self-satisfied that he imagines himself capable of talking about everything, no matter what; he does so at random, and the greater his incompetence the greater his glibness: so simple do all things appear to one who knows nothing!

Besides, even setting aside the evils of popularization itself and considering Western science as a whole and under its most authentic aspects, there remains, in the claim that the representatives of this science advertise of being able to teach it to all without any reserve, a sign of clear mediocrity. In the eyes of the Orientals there can be no great value and no true depth of contents in something whose study calls for no particular qualification; and, in fact, Western science is altogether out-ward and superficial; to characterize it, instead of saying "ignorant knowledge" we would be willing to say, with very much the same meaning, "profane knowledge." There is no real distinction, from this point of view any more than from the others, to be made between philosophy and science. People have sought to define philosophy as "human wisdom"; indeed it is, but with the strong reserve that it is nothing more than that, a wisdom purely human, in the most limited acceptance of this word, derived from no element of a higher order than reason; to avoid all uncertainty we would call it also "profane wisdom," but that amounts to saying that it is not really a wisdom at all, but only the illusory appearance of one. We will not insist here on the consequences of this "profane" character of all modern Western knowledge; but to show further how superficial and sham this knowledge is, we will call to notice that the methods of teaching in use have the effect of replacing intelligence almost entirely by memory. What is demanded of the pupils, from the time they first go to a primary school to the time they leave the university, is that they should hoard up as much as possible of what is taught them, not that they should assimilate it; those things are especially worked at whose study requires no comprehension; facts are substituted for ideas, and scholarship is commonly mistaken for real knowledge. To promote or to discredit this or that branch of knowledge, this or that method, no more is needed than to declare that it is or is not "scientific"; what are accounted officially as "scientific methods" are the most unintelligent methods of learning, methods which exclude everything which is not research after facts for facts' sake down to their most insignificant details; and it is worth noting that the worst abusers of this denomination are the "men of letters." The prestige of this label "scientific," even when it is really nothing more than a label, is indeed the triumph of triumphs for the "scientist" mind; and as for the respect which is extorted from the masses (including the so called "intellectuals") by the use of a simple word, are we not right in calling it "the superstition of science"?

Of course “scientist” propaganda is not carried on only within the West, under the double form of “compulsory education” and popularization; it is rife also outside, like all the other varieties of Western proselytism. Everywhere that the Europeans have installed themselves, they have wanted to spread these so-called “benefits of education,” always following the same methods, without the least attempt to adapt them and without it entering their heads that there may be already some other kind of education there. Everything that does not come from them is to be considered as null and void, and “equality” does not allow different peoples and different races to have their own mentality; moreover the chief “advantage” that the imposers of this education expect from it is probably, always and everywhere, the blotting out of the traditional outlook. The “equality” so dear to Westerners amounts moreover, as soon as they leave their home, to mere uniformity; the rest of what it implies does not come into the category of “exportable goods” and only concerns the relations between one Westerner and another, for they believe them-selves incomparably superior to all other men, among whom they scarcely make any distinctions: the most barbarous negroes and the most cultured Orientals are treated in almost the same way, because they are equally outside the one “civilization” which has the right to exist. Also the Europeans usually confine themselves to teaching the most rudimentary fragments of all their knowledge; it is not hard to imagine how these fragments must be appreciated by the Orientals, to whom even what is highest in this knowledge would seem chiefly remarkable for its narrowness, and stamped with a rather gross ingenuousness. As the peoples who have a civilization of their own prove themselves on the whole retrectory to this so much boasted education, while the peoples without culture submit to it much more docilely, Westerners are perhaps not far from judging the latter superior to the former; they are prepared to show at least a relative esteem for those whom they look on as susceptible of “rising” to their level, even though this elevation be considered only possible after some centuries of the regime of compulsory elementary education. Unfortunately, what the people of the West call “rising” would be called by some, as far as they are concerned, “sinking”; that is what all true Orientals think, even if they do not say so, and if they prefer, as most often happens, to hedge themselves round with the most disdainful silence, leaving, so little does it matter to them, Western vanity free to interpret their attitude as it pleases.

The Europeans have so high an opinion of their science that they believe its prestige to be irresistible, and they imagine that the other peoples must fall down in admiration before their most insignificant discoveries; this state of mind, which leads them sometimes into strange misunderstandings, is not altogether new, and we have found a rather amusing example of it in Leibnitz. This philosopher, as is known, had planned to establish what he called a “universal characteristic,” that is a sort of generalized algebra, made applicable to the notions of every order, instead of being limited to quantitative notions alone; moreover this idea had been inspired in him by certain authors of the Middle Ages, especially Raymond Lulle and Trithemius. in the course of the studies which he made towards realizing this project, Leibnitz came to be engrossed with the meaning of the ideographic characters which constitute Chinese writing, and more particularly with the symbolical figures which form the basis of the Yi-king; it will be seen how he understood these last: “Leibnitz,” says M. Couturat, “believed he had found by his binary numeration (a numeration which only employs the signs O and I and in which he saw the image of creation exnihilo) the interpretation of the characters of Fo-hi, mysterious and remotely ancient Chinese symbols, whose meaning was unknown to the European missionaries and to the Chinese themselves. . . . He proposed to use this interpretation for the propaganda of the Faith in China, seeing that it was fit to give the Chinese a high idea of European science, and to show the accordance of this science with the venerable and sacred traditions of Chinese wisdom. He added this interpretation to the exposition of his binary arithmetic which he sent to the Paris Academy of Sciences.” Here, in fact, is the text of the thesis in question: “What is surprising in this calculus (of binary Arithmetic) is that this Arithmetic by O and I happens to contain the mystery of the lines of an ancient King and Philosopher named Fohy, who is believed to have lived more than four thousand years ago and whom, the Chinese regard as the Founder of their Empire and of their sciences. There are several linear figures which are attributed to him, and they are all the outcome of this Arithmetic; but it is enough to give here the Figure of eight Cove,⁷ as it is

⁷ Leibnitz’s *La Logique*, pp. 474-475.

The exact date is 3468 B.C., according to a chronology based on the, precise description of the state of the heavens at that epoch; it should be added that actually the name Fo-hi serves to designate a whole period of Chinese history.

called, which passes for fundamental, and to add the explanation which is clear, so long as it be noticed first of all that a whole line signifies unity or I, and secondly, that a broken line signifies zero or 0. It is perhaps more than a thousand years since the Chinese lost the meaning of the Cova or Lineations of Fohy, and they have made commentaries about it, in which they have sought to give I know not what remote interpretations, so that they have now had to receive the true one from the Europeans. This is how: it is scarcely more than two years since I sent to the Rev. Father Bouvet, a celebrated French Jesuit living at Peking, my way of counting by 0 and I, and it needed no more to make him realize that it is the key to the figures of Fohy. So, writing to me on November 17th, 1701, he sent me this Philosopher-Prince's great figure, which goes up to 64,⁸ and leaves no longer any room for doubting the truth of our interpretation, so that one may say that this Father has deciphered the enigma of Fohy with the aid of what I had communicated to him. And as these figures are perhaps the most ancient monument of science in the world, this restitution of their meaning, after so great an interval of time, will seem all the more curious... And this accordance gives me a high opinion of the depth of Fohy's meditations. For what we now find easy was not all so in those remote times... And as it is believed in China that Fohy is as well the author of the Chinese characters, although they have been much changed by the lapse of time, his essay in Arithmetic leads one to judge that there might well be something else of import there in relation to numbers and to ideas, if the foundation of Chinese writing could be laid bare, the more so as it is believed in China that he had regard to numbers in establishing it. The Rev. Father Bouvet is much inclined to press this point, and very capable of succeeding in many respects. However, I know not if there has ever been in Chinese writing an advantage approaching that which should necessarily be in a Characteristic that I am planning. This is that all reasoning which may be deduced from notions,

⁸ Koua is the Chinese name for "trigrams," that is figures obtained by assembling in threes, with every possible combination, whole and broken straight lines. Actually the number of figures so obtainable is eight.

This reference is to the sixty-four "hexagrams" of Wen-Wang, that is figures of six lines formed by combining the eight "trigrams" two by two. Incidentally, Leibnitz's interpretation is quite incapable of explaining, amongst other things, why these "hexagrams," as well as the "trigrams" that they are derived from are always tabulated in circular form.

might be deduced from their Characters by a manner of calculation, which would be one of the chief means of aiding the human mind.”⁹ We were anxious to reproduce at length this curious document, by means of which one may measure the limits in understanding of the man whom we none the less regard as the most “intelligent” of all the modern philosophers. Leibnitz was convinced in advance that his “characteristic,” which moreover he never succeeded in constituting (and the logisticians of to-day are scarcely more advanced), could not fail to be very superior to the Chinese ideography; and the best of all is that he thinks to do Fo-hi great honour in attributing to him an essay in arithmetic” and the first idea of his own little play on numbers. We seem to see here the smile of the Chinese, if they had been presented with this rather puerile interpretation, which would have been very far from giving them “a high idea of European science,” but which would have been fit to make them realize very, exactly its actual range. The truth is that the Chinese have never “lost the meaning,” or rather the meanings, of the symbols in question; only they do not feel themselves in the least obliged to explain them to the first-comer, especially if they judge that it would be a waste of breath; and Leibnitz, in speaking of “I know not what remote interpretations” admits in so many words that he understands nothing about it. It is just these interpretations, carefully preserved by the tradition (which the commentaries never cease to follow faithfully), that constitute “the true explanation,” and moreover they are not in the least “mystical”; but what better proof of incomprehension could be given than the taking of metaphysical symbols for “purely numerical characters”? They are, in fact, essentially metaphysical symbols, these “trigrams” and “hexagrams,” a synthetic representation of theories which are susceptible of unlimited developments, susceptible’ also of multiple adaptations, if, instead of keeping to the domain of the principles, one wishes to apply them to one or another

⁹ Explanation of binary Arithmetic, which makes use of the characters 0 and I only, with remarks on its utility, and on its giving the sense of the ancient Chinese figures of Fo-hy, *Memoires d’l’ Academic’ des Sciences*, 1703: *Mathematical works of Leibnitz*, Gerhardt, Vol. VII, pp. 226-227; see also *De Dyadicis*: *ibid.*, Vol. VII, pp. 223-234. This text ends as follows: “Ita mirum accidit, ut res ante ter et amplius (millia?) annos nota in extremo ?stric continentis Oriente, nunc in extremo ejus occidente, sed inelioribus ut spero auspiciis resuscitaretur. Nam non apparet, ante usum hujus characterismi ad augendam numerorum scientiam innotuisse. Sinenses vero ipsi ne Arithmeticam quidem rationem intelligentes nescio quos mysticos significatus in characteribus mere numeralibus sibi fingeant.”

determined order of things. Leibnitz would have been most surprised if he had been told that his arithmetical interpretation was also included among these meanings which he rejected without knowing, but only on an altogether accessory and subordinate level; for this interpretation is not false in itself, and it is perfectly compatible with all the others, but it is quite incomplete and insufficient, even insignificant when considered by itself, and may only be held interesting in virtue of the analogical correspondence which binds up the lower meanings with the higher one, in accordance with what we have said about the nature of the "traditional sciences." The higher meaning is the pure metaphysical meaning; as for the rest, they are only different applications, more or less important, but always contingent; it is in this way that there may be an arithmetical application just as there are an indefinite number of others, just as there is for example a logical application, which might have better served the turn of Leibnitz's project if he had been aware of it, just as there is a social application, which is the basis of Confucianism, just as there is an astronomical application, the only one that the Japanese have ever been able to grasp,¹⁰ just as there is even a divinatory application, which moreover the Chinese look on as one of the lowest of all, and the practice of which they leave to the wandering jugglers. If Leibnitz had been in direct contact with the Chinese, they might have explained to him (but would he have understood?) that even the numbers which he used might symbolize ideas of an order much more profound than the order of mathematics, and that it is by reason of such a symbolism that numbers played a part in the formation of the ideograms, no less than in the expression of the Pythagorean doctrines (which shows that these things were not unknown to the ancients of the West). The Chinese might even have accepted the notation by 0 and I, and have taken these "purely numerical characters" to represent symbolically the metaphysical ideas of yin and of yang (which have moreover nothing to do with the conception of the creation ex nihilo), there being none the less many reasons for them to prefer, as more adequate, the representation furnished by Fo-hi's "lineations," of which the essential and direct object is in the domain of metaphysics. We have treated this example at length because it shows up

¹⁰ The French translation of the Yi-king by Philastre (*Annales du Muséum Guimet*, Vol. VIII and Vol. XXIII), which is moreover an extremely remarkable work, has the fault of considering rather too exclusively the astronomical meaning.

clearly the difference that exists between philosophical systematization and traditional synthesis, between Western science and Eastern wisdom; it is not hard to see, judging from this example which

also serves us as a symbol, on which side lie the incomprehension and the narrowness of outlook.¹¹ Leibnitz, in his pretention to understand the Chinese symbols better than the Chinese themselves do, is a veritable forerunner of the orientalist, who, the Germans above all, have the same pretention with regard to all the conceptions and all the doctrines of the East, and who refuse to take into the smallest consideration the opinion of the authorized representatives of these doctrines: we have mentioned elsewhere the case of Deussen thinking to explain Shankaracharya to the Hindus, and interpreting him through the ideas of Schopenhauer; these are indeed manifestations of one and the same mentality.

There is still a last remark that we should make with regard to this: it is that Westerners, who advertise so insolently on every occasion belief in their own superiority and in that of their science, are really very much beside the mark when they call Eastern wisdom “arrogant,” as some of them do at times, on the grounds that it does not submit to the limitations that they are used to, and because they cannot allow what goes beyond these limitations; this is one of the habitual faults of mediocrity, and it is mediocrity which forms the basis of the democratic spirit. Arrogance, in reality, is something very Western; so also, moreover, is humility, and however much of a paradox that may seem, these two opposites go rather closely together: it is an example of the duality which dominates the whole order of sentiment and which is proved most obviously by the innate character of moral conceptions, for the notions of good and evil could not exist but by their very opposition. In actual fact, arrogance and humility are equally strange to Eastern wisdom (we might as well say to wisdom without epithet) and leave it equally unaffected, because in essence it is purely intellectual, and entirely

¹¹ We will recall here what we said of the plurality of meanings of all traditional texts, and especially of the Chinese ideograms: introduction generate a /'étude des doctrines hindoues, pp. 149-150. We will add also this quotation borrowed from Philastre: “In Chinese, a word (or a character) has scarcely ever an absolutely defined and limited meaning; the meaning results very generally from the position in the sentence, but above all from its use in some older book or other, and from its admitted interpretation in this case . . . A word has no value except by its traditional acceptations.” (Yi-king, Part I, page 8.).

detached from all sentimentality; it knows that the human being is at the same time much less and much more than it is believed to be by the people of the West, by those at least of to-day, and it knows also that it is just what it should be to occupy the place assigned to it in the order of the universe. Man, that is, human individuality, has by no means a situation that is privileged or exceptional, either one way or the other; he is neither at the top nor at the bottom of the scale of beings: he represents simply, in the hierarchy of existence, a state like the others, among the indefinity of others, many of which are above him, and many of which also are below him. It is not hard to show, even in this respect, that humility goes very steadily together with a certain kind of arrogance: it is just, in seeking to abase man, as they often do in the West, that they find the means of attributing to him at the same time an importance which is really quite undue,, at least in so far as his individuality is concerned; perhaps it is an example of that kind of unconscious hypocrisy, which is, in one degree or another, inseparable from all "moralism," and in which the Orientals see fairly generally one of the specific marks of the Westerner. Besides, this counterbalancing humility by no means always exists; there is also, among a good number of other Westerners, a veritable deification of human reason, worshipping itself either directly or through the science which is its work; it is the most extreme form of rationalism and of "scientism," but it is their most natural outcome and altogether the most logical one. Indeed, anyone who knows nothing beyond this science and this reason may well have the illusion of their absolute supremacy; anyone who knows nothing superior to humanity, and more particularly to this type of humanity which is represented by the modern West, may be tempted to deify it, especially if sentimentalism intrudes (and we have shown that it is far from being incompatible with rationalism). All this is only the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the principles, an ignorance which we have denounced as the capital vice of Western science; and, despite Littré's protestations, we do not think that Auguste Comte caused the slightest deviation in positivism by wishing to set up a "religion of Humanity"; this particular "mysticism" was nothing more than an attempt at fusion of the two characteristic tendencies of the modern civilization. Worse still, there exists even a materialist pseudo-mysticism: we have known people who went to the length of declaring that even if they should have no rational motive for being materialists, they would none the less continue to be so, solely because it is "finer" to "do good" without any hope of possible

recompense. These people, whose minds are so powerfully influenced by “Moralism” (and their morality, in spite of calling itself “scientific,” is none the less purely and radically sentimental), are naturally among those who profess the “religion of science”. As this, in all truth, can only be a “pseudo-religion,” we deem it far juster to call it “superstition of science”; a belief which is only based on ignorance (even if it is that of authority”) and on vain prejudice does not deserve to be looked at in any other way than as a common superstition.

IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

Riffat Hassan

Scattered throughout Iqbal's writings are his various pronouncements on the nature and purpose of art. Iqbal has not propounded a theory of beauty and art as such, but from his writings it is clear that he had thought deeply about aesthetics and that he had a philosophy of art though its component ideas do not seem to have appeared simultaneously (except perhaps in *Bandagi Nama*).¹² Although by 'art' most of the time Iqbal means his own art, i.e. the poetic art much of what he says is relevant also to the other arts.

Purpose of Art

For Iqbal, art must add to the fullness and richness of life. Art is genuine and significant only when it impinges dynamically on life, deepening its appreciation, quickening its pulse and illuminating its fundamental purposes with insight.¹³ He has no use for a self-regarding art which is divorced from the problems of living. Art must serve life in some way and not exist merely for its own sake. Unequivocally he says:

“Art is subordinate to life, not superior to it. The ultimate end of all human activity is life-glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force, and helps us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around on the mastery of which alone life depends — is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in art. The disguise of art for

¹² Iqbal, M., *Zabur-e-ʿA jam*, Lahore, 1948, pp. 245-264.

¹³ Saiyidain, K. G., *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy*, Lahore, 1960, p. 3.

the sake of art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.”¹⁴

Iqbal has placed much emphasis on the “life-yielding” quality of art and stated emphatically that art which is “life destroying,” robbing life of its joy, zest, courage and enthusiasm, should cease to exist

افسردہ اگر اس کی نواسے کی نوا سے ہو گلستان
بہتر ہے کہ خاموش رہے مرغ سحر خیز

(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 127)¹⁵

اگر نوا میں سے پوشیدہ موت کا پیغام
حرام میری نگاہوں میں نالئے وچنگ و رباب

(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 125)¹⁶

Attack on “Decadent” Art

A good portion of Iqbal’s writings on aesthetics deals with the subject of what he considers to be “decadent” art. Like Plato, Iqbal too had once been susceptible to the charms of poetry which sapped the energies of human beings lulling them into a barren, albeit a seemingly golden dream, of effortless existence. For Iqbal, Hall/ is the symbol of such life-stultifying art. This is surprising, for to the young poet Iqbal, Hafiz had meant much. ‘Attiya Faizi tells us of Iqbal’s great admiration, for Hafiz and comments, “I felt that

¹⁴ Vahid, S. A., (Editor), Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, Lahore, 1964.

¹⁵ If the garden with its song is made mournful and sad, ‘this better then, silent remains the early-rising bird.

¹⁶ If hidden in a melody is the call of death, unholy in my sight are, then, the flute, the harp, the vol.

Iqbal believed more in Hafiz than in any other Persian poet.”¹⁷ In his Notebook, Iqbal himself paid a glowing tribute to the perfection of Hafiz’s poetic technique. “In words like out jewels Hafiz put the sweet unconscious spirituality of the nightingale.”¹⁸

Iqbal’s rejection of Hafiz was, in effect, also a rejection of a phase of his own youth, a phase when he could say:

زندگانی جس کو کہتے ہیں فرارموشی ہے یہ
خواب ہے غفلت ہے 'سرمستی ہے' ہبیوشی ہے یہ

¹⁹ (Bang-e-Dara, p. 93)

In lines which caused great uproar, Iqbal attached, Hafiz in no uncertain terms,

ہوشیار از حافظ صہباگسار
جامش از زہر اجل سرمایہ دار
ناوک انداز کہ تاب از دل برو
نارک او مرگ را شیریں کند²⁰

¹⁷ Faizi, A., Iqbal, Bombay, 1947, p. 15.

¹⁸ Iqbal, J., (Editor), Stray Reflections, Lahore, 1961, p. 152.

¹⁹ That which is called living is but a forgetfulness, a dream, a drowsiness, a drunkenness, unconsciousness.

²⁰ Beware of Hafiz the drinker of wine, his cup is full of deadly poison; he is an archer who robs the heart of strength, his dart makes even death seem sweet.

He went on to compare Hafiz unfavourably with ‘Urfi, another Persian poet:

حافظ جادو بیان شیرازی
است
عرفئی آتش بیان
شیرازی است
این سوئے ملک خودی
مرکب جهانند
آن کنار آب و کنا باد
جاندا!
باده زن باعرفئی ہنگامہ
خیز
زنده از صحت حافظ
گریزا!

²²(Khayaban-e-Iqbal, p. 232)

Iqbal inveighed against Hafiz “for his quietism, his Epicureanism, his libertinism, his indifference to the great historical events that were taking place around him and the soporific effect of his mystical eroticism.”²³

²¹ Edited by Faruqi, M. I. and Ghaznawi, K., Peshawar, 1966.

²² Hafiz, the enchanting poet, hails from Shiraz, ‘Urfi, emitting fire, also hails from Shiraz, ‘Urfi leads to the domain of the Self, Hafiz remained on the banks of Ruknabad. Drink wine with ‘Urfi the tumultuous, if you have life, avoid the company of Hafiz.

Iqbal has painted a vivid picture of the harm that a poet who preaches death rather than life may do:

بوسه او تازگی از گل
برد
ذوق پرواز از دل بلبل
برد
سست اعصاب تو از
افیون او
زندگانی قیمت مضمون
او
نغمه ہائش از دلت دزد
وثبات
مرگ را از سحر او دانی
حیات
دریم اندیشہ انداز و ترا
از عمل بیگانه می سازد
ترا
حسن او را با صداقت

²³ Hussain, M. H., Iqbal, on Poetry and the Poet, (In manuscript, consulted by courtesy of the author).

کار نیست

درئیش جز گو پر تف

دار نیست

(Asrar-e-Khudi, pp. 39-40)²⁴

Implicit in Iqbal's rejection .of Hafiz, is his rejection of a considerable portion of contemporary Persian and Urdu poetry. In his view, perhaps the senses could luxuriate in such art but themes such as the following could hardly offer sustenance to the spirit:

راہیے در حلقہ دام

ہوسس!

دلبرے باطائرمے اندر

قفس

خسروے پیش فقیرے

خرقہ پوش

مرد کوہستانی بیزم

بدوش

نازنینے در رہ بت خانہ

²⁴ His kiss robs the rose of freshness, He takes away from the nightingale the joy of flying. The sinews are relaxed by his opium, Thou payest for his song with the life. His melodies steal firmness from thy heart, His magic persuades thee that death is life, He plunges thee in a sea of thought. And makes thee a stranger to action. His beauty hath no dealing with truth, There are none but flawed pearls in his sea. (Nicholson, R. A., The Secrets of the Self, Lahore, 1964, pp. 64-65.)

جو گئے در خلوت
ویرانہ

پیر کے از درد پیری داغ
داغ

آنکہ اندر دست او گل

شب چراغ

(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 254)²⁵

Transition from 'Ajam to Hijaz

In Asrar-e-Khudi, Iqbal bids us leave the “garden of Persia” and return to “the heat of the desert.”²⁶ ‘Ajam was to become for Iqbal a symbol of art which, though moving and beautiful in its own way, does not keep the ego in that state of tension, or heightened self-awareness, in which it is able to pervade reality and transcend all obstructing forces.

ہے شعر عجم گرچہ طربناک و

دلاویز

اس شعر سے ہوتی نہیں

شمشیر خودی تیز!

²⁵ A monk caught in the snare of carnal lust; A beauty with a bird imprisoned in A cage, a king with folded knees before A hermit wrapped up in a patchwork cloak; A man from the hills with a firewood load; A lovelorn maiden going to a temple; A Yogi sitting in a wilderness; An old man tortured by the pains of age, Whose candle is about to flicker out. (Iqbal, on Poetry and the Poet.)

²⁶ The Secrets of the Self, p. 70.

(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 127)²⁷

Because art is subservient to life — and life, for Iqbal is the ego's striving for perfection — it is necessary to move on from 'Ajam to Hijaz. Hijaz now becomes, aesthetically, the symbol for that potent, life-yielding and life-enriching art which unites Beauty and Power, and becomes an embodiment of Love. Iqbal says:

دلبری بے قاہری جادہ
گری است
دلبری باقاہری پیغمبری
است

(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 264)²⁸

Is "Decadent" Art Not Art at All?

An interesting question comes to mind here. One wonders if Iqbal would have denied the status of art to the work of poets such as Hafiz. Iqbal had known that "the good in art is not necessarily identical with the good in life; it is possible for a person to write fine poetry, and lead his society to Heil."²⁹ Since it is possible for the good in art to be separate from the good in life, Iqbal would not have denied the name of art to that which was, in any way, detrimental to life. However, such art he would have banished from his Republic.

Attack on All Art

²⁷ Though Persian verse is lively and entrancing, not sharpened by this verse is ego's sword.

²⁸ Beauty sans power is mere sorcery, But joined with power, beauty is prophethood.

²⁹ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 84.

There are places in Iqbal's works where he seems to denounce not only decadent art but all art. His words "convey the impression that he has no use for poetry of any kind."³⁰ To the Editor of Makhzan he sent the message:

جو کام کچھ کر رہی
ہیں قومیں
انہیں مذاق سخن نہیں
ہے
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 140)³¹

His words may be easily misunderstood. Here Iqbal is not saying that art is useless. He is merely expressing his disapproval of the passivity in which his fellow-country men were sunk, content with poetry which did not stir in them any longing For action while European nations were struggling hard to build a better life tot themselves.

True Poetry versus Versification

At times Iqbal has denied the fact that he is a "poet

نہ بینی خیز ازاں مرد
فرد است
کہ برمن تہمت شعر و
سخن بست
سب کومے دلبران کارے

³⁰ Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

³¹ The nations who are strong in action do not have a taste for verse.

ندارم
دل زا زمے غم یارے
ندارم
نہ خاک من غبار
رہگذارے
نہ در خاکم دل بے
اختیارے
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 204)³²

This disclaimer is, of course, an attack on traditional erotic poetry which abounds in lifeless images of servile adoration. Such poetry lacks dignity and sincerity and is unworthy of the fortified, self-respecting ego.

When Iqbal says:

مری نوائے پریشاں کو
شاعری نہ سمجھ
کہ میں ہوں محرم راز
درون میخانہ

³² No good will ever come from any churlish boor who lays the charge of versifying at my door. I do not know the alley where the poet's sweet-heart swells; I have no lovelorn heart which someone's coldness ails, Mere humble dust, I yet do not lie on the street to be a carpet under beauty's feet.

Nor is there in my dust A heart made clamorous by lust. (Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.)

He does not mean to say that he is not a poet but that his song is not mere versification. Versification is a mechanical activity, whereas true poetry is organic to the poet's being and reveals to him the secrets of life and reality. This is another significant idea from Iqbal's aesthetics, namely, that poetry is to be distinguished from versification. As Sir Philip Sidney wrote, "there have been many most excellent poets that never versified, and now swarm many versifiers that need never answer to the name of poets."³⁴

Art as Imitation

One of the oldest conceptions of art is art as imitation ("mimesis"). For Plato, art was an imitation of transcendental reality and not once but twice removed from the truth, as the artist imitates what is itself an appearance. Iqbal does not believe in the imitation theory of art. He questions the very reality, which, according to Plato, poetry fails to represent. Even if Plato's picture of reality could be represented it would, for Iqbal, be an immoral act; for it would amount to the bodying forth of illusions. For Iqbal poetry does not represent an illusory world forever beyond human reach but a real world — a world which has a past, present and future, and can be seen and known.³⁵

For Iqbal, art is no more an imitation of Nature than it is an imitation of a supersensible world of Ideas. To the poet he says:

فطرت کی غلامی سے کر آزاد ہنر کو
صیاد ہیں مردان ہنر مند کہ نخچیر

³³ Think not my troubled song is just a rhyme — for I am privy to the secrets of the tavern's inside.

³⁴ Collins, J. C., (Editor), Sidney's Apologie for Poetry, Oxford, 1955, p. 12.

³⁵ Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

To imitate Nature is to enervate the Self by denying an opportunity to its creativeness to manifest itself. Iqbal describes a poet who is merely an imitator of Nature thus:

حسن را در پوزه از فطرت کند
رہزن دراه نمی دستے زند
حسن را از خود بردن جستن خطاست
آنچه می بایست پیش ما کجاست!
نقش گر خود را چو بافطرت سپرد
نقش او افگندد نقش فود سترد
(Zabur-e-' Ajam, p. 255)³⁷

Art as Improvement on Nature

Poets give life to the images of Nature from the dynamism of their own being. They are not passive observers on whose blank mind Nature leaves a series of discordant impressions. On the contrary- by imaginative participation in the life of Nature, poets give unity to the diversity of natural phenomena and a meaning to what they perceive. Nature is what it is, poets create from what is that which ought to be. In the words of Sir Philip Sidney, “Her (Nature’s) world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden.”³⁸

³⁶ Free art from imitating Nature’s way, are artists hunters or mere beasts of prey?

³⁷ He goes to Nature with a begging bowl For beauty’s alms: a robber in disguise, He steals from Nature, itself destitute. To seek for beauty outside of yourself is wrong: what ought to be is not before Your eyes, all ready-made for you to see. A painter who surrenders himself to The forms of Nature loses the form of his Self In imitating mere external forms. (Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

³⁸ Collins, J. C. (Editor), Sidney’s Apologie for Poetry, O. 8.

In Iqbal's words:

“I O permit the visible to shape the invisible, to seek ‘what is scientifically called adjustment with Nature is to recognize her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli, and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance of what is with a view to create what ought to be, is health and life. All else is decay and death... The artist who is blessing to mankind defies life In the words of Fichte, he sees all Nature full, large, and abundant as opposed to him who sees all things thinner, smaller and emptier than they actually are. The modern age seeks inspiration from Nature. But Nature simply ‘is’ and her function is mainly to obstruct our search for ‘ought’ which the poet must discover within the depth of his own being.”³⁹

In regarding Nature as passive and static and the poet as possessing the inner power of investiture, Iqbal comes very close in idea to the thought expressed in the well-known lines of S.T. Coleridge:

“O Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does Nature live;
Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud!
And would we ought behold, of higher worth
Than that inanimate cold world allowed
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd,
Ah! from the sour itself must issue forth
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
Enveloping the Earth.”⁴⁰

³⁹ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 145.

⁴⁰ Coleridge, E. H. (Editor), The Complete Poetical Works of S.T. Coleridge, Oxford, 1912, Volume I, p. 365.

The poet is expected by Iqbal to transcend Nature and to succeed where Nature has failed:

بے ذوق نہیں اگرچہ فطرت
جو اس سے نہ ہو سکا وہ تو کر
(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 87)⁴¹

The poet adds a new charm to the of Nature:

از نگاہش خوب گردد خوب تر
فطرت از افسون او محبوب تر
(Asrar-e-Khudi, p. 37)⁴²

and may be said to have improved upon it:

آن ہنر مندے کہ بر فطرت فزود
راز خود را بر نگاہ ما کشود
آفریند کائنات دیگرے
قلب رابخشد حیات دیگرے
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 256)⁴³

Browning has, expressed the same thought thus:

⁴¹ Though lacking in taste Nature is not, What she is unable to do, you do!

⁴² By his look the fair is made fairer Through his enchantments Nature is more beloved.
(The Secrets of the Self, p. 61.)

⁴³ The skilful master improves upon Nature, and reveals his secret to our gaze! He creates a new world and gives a new life to our being!

“For, don’t you mark? we’re made so that we love
First when we see them painted, things we have passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see;
And so they are better, painted — better to us,
Which is the same thing, Art was given for that;
God Uses us to help each other so,
Lending our minds out.”⁴⁴

To sum up the relation of Art with Nature it would be true to say that Iqbal believes with Sir Thomas Browne that “nature is not at variance with art, nor art with nature; they both being the servants of His Providence: Art is the perfection of Nature.”⁴⁵

Iqbal’s Disapproval of Drama

If has been observed by a writer that Iqbal disapproves of drama because, “it kills our personality or egohood”.⁴⁶ It is to be noted here that Iqbal does not disapprove of the writing of drama and that a number of his own poems have, in I fact, a dramatic structure and effect. What he disapproves is the performance of a play because it involves a kind of mimicry or imitation, and by imitation the Self is weakened.

حریم تیرا خودی غیر کی! معاذ اللہ
دو بارہ زندہ نہ کر کاروبار لات و منات
یہی کمال ہے تمثیل کا کہ تو نہ رہے

⁴⁴ The Poetical Works of Robert Browning, London, 1905; Volume I, p. 522.

⁴⁵ Browne Sir T., *Religio Medici* (Edited by Denonain J. J.), Cambridge, 1953, p. 26.

⁴⁶ Sharif, M. M., *About Iqbal and His Thought*, Lahore, 1964, p. 91.

رہا نہ تو، تو نہ سوز خودی نہ ساز حیات
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 104)⁴⁷

Emphasis on Creativeness

Throughout his writings, both poetical and philosophical, Iqbal has laid much emphasis on creativeness an attribute which humanity shares with God. “Both God and man, “he says, live by perpetual creation. The artist is an associate of God and feels the contact of time and eternity in his soul.”⁴⁸

In considering the creative imagination as an extension of God’s creative powers, Iqbal has an affinity with Blake and Coleridge. “For Blake the imagination is nothing less than God as He operates in the human soul. It follows that any act of creation performed by the imagination is divine.”⁴⁹ Coleridge defines the primary-imagination as “the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.”⁵⁰

For Iqbal, God is the archetypal poet and the supreme creative artist.⁵¹ A human being is God’s apprentice:-

گفت یزداں کہ چنیں است و
دگر ہیچ مگو
گفت آدم چنیں است و چنار
می بایست
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 192)⁵²

⁴⁷ Your sanctuary and another’s self! God forbid! Revive not the business of Lat-Manat, Theatre’s object is — you should not be, if you are not, no selfhood and no life.

⁴⁸ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 145.

⁴⁹ Bowra; C. M., The Romantic Imagination, Oxford, 1964, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁰ Coleridge, S. T., Biographic Literaria, (Edited by Shawcross, J., Oxford, 1907, Volume, I, p. 202.

⁵¹ Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

and to assert that human creativity is not inferior to God's:

تو شب آفریدی چراغ آفریدم
سفال آفریدی ایاع آفریدم
بیابان و کہسار دراغ آفریدی
خیابان و گلزار و باغ آفریدم
من آنم کہ از سنگ آئینہ سازم
من آنم کہ از زہر نوشینہ سازم
(Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 132)⁵³

The artist also dares to question God about God's finest creation which is humanity itself:

عالم سوزو ساز میں وصل سے
بڑھ کے ہے فراق
وصل میں مرگ آرزو ہجر میں

⁵² God said, "It is like this! Gainsay it not". Said Adam, "Thus it is, like that should be!"

⁵³ You created night and I made the lamp:

You created clay and I made the cup,

You created deserts and mountains and forests,

I created orchards and gardens and groves.

It is I who make a mirror from a stone

and I who make an antidote from a poison.

The Poet and Moral Responsibility

Iqbal agrees with Plato in regarding the poet as an inspired being. But Socrates when he had led Ion to confess to being either dishonest or divinely mad, had meant to discredit the poet anyhow. The poet has a touch of divine madness in him; from this Plato infers that a poet is not morally responsible for his utterances since his words are ordered by forces outside him. Iqbal admits that “inspiration is... is gift the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it.”⁵⁵ However, from this premise Iqbal draws a conclusion vastly different from Plato’s. The poet is blessed above others and therefore bears the burden of greater responsibility to God.

For Iqbal, then inspiration or the creative intuition is of the greatest importance, for if it is lacking, “a work can be perfectly made, and it is nothing; the artist has nothing to say... Just as finally the unique law of the perfect soul, according to the saying of St. Augustine is — love and do what you want -- the unique rule of the perfect artist is finally 'cling to your creative intuition and do what you' 'want?’”⁵⁶

Vision and Desire

Since the object of art is to look into “the life of things” and unfold the secrets of Eternity, Iqbal says:

اے اہل نظر ذوق نظر خوب ہے لیکن

⁵⁴ Neither self-seeing, nor God-seeing, nor world-seeing, of your great art is this the masterpiece?

⁵⁵ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 144.

⁵⁶ Jacques H., Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, New York, 1953, p. 60.

جو شے کی حقیقت کو نہ دیکھے تو نظر کیا
مقصود ہنر سوز حیات ابدی ہے
یہ ایک نفس یا دو نفس مثل شرر کیا
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 117)⁵⁷

Iqbal perceives poets as restless creatures, possessed of an unbounded imagination which sets before them endless goals and ideals to be achieved. The fire of their passion consumes their very being, yet for them desires and dreams are born every instant

فطرت شاعر سراپا جستجوست
خالق و پروردگار آرزو ست
(Javid Nama, p. 45)⁵⁸

Since desire is the fountain-head of, art, a desire which remains ungratified is of greater value to the artist than a desire which is lost in fulfilment:

عالم سوز و ساز میں وصل سے بڑھ کئے ہے فراق
وصل میں مرگ آرزو ہجر میں لذت طلب!
(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 155)⁵⁹

and so it is the poet's prayer that the ultimate goal remain an ever ceding shore:

⁵⁷ Men of vision, it is good to have an eye for beauty, But the eye that does not perceive Reality has no vision! Art yearns for the immortal life, And not for this fleeting breath transitory like the spark. (Iqbal's Educational Philosophy, p. 3.)

⁵⁸ The poet's nature is all searching, creator and nourisher of desire.

(Arberry, A. Javid Nama, 1966, p. 45.)

⁵⁹ In the world of passion and song better than union is separation; in union is desire's death; in separation the pleasure of yearning.

ہر لحظہ نیا طور نئی برق تجلی
اللہ کرے مرحلہ شوق نہ ہو طے!
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 126)⁶⁰

Art and Life

Iqbal has said repeatedly that it is a necessary condition of art that it is not bifurcated from the' endless struggles and quests of life. "Matthew Arnold," says Iqbal, "defines poetry as criticism of life. That life is criticism of poetry is equally true".⁶¹ Real poetry springs from the depths of actual experience, from the hopes and despairs, joys and sorrows, aspirations and frustrations of the human heart. To the poet, Iqbal says:

اے میان کیسہت نقد سخن
برعیار زندگی او را بزن
(Asrar-e-Khudi, p. 42)⁶²

Abstract knowledge is not the stuff of which poetry is made:

نادان! ادب و فلسفہ کچھ چیز نہیں ہے
اسباب ہنر کے لیے لازم ہے تگ و دو
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 169)⁶³

⁶⁰ Each instant, a new Sinai,-a new flash, God grant Desire's journey never ends.

⁶¹ Stray Reflections, p. 37.

⁶² If thou hast the coin of poesy in the purse, Rub it on the touchstone of life. (The Secrets of the Self, pp. 68-69.)

⁶³ Unknowing one, literature and philosophy are naught, essential for the stuff of art is the struggle of life.

Keats had also believed that “nothing ever becomes real till it is experienced; even a proverb is no proverb to you till your life was illustrated it.”⁶⁴

For Iqbal, “Art is living only in so far as the poet or any artist has poured his lifeblood into it.”

(Bal -e- Jibril, p. 136)⁶⁵

رنگ ہو یا خشت و سنگ جنگ ہو یا حرف و صوت
معجزہ فن کی ہے خوں جگر سے نمود!

(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 129)⁶⁶

نقش ہیں سب ناتمام خون جگر کے بغیر
نغمہ ہے سودائے خام خون جگر کے بغیر

(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 136)⁶⁷

خون دل و جگر سے ہے میری نوا کی پرورش
ہے رگ ساز میں رواں صاحب ساز کا لہو!

(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 154)⁶⁸

Intensity in Art

⁶⁴ Rollins, H. E., (Editor), Letters of John Keats, Cambridge, (Massachusetts), 1958, Volume II, p. 91.

⁶⁵ Schimmel, A. M., Gabriel's Wing, Leiden, 1963, pp. 70-71.

⁶⁶ Colour or brick and stone, harp, or speech and sound, born of heart's blood alone are miracles of art.

⁶⁷ Incomplete are all creations without the heart's blood, and lacking it a melody is but a frenzy false.

⁶⁸ Nourished is my song with the heart's blood —the artist's blood flows in the instrument's vein.

For Iqbal, as for Coleridge, “Passion must be the soul of Poetry.”⁶⁹ When passion — and for Iqbal, this passion is Love — irradiates art, it acquires intensity, beauty and truth. With Keats, Iqbal had believed that “the excellence of every art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeable evaporate, from their close relation-ship with Beauty and Truth.”⁷⁰ Intensity in art, or what Longinus called “sublimity” is the product “of an inspired moment of passion, rather than of cool and sustained calculation.”⁷¹

Art and Beauty

Both Keats and Iqbal held that through beauty the artist can somehow come into the presence of the ultimately real. Of Keats, a writer has said that he “substitutes the discovery of beauty through the imagination for the discovery of facts through the reason, and asserts that it is a more satisfactory and certain way of piercing to the heart of things since inspired insight sees more than abstract ratiocination ever can... The rationale of poetry is that intensity that is at once both beautiful and real.”⁷²

Iqbal has expressed the Keatsian idea thus:

حق اگر سوزے ندارد حکمت است
شعر میگرد وچو سوز از دل گرفت
بوعلی اندر غبار ناقه گم
دست روسی پردهٔ محمل گرفت
(Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 122)⁷³

Poetry and Philosophy

⁶⁹ Quoted in Abrams, M. H., *The Mirror and the Lamp*, New York, 1953, p. 134.

⁷⁰ *Letters of John Keats*, Vol. 1, p. 192.

⁷¹ Quoted in *The Mirror and the Lamp*, p. 133.

⁷² *The Romantic Imagination*, pp. 147-148.

⁷³ Sans fervour, Truth is but Philosophy, Grasping heart's passion Poetry it becomes. Lost in the camel-raised dust is Avicenna, While Rumi's hand has grasped the dorser's veil.

It is the poet who animates the abstract concepts of philosophy and gives to them a living reality. In Iqbal's words "Philosophy is a set of abstractions shivering in the cold night of human reason. The poet comes and warms them into objectivity."⁷⁴

Iqbal has expressed his lack of enthusiasm for mathematical or logical preciseness in poetry in his comment on Matthew Arnold:

"Matthew Arnold is a very precise poet. I like, however, an element of obscurity and vagueness in poetry, since the vague and the obscure appear profound to the emotions."⁷⁵

He also states:

"It is idle to seek logical Truth in poetry. The ideal of imagination is beauty, not truth. Do not then try to show a poet's greatness by quoting passages which embody scientific truth."⁷⁶

Iqbal and Nietzsche

Like Iqbal, Nietzsche believes that art is inspired by passion rather than reason or logic. But for Nietzsche, the creative passion underlying art and poetry is a blind force. It is Dionysian power, the symbol of the Eternal Will, which destroys the Apollonian illusion of beauty, reason and enlightenment merely so that it can assert the permanence of change and the mastery of the irrational and immoral, will to live. With Iqbal, however, the will-to-live is inspired by a moral impulse. In its highest manifestation this moral impulse becomes Love, when the Self identifies itself with the object of its Love.⁷⁷66

Nietzsche has two categories of art, the Apolline and the Dionysiac.⁷⁸67 Iqbal also has two categories, symbolized by "Jamal" (Beauty) and "Jalal" (Power) respectively, but while Nietzsche is partial to Dionysian as against

⁷⁴ Stray Reflections, p. 127.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 106.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 16.

⁷⁷ Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

⁷⁸ Carritt, E. F., The Theory of Beauty, London, 1931, p. 139.

Apolline, Iqbal maintains a balance between beauty and sublimity, and recommends a synthesis of them in art as well as in human life. It is of interest to note here that one of Iqbal's criticisms of decadent art was that it possessed "Jamal" but lacked "Jalal" and was, therefore, ineffective.

نہ ہو جمال تو حسن و جمال ہے تاثیر
نرا نفس ہے اگر نغمہ ہو نہ آشناک
(Zarb-e- Kalim,, p. 122)⁷⁹

One main difference in the effect achieved by the two categories of art has been stated thus: "The mind feels itself moved in the representation of the Sublime in Nature; whilst in aesthetical judgment about the Beautiful it is in restful contemplation."⁸⁰ For Iqbal, both categories are needed for the perfection of art: "I have tried to picture the movement of the-true artist in whom love reveals itself as a unity of Beauty and Power."⁸¹

Iqbal and the Sturm und Drang School

Iqbal's theory of art may be compared with the aesthetic theory of the Sturm und Drang School. The aesthetic theory of this school was a kind of transcendental Qedonism. Poetry was regarded as the source of ecstatic rapture which led to an inner enlargement of the being and its final immersion in the Absolute. The poet presented supersensible reality and poetry manifested the divine principle of creative energy which pervades the universe keeping the human soul constantly in a fever of self-expression. Poetry revealed reality more fully than philosophy, which was only concerned with conceptual thought. This school regarded the poet as God's co-worker in creation and as such an ideal being.⁸²

⁷⁹ Without Power, Beauty and Charm are of no avail, if a melody has no fire it is merely breath.

⁸⁰ Bernard J. H. (Editor), Kant's Critique of Judgment, London, 1914, p. 120.

⁸¹ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 144.

⁸² Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

To a considerable extent Iqbal agrees with this school of thought except for its hedonistic aspect. Getting involved in a kind of pseudo-mysticism, the Sturm und Drang School regarded the spiritual rapture which poetry produced as being desirable for its own sake. Iqbal, however, does not consider it desirable, unless it translates itself into concrete action. In Iqbal's philosophy there is no place for static pleasure or mere contemplation "much less for the spurious pleasure of feeling like a demigod or superman without acting like one."⁸³ In his own words: "Life, like the arts of poetry and a painting, is wholly expression. Contemplation without action' is death."⁸⁴

Beauty and Love in Iqbal's Aesthetics

Beauty and Love figure very largely in Iqbal's aesthetics and it is interesting to see the different roles allotted to these concepts during the different phases of Iqbal's thought.⁸⁵ Iqbal's theory of art, in its earliest stages, was heavily coloured by Neoplatonism. Like Plato, Iqbal identified God with Beauty and held that it was Beauty which set in motion the dynamic of Eros and Love.

Eternal Beauty is reflected in all things:

حسن ازل کی پیدا ہر چیز میں
 جہل _____ ک ہے
 انسان میں وہ سخن ہے غنجے میں
 وہ چٹ _____ ک ہے
 یہ چاند آسمان کا شاعر کا دل ہے

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Stray Reflections, p. 110.

⁸⁵ Here I am' indebted to M. M. Sharif's illuminating essay: "Iqbal's Theory of Beauty" in About Iqbal and His Thought, pp. 54-84.

گویا
واں چاندنی ہے جو کچھ یاں درد
کسی کسی کسک ہے
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 82)⁸⁶

Avicenna believed that everything in the world is striving to complete itself; what prompts its striving is Love, and its aim is Beauty. Avicenna's theory also finds an expression in Iqbal:

کہنے لگا چاند! ہم نشینو!
اے مزرع شب کے خوشہ چینو!
جنبش سے ہے زندگی جہاں کی
یہ رسم قدیم ہے یہاں کی
ہے دوڑتا اشہب زمانہ
کہا کہا کے طلب کا تازیانہ
انجام ہے اس خرام کا حسن
آغاز ہے عشق، انتہا حسن
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 121)⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Visible in everything is Beauty everlasting.

What's speech in humans, is in the bud a sparkle ravishine

It is as if the moon in the sky is as the poet's heart,

What happens to be moonlight there, is here a painful smart.

⁸⁷ "Oh my companions", said the moon,

Until 1908, Iqbal had accepted the Platonic doctrine of ‘anamnesis’ which Socrates advanced “as an explanation of how we come to be possessed at all of ideas more perfect than the things of our worldly experience.”⁸⁸ Iqbal’s early writings suggest that at that time he believed that before birth the soul enjoyed the presence of Eternal Beauty and that yearning for beauty in this life is a longing for that lost delight:

محفل قدرت ہے اک دریائے بے پایان حسن
آنکھ اگر دیکھے تو ہر قطرے میں ہے طوفان حسن
روح کو لیکن کسی گم گشتہ شے کی ہے ہوس
ورنہ اس صحرامیں کیوں نالاں ہے یہ مثل جرس
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 93)⁸⁹

“You who night’s harvest-acres glean,
On motion all this world’s life hangs:
.Such is the ancient doom of things.
Swift runs the shadowy steed of time
Lashed by desire’s whip into foam,
And what is the goal of all this haste?
Its cradle love — beauty its quest.”

(Kiernan, V. G., Poems from Iqbal, London, 1955, p. 11.)

⁸⁸ Wimsatt, W. and Brooks C., Literary Criticism: A Short History, London, 1951, p. 137.

⁸⁹ A river of boundless beauty, Nature is,

if eyes can see each drop’s a riot of beauty,
but the spirit lusts for something that is lost,
else why does it mourn bell-like in this desert?

During the first phase of the development of his theory of art, Iqbal believed that Reality is made manifest to humanity only through Beauty. Every beautiful object be it a rosebud, or star or a scene, is a window through which one peeps into the heart of truth by establishing a kind of communication between mind and reality. The function of the true artist is to reveal similar beauty in all things, which are particular revelations of that Divine Beauty which permeates the whole universe.⁹⁰

In 1908, the year of his return from Europe, Iqbal went through a period of doubt about the existence of real beauty in the world.

جلوۂ حسن کہ ہے جس سے تمنا بے تاب
پالتا ہے جسے آغوش تخیل میں شباب
ابدی بنتا ہے یہ عالم فانی جس سے
ایک افسانہ رنگیں ہے جوانی جس سے
دور ہو جاتی ہے ادراک کی خامی جس سے
عقل کرتی ہے تاثر کی غلامی جس سے
آہ! موجود بھی وہ حسن کہیں ہے کہ نہیں؟
خاتم دھر میں یارب وہ رنگیں ہے کہ نہیں؟
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 131)⁹¹

⁹⁰ Das S., "The Philosophy of Sir Mohomed Iqbal," Indian Review, Madras; 1938, Volume 39, p. 737.

⁹¹ Beauty's-display which keeps desire restless,

which is, 'in fancy's bosom, fed by youth,

which makes immortal this our mortal world,

and makes youth seem a colourful episode,

He was also struck by the thought of Beauty's mutability. Beauty asks the Creator:

خدا سے حسن نے ایک روز یہ
کیا سوال
جہاں میں کیوں نہ مجھے تو
نے لازوال کیا
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 112)⁹²

The reply is unexpected:

ملا جو اب کہ تصویر خانہ ہے دنیا
شب در از عدم کا فسانہ ہے دنیا
ہوئی ہے رنگ تغیر سے جب نمود اسکی
وہی حسین ہے حقیقت زوال ہے جس کی
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 113)⁹³

which makes good the intellect's limitations

and makes reason captive to the senses,

Ah! is such Beauty present anywhere or not?

Lord, in there such a gem in the world's ring or not?

⁹² Beauty asked God one day This question: "Why Didst Thou not make me, in Thy world, Undying?"

(Poems from Iqbal, p. 10.)

⁹³ And God replying.

"A picture-show is this world: all this world

Here we have a glimpse of the idea that haunted Keats — that Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes and must die. This thought makes the lover pursue Beauty all the more intently and ardently and since “every mental pursuit takiss its reality and worth from the ardour of the pursuer;”⁹⁴ its very mutability makes Beauty more real.

In Asrar-e-Khudi, Iqbal had written:

(Asrar-e-Khudi, p. 37)⁹⁵

Later we see a gradual shifting of the emphasis from Beauty to, Love. Of Geothe, “it has been said ... that his search for the nature of beauty culminated and ended in praise of the divine powers of love.”⁹⁶ Iqbal’s quest also ended in love. In the period extending from about 1920 to the time of his death, Iqbal described the essence of Reality not in terms of Beauty but in terms of Love. As M. M. Sharif has observed:

A tale out of the long night of not-being;

And,in it, seeing,

Its nature works rough mutability,

That only is lovely whose essence knows decay”

(Poems from Iqbal, p. 10.)

⁹⁴ The Letters of John Keats, Vol. 1, p. 242.

⁹⁵ Beauty is the creator of desire’s spring-tide,

Desire is nourished by the display of Beauty,

‘Tis in the poet’s breast that Beauty unveils

(The Secrets of the Self, p. 61.)

⁹⁶ About Iqbal and His Thought, p. 69.

“For the Neoplatonist Iqbal, beauty was the creator and the goal of love; for the budding vitalist Iqbal, it was the creator of love, but not its goal; now for the full-fledged heroic vitalist Iqbal, love is everything.”⁹⁷

For Iqbal while Beauty is subject to mutability, not so is Love:

(Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 195)⁹⁸

(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 197)⁹⁹

Iqbal has written extensively on Love which is for him the way and the end, the criterion of beauty, the power and the glory of human life:

(Zabur-e-'Ajam, pp. 263-264)¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

⁹⁸ Beauty said that my morning has no eventide, Love said the immortality of restlessness I have.

⁹⁹ O world of colour and scent, how long will our association last?

Extinction is your final doom and love is my destiny.

¹⁰⁰ It is a touchstone for the gold of beauty, It both uncovers beauty and preserves Its sanctity. Its aspirations soar Beyond the summit of the skies, beyond This world of quantity, cause and effect. Love sublimates all passions and invests With worth much that is worthless. Without love Life is a funeral, a joyless thing.

A celebration of decay and death. Love meliorates man's mental faculties And Burnishes a stone into a mirror. It gives the miracle-performing power Of Moses' Shining Hand. All that exists, All that is possible yields to its might; And in this bitter, gloomy world it is a gushing fountain of sweetness and light.

For Iqbal, the experiential knowledge of Reality as distinguished from abstract intellectualism is named “Ishq”. All true poetry must find its basis in Love:

(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p, 253)¹⁰¹

A real artist is a lover. Love alone brings true knowledge by unfolding the secrets of the heart.

(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 113)¹⁰²

Iqbal and Shelley

In his conception of Love as the source of poetry and of the moral impulse in human beings Shelley is close to Iqbal. He says,

“The great secret of morals in love; or a going out of our own nature, and identification of ourselves with the beautiful that exists in thought, action or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and .comprehensively, he must put himself in the place of another, and of many others, the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination, and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause.”¹⁰³

The ardour of our thought comes from its fire. Its work is to create and to breath life-Into what it creates.

(Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.)'

¹⁰¹ A melody must be cherished on the madness of love, it should be like fire dissolved in life-blood.

¹⁰² When the musician understands the secrets of the heart, then overcome are all the stages and problems of art.

¹⁰³ Shelley, P. B., “A Defence of Poetry”, The Four Ages of Poetry, Oxford, 1947, p. 33.

The Poet as Prophet

In the history of literary criticism we come across a number of instances when a poet has been regarded as a prophet. This is hardly surprising since, like prophets, poets transform subjective into objective reality, and translate their own inner states of being into concrete facts and situations, thereby adding new dimensions to life.¹⁰⁴ However, seldom has the word 'prophet' in this context borne so wide a connotation as it does in Iqbal's thought.

Prophets grasp the deepest realities of human existence and since these realities can only be grasped through life-enhancing action, they attempt to produce, in the people to whom they are sent, such action or at least a state of mind conducive to it.¹⁰⁵ Poets must do likewise or else for Iqbal their art is trivial and of little significance:

گرہنر میں نہیں تعمیر خودی کا جوہر
وائے صورت گری و شاعری و نامے و سرود
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 112)¹⁰⁶

In those who lack strength and courage, they must infuse a spirit of resolve and fortitude:

نوا پیرا ہو اے بلبل کہ ہو
تیرے ترنم سے
کبوتر کے تن نازک میں
شاہیں کا جگر پیدا

¹⁰⁴ Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

¹⁰⁵ McCarthy E., "Iqbal as a Poet and Philosopher", Iqbal Review, October 1961, p. 21.

¹⁰⁶ If art lacks the Self-building quality.

woe to such sculpture, poetry and music.

(Bang-e-Dara, p. 300)¹⁰⁷

And if poets succeed in shaping the human personality, then they are accomplishing the task of prophets:

شعر را مقصود اگر آدم
گرمی است
شاعری ہم وارث پیغمبری
است
(Javid Nama, p. 46)¹⁰⁸

‘ Like Blake and Shelley, Iqbal also believes that poets are vouchsafed knowledge of what is yet to be – that is, they have the gift of foresight and prophecy. In the words of Blake:

“Hear the voice of the Bard!

Who Present, Past and Future sees.”¹⁰⁹

Shelley’s theory of poetry “identifies poetry with prophecy,¹¹⁰ and for him, poets are “the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present”¹¹¹ For Iqbal:

حادثہ وہ جو کہ پردہٴ افلاک میں ہے
عکس اس کا مرے آئینہ ادراک میں ہے

¹⁰⁷ Commence your singing nightingale that with your melody

an eagle’s heart is born within a pigeon’s frail body.

¹⁰⁸ If the purpose of poetry is the fashioning of men, poetry is likewise the heir of prophecy. (Javid Nama, p. 45.)

¹⁰⁹ Frye N., (Editor), Selected Poetry and Prose of William Blake, New York, 1953, p. 35.

¹¹⁰ Pottle [A “The Case for Snetley,” English Romantic Poets, (Edited by Abrams M. H.). Oxford 1960, p. 290.

¹¹¹ “A Defence of Poetry,” p. 59.

نہ ستارے میں ہے نہ گردش افلاک میں ہے
تیری تقدیر مرے نالہ بیباک میں ہے
(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 94)¹¹²

The true poet, like the prophet, is also an interpreter of Nature who reveals secrets not known to humanity. In Iqbal's words:

“The world spirit conceals the various phases of her minor life in symbol. The universe is nothing but a great symbol. But she never takes the trouble to interpret them and to reveal their meaning to humanity.”¹¹³

For Iqbal, as for Shelley: poet-prophets are “gifted with a particular insight into the nature of reality”.¹¹⁴ They are visionaries and their poetry is the vehicle of their vision. Iqbal's poet-prophet is able not only to look into the future but also to inspire humanity to greater striving in order to achieve its higher destiny. Iqbal visualized Sir Saiyid's spirit words to the poet as follows:

سونے والوں کو جگا دے شعر کے اعجاز سے
خرمن باطل جلا دے شعلہ آواز سے
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 41)¹¹⁵

¹¹² The event that's yet beyond the curtain of the skies,

its shadow can be seen in my mind's mirror.

Not in the star nor in the motions of the sky,

your destiny lies in my unfeared song.

¹¹³ Stray Reflections, p. 105.

¹¹⁴ The Romantic Imagination, p. 21.

¹¹⁵ With the miracle of verse, awaken those asleep,

burn the seed of falsehood with the voice's flame.

Through their works, then, poets encourage human beings to translate the immense potentialities of the Self into action.

Iqbal's poet-prophet possesses the lineaments of Carlyle's Hero as Poet. Like Carlyle's Poet Hero, Iqbal's Ideal person is both a revealer and creator of beauty and values.¹¹⁶

چیں ربا ید از بساط روزگار
ہر نگار از دست او گپرو عبار
(Zabur-e-'A jam, p. 256)¹¹⁷

Carlyle's words,

“the true poet is ever, as of old, the Seer; whose eye has been gifted to discern the gold like mystery of God's universe and decipher some new lines of its celestial writings. We can still call him a Vates and Seer; for he sees into the greatest of secrets, ‘the open secret’, hidden things become clear; how the Future is but another phasis of the present: thereby are his words in very truth prophetic; what he has spoken shall be done.”¹¹⁸

For Iqbal too poets have a great social role to play. They are the “eye” of the nation:

شاعر رنگین نوا ہے دیدہ بینائے قوم
مبتلائے درد کوئی عضو ہو، روتی ہے آنکھ

¹¹⁶ Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.

¹¹⁷ He transforms the old values of life,

His art establishes the true standard of beauty

(Dar B. A., Iqbal's Gulshan-e-Raz-i Jadid and Bandagi Namah, Lahore, 1964, p. 70.)

¹¹⁸ Carlyle, T., Collected Works, London, 1869, Volume III, p. 388.

کس قدر ہمدرد سارے جس کی ہوتی ہے آنکھ
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 51)¹¹⁹

Lacking poets a nation becomes a mere heap of dust:

شاعر اندر سینہ ملّت چو دل
ملتے بے شاعرے انبار گل
(Javid Nama, p. 45)¹²⁰

Since the artist has messianic role to play. it follows that “the spiritual a health of a people largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their poets and artists receive.”¹²¹ Subject to the king or inspiration received, art can proclaim the message of life, or death

سینہ روشن ہو تو ہے سوز
سخن عین حیات
ہو نہ روشن، تو سخن مرگ
دوام اے ساقی

¹¹⁹ The poet with the colourful song is the nation’s eye,

if in pain is any limb, ‘tis the eye that weeps,

how great a sympathiser of the body is the eye!

¹²⁰ The poet is like the heart in-a people’s breast,

a people without a poet is a mere heap of clay.

(Javid Nama, p. 45.)

¹²¹ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 144.

(Bal-e-Jibril, p. 18)¹²²

From history Iqbal had learnt that life-denying ideas could destroy a nation more surely than anything else. He believed that

“The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or a Changes.”¹²³

Or, in words of poetry:

از نوا تشکیل تقدیر امم
از نو اتخریب و تعمیر امم
(Javid Nama, p. 195)¹²⁴

When art is divorced from life and its problems, it heralds a nation’s downfall:

نہ جدا رہے نو اگر تب و تاب
زندگی سے
کہ ہلاکی امم ہے یہ طریق نے
لوازی
(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 72)¹²⁵

¹²² Life itself is Poetry’s passion, if enlightened is the heart, if ‘tis not, then Poetry is eternal death, O giver-of-wine.

¹²³ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 145.

¹²⁴ The destinies of nations are shaped by a song, by a song nations are destroyed and rebuilt

(Javid Nama, p. 122.)

¹²⁵ Aloof the poet must not be from the pursuits of life,

Like Tennyson, Iqbal believed that “A song that nerves a nation’s heart is in itself a deed”¹²⁶ and for him the whetstone of poets’ art was whether their words possessed the efficacy of the stroke of Moses — the emblem of Love and Power in Iqbal’s poetry — and could resurrect a people’s languishing spirit

یہ معجزہ دنیا میں ابھرتی
نہیں قومیں
جو ضرب کلیمی نہیں رکھتا
وہ ہنر کیا

(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 117)¹²⁷

Not only did Iqbal hold it true that “nations are born in the hearts of poets”¹²⁸ but also that poets whose apt springs from their heart bring a message of life everlasting to the whole world:

اہل زمیں کو نسخہ زندگی دوام ہے
خون جگر سے تربیت پاتی ہے جو سخنوری
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 230)¹²⁹

And if poets be indeed like prophets in their ability to transform life and history then their words are comparable in sanctity to the utterance of celestial beings:

for the death of nations is this way of making songs.

¹²⁶ Tennyson, A., Poetical Works, London, 1959, p. 530.

¹²⁷ Without a miracle, in the World, nations cannot rise,

of what use is art which is lacking Moses’ stroke?

¹²⁸ Stray Reflections, p. 125.

¹²⁹ To the world it is a way to everlasting life, that art of eloquent speaking which is fostered by heart’s blood.

وہ شعر کہ پیغام حیات ابدی

ہے

یا نغمہ جبریل ہے یا بانگ

سرافیل

(Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 133)¹³⁰

Iqbal's Philosophy of Art: Questions

Two fundamental questions arising from Iqbal's philosophy of art relate to his views regarding (1) inspiration and purpose and (2) functionalism and 'universal' art. Each of these questions is discussed below.

Inspiration and Purpose, If poets are "inspired" as Iqbal believes them to be then is it logical to expect from them poetry with a "good" purpose? Is it not possible that their inspiration may lead poets to that which is detrimental to life?

Here it is to be noted that while asserting "the utmost importance for mankind" of "the personality that receives (the inspiration) and the life-quality of that which is received," Iqbal recognizes that "inspiration is not a matter of choice."¹³¹ Does it follow then that the kind of inspiration received by a poet is a matter of sheer luck and that poets cannot be held morally responsible for what they say since they have no control over the inspiration under whose influence they speak?

At this point, Iqbal's conception of inspiration is worth examining. Inspiration is not something which "possesses" a person; it is not an outside agency acting upon a person. Inspiration springs not from without but from within. It has an organic relationship with the poet's being. Poets cannot,

¹³⁰ The poetry which is a message of eternal life is either Gabriel's song or else the voice of Israfil.

¹³¹ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, pp. 144-145.

therefore, claim exemption from moral responsibility on the ground that their words are determined by the kind of inspiration they receive.

Far from regarding art as determined, Iqbal agrees with Croce in regarding art as the self-expression of the artist.¹³² He also agreed with Croce that appreciation of art is possible chiefly because we have the same emotions as the poet.¹³³

نوائے او بہ ہر دل ساز گار است
کہ در ہر سینہ قاشے از دل اوست
(Armaghan-e-Hijaz, p. 34)¹³⁴

Sometimes from Iqbal's writing it appears as if he thinks that inspiration may lead either to life-giving and life-enhancing art or to decadent art. He does not deny the name of inspiration to that which leads to the latter, However, like Shelley, most of the time, he describes inspiration — which is another name for the creative imagination — as the agent of moral good. Decadent art is art which bears no relation to life or is destructive to the vital impulse in humanity. Because real inspiration springs from the poet's 'heart' and is intimately linked with the problems and ideals of Human beings, Iqbal implies that decadent art lacks real inspiration. If inspiration is the agent of moral good it follows that it can only lead to life-renewing and morally invigorating poetry.

The main difficulty arises when one tries to reconcile the idea that poets are inspired beings with the idea that their poetry must further a specific purpose. In Javid Nutria the poet asks the Indian poet Bartari-Hari to answer this question:

¹³² About Iqbal and His thought, p. 104.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 106.

¹³⁴ His melody is in concord with each heart

for in each breast a piece of his heart lies.

شعر را سوز از کجا آید
بگوئے
از خودی یا از خدا آید
بگوئے
(Javid Nama, p. 198)¹³⁵

The answer is couched in ambiguous terms:

کس نداند در جہاں شاعر
کجاست
پردہ او ازیم وزیر نواست
آن دل گرمے کہ دراد در کنار
پیش یزداں ہم نمی گیرد
قرار
جان ما را لذت اندر
جستجوست
شعر را سوز از مقام
آرزوست
(Javid Nama; pp. 198-199)¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Say, Whence comes the fire into poetry?

Does it come from the Self, or from God?

(Javid Nama, p. 124.)

Iqbal and Shelley both believe that poetry gets at “the motives for good action, touching the heart by enkindling the imagination.”¹³⁷ For Shelley, however, poetry has no conscious purpose. “Didactic poetry is my abhorrence”, he said.¹³⁸ For Croce, too, art is an autonomous activity free from ethics.¹³⁹ For Iqbal, in one sense, the highest poetry is didactic in nature, and art cannot be divorced from ethics. Artists create with a conscious purpose in view. How is this conscious purpose reconcilable with the fact that they are inspired? The fact that artists are inspired means, for Iqbal, that they are being guided in their work not by reason or the discursive faculties, but by intuition, or through the heart. Intuition, as Iqbal conceives it, is a “higher kind of intellect,”¹⁴⁰ and not a blind force. Therefore, in view of Iqbal’s total vision it is possible to imagine an artist who is inspired but with a conscious purpose in mind.

Functionalism and 'Universal' Art

While there is much in Iqbal’s writings to support the statement that “Poetry as active history and history-making prophecy... is the supreme goal of Iqbal’s aesthetics,”¹⁴¹ it is possible to challenge the following statement pertaining to Iqbal’s concept of an ideal Poet:

“The Prophet fixes his eye his eye only on one specific goal and uses the simplest possible means of gaining it, preaching a single doctrine in order to

¹³⁶ None knows where the poet is in this world, his melody springs from the high notes and the low. That burning heart which he has in his breast finds not repose even before God.

Our soul’s delight is in questing;

Poetry’s fire of the station of desire,

(Javid Nama, p. 124.)

¹³⁷ Wimsatt, W. and Brooks, C., *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, pp. 422-423.

¹³⁸ Shepherd, R. H., (Editor), *Shelley’s Poetical Works*, London, 1888, Volume I, p. 330.

¹³⁹ Vahid, S. A., *Studies in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1967, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ Iqbal M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, 1965; p. 3.

¹⁴¹ Schimmel, A. M., *Gabriel’s Wing*, p. 72.

collect the peoples around it like around a flag. That is exactly what Iqbal wants from his ideal poet.”¹⁴²

Iqbal’s poet does, indeed have a prophet-like mission to accomplish, but it is difficult to corroborate the suggestion that Iqbal does not have much use for a poet who has no doctrinal commitment or view, of Iqbal’s deep admiration for non-didactic poets like Shakespeare and Ghalib. To Shakespeare, the immortal play Wright, Iqbal says:

حسن آئینہ حق اور دل آئینہ حسن
دل انسان کو ترا حسن کلام آئینہ
(Bang-e-Dara, p. 277)¹⁴³

and about the inimitable Ghalib, Iqbal observes:

“He is one of those poets whose imagination and intellect place them above the narrow limitations of creed and nationality. His recognition is yet to come.”¹⁴⁴

In stressing the functionalism of Iqbal’s ideal poet, it is often overlooked that Iqbal has also stated, not once but repeatedly, that true art is that which leads to an increment and a more vivid apprehension of life. Iqbal shared the Dantesque concept that poetry was as “vast and deep as humanity, wherein every soul will stand forth revealed in its naked truth (and that) the object of a poet... is to enshrine in imperishable words the highest truths known to man and some truths that had escaped man’s notice.”¹⁴⁵ These truths are not necessarily of a religious or moral import; nevertheless they are significant and valuable, because like Shakespeare’s art, they are a translation of reality into human terms.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁴³ Beauty mirrors truth, and the heart mirrors beauty, your art’s beauty is the mirror for the human heart.

¹⁴⁴ Stray Reflections, p. 51.

¹⁴⁵ Studies in Iqbal, p. 218.

“Both Shakespeare and Goethe re-think the Divine Thought of Creation,¹⁴⁶ says Iqbal, and he would have agreed that though some of the greatest poets have not set out to preach a particular doctrine, they have “both informed and created, have been both teachers and magicians.”¹⁴⁷

Iqbal, then, does not exclude from his concept of a poet, poets whose work has a “universal” rather than a “particular” import. He could scarcely have done so when he shared with Blake the view that the imagination includes “all activities which create or increase life,”¹⁴⁸ and with Keats his faith in the “holiness of the heart’s affections and the truth of the imagination.”¹⁴⁹ What he rejects is not “universal” art which has no particular purpose to serve, but decadent art which has no meaning:

نغمه گر معنی ندارد مرده ایست
سوز آواز آتش افسرده ایست
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 253)¹⁵⁰

The art of a genuine artist according to Iqbal reflects all that the artist perceives, discerning good and bad equally.

فطرت پاکش عیار
خوب و دزشت
صنعتش آئینه دار
خوب دزشت
(Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 256)¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Stray Reflections, p. 144.

¹⁴⁷ Bowra, C. M., The Heritage of Symbolism, London, 1943, p. 219.

¹⁴⁸ The Romantic Imagination, p. 16.

¹⁴⁹ The Letters of John Keats, Vol I, p. 84.

¹⁵⁰ Dead is a melody which has no meaning,

its warmth is only from a dying fire.

Such a conception of an ideal poet certainly does not exclude all non-didactic poets.

Iqbal's Aesthetics: Summing Up

Iqbal, then, has a dual conception of a poet and consequently of art. Firstly, poets are seen primarily as prophets having a definite function to perform and possibly having a fixed doctrinal commitment. Secondly, they are seen as artists who present life as they see it, their imaginative insight illuminating the secret depths of the human mind, their work concerned not with the purely temporal or ephemeral aspects of individual or collective experience but with what is genuinely significant and abiding.¹⁵²

The narrow conception of a poet may not be reconcilable with the wider one, but though the two conceptions may not be reducible one to the other, in one sense, the ultimate goal in both cases is the same. As one writer observes, for Iqbal, the ultimate objective of art... is the 'life eternal'.¹⁵³ The poet-prophet aims to secure this objective by moral and spiritual enlightenment and development; the artist attains the end of adding to the abundance and glory of life by responding with sensitivity inner and outer reality and experiencing, perhaps in a moment of blessed awareness, that which lies beyond good and evil and foreshadows eternity.

¹⁵¹ His pure heart is the touchstone of the beautiful and the ugly, and His art a mirror which reflects them both.

(Iqbal on Poetry and the Poet.)

¹⁵² Saiyidain, K. G., "Progressive Trends in Iqbal's Thought", in Iqbal as a

Thinker, Lahore, 1966, p.53.

¹⁵³ Saiyidain K. G., "Progressive Trends in Iqbal's Thought", O. 53.

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MUSLIM & CHRISTIAN CALENDARS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Akhtar Amratsari

Man must have realized the importance of time as soon as he took up his social obligations. Imagine the bells ringing out early in the morning from the Sun-god's temple and the people flocking towards it, their hearts overflowing with feelings of thanks-giving and a desire to make obeisance. The "Hourly Tables", which are still in use, had already been compiled. Temples were erected for the Sun and the Moon and the five known planets. The worshippers followed the "Hourly Tables" and visited various temples at different hours to perform the rites under the guidance of the priest.

The priests attached to a particular planet naturally kept a very sharp eye on its movements. It marked the beginning in the earnest of the science of Astronomy. As the secret of a people's survival lies in their political saga — city and economic well-being which are the attributes of Sun and Moon respectively, special attention was paid to them and they were regarded as the creators of time. Events of nation-al importance, like the coronation of a king, the holding of some important festival, the celebration to mark the victory over a rival nation or tribe or catastrophic visitations like earthquakes or floods — all these happenings assumed special significance in national life and became focal points for the introduction of various calendars and chronologies.

The oldest book on Astronomy which exists is probably the "Surya Siddhanta." According to it the Maha Yuga consists of 43,20,000 years containing 1,57,79,17,828 days. As the days are clearly related to the Sun, the speed at which

the Sun rotates daily comes to 1,57,79 17,828 = 0-59-8.16955652015. Now-a-days the science of Astronomy is at its zenith and according to the latest calculations the speed of the Sun's daily rotation is 0-59-8.33045964. As you see the figures given above differ and the obvious conclusion would be that the duration of the year must also vary. For what is a year but a word coined to denote the time the Sun takes to complete a full revolution in the sky. The duration of the solar year as given in some of the authentic books, is as follows:

Solar year according to Su rya Siddhanta = 365.258724 days.

Solar year according to Makrand Sarni = 365.2587566 days.

Solar year according to Indian Calendarists = 365.2584375 days.

Zodiacal solar year according to modern findings = 365.25875 days.

Seasonal solar year according to modern findings = 365.242193402 days.

The results obtained by Bhaskar Acharya, Arya Bhat, Varahamihira and Brahm Gupta are slightly at variance from that arrived at by Surya Siddhanta. We have left them out in order to avoid going into unnecessary details.

Zodiacal Solar Year

The path along which we see the Sun moving every day is known as the solar trajectory. A circle consists of 360 degrees. The zodiac being a circle also contains 360 degrees. Astrologers have further divided the circle into twelve equal parts, technically known as the signs. Each part extends to 30 degrees. The stars located in each of the signs have been joined together with imaginary lines to produce equally imaginary resemblances. Some of the signs therefore, resemble beasts, others create the illusion of human figures, hence their names. The zodiac consists of the following signs.

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|----|--------|----|--------|----|--|
| 1. | Aries | 2. | Taurus | 3. | Gemini | 4. | |
| | Cancer | | | | | | |
| 5. | Leo. | 6. | Virgo. | 7. | Libra. | 8. | |
| | Scorpio. | | | | | | |

9. Sagittarius 10. Capricorn. 11. Aquarius. 12.
Pisces.

If we stand at a fixed spot and keep an eye on the Sun we discover that everyday the Sun moves forward through the zodiac by a degree. We therefore, say that the Sun takes twenty four hours to negotiate a degree. Zodiacal solar year begins exactly when the Sun enters the sign of Aries. After passing through the twelve signs the Sun comes back to the sign of Aries. With the completion of the cycle, the zodiacal year comes to an end and the new year begins.

Seasonal Solar Year

We now know empirically that every year the day and night are of equal length on March 21 and September 22. After March 21, the Sun begins to creep northward from the equator. It continues to do so till June 22 & 23 which happen to be mid-summer and the longest days of the year in the northern hemisphere and mid-winter and the shortest days of the year in the southern hemisphere. After June 22 & 23, the Sun starts moving back to the equator and there is another equinox on September 22. Following this the Sun moves south of the equator with the result that the climatic changes take place in the northern hemisphere and the days grow shorter the nights longer. On the other hand the days grow longer and the nights shorter in the southern hemisphere. The period of this seasonal rotation is technically known as the seasonal solar year. According to latest findings, its duration is 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes and 45.5099328 seconds.

Two Types of Years

The years are either real or unreal.

The real years are those which are calculated from the time the Sun enters any of the twelve signs of the zodiac or from the appearance of the new moon. All other years are regarded as unreal. The fact that their duration is dependent on the movement of the Sun or the Moon is of no

consequence. Samvat Bikrami, Samvat Saka Shalabaheen and the Hebrew and Hijri years are examples of real years. The list of unreal years includes Nebuchadnezzarian, Alexanderian, Roman, Greek, Noshirwani, Yazdjerdi, Maghi, Bangla and the Christian years. There are no unreal years in the calendars dependent on the lunar cycle. It should, however, be noted that there are some year of composite characters i.e., comprising both lunar and solar aspects. In these years each month's length is determined by the Moon's synodical progress. But after a few years intercalary days are added to make the calendar conform to the real solar year. Bikrami Chandra Mas and Hindi 1-ash are examples of such composite years. All solar years, real or unreal, consist of the time the Sun takes to complete a zodiacal revolution. The best example of the seasonal solar year is the Christian year. It has now assumed the status of a yardstick against which all other years are measured or corrected. The difference between the zodiacal solar year and the seasonal solar year is as follows:

days-hrs-m.-sec.

Zodiacal solar years' duration =	365-6-12-36
Seasonal solar years' duration =	365-5-48-45.51
Difference	= 0-0-23-50.49

The Hijri Era

The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) after migrating from Mecca arrived at a place called Qaba in Medina. He reached Qaba on Monday, 8th Rabi-ul-Awal of the first Hijri Year. Seventeen years after the Hijrat, during the rule of Hazrat Umar-Farooq, the Muslims felt that they needed a calendar of their own. They decided that it would be more appropriate to begin their calendar, not from 8th Rabi-ul-Awal, but from 1st Muharram of the Medinite Lunar year which had fallen 67 days earlier. Therefore the Hijri era began from 1st Muharram, 1 after Hijrat. There is disagreement among the mathematicians as to which day of the Christian Calendar corresponds with 1st Muharram, 1 A.H. Some of them say that it corresponds with; 15th July, 622 A.D. Most however believe that Friday,

16 July, 622 A.D. is correct. Jetha Bhai in his book "Centruy Calendar" mentions that 1st Muharram, 1 A.H. corresponds with Thursday, 16 July, 622 A.D. The editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Wustefeld and G.S.P. Freeman also give it as Friday, 16 July, 622 A.D., according to the Julian Calendar. (In this connection see "Taqveem-e-Hijri va Isvee" and the Muslim and Christian Calendar.) According to my finding also the date, Friday, 16th July, 622 A.D. of the Julian Calendar is correct.

Several types of Hijri Calendars are found in the world. A brief notice of these would not be devoid of interest.

1. The Hijri Calendar with Arabic months and year.
2. The Hijri Calendar with Persian months and year. It is known as Irani Khiraji. It is also used in Afghanistan where it is known as the Hijri Solar Calendar. Months are still called after the zodiac signs. In the not too distant past the months were named after the zodiac signs in Iran also, but now the Iranis generally use ancient Iranian nomenclature.
3. The Hijri Calendar with Egyptian months and year (Coptic Khiraji).
4. The Hijri Calendar with Syrian months and Greek year (Turkey). In this connection see "Beest Maqala" by Taqi Zada.
5. In this article we are concerned only with the Lunar Hijri Calendar (with Arabic months and year). As the other Hijri calendars are not in vogue here they have not been discussed.

The Hid Laiendar is the best example of the Lunar year. The Moon is a satellite of the earth. It revolves round the earth unceasingly. As the earth itself revolves round the Sun, the Moon circles round the, Sun also, albeit in an indirect manner. The savants believe that the duration of the Lunar year is as open to-dispute as that of the Solar year. According to them the Lunar year's duration comes to 354 days, 8 hours, 48 minutes and 16.9702848 seconds. According to modern astronomical calculations the lunar year is 354 days, 8 hours, 48 minutes and 34 seconds long. The Hebrew and the Hilali Calendars were also dependent on the movement of the Moon. Put after the event of Hijra the Hilali Calnedar was converted into the Hijri Calendar, exactly as the Julian Calendar was renamed the Christian Calendar.

Each thirty years span of the Lunar calendar consists of 10631 days. Out of these thirty years, nineteen have 354 days and the remaining eleven 355 days. The years which contain 355 days are known as leap years. Here is the sequence in which they occur.

Leap years: 2, 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19, 24, 26 and 29.

The calculations are made in this way:

Total number of days of a lunar year	=	354.367060185
Thirty years (x)	=	<u>30</u>
Total number of days in thirty years	=	10,631.01180555
Total number of days of nineteen years	=	(19x354) = 6,726
Total number of days of eleven leap years	=	(11 x354) = <u>3,905</u>
Total number of days in thirty years	=	10,631

The fraction of .01180555 which is left out brings about after every 84.7059222145 revolutions a difference of one day.

To calculate the leap year a uniform method is followed throughout the Islamic world, with the exception of Egypt. The editors of "Encyclopedia Britannica" have also adopted the Pakistani method, i.e. in the year which is to be reckoned a leap year, the month of Dhil Hijj is supposed to consist of thirty days and not of twenty nine. The method of distinguishing a leap year from an ordinary year is as follows. The required Hijri year is divided by thirty. The quotient is ignored and the remainder is taken into account. If the remainder is one of the eleven figures mentioned earlier the year shall be deemed a leap year, if not, it will be regarded as an ordinary one.

The lunar year is shorter from the solar year by about ten days and twenty one hours. Therefore by the time 32 solar years have gone by 33 lunar years are not only completed but exceed them by a few days. In other words:

Total days of 33 lunar years: 11694.1129861

Total days of 32 solar years:	11687.7501888
Margin of difference:	6.3627973

Therefore while converting seasonal solar years into-lunar Hijri years, it should be assumed that 32 solar years equal 33 lunar years.

The modern Hijri Calendar is prepared according to the principle of annual average. From Muharram onwards the successive months are reckoned as consisting of 30 or 29 days respectively. Whenever the Hijri year is to be converted into a leap year the days of Dhil Hijj are increased from 29 to 30 so as to make up a tally of 355 days.

There were a number of historians and astronomers who were conscious of the importance of comparative calendars. That's why they listed comparative dates of various calendars in their works. In this connection the names of Yaqubi, Masudi, Umar Khayyam, AI Beruni and Abul M'ashar Belkhi are particularly noteworthy.

Now-a-days should the need arise to convert a Hijri date into a Christian one or it is required to find the day on which a particular Hijri date fell, you can't come across a single authentic method. If by chance you were obliged to find out the Christian day and date of a Hijri dater you will be in a fix. There will be no alternative but to set out in search of a diary, calendar or almanac of the required year.

In works written after 14th October, 1752 A. D. the Gregorian or the new style calendar is used. But prior to that the date in our ancient literature,, history and biographical collections are given either in Hijri or according to the Julian or the old style calendar.

Therefore up until 14th October, 1752 A.D. we will use the Julian Calendar and after that stick to the Gregorian Calendar. The readers will not be unaware of the fact that when Pope Gregory XIII proposed a calendar reform in 1582 A.D. all the European countries, except England and Russia, accepted it. The reform came into effect on 15th October, 1582 A.D. by skipping nine days from the current calendar. As England and Russia were outside the sphere of influence of the Vatican they chose to ignore the papal directive. However Russia accepted the changeover after the revolution. The British Parliament approved of the skipping of ten days on Wednesday, the 3rd September, 1752 A.D. So 4th September, 1752 A.D. was converted into 14th September, 1752 A.D. and the new

calendar was enforced through-out the British Empire. The people held protest meetings and rallies, demanding that the ten days of their lives deducted by the British Government should be restored forthwith. As in those times India was under the British rule the reform of the existing calendar took place here also in 1752 A.D. Most mathematicians push the

calendar forward by ten days as a corrective measure but in the comparative calendar of Hijri and Christian eras, compiled by Abun Nasr Muhamad Khalidi (published by Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu, third edition) it is stated on page 59 that in order to correct the tables eleven days attar 2nd September, 1752 A.D. have not been counted.

So far as the determination of comparative dates is concerned some people suggest that one should use the 19 year long Metonic cycle. But the editors of "En-cyclopedia Britannica" claim that we can get reliable dates quite easily by using the thirty year lunar span. The method is to split up the Hijri years from 1 A.H. into slabs of thirty years. Then find out which Hijri year in the last slab corresponds to the year you require and on which date of the Christian era it began. Add forty days to the date you have arrived at. The Hijri year would have begun on the date so obtained.,For further confirmation we are advised to use Woolwich's decimal fraction method.

Woolwich's decimal fraction method is as follows. First multiply the required Hijri year by .970224. Then add 621.5774 t) it and find out the Christian year corresponding to the Hijri era. Finally multiply the decimal fraction by 365 to find out the date and day of the Christian era. Here is an example.

Find out the Christian equivalent of 1st Muharram, 1194. After Hijrat by Woolwich's method.

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 1194 \times .970224 & = & 1158.447456 \\
 1158,447456 + 621.5774 & = & 1780.024856
 \end{array}$$

We now know that 1st Muharram fell on some day of 1780 A.D. Now multi-ply the decimal fraction by 365, the fixed days of the Christian year to find out the date. $365 \times .024856 = 9.07244$.

This enables us to know that the new moon appeared in the evening of 9th January. 1st Muharram, 1194 A.H. therefore fell on 10th January, 1780 A.D. Ac-cording to Wustenfeld 1st Muharram fell on 8th January.

The method defined above does not make sense to me for following reasons:

1. Mathematically speaking the difference between thirty lunar years and twenty nine solar years comes to roughly less than 39 days, but we are being advised to make use of a factor of forty days. For further clarification see the following equation:

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 \text{Total days of 30 lunar years} & = & 10631.0118055 \\
 \text{Total days of 29 solar years} & = & 10592.9881969 \\
 \text{Difference in days} & = & 38.0236086
 \end{array}$$

2. To find out the comparative year and month of the required date is in itself a big headache. The problem is confounded by the fact that one has to find out first what the Christian date was 30 Hijri years before the date

required, so that by adding forty days to it one can arrive at a solution and fix the probable Christian equivalent of the required Hijri date. After that we are invited to test the probable Christian date so obtained by Woolwich's method. If both methods provide the same date that's fine but in case of discrepancy the date disclosed by Woolwich's method is to be regarded as authentic. But the point is that if Woolwich's method can come up with a correct answer why shouldn't we make use of it in the first place. Why all this regmarole!

3. The Christian comparative table established by Woolwich's decimal fraction method follows the Gregorian calendar. The funny thing is that the obtained Christian date is as often wrong as it is right. One of the basic shortcomings of Woolwich's method is that he equates 1st Muharram, 1 A.H. with 20th July, 622 A.D. according to Gregorian calendar.

For example we wish to find out the Christian date for the beginning of 200 A.H. Here is the relevant calculation $200 \times .970224 + 621.5774 = 815.6222$. It means that 200 A.H.'s new year's day fell in 815 A.D. To obtain the Christian date multiply .622 with 365. It comes to 227.103. According to Christian Calendar it should be 15th August. But as the figure of 277 is followed by a fraction, 1st Muharram, 200 A.H. should fall on 16th August. However, according to Wustefeld 1st Muharram, 200 A.H. equals 11th August, 815 A.D., that is 11th August according to the Julian Calendar and 13th August according to the Gregorian Calendar. But Woolwich's method gives the answer as 16th August 815 A.D. which is absolutely incorrect.

As I have already mentioned Woolwich's method is based on the existing annual lunar and solar revolutions as calculated by modern science. For instance, in order to convert Hijri or lunar years into Christian years the following equation is used:

Annual period of lunar revolution

Annual period of seasonal solar revolution 354.367060185

j i.e. = .97022487156

365.242193402

4., Woolwich's decimal fraction method converts Hijri dates into the Gregorian Calendar only, although up till 1166 A.H., the dates mentioned in all Islamic writings conform only to the Julian Calendar.

Keeping in view all these facts it would be no exaggeration to say that so far no method of arranging a Hijri Calendar has been evolved which can serve the purpose of establishing a comparative calendar as well as enabling us to find the exact day by direct reference to the Hijri Calendar. In my opinion this shortcoming can be remedied if we pursue the following two courses of action.

In the first place a comparative calendar should be compiled which will show from 1 A.D. to, let us say 2500 A.D. the monthly correspondences of the following calendars:-54

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1. Christian.
2. Alexandrian.
3. Turkish.
4. Vikrami.
5. Saka Shalbaheen including the existing Indian Calendar.
6. Coptic.
7. Nousherwani.
8. Yazdjerdi.
9. Hijri with Arabic months.

I did some preliminary work on the project but soon realised that it wasn't the sort of job which can be completed all by oneself. Naturally I postponed the compilation of this gigantic calendar to some other time.

I have done some work on compiling a comparative Hijri-Christian Calendar. I set about the task in summer, 1964. foiled for fourteen years and now in November, 1978 I am able to offer it, thanks be to Allah, for general perusal. I earnestly hope that after going through my article the readers will be able to convert Hijri months and years into Christian months and years very easily.

"Encyclopedia, Britannica" advocates the division of Hijri years into cycles of thirty years but I think that nearly accurate results can be obtained much more easily by making use of a sixty seven year cycle.

Total days of Sixty seven lunar years
according to modern science: = 23742.5930323

Total days of Sixty five solar years
according to modern science: = 23740.7425711

Difference in days: = 1.8504612

Now that we know the relevant difference, we can, by adding it at the beginning of each year, compile the successive sixty seven year cycles. Here is how it can be done.

1st Muharram, Friday, 1 A.H.	622-7-16
+ 67 year cycle's difference. 65-00-1.8504612	
1st Muharram, 68 A.H.	687-7-17.8504612
+ 67 year cycle's difference 65-00-1.8504612	
1st Muharram, 135 A.H.	752-7-19.7009224
+ 67 year cycle's difference - 65-00-1.8504612	
1st Muharram, 202 A.H.	817-7-21.5513836
+ 67 year cycle's difference 65-00-1.8504612	
1st Muharram, 269 A.H.	882-7-23.4018448

+ 67 year cycle's difference. 65-00-1.8504612	
1st Muharram, 336 A.H.	947-7-25.2523060
4 67 year cycle's difference.	65-00-1.8504612
1st Muharram 403 A.H.	1012-7-27.1027672

As you can judge for yourself the calculations are extremely simple. You only have to add or subtract a couple of days or so to determine which day of the week it will be. No difficulty is involved. But there is another problem facing us here. If it is so very easy to find out a date by using the sixty seven year cycle why has 1st Muharram, 403 A.H. shifted forward by as many as four days? As one can easily find out by checking the Hijri-cum-Christian Calendar compiled by Abun Nasr Muhammad Khalidi (published by Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu, third edition) that 1st Muharram, 403 A.H. corresponds with 23rd Jul, and not 27th July, 1012 A.D. The objection is well taken. The reason for the discrepancy is that the necessary adjustments were not carried out. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the correct date without first making the required adjustments. In my opinion if the lunar years were divided into three phases and the matters specified below kept in mind it would be possible to overcome the difficulty.

1. Pre Hijri Period.
 2. Hijri era from 1 A.H. to 1165 A.H.
 3. Hijri era from 1116 A.H. to the year required.
- Pre Hijri Era

- a. Take the lunar and solar period as Established by the current findings and convert them into decimal fractions.
- b. Convert 16th July 622 A.D. into decimal fraction.
- c. Multiply the required Hijri year by decim... fraction obtained under a. Then subtract the figure so obtained from the decimal fraction resulting from the conversion in b. This will enable you to find the Christian year corresponding to the lunar year with the exact date in decimal fractions.
- d. Minus the Christian year from the total arrived in c and multiply the decimal fraction by the length of the solar year. The result of the multiplication will provide you with the Christian Calendar's day. Here is a practical example.

a.	Lunar year =	354.367060185
	.97022487156 Solar year =	365.242193404

b. 16th July, 622 A.D. 16th July is the 197th day of the calendar.
197

Therefore	= 0.53936813314 + 622
365.242193402	
622.53936813314	

c. Suppose we have to find out the Christian date corresponding to 1st Muharram, 320 B.H.

The Hilali or B.H. year which is required: 320 97022487156 320 (x)

310.471958899 (—) 622.539368133

(—) 312.067409234

It means that 320 B.H. corresponds to 312 A.D. to get the Christian date multiply the decimal fraction .067409234 by ³65.242193402

.067409234

365.242193402

24.6206964817

This shows that 24 days of 312 A.D. had already gone by the time the new moon heralding the 1st Muharram, 320 B.H. appeared. Therefore the 1st Muharram occurred on the 25th day. In the Christian calendar it comes to 25 January. So we know that 25th January 312 A.D. corresponds with 1st Muharram, 320 B.H.

Let us now solve a few problems.

It is said that the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was born on Monday, 9th Rabi-ul-Awal, 53 B.H. Find out the corresponding Christian date.

.97022487156

53 (x)

51.4219181926 (—) 622.5393681331

571.117449941

It means that 1st Muharram, 53 B. H. corresponded with the date .117449941 of 571 A.D. To find out the Christian date make use of the following decimal fraction.

.117449941

365.242193402 (x)

42.8976740657

The 42nd day of the ordinary Christian year falls on 11th February. According to the calculation the new moon of Muharram, 53 B.H. was observed on 11th February. Therefore 1st Muharram occurred on 12th February (see Table A).

1st Muharram, 53 B.H. = 12th February, 571 A.D.

1st Saffar, 53 B.H. = 13th March, 571 A.D.

1st Rabi-ul-Awal, 53 B.H. = 12th April, 571 A.D.

9th Rabi-ul-Awal, 53 B.H. = 20th April, 571 A.D.

Those who wish to follow the Gregorian Calendar should add two days to the Julian Calendar and they will have their record right. $20 + 2 = 22$ nd April, 571 A.D.

It was Monday on 9th Rabi-ul-Awal, 53 B.H. Later on I will put down a method of finding out the day directly from the lunar years. It is a completely separate issue whether the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was born on 9th or 12th Rabi-ul-Awal, 53 B.H.

2. It is said that Hazrat Ali was born on 13th Rajab, 24th B.H. Find out the corresponding Christian month and date.

.97022487156

24 (x)

23.2853969174 (—)

622.5393681331

599.253971216

It means that 1st Muharram 599 B.H. corresponded with the date .253971216 of 599 A.D. To find out the Christian date make use of the usual decimal fraction.

.253971216

365.242193402

92.7610039928 = 93

According to Table A it is 3rd April. It means that 1st Muharram, 24 B.H. corresponds with 3rd April, 599 A.D.

Total number of days from 1st Muharram = 190 days (according to
to 13th Rajab Table "B").

3rd April, 599 A.D. corresponds with = 93 days.

1st Muharram, 24 B.H. (Table "A"). —

283 days

As the 1st Muharram has been counted (—) 1 day

twice, deduct one day 13 Rajab, 24 B.H.

corresponds to 9th October, 599 A.D.

282 days.

Hijri Era from 1 A.H. to 1165 A. H.

In order to establish a comparative calendar from 1st Muharram 1 A.H. to

165 A.H. (inclusive) multiply the Hijri year required by .97020237734 and add 1st Muharram, 1 B.H. to get the correct answer (1st Muharram, 1 B.H. = 621.569165-756). Example No. 1. When did 1st Muharram, 1 A.H. begin. Find out the corresponding Christian year and month.

.97020237734

I (x)

.97020237734

(+) 621.569165756 622.539368133

Here we leave 622 out of the calculation and multiply the decimal fraction.

.539368133 365.242193402 (x)

196.999999948 = 197 =

16th July, 622 A.D. (Table "A").

Example No. 2. Hazrat Imam Husain's martyrdom took place at Karbala on 10th Muharram, 61 A.H. Find out the corresponding year and month etc.

.97020237734

61 (x), -"

59.1823450177 +)

621.569165756

680.7515107737 leave out 680

365.242193402 and multiply

the rest with 274.483443095

680 A.D. was a leap year. 1st Muharram, 61 A.H. therefore fell on 1st October, 680 A.D. Hence 10th Muharram, 61 A.H. corresponds with 10th October, 680 A.D.

Hijri Era from 1166 A.H. Onwards

Use the following method. Deduct 1165 from the Hijra year required. Multiply the result by .97022382687 and then add 1751.8874179. The sum will contain the Christian year and the date which will be in decimal fraction. Multiply the decimal fraction by 365.242193402 to find the day.

Example. Find the corresponding Christian year and month for 1st Muharram, 1500 A.H.

$$1500 - 1165 = 335$$

$$.97022382687$$

$$335 (x)$$

$$325.024982001$$

$$1751.88574179$$

$$2076.910723791$$

$$2076 \text{ A.D.}$$

$$\text{Established. } .910723791$$

$$365.242193402 \times 332.63754642$$

It means that the moon of Muharram, 1500 A.H. will become visible after 332 days of the Christian year had gone by and the first of Muharram will occur on the 333rd day. As 2076 A.D. would be a leap year the correct answer should be 28th November, 2076 A.D.

However, please keep the following facts in mind.

1. In spite of exercising the utmost caution the Christian date cannot always be established with total accuracy. It could be plus or minus by a day. No cause for alarm.

2. I have solved all these problems with the help of an electronic calculator (Casio 121-MR) which gives decimal fraction upto 12 digits. Readers who don't own a calculator can manage with fractions of 6 digits only.

3. The duration of the solar year had been fixed at 365.242193402. In all my examples, while converting the decimal fractions I have multiplied them with the complete figure, down to the last digit. If you don't wish to use these very large figures while multiplying use only 365.2422 or 365. You will still be able to obtain a very close approximation.

4. If the first digit of the decimal fraction is a zero consider the rest of the fraction as inconsequential.

5. For people who want to avoid long and tedious multiplications I have compiled six tables i.e. K, L, M, N, P & Q. Each table is accompanied by one or two worked out solutions.

6. Up till now I used, when necessary, the comparative Hijri-Christian Calendar published by Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu, Karachi.

How to Find out the Day from the Hijri Year

Long before I ever thought of writing this article the idea crossed my mind several times as to why we have not been successful in formulating a methodology of the Hijri Calendar. After all the duration of the lunar year is, like that of the solar year, fully determined. I attempted time and again to sort out the problem but could make no headway. Whenever I wanted to take up the subject my mind was weighed down by the feeling that I was on the track of something impossible. I realized that no one has been able so far to come up with a definitive formula. Indeed if the whole thing was within the realm of possibility, savants in the past would have hit upon a solution hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. If the problem were a bit too complex for them why can't modern computers suggest a solution. Some-times I reassured myself by saying that only fourteen hundred years of the Hijri era have lapsed so far. On the other hand the Hebrew Calendar is already more than 5700 years old. If Muslim scholars failed to find a solution what made the Jews fight shy of the issue. In short, I used to become discouraged as soon as I thought of the problem.

Meanwhile one of my acquaintances presented me with a circle accompanied by two tables. Enlarging on its background he said: "Once upon a time some people belonging to the uplands of Amil came and met the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him.). They said that in their country the new moon could be seen only on the second or third night and they were never able to begin the month of fasting on time. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) told them that as the visibility of the moon was uncertain they should make use of calculation to determine the correct date. However the visitors said that they didn't know how to calculate. After questioning them for a while the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) told the highlanders to go and see Hazrat Ali. Hazrat Ali also questioned them closely and devised a method for the visitors. The circle is based on the very method. Its greatest advantage is that it is exceedingly easy to work with." He ended his recital on a hyperbolic note, saying "Now all your problems are ended. With the help of the circle and the tables which accompany it you can find out the first day of every Hijri year, past or future."

Here is the circle and the two tables.




Table No. 1

For Months

	Month	Letter with its
1.	Muharram	Za 7
2.	Safar	Ba 2
3.	Rabi'-ul-Awwal	Jeem 3
4.	Rabi'-ul-Thani	Ha 5
5.	Jamadi-ul Awwal	Wao 6
6.	Jamadi-ul-Thani	Alif 1
7.	Rajab	Ba 2
8.	Sha'ban	Dal 4
9.	Ramadan	Ha 5
1	Shawwal	Za 7
1	Zu-al-Qa'dah	Alif 1
1	Zu-al-Hijjah	Jeem 3

Table
No. 2

Days	For Days	Collective
Sunday		numerical 1 or
Monday		2 or
Tuesday		3 or 10
Wednesday		4 or 11
Thursday		5 or 12
Friday		6 or 13
Saturday		7 or 14

How to use it: the procedure is somewhat like this. Suppose you wish to find out the first day of a month of a Hijri year. first divide the year by eight. Start counting the remainder within the circle letter by letter. The

sum would naturally come to an end at one of the letters. Take the letter's numerical value as given in the circle. Now add to it the numerical value of the required month as given in the table of months. Look up the sum in the table of days. The day against which the sum is listed will be the first day of the month you are looking for. Let us say that we wish to find out the day on which 1st Muharram, 617 A.H. fell.

That is $617 \div 8 = 77$ being the quotient, only one is left. So we take from the letters in the circle the first one. Its numerical value is one. In the table of months

the letter assigned to Muharram is "Za" with a numerical value of seven. Seven plus one is eight. We look eight in the table of days. Sunday is listed against eight. There-fore 1st Muharram, 617 A.H. was a Sunday. The Hijri year in this test- case was picked by me. The gentleman who had made the circle available to me had not given any practical demonstrations.

As I settled down to work on the circle I found that it was next to impossible to arrive at a correct answer with its help I was astonished to learn that the circle said that 1st Muharram 1 A.H. was a Sunday whereas in fact the date corresponds with Friday, 16th July, 632 A.D. I had a close look at the table of months and realized that it was an arrangement in which months of 29 and 30 days appeared alternately. How the intercalary days of the eight years had been dealt with in the circle was a mystery and when I considered that the intercalary days belonging to other years would also be missing I gave up the hope of ever getting a correct answer out of it. There is no room in the circle for making necessary annual adjustments either.

The month of fasting was probably made obligatory in 619-20 A.D. and the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) graced Medina with his presence until 12 Rabi-ul-Awwal, 11 A.H. It was during this period that the highlanders of Mount Amil must have presented themselves before him and left Medina after learning the method of using the circle. It was therefore incumbent upon the circle that it should provide

correct data for the months of the year involved. But it turned out to be a wild goose chase. -In fact I was so disturbed that my mind balked at the idea that the circle had been formulated by Hazrat Ali. The more I looked at it the more I came to the conclusion that the circle had either been drawn up by the Greeks or belonged to a much later period and

attributed to Hazrat Ali. As the Hilali era had not been taken into account by its compiler he was obviously not a Greek. It was al-most certainly drawn up at a later age. According to the circle the first days of the eight years occur in the following order:

1. Sunday,
2. Thursday,
3. Tuesday,
4. Saturday,
5. Wednesday,
6. Monday,
7. Friday,
8. Wednesday.

Persisting in my research I came to the conclusion that the circle was designed in 601 A.H. because prior to that the new year days don't occur in the order given above and even when they do the numerical values of the letters in the table of months do not support them.

The circle gives correct answers for the period extending from 601 A.H. to 615 A.H. It shall again function properly for the short period 1441 A.H. to 1455 A.H. It is my unmistakable belief that Hazrat Ali would never have said something which had no substance to it, while this circle is riddled with errors from end to end. Let us now try to solve a few problems with it.

Example 1. What day it was on 1st Muharram, 1 A.H.?

In the eight letters listed within the circle the numerical value of the first letter "alif" is one. The numerical value of Muharram in the table of months is seven. One plus seven is eight. Therefore 1 Muharram 1 A.H. turns out to be a Sunday. Actually it was a Friday. It is possible that someone objecting to this clear case of inaccuracy may try to sow confusion by referring to the Julian and Gregorian calendars. However, the readers must be well aware that the problems raised by these old and new style calendars are connected with the Christian era and have no-thing to do with the Hijri Calendar. In the first place, no such amendments were ever made in the Hijri Calendar. Secondly, no one ever undertook to examine the ramifications of the issue. Let us thank Western mathematicians who took the trouble of compiling the Christian and Hijri Calendars and simplified matters for us, otherwise the work of our distinguished experts of Jafar, which transforms the Friday of 1st

Muharram, 1 A.H. into a Sunday would have led us completely astray.

Example 2: Hazrat Imam Hasan was born on 15th Ramzan 3 A.H. What day was it?

The third letter in the circle is "Deem" with a numerical value of three. According to the table of months Ramazan is represented by the letter "ha" with a numerical value of five. So $3+5=8$. And eight is Sunday according to the table of days. If 1st Ramazan is Sunday, 15th Ramazan will also be a Sunday. The correct answer is Friday.

Example 3: Hazrat Imam Hussain was born on 3rd Shaban, 4 A.H. Establish the day?

The fourth letter in the circle is ".Za" with a numerical value of seven. Shaban is represented by the letter "Dal" with a numerical value of four. So $7+4=11$. The

table of days shows that the first day of Shaban was a Wednesday. 3 Shaban therefore was a Friday. The answer is incorrect again. 1st Shaban was a Monday and 3rd Shaban a Wednesday.

Example 4: It is said that the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), passed away on 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal, 11 A.H. Find the day with the help of the circle?

Divide 11 by 8. The remainder is 3. The third letter in the circle is "Jeem" with a numerical value of 3. Rabi-ul-Awwal is also represented by "Jeem" with a similar numerical value. So $3+3=6$. Six is Friday according to the table of days. If the first day of Rabi-ul-Awwal was a Friday, its twelfth day should be a Tuesday.

As you can see for yourself the circle fails to give the correct days of the dates of 11 A.H. It is mostly unlikely that the circle and the two tables were formulated by Hazrat Ali. Even if you can occasionally find the right day with its help, that is no proof of its accuracy. However the circle can be amended and made to function accurately should the need arise.

Being a thinker of independent nature I wanted to discover a method which would render all use of tables completely redundant but it seemed that I was merely groping in the dark. One night as I pursued my studies I felt the

need of looking up the rate of precession of the Equinoxes as determined by Bhaskar Acharya. In this connection I had to leaf through several books and I came across the words "Besselian Fictitious year". The phrase was not new for me. I had noticed it time and again in the past. However, as I read it an idea flashed through my mind. The problem of establishing the correspondence of days and dates with the help of the real lunar calendar, now in vogue, was, in fact, insoluble. Had it been soluable it would have been solved long ago. I think it was not an idea but an inspiration.

I immediately launched several imaginary satellites in quick succession and set them to revolve in different orbits. The satellite nearest to the earth had an annual rotation period of 351 days and the one above the real moon had one of 356 days. As I worked upwards through the satellites my calculations showed that the further away the satellite the more encouraging were the results. Finally the satellite below the moon but nearest to it began to give correct answers. I dubbed the imaginary satellite "the artificial moon of Mr. Akhtar" and the year it created "the artificial lunar year of Mr. Akhtar." The duration of its annual rotation comes to 354 days, 8 hours and 48 minutes. If we divide 354 by 7, that is by the number of days in a week, we are left with a remainder of 4 days, 8 hours and 48 minutes per annum. Conversion of the above into decimal fraction would give us 4.366666666666. A difference of 131 days will occur after every thirty years. Divide 131 by 7. The quotient will be 18 and the remainder 5. It means that a difference of 5 days will occur after every thirty years. In order to find the new year's day add five days after every thirty years if the date belongs to the future and deduct five days after every thirty years if you are dealing with the past. For example 1st Muharram, 1 A.H. began on Friday. After thirty years that is in 31 A.H. the new year's day will occur five days ahead of Friday which is Wednesday. Similarly the new year's day of 61 A.H. will fall on Monday and so on. I have compiled a table (see Table "C") on the basis of the annual difference of 4.366666666666. This table will Inshallah, enable you to determine the days of average lunar years from 1 A.H. to 9000 A.H. It would give comparatively better results than other average tables. Other calendars may assign Monday to some lunar date which in all likelihood it would be a Wednesday or a Thursday. But with the help

of my table you will invariably get Monday for an answer or the resulting difference would not be of more than a day at the most. Please keep in mind the following points while using the table.

1. In addition to the fixed number of days assigned to a single Hijri year or to tens or hundreds or thousands of Hijri years, take also the numbers belonging to the past months as listed in Table "C". Add both these up. Also add the date of which the day is required. Divide the complete sum of days so obtained by 7, as the week consists of 7 days. Look up the remainder in Table "F" (The circle dealing with the post Hijri era. The day listed next to the figure you obtain will be correct one.

2. If a figure of 50 or over turns up in the decimal fraction, add one day to the number of the days of the week already obtained in order to reach a proper conclusion. If the decimal fraction is .85 or above the answer will be definite. Should the decimal fraction be below .50, the answer will extend over two days.

3. Through this method the problem of intercalary days would be solved automatically. You won't have to make extensive calculations to resolve it.

4. For pre-Hijra years use 4.4607601 instead of 4.3666666 while multiplying. Repeat the process given above and find the day by referring to the circle dealing with the pre-Hijra era.

5. All the tables drawn up to find the Hijri months and days are compiled not according to the principle of average month but by assigning 30 and

29 days alternately to successive months. For instance Muharram has

30 days and Safar 29. All this in spite of the fact that the average lunar month consists of 29.5305555555 days.

6. The Hijri Calendar has nothing whatever to do with the reform of the Christian Calendar carried out by Pope Gregory. However, if you are compiling a comparative Calendar of-Hijri and Christian eras don't ever lose sight of the Pope's fiat.

7. People who think that Western scholars alone are authentic and wish to derive their results according to the Calendars devised by Wustenfled or Freeman should bear the following in mind while doing their calculations.

After totaling up the annual number of days of the required Hijri year divide the sum of days by 7. With the help of the remainder find the day by referring to the relevant circle. If the decimal fraction comes to .89 or more, add another day. Decimal fraction below .89 should be treated as cancelled. The days so obtained will be that of 1st Muharram of the required Hijri year.

8. As months of 30 and 29 days occur alternately in the average calendar. Count two for every 30 days and one for every 29.

9. By adding the extra days of the lunar year you obtain 1st Muharram of the required year. Therefore take only one digit for Muharram instead of two.

Here now are a few examples.

It is said that the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) passed away on Monday, 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal, 11 A.H. Confirm or deny it.

Fixed number of days for ten years: 1.666 Table "C".

Fixed number of days for one year: 4.366 Table "C".

Fixed number of days till the end of Safar: 3.061 Table "D".

Date known, 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal: 12.000

Total: 21.093 Days in excess.

By dividing 21 by 7 we get three complete weeks. Not a single day is left over. Looking up in table "F" we find that Monday is assigned to zero. So the day was a Monday. As the fraction is almost non-existent it has been omitted altogether. Since the common Muslims also celebrate on the same day Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi, we

can solve the problem like this as well.	1.6	
Fixed number of days for ten years:	66	
Fixed number of days for one year:	4.3	
Eid-e-Milad-u'n-Nabi:	1.0	
	<u>7.0</u>	Days in excess.
	93	

The seven days make up a week, leaving behind zero. In Table "F" zero stands for Monday. Therefore 12 Rabi-ul-Awwal, 11 A.H. was a Monday.

List of Dates and Days of Important Events

N	Event	The Day has been lished	Lunar Date
1.	The beginning of Hijri era.	Friday	1 Muharram, 1. A.H.
2.	Nouroz.	Tuesday	22 Ziquad, 3 A.H.
3.	Nourouz.	Wednesday	3 Dhil Hajj, 4 A.H.
4.	Nourouz.	Sunday	17 Muharram, 9 A.H.
5.	Holy Prophet's (peace be upon him) demise.	Monday	12 Rabi'-ul-Awwal, 11
6.	Hazrat Abu Bakr's	Tuesday	22 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 13
7.	Nourouz..	Friday	29 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 21
8.	Martyrdom of Hazrat 'U	Sunday	1 Muharram, 24 A.H.
9.	Martyrdom of Hazrat	Monday	12 Dhil Hajj, 35 A.H.
1	Nourouz.	Wednesday	28 Dhil Hajj, 40 A.H.
1	Martyrdom of Imam	Thursday	28 Safar, 50 A.H.
1	Martyrdom of Imam	Thursday/Friday	10 Muharram, 61 A.H.
1	Death of Caliph Hadi.	Saturday	16 Rabi'-ul-Awwal, 170

1	Death of Caliph Mamun.	Thursday	15 Rajab, 218 A.H.
1	Christians Capture Bait-Maqdas.	Friday	22 Sha'ban, 492 A.H.
1	Muslim recapture Bait-ul-Magdas.	Friday	25 Rajab, 582 A.H.
1	Fall of Granada	Tuesday	1 Rabi'-ul-Awwal, 897
7.	(Andalus).		A.H.
1	Death of Khawaja Baqi Billah.	Saturday	25 Jamadi-ul-Awwal, 1000 A.H.
1	Death of Emperor	Monday	17 Jamadi-us-Sani, A.H.
2	Death of Hazrat Alf Thani.	Tuesday	28 Safar, 1034 A.H.
2	Death of Pir Mehr Ali of Golarah Sharif.	Tuesday	29 Safar, 1356 A.H.

22. Fall of Dacca. Tuesday 27 Shawwal, 1391 A.H.

If anyone is desirous of finding dates belonging to the Pre-Hijra period he can refer to Tables "G", "H" & "I". These have been compiled specially for this purpose. The rules which have to be followed for finding the days during the Post-Hijra period will be applicable here also. As the necessary adjustments have not been carried out the ratio of moon's movement had to be enhanced. Anyone undertaking research on events outside the pale of Hijra era will find the table and the circle very useful.

Up until Juma-tul-Wida two calendars were being used in Mecca. One was known as the Hilali Calendar and the other, which had been designed to cover business deals and trade activities, was called Nasai. The historians, while dating events they mention, don't specify which calendar

they have been following. However, dates belonging to the Hilali Calendar can be checked in this way. Here are a few examples.

Example No 1. In the afternoon of Sunday, 22nd March, 285 A.D.; Sam-vat Saka 208, Samvat Vikrami 343 and Samvat Kaljug 3387 were about to begin. Incidentally on the very day, at the time of the Maghrib prayer, new moon of Jamadiul-Awwal, 348 Before Hijra appeared. Please confirm that it was actually a Monday on 1st Jamadi-ul-Awwal, 348 B.H.

Extra days for 300 years:	1.2280	Table "H".
Extra days for 40 years:	3.4304	
Extra days for 8 years:	0.6860	
Extra days upto the end of Rabi-us-Sani:	3.8202	"I".
9.1646 (—) days.	7	
	2.1646	= 3 days.

We look up Table "G" and discover that it was in fact a Monday.

Example No 2. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was born on 9th Rabi-ul-Awwal, 53 B.H. What day was it?

Extra days for 50 years:	6.0380	Table "H".
Extra days for 3 years:	6.3822	
Extra days upto the end of Safar:	1.9101	Table "I".
9th Rabi-ul-Awwal:	9.0000	
Days:	23.3303	
complete weeks: (—)	21.0000	
Rest of the Days:	2.3303	=3

On consulting the relevant table we find that it was a Monday.

Let us now give a couple of examples of answers received by using the methods of Western Scholars.

Example No 1. Imam Hussain's martyrdom occurred on 10th Muharram, 61 A.H. Find the day?

The difference of days given under the digit of 6: 2.999
 The difference of days given under the digit of 1: 4.366
 7.365

As the decimal fraction is smaller than .89 it will be omitted. We consult Table "F" and find that 7 stands for Monday. Therefore 1st Muharram, 61 A.H. was a Monday. Calculating onwards we establish that 10th Muharram was a Wednesday.

Example No 2. On what day will 1500A.H. begin?

The difference of days given for one thousand years: 5.666 Table "C".
 The difference of days given for five hundred years: 6.333 Table "C".
 11.999

As the decimal fraction is larger than .89 an extra day will be counted. Eleven days are already there. So the total becomes 12 days. Divide it by 7. We are left with 5. In the relevant table five stands for Saturday. Therefore, 1st Muharram 1500 A.H. will be a Saturday.

TABLE "A"
 The Christian Months and Days of the Year

JANUARY			FEBRUARY		
Common Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year	Common Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year
1	1	1	1	1	32
2	2	2	2	2	33

3	3	3	3	3	34
4	4	4	4	4	35
5	5	5	5	5	36
6	6	6	6	6	37
7	7	7	7	7	38
8	8	8	8	8	39
9	9	9	9	9	40
10	10	10	10	10	41
11	11	11	11	11	42
12	12	12	12	12	43
13	13	13	13	13	44
14	14	14	14	14	45
15	15	15	15	15	46
16	16	16	16	16	47
17	17	17	17	17	48
18	18	18	18	18	49
19	19	19	19	19	50
20	20	20	20	20	51
21	21	21	21	21	52
22	22	22	22	22	53
23	23	23	23	23	54
24	24	24	24	24	55
25	25	25	25	25	56
26	26	26	26	26	57
27	27	27	27	27	58
28	28	28	28	28	59
29	29	29		29	60
30	30	30			
31	31	31			

Common Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year	Common Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year
1		121	1		152
2	1	122	2	1	153
3	2	123	3	2	154
4	3	124	4	3	155
5	4	125	5	4	156
6	5	126		5	157
7	6	127	7	6	158
8	7	128	8	7	159
9	8	129	9	8	160
10		130	10	9	161
11	10	131	11	10	162
12	11	132	12	11	163
13	12	133	13	12	164
14	13	134	14	13	165
15	14	135	15	14	166
16	15	136	16	15	167
17	16	137	17	16	168
18	17	138	18	17	169
19	18	139	19	18	170
20	19	140	20	19	171
21	20	141	21	20	172
22	21	142	22	21	173
23	22	143	23	22	174
24	23	144	24	23	175
25	24	145	25	24	176
26	25	146	26	25	177
27	26	147	27	26	178
28	27	148	28	27	179
29	28	149	29	28	180
30	29	150	30	29	181

31

30

151

30

182

31

152

JULY

AUGUST

Common Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year	Common Year	Leap Year	Day the
	1	182	1		213
	2	183	2	1	214
	3	184	3	2	215
	4	185	4	3	216
	5	186	5	4	217
	5	187	6	5	218
	7	188	7	6	219
	8	189	8	7	220
	9	190	9	8	221
	10	191	10	9	222
	11	192	11	10	223
	12	193	12	11	224
	13	194	13	12	225
	14	195	14	13	226
	15	196	15	14	227
	16	197	16	15	228
	17	198	17	16	229
	18	199	18	17	230
	19	200	19	18	231
	20	201	20	19	232
	21	202	21	20	233
	22	203	22	21	234
	23	204	23	22	235
	24	205	24	23	236
	25	206	25	24	237

26	25	207	26	25	238
27	26	208	27	26	239
28	27	209	28	27	240
29	28	210	29	28	241
30	29	211	30	29	242
31	30	212	31	30	243
	31	213		31	244

SEPTEMBER

OCTOBER

Common	Leap	Day of	Common	Leap	Day
Year	Year	the Year	Year	Year	the

1		244	1		274
2	1	245	2	1	275
3	2	246	3	2	276
4	3	247	4	3	277
5	4	248	5	4	278
6	5	249	6	5	279
7	6	250	7	6	280
8	7	251	8	7	281
9	8	252	9	8	282
10	9	253	10	9	283
11	10	254	11	10	284
12	11	255	12	11	285
13	12	256	13	12	286
14	13	257	14	13	287
15	14	258	15	14	288
16	15	259	16	15	289
17	16	260	17	16	290

18	17	261	18	17	291
19	18	262	19	18	292
20	19	263	20	19	293
21	20	264	21	20	294
22	21	265	22	21	295
23	22	266	23	22	296
24	23	267	24	23	297
25	24	268	25	24	298
26	25	269	26	25	299
27	26	270	27	26	300
28	27	271	28	27	301
29	28	272	29	28	302
30	29	273	30	29	303
—	30	274	31	30	304
				31	305

NOVEMBER

DECEMBER

Common Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year	Comm Year	Leap Year	Day of the Year	
1		305	1		335	
	2	1	306	2	1	336
	3	2	307	3	2	337
	4	3	308	4	3	338
	5	4	309	5	4	339
	6	5	310	6	5	340
	7	6	311	7	6	341
	8	7	312	8	7	342
	9	8	313	9	8	343
	10	9	314	10	9	344
	11	10	315	11	10	345

12	11	316	12	11	346
13	12	317	13	12	347
14	13	318	14	13	348
15	14	319	15	14	349
16	15	320	16	15	350
17	16	321	17	16	351
18	17	322	18	17	352
19	18	323	19	18	353
20	19	324	20	19	354
21	20	325	21	20	355
22	21	326	22	21	356
23	22	327	23	22	357
24	23	328	24	23	358
25	24	329	25	24	359
26	25	330	26	25	360
27	26	331	27	26	361
28	27	332	28	27	362
29	28	333	29	28	363
30	29	334	30	29	364
	30	335	31	30	365
				31	366

TABLE "B" The ISLA MONTHS AND DAY OF THE YEAR

TABLE "C"
ADDITIONAL DAYS FOR HIJRI YEARS

Serial	No.	Single	Tens	Hundreds	Thousands
1.		4.366	1.666	2.666	5.666
2.		1.733	3.333	5.333	4.333
3.		6.099	4.999	0.999	2.999
4.		3.466	6.666	3.666	1.666
5.		0.833	1.333	6.333	0.333
6.					
5.199		2.999	1.999	5.999	
7.		2.566	4.666	4.666	4.666
8.					
6.933		6.333	0.333	3.333	
9.					
4.299	1	1	10	90	200
TA	2	2	32	61	91
BLE	3	3	33	62	92
"D"	4	4	34	63	93
ADDI	5	5	35	64	94
TION	6	6	36	65	95
AL	7	7	37	66	96
DAYS	8	8	38	67	97
FOR	9	9	39	68	98
ISLAM	10	10	40	69	99
IC	11	11	41	70	100
MON	12	12	42	71	101
THS	13	13	43	72	102
	14	14	44	73	103
	15	15	45	74	104
1.					
Muharr	16	16	46	75	105
am.	17	17	47	76	106
	18	18	48	77	107
	19	19	49	78	108
	20	20	50	79	109
	21	21	51	80	110

2.	Safar.	3.061	8.	Sha'ban.	5.244
3.	Rabi-ul-Awwal.	4.591	9.	Ramazan.	6.775
4.	Rabi-us-Sani.	6.122	10.	Shawwal.	1.306
5.	Jamadi-ul-Awwal.	0.652	11.	Dhu-al-Qa'da.	2.836
6.	Jamad-us-Sani.	2.183	12.	Dhu-ul-Hajja.	4.366


TABLE "E "

ADDITIONAL DAYS FOR PRINCIPAL MUSLIM FESTIVALS

1.	Ashura: Commemoration of the Battle of Karbala.	3.000
2.	Chehlum: 40th day of the Battle of Karbala.	0.531
3.	Milad al-Nabi: Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be	1.061
4.	Death Anniversary of Syedna Abu Bakar.	0.122
5.	Birth day of Syedna Ali.	1.183
6.	Shab-e-Miraj: [Ascent of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be	1.183
7.	Shab-e-Bara't.	2.714
8.	1st Ramazan.	5.244
9.	Death Anniversary of Syedna Ali.	
10.	Lailat al-Qadr.	3.244
11.	Eid al-Fitr.	0.775
12.	Youm-e-'Arfa.	4.836
13.	Eid-ul-Adha.	5.836

TABLE "F"

CIRCLE INDICATING THE DAY OF COMMENCEMENT OF



HIJRI MONTHS AND YEARS
(@ 4.366666666666 days per year)

TABLE "G"

CIRCLE INDICATING THE DAY OF COMMENCEMENT OF

PRE-HIJRI MONTHS AND YEARS
 (@ 4.4607601 days'per year)

TABLE "H"
 ADDITIONAL DAYS FOR PRE-HIJRA YEARS

Serial No.	Single	Tens	Hun- dreds	<i>Thousands</i>
1.	4.4607	2.6076	5.07	1.7601
2.	1.9215	5.2152	3.15	3.5202
3.	6.3822	0.8228	1.22	5.2803
4.	3.8430	3.4304	6.30	0.0404
5.	1.3038	6.0380	4.38	1.8005
6.	5.7645	1.6456	2.45	3.5606
7.	3.2253	4.2532	0.53	5.3207
8.	0.6860	6.8608	5.60	0.0808
9.	5.1468	2.4684	3.68	1.8409

TABLE "I"
 ADDITIONAL DAYS FOR PRE-ISLAMIC MONTHS

1.	Muharram.	0.9550633	7	Rajab.	6.685443
2.	Safar.	1.9101266	8	Sha'ban.	0.640506
3.	Rabi-ul-Awwal.	9	Ramazan.	.1.595570	
4.	Rabi-us-Sani.	3.8202533	1	Shawwal.	2.550633
5.	Jamadi-ul-Awwal.	1	Dhu-al-	3.505697	
6.	Jamadi-us-Sani.	1	Dhu-al-	4.460760	

TABLE "U"
 OLD CALENDAR

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	0/7.
----	----	----	----	----	----	------

500	400	300	200	100	700	600
1200	1100	1000	900	800	1400	1300

NEW CALENDAR

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	0/7.
1600	1900		1800		1700	
2000	2300		2200		2100	

TABLE "V"

FIGURE

1
S FOR

3

4

5

6

0/7

CHRISTIAN MONTHS

For leap years

Feb.

Jan.

TABLE "W"

1

2

3

4

5

6

0/7

TO FIND OUT WEEK DAY

Sun

Mon

Tue

Wed

Thu

Fri

Sat

TABLE "X" FIGURES FOR MISC. YEARS

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3		4	5	6
7		8	9	10	11	
12	13	14	15		16	17
18	19		20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27		28
29	30	31		32	33	34
35		36	37	38	39	
40	41	42	43		44	45
46	47		48	49	50	51
	52	53	54	55		56
57	58	59		60	61	62
63		64	65	66	67	
68	69	70	71		72	73
74	75		76	77	78	79
	80	81	82	83		84
85	86	87		88	89	90
91		92	93	94	95	
96	97	98	99			

What was the day on 26th Nov. 1918?

Figure for 1900 years. Tab. "U":

Figure for 18 years. Tab. "X":

Figure for November. Tab. "V":

Date of November: _____

31 days divided by 7, leaves one which means Sunday. See Tab. "W".

CONVERSION TABLES
TO CONVERT HILALI OR HIJRI YEARS INTO CHRISTIAN
YEARS
OR VICE VERSA

TABLE "K" FOR YEARS

Serial	Single	Ten	Hundreds	Thousands
No				
1.	.970225	9.702249	97.0224988	970.2249872
2.	1.940449	19.404498	194.044974	1940.449744
3.	2.910675	29.106746	291.067461	2910.674615
4.	3.880899	38.808995	388.089949	3880.899487
5.	4.851125	48.511244	485.112435	4851.124358
6.	5.821349	58.213492	582.134923	5821.349229
7.	6.791574	67.915742	679.1574101	6791.574101
8.	7.761798	77.617989	776.179873	7761.798973
9.	8.732024	87.320238	873.202385	8732.023845

TABLE "L" FOR MONTHS

Months	Period	Month	Period	Month	Period
1.	0.08085	5.	0.404261	9.	0.7
2.	0.161705	6.	0.485113	10.	0.80852
3.	0.242556	7.	0.565965	11.	0.88937
4.	0.323409	8.	0.646817	12.	0.97022

TABLE "M"
1 A.H. TO 1165 A.H. (A.H. = After Hijrat)

Serial	Singles	Tens	Hundreds	Thousands
No				
1.	0.970203	9.702024	97.020238	970.202378
2.	1.940405	19.404045	194.040476	1940.404755
3.	2.910608	29.106071	291.060714	2910.607133
4.	33.880809	38.808095	388.080951	3880.809509
5.	4.851011	48.510118	485.101188	4851.011188
6.	5.821214	58.212143	582.121426	5821.214264

7.	6.791417	67.914166	679.141664	6791.416642
8.	7.761619	77.616191	776.161902	7761.619009
9.	8.731821	87.318213	873.182140	8731.821386

TABLE "N" FOR MONTHS

Months	Period	Month	Period	Month	Period
1.	0.080850	5.	0.404251	9.	0.7276522
2.	0.161700	6.	0.485101	10.	0.8085025
3.	0.242550	7.	0.565951	11.	0.8893527
4.	0.323401	8.	0.646802	12.	0.970203

TABLE "P"
1166 A.H. AND YEARS ONWARDS

Serial	Single	Tens	Hundreds	Thousands
1.	0.9702238	9.7022382	97.0223826	970.223826
2.	1.9404476	19.4044765	194.044765	1940.447652
3.	2.9106715	29.1067147	291.067147	2910.671478
4.	3.8808954	38.8089530	388.089530	3880.895304
5.	4.8511191	48.5111913	485.111913	4851.11913
6.	5.8213429	58.2134295	582.134295	5821.342956
7.	6.7915667	67.9156678	679.156678	6791.566782
8.	7.7617907	77.6179060	776.179068	7761.790608
9.	8.7320144	87.3201443	873.201443	8732.014434

TABLE "Q" FOR MONTHS

Months	Period	Months	Period	Months	Period
1.	0.080852	5.	0.404259	9.	0.727667
2.	0.161703	6.	0.485112	10.	0.8085198
3.	0.242556	7.	0.565963	11.	0.889371
4.	0.323407	8.	0.646816	12.	0.970224

MATERIAL FOR FURTHER STUDY

Urdu & Persian Books

1. Beest Maqala-e Tag/ Zddah, Tehran (Bangah Pehlavi), 1346 A.H.
2. Tareekh-e-Adabiyat-e /ran by Jalaluddin Humai, Tehran 1340 A.H.
3. Tareekh-e Piyambar O Shahan by Hamza bin Hasan Isfahani, translated by Dr. Jafar Shaar, Intisharat-e Bynyad-e Farhang-e Iran, 1340, A.H.
4. At-Tanbih al Ashraf by Abul Hasan Ali bin Husain Masudi, translated by Abul Qasim Payinda, Tehran, 1349 A.H.
5. Taqveem-e Hijri va lsvi, compiled by Abun Nasr Muhammed Khalidi, Karachi, 1974, third edition.
6. Azkar-e Abrar, a translation of "Gulzar-e Abrar" by Muhammad Nou Shattari Mandvi, translation by Fazl-e Ahmad Jeory, Lahore, 1395 A.H., new edition.
7. Jamal-e Naqshband by Salahuddin, Maktaba-e Jamal, Lahore.
8. Tajalliyat-e Imam Rabbani, by Muhammad Abdul Hakim Khan Akhtar Mujaddadi Muzhari, Maktaba-e Nabviya, Lahore, 1978.
9. Taqveem-u/ Alam by Khawaja Muhammad Abul Hasan Mohy-uddin, Matba-e Yusufi, Lucknow.
10. Mehr-e Muneer by Moulana Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Golra Sharif, 1973.

Arabic Books

1. Asar-ul-Bagiyah 'an Quroon-ul-Khaliya by Al-Biruni.
2. Baloogh-ul-lral by Mahmood Shukri Aaloosi.
3. Seerat by I bn-e Hisham.
4. Tabaqat by Ibn-e Saad.

"English Books

1. Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, U.S.A.
2. Freeman, G.S.P., The Muslim and Christian Calendar, London.
3. Lahri, N.C., Tables of the Sun, Calcutta.
4. Rajan C.G., Raja joythida Garitham, Madras, 1932.

Muhammad Munawwar

There is no doubt that the first verse of the Quran revealed to the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) was

"Read in the name of thy Sustainer, Who has created."

Interpreting Muhammad Asad writes;

"The imperative Iqra may be rendered as "read" or "recite". The former rendering is to my mind, by far preferable in this context inasmuch as the concept of "reciting" implies no more than the oral delivery . . . with or without understanding — of something already laid down in writing or committed to memory, whereas reading primarily signifies a conscious taking-in, with or without an audible utterance but with a view to understanding them, of words or ideas received from an outside source: in this case the message of the Quran."¹

Whether it be "read" or "recited", one thing is obvious that the Message was being conveyed in words. Telepathically also things can be conveyed, messages can be imparted but without words no message can take a form similarly it cannot be understood without words uttered or unuttered. There can be no thought without words. Then how could only the meaning be inspired in respect of the book which had to offer clear guidance to mankind till eternity with injunctions, prohibitions and commands meant to be made home to them.

Iqbal does not bother about what the Mu'tazalites () and th

Ash'arites (o7L"I) held in this regard. For him the words of the Quran.were also eternal and above any shadow of doubt. They being words of Allah could not entertain any change, doubt or falsehood. He says:

N + +:./,.,

"There is no doubt about the meaning of its words. Nor can they be changed.

It does not allow misinterpretation of its verses".

This is what God Almighty Himself proclaims about the Quran, in the words of the Qu ran:

"Behold! it is We Ourselves Who have bestowed from on high, step by step, this reminder (i.e. Quran) and behold! it is We Who shall truly guard it (from all corruption)."

"No falsehood can ever attain to it openly and neither in a stealthy manner, it is bestowed from on high by One Who is truly wise, ever to be praised."

Thus Quran is the only revealed book which remained free from all sorts of changes and alterations. Nothing was added to it nor was anything deleted from its text, since the moment it was revealed to the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.). From the very first verse to the last, it retains its form, every word as it was. Nobody could dare tamper with the Quran openly nor could one corrupt its words surreptitiously in order to confuse its meanings.

Iqbal in the verses quoted above has laid down his belief in and appreciation of the Quran. It was his firm faith that the Quran being the last revealed book had to be guarded against all corruptions. It was his ardent conviction that as the Quran was the everlasting wisdom for the guidance of man till eternity hence its every word was a living word. No word could become obsolete because it neither contained any doubtful word in its original text nor could it ever afterwards enter into any questionable expression.

There have been theologians as well as philosophers who addressed the question whether it were the meanings only which were revealed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) or the words also came from God. In other words we may say that the question baffled some critics, logicians and analysts because according to them the purpose, the object, and meanings were inspired but the words were from the Prophet (peace be upon him).

As far as Iqbal's stance is concerned, he unquestioningly believed that the Quran was revealed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) in the very words it contained. Not the sense only, the vocabulary also was Divine. In this regard Faqir Sayyed Waheed-ud-Din relates:

"Once Iqbal was in jolly mood of talking. I availed of the opportunity and put him a question as to how he composed verses. He answered that I had started an interesting discussion but asked me to listen to an anecdote first. He narrated that the Annual Meeting of the Forman Christian College was being held. Dr. Lucas, the then Principal of the college, invited him also. Tea was served at the end of the meeting. Dr. Lucas approached him and asked him not to go away after tea because he wanted to discuss with him something very important. When the tea was over Dr. Lucas came to him and took him to a corner and stated that he wanted to know whether it was only the sense and meanings of the Quran that were revealed to his (Iqbal's) Prophet (peace be upon him) which he translated in his own language or the words of the Quran also were revealed to him. In brief, was the Quran revealed to his (Iqbal's) Prophet (peace be upon him) in words or in "meanings". Iqbal's answer was that words of the Quran were also revealed. And according to him the verses of the Quran were revealed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) in Arabic language. On hearing the this unexpected reply Dr. Lucas was taken aback and remarked amazedly 'I wonder how a man of your wisdom can believe without any reason that the words of the Quran were also revealed'. Iqbal's explanation was that when he composed a verse it was revealed to him as a whole. Then how could it be possible-that the last of Prophets who was sent' for the guidance of the worlds, the Quran should not have been revealed as a whole, meanings and words. In Iqbal's view there was nothing extraordinary about that. Thus, Iqbal stated that he silenced Dr. Lucas on the strength of that argument."⁵

It was quite obvious that Iqbal when composed verses it was not thought without words that came to his mind. No thought can ever be visualized without words, especially when the thought is to be conveyed to somebody else. It was the Angel who was the medium of the revelation. As though God put the message into the Angel's mind without words, who in turn conveyed it to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) without words, a Message aiming at transforming the whole lot of

humanity from every walk of life, individually and collectively. Not only that but to prepare them for the Day of Judgement and for life after death. Either one should believe in the revelation or one should reject it as a whole.

Prof. F. K. Hitti endorses Iqbal's view and supports his faith in respect of this aspect of the Quran:

"Bible, as is evident from the very word is a 'library' written in different languages, places and times. Its writing extends over eight hundred years. But the Quran was revealed to a person within a few years and almost at a place. The Bible was inspired, the Quran was dictated. You can quote the Quran by saying 'God said'. But Bible has undergone editorial and amendment changes but not so the Quran."

Quran's own declaration about itself is clear, no ambiguity of any kind.

o c ~ " ° X 1 1 Z ~ 1 1 a v J o l u ~ c ~ j ~ .. ~ d ~ 1 ~

"Now behold this (divine book) has indeed been bestowed from on high by the Sustainer of all worlds, trustworthy divine inspiration has alighted with it from high upon your heart (O, Muhammad) so that you may be among those who warn and preach, in clear Arabic language."

And for Iqbal the words of the Quran being divine contained light, blessing,

benediction. This is why Iqbal says addressing Niazud-Din Ahmad Khan: "One should read Quran more and more so that the heart may find a relation with Muhammad (peace be upon him). To get at this relation the knowledge of its meanings is not necessary. To read the Quran with a sincere heart is sufficient."⁸

An anecdote related by Professor Rashid Ahmad Siddiqui throws ample light on Iqbal's belief in the blessings of the words of Quran. In an article the Professor

writes:

"Iqbal intensely loved Sir Ross Masood and vice versa. Lady Ross Masood too had great respect for Iqbal and looked after his health. Lady Masood was pregnant. Iqbal got appointed a Qari who, with a sweet voice recited the Quran to the Lady every day early in the morning for half an hour. Iqbal believed that during pregnancy, it was highly beneficial to the child if the mother listened to the Quran being recited melodiously."⁹

Since the Quran contains words of God hence when a person reads it he in fact, establishes contact with God. Quran serves as a medium between God and man. Abu-Saeed al-Khudri has reported a saying of the Holy Prophet:

.. 1 M 1J ^{1t~Jlv°}.J.)..-41c}:¹¹,9⁰4.1m.al~

"The Book of God is the rope extending from the heavens to the earth."

Iqbal has expressed the same idea in the following verses:

"We are all dust and a heart, wide awake, is the Quran.

Hold on to it firmly, this is God's rope.

Knit yourself well in it like jewels in a thread,

Otherwise you will scatter and vanish like dust."

Iqbal's belief in the Gracefulness of the Revelation as a whole leads him to the conclusion that the words of the Quran themselves are a Light, a Benediction and a Blessing. Does not the Quran itself declare about its status, for example:

"And We reveal of the Quran that which is a healing and a mercy for believers." (3)

"O, mankind, now a proof from your Lord has come unto you, and We have sent unto you a clear Light." (4)

~9-~ ~ ~ y o ▶ ~ 1 j

جL..e,c l'.s~1

"And this a blessed Book which We have revealed. So follow it and ward off evil, that you may find mercy." (5)

It means that it is not only the meanings of the Quran which are a Light, a Healing and a Blessing which purify and enlighten human hearts and souls and lead human beings to the righteous path but its words also disseminate their heavenly influence over and above their contents. Even a baby in the womb of the mother could benefit from the words of the Quran. This is how Iqbal looked at the Quran.

In the "Armughan-e-Hijaz", while addressing the "Daughters of the Ummah", Allama Iqbal spotlighted this fact with reference to 'Umar's acceptance of Islam. History stands witness as to how 'Umar had left his home and made for the abode of the Prophet (S.A.S.) with a determination to put an end to his life. But on his way to the Prophet he was told that his own sister had embraced Islam, the religion preached by Muhammad (S.A.S.). In order to sweep before his own door first he returned towards his sister to take her to task. At his sister's dwelling the words of the Quran which were being recited by the sister fell on his ears. The words moved him ('Umar), who till that moment was an arch enemy of the Prophet (S.A.S.) went straight to him and declared with all earnest and in it'state of submission that he had come for the sake of embracing Islam. Says Iqbal:

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"From our evening dusk get a dawn anew;

To seeing eyes read the Quran anew;

From your readings warmth you know

That you changed altogether the destiny of 'Umar."

There transpired a complete change in 'Umar's destiny. And he had

heard only the words of the Quran. As is obvious he till then did not know the meanings of what the Quran contained and what the principles of Islam were. It was 'Umar who had intended to kill the Prophet (S.A.S.). And it was the same 'Umar who became one of his best companions who was nominated Caliph by Hazrat Abu Bakr-e-Siddique to succeed him, who was the first to assume the title of the "Commander of the Faithful", and who set the brightest examples in the art of governing, administering justice and evolving practical shape of collective fraternity and social equality unsurpassed in human history.

As to the luminosity of the words of the Quran, Khawaja Nizam-ud-Din of Delhi once related how a God-fearing man and gnostic Hassan Afghan, although absolutely unlettered could distinguish the words of the Quran from other writings. People would come to him and show him some piece of writing Arabic and Persian, and ask him as to where was the Quran in those lines. Hassan always put his finger correctly on the Quranic verse or verses. Whenever asked how could he so correctly distinguish the Quran from other text although he had not read the Quran, his reply always was that the words of the Quran were luminous whereas the others were not. This shows that even an illiterate person can avail of the Blessings of the Quran according to the degree of his inner purity. A saintly person was asked whether one could benefit from reading the Quran without knowing its meanings. The answer was that a medicine works even if the patient might not be knowing the ingredients of the medicine. The Quran is much more than a medicine prepared by human hands.

We should not refute such facts in a hurry. On the contrary, we should accept that God has stored in man subtle delicacies and endowed him with infinite possibilities. So far we have not been able to comprehend the scope of our sense-perception, the turn of the inner sensations will come a bit later. Come it must.

1. The Message of the Quran, p. 963.
2. Kulliyat-e-Iqbal (Persian), p. 121/121.
3. 15:9.
4. 41:42.
5. Ruzgar-i-Faqir, (1950), pp. 55, 56, 57.

6. Islam — A Way of Life, Oxf. Press, (1970), p. 27.
7. 26:192—194.
8. Iqbal Aur Quran, Iqbal Academy, p. 10. i
9. Ganjhai Giran Mayah () Three Friends
Publishers, Urdu 'Bazar, Rawalpindi.
10. Faiz-ul-Qadeer, Vol. II, p. 83.
- 11.
12. 17:82.
13. 4:174.
14. 6:155.
15. Armughan-e-Hijaz, Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Persian),. 94/976.

IQBAL AND THE WORDS OF THE QURAN

Muhammad Munawwar

There is no doubt that the first verse of the Quran revealed to the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) was

اقراء باسم ربك الذى خلق

"Read in the name of thy Sustainer, Who has created."

Interpreting اقراء Muhammad Asad writes:

"The imperative Iqra may be rendered as "read" or "recite". The former rendering is to my mind, by far preferable in this context inasmuch as the concept of "reciting" implies no more than the oral delivery... with or without understanding — of something already laid down in writing or committed to memory, whereas reading primarily signifies a conscious taking-in, with or without an audible utterance but with a view to understanding them, of words or ideas received from an outside source: in this case the message of the Quran."¹⁵⁴

Whether it be "read" or "recited", one thing is obvious that the Message was being conveyed in words. Telepathically also things can be conveyed, messages can be imparted but without words no message can take a form similarly it cannot be understood without words uttered or unuttered. There can be no thought without words. Then how could only the meaning be inspired in respect of the book which had to offer clear guidance to mankind till eternity with injunctions, prohibitions and commands meant to be made home to them.

Iqbal does not bother about what the Mu'tazalites (معتزله) and the Ash'arites (اشاعره) held in this regard. For him the words of the Quran were also eternal and above any shadow of doubt. They being words of Allah could not entertain any change, doubt or falsehood. He says:

حرف اور ارب نے تبدیل نے!

¹⁵⁴ The Message of the Quran, p. 963.

آیہ اش شرمندہ تاویل نے! ¹⁵⁵

"There is no doubt about the meaning of its words. Nor can they be changed.

It does not allow misinterpretation of its verses".

This is what God Almighty Himself proclaims about the Quran, in the words of the Quran:

انا نحن نزلنا الذکر وانا له لجانظون ¹⁵⁶

"Behold! It is we Ourselves Who have bestowed from on high, step by step, this reminder (i.e. Quran) and behold! it is We Who shall truly guard it (from all corruption)."

لا یاتیہ الباطل من بین یدیه ولا من خلفہ تتزیل من حکیم حمید ¹⁵⁷

"No falsehood can ever attain to it openly and neither in a stealthy manner, it is bestowed from on high by One who is truly wise, ever to be praised."

Thus Quran is the only revealed book which remained free from all sorts of changes and alterations. Nothing was added to it nor was anything deleted from its text, since the moment it was revealed to the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.). From the very first verse to the last, it retains its form, every word as it was. Nobody could dare tamper with the Quran openly nor could one corrupt its words surreptitiously in order to confuse its meanings.

Iqbal in the verses quoted above has laid down his belief in and appreciator of the Quran. It was his firm faith that the Quran being the last revealed book had to be guarded against all corruptions. It was his ardent conviction that as the Quran was the everlasting wisdom for the guidance of man till eternity hence its every word was a living word. No word could become obsolete because it neither contained any doubtful word in its original text nor could it ever afterwards enter tarn an iota of questionable expression.

There have been theologians as well as philosophers who addressed the question whether it were the meanings only which were revealed to the

¹⁵⁵ Kulliyat-e-Iqbal (Persian), p. 121/121.

¹⁵⁶ 15:9.

¹⁵⁷ 41:42.

Prophet (peace be upon him) or the words also came from God. In other words we may say that the question baffled some critics, logicians and analysts because according to them the purpose, the object, and meanings were inspired but the words were from the Prophet (peace be upon him). As far as Iqbal's stance is concerned, he unquestioningly believed that the Quran was revealed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) in the very words it contained. Not the sense only, the vocabulary also was Divine. In this regard Faqir Sayyed Waheed-ud-Din relates:

"Once Iqbal was in jolly mood of talking I availed of the opportunity and put him a question as to how he composed verses. He answered that I had started an interesting discussion but asked me to listen to an anecdote first. He narrated that the Annual Meeting of the Forman Christian College was being held. Dr. Lucas, the then Principal of the college, invited him also. Tea was served at the end of the meeting. Dr. Lucas approached him and asked him not to go away after tea because he wanted to discuss with him something very important. When the tea was over Dr. Lucas came to him and took him to a corner and stated that he wanted to know whether it was only the sense and meanings of the Quran that were revealed to his (Iqbal's) Prophet (peace be upon him) which he translated in his own language or the words of the Quran also were revealed to him. In brief, was the Quran revealed to his (Iqbal's) Prophet (peace be upon him) in words or in "meanings". Iqbal's answer was that words of the Quran were also revealed. And according to him the verses of the Quran were revealed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) in Arabic language. On hearing the this unexpected reply Dr. Lucas was taken aback and remarked amazedly 'I wonder how a man of your wisdom can believe without any reason that the words of the Quran were also revealed'. Iqbal's explanation was that when he composed a verse it was revealed to him as a whole. Then how could it be possible-that the last of Prophets who was sent' for the guidance of the worlds, the Quran should not have been revealed as a whole, meanings and words. In Iqbal's view there was nothing extra-ordinary about that. Thus, Iqbal stated that he silenced Dr. Lucas on the strength of that argument."¹⁵⁸

It was quite obvious that Iqbal when composed verses it was not thought without words that came to his mind. No thought can ever be visualized

¹⁵⁸ Ruzgar-i-Faqir, (1950), pp. 55, 56, 57.

without words, especially when the thought is to be conveyed to somebody else. It was the Angel who was the medium of the revelation. As though God put the message into the Angel's mind without words, who in turn conveyed it to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) without words, a Message aiming at transforming the whole lot of humanity from every walk of life, individually and collectively. Not only that but to prepare them for the Day of Judgement and for life after death. Either one should believe in the revelation or one should reject it as a whole.

Prof. F. K. Hitti endorses Iqbal's view and supports his faith in respect of this aspect of the Quran:

"Bible, as is evident from the very word is a 'library' written in different languages, places and times. Its writing extends over eight hundred years. But the Quran was revealed to a person within a few years and almost at a place. The Bible was inspired, the Quran was dictated. You can quote the Quran by saying 'God said'. But Bible has undergone editorial and amendment changes but not so the Quran."¹⁵⁹

Quran's own declaration about itself is clear, no ambiguity of any kind.

وانزلنا التنزيل رب العالمين - نزل به الروح الامين
على قلبك لتكون من المنذرين - بلسان عربي مبين¹⁶⁰

"Now behold this (divine book) has indeed been bestowed from on high by the Sustainer of all worlds, trustworthy divine inspiration has alighted with it from high upon your heart (O, Muhammad) so that you may be among those who warn and preach, in clear Arabic language."

And for Iqbal the words of the Quran being divine contained light, blessing, benediction. This is why Iqbal says addressing Niazud-Din Ahmad Khan: "One should read Quran more and more so that the heart may find a relation with Muhammad (peace be upon him). To get at this relation the knowledge of its meanings is not necessary. To read the Quran with a sincere heart is sufficient."¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Islam — A Way of Life, Oxf. Press, (1970), p. 27.

¹⁶⁰ 26:192—194.

¹⁶¹ Iqbal Aur Quran, Iqbal Academy, p. 10.

An anecdote related by Professor Rashid Ahmad Siddiqui throws ample light on Iqbal's belief in the blessings of the words of Quran. In an article the Professor writes:

"Iqbal intensely loved Sir Ross Masood and vice versa. Lady Ross Masood too had great respect for Iqbal and looked after his health. Lady Masood was pregnant. Iqbal got appointed a Qari who, with a sweet voice recited the Quran to the Lady every day early in the morning for half an hour. Iqbal believed that during pregnancy, it was highly beneficial to the child if the mother listened to the Quran being recited melodiously."¹⁶²

Since the Quran contains words of God hence when a person reads it he in fact, establishes contact with God. Quran serves as a medium between God and man. Abu-Saeed al-Khudri has reported a saying of the Holy Prophet:

کتاب اللہ هو الحبل الممدود من السماء الى الارض¹⁶³

"The Book of God is the rope extending from the heavens to the earth."

Iqbal has expressed the same idea in the following verses:

ماہمہ خاک و دل آگاہ اوست!
اعتصامش کن کہ حبل اللہ اوست!
چوں گہر در رشتہ اوسفتہ شو
ورنہ مانند غبار آشتہ شو!¹⁶⁴

"We are all dust and a heart, wide awake, is the Quran.

Hold on to it firmly, this is God's rope.

Knit yourself well in it like jewels in a thread,

Otherwise you will scatter and vanish like dust."

Iqbal's belief in the Gracefulness of the Revelation as a whole leads him to the conclusion that the words of the Quran themselves are a Light, a Benediction and a Blessing. Does not the Quran itself declare about its status, for example:

من القرآن ما هو شفاء و رحمة لعلو منین¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Ganjhai Giran Mayah (گنج ہائے گرانمایہ) Three Friends Publishers, Urdu 'Bazar, Rawalpindi.

¹⁶³ Faiz-ul-Qadeer, Vol. II, p. 83.

"And we reveal of the Quran that which is a healing and a mercy for believers."3)

يا ايها الناس قد جاءكم برهان من ربكم وآنزلنا اليكم نورا مبينا¹⁶⁶

"O, mankind, now a proof from your Lord has come unto you, and we have sent unto you a clear Light." (4)

هذا كتاب انزلنا، مبارك فاتبعوا التقوا والعكم ترجمون¹⁶⁷

"And this blessed Book which we have revealed. So follow it and ward off evil, that you may find mercy." (5)

It means that it is not only the meanings of the Quran which are a Light, a Healing and a Blessing which purify and enlighten human hearts and souls and lead human beings to the righteous path but its words also disseminate their heavenly influence over and above their contents. Even a baby in the womb of the mother could benefit from the words of the Quran. This is how Iqbal looked at the Quran.

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ز شام برون آور سحر را

بہ قرآن باز خواں اہل نظر را

تو میدانی کہ سوز قرات تو

¹⁶⁵ 17:82.

¹⁶⁶ 4:174.

¹⁶⁷ 6:155.

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of our sense-perception, the turn of the inner sensations will come a bit later.
Come it must.

THE UNIVERSITY — REPOSITORY OF UNIVERSAL AND TOTAL TRUTH

Dr. Absar Ahmad

Importance of Ideas

There is an old proverb which says that the pen is mightier than the sword. We must of course not make too much of any saying. To any proverb there is a counter proverb and one can always find proverbial support for what one believes. Nevertheless, it is interesting to distil fraction of truth that they contain. The remark about the pen and sword describes the extraordinary power of ideas. Of course, not everybody is interested in ideas as such. Indeed, most of us most of the time and all of us some of the time need to know rather what to do next, to decide on what action to take. But some people are interested in ideas in their own right. Such are called collectively intellectuals, or the intelligentsia. Often unpopular and regarded with suspicious a society would lose its direction and vitality without these intellectuals.

What makes a man an intellectual? This is not so easy to define. Evidently, it is not a matter of just being intelligent. There are many who display great intelligence in going about these affairs, but that does not make them intellectuals. Again, it is not merely a matter of education either. A man may have a most elaborate formal education to his credit and yet not he much interested in ideas. The reverse is probably less likely, some measure of literacy is needed to cope with ideas, so that an intellectual will usually have some education. Much the same holds for the question of whether a man is well informed or not while the totally uninformed cannot well be counted as intellectuals, a man may be a mine of information and yet thoroughly blind to the importance of ideas. Similarly those who subscribe to the fads of the moment are not necessarily intellectuals. The peculiar way in which intellectuals influence the development of society lies in the fact that their efforts ensure that ideas are formulated and put into circulation. It is the intellectual who translates the vague and inarticulate misgivings of man at large into coherent accounts or theories that can be communicated. The theories pertain to the questions about the being of Man and the Universe,

about the idea of good; about the possibility of knowing, about the ultimate meaning of the things.

An intellectual's thinking or reflection in this context is something different from solving limited and specific problems — finding ways to grow better plants or make better tools. It is to provide a rational explanation of the Universe, to lay down what ought to be and what people ought to do, and to grapple with the questions raised by the very fact that they think — that is, the problems posed by awareness of the thinking process itself and the awareness of existence that comes with it. This special kind of self-consciousness may, in fact, be the greatest single spur to philosophical thought.

Classical Sense of the University Plato's Academy founded in 385 A.C. and the Lyceum of Aristotle established in 335 B.C. were the earliest institutions of higher learning. Unlike the Rhetoric School of Isocrates (436—338 B.C.), which preceded them and which offered the highest practical training for achieving success in life, they were devoted to theoretical investigations in respect of reality and the ultimate problems relating to it. The Academy was concerned solely with philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy, and the discovery and formulation of the fundamental principles of methodology which was to provide sound bases to the structure of all scientific knowledge the main and the all-important discipline was, however, metaphysics which determined, in every detail the entire intellectual activity. Aristotle, with a slight shift in the metaphysical position of his master— Plato — was able to include the natural and social sciences in the scheme of studies at his Lyceum. However, at both the schools philosophy was the chief discipline; and the main aim of all speculation and research remained the discovery of the universal truth and the determination of the ultimate principle of reality.

The method of discussion and cross-examination introduced by Socrates for inquiry into the nature of concepts, gave rise to the schools and academy which provided the medium of communication and exchange of ideas between the teacher and the taught. This discussion and communication was not confined to the transmission of knowledge, it was used primarily to discover truth by combined intellectual efforts of the teacher and the pupil. All enquiry, whether in the realm of the human mind or that of the external world, was ultimately determined in these early schools by the pre-

suppositions furnished by philosophy. All the great Alexandrian teachers who did the pioneering work in variegated scientific fields were Aristotelian whose work was based on the philosophical presupposition of the master. It was the metaphysical assumptions of Aristotle and Plato which were applied by them in the sphere of all particular sciences. In fact, in Alexandria as in Athens philosophy provided the basis of all intellectual activity. Whatever be the field of investigation, Aristotelian "metaphysics of form and matter" played the role of the final arbiter. Thus all higher education, called University education today, continued to move within the categories of philosophy which alone was considered competent to provide the foundation of all knowledge.

The word 'University', according to the definition provided in the Encyclopedia Britannica, is derived from the medieval Latin term *universities* which was employed to denote any community or corporation devoted to universal learning and education. The more ancient and customary designation of such communities or places in medieval times was *stadium* and subsequently *stadium generalis*. It is an interesting historical fact that the "Stadium General", later called universities, came into existence to replace the cathedral and monastic schools which had attained to the highest degree of reputation and influence with the rightly Church behind them. However, in the universities, side by side with the Faculty of Theology, the Faculty of Philosophy now asserted its right to independent and free inquiry.

And soon it came to be realized that philosophy covered the entire field of knowledge including theology and natural sciences, and as such, determined the character of the university.

The very idea of university includes and encompasses the whole of knowledge as an integrated whole. Though historically it is true that Bologna started with law and Paris was originally concerned with Theology and Arts, yet both of them gradually appropriated the whole universe of knowledge and ultimately became composite bodies consisting of all the Faculties Theology, Law, Medicine, and Arts. The last, however, served on the necessary means for the mental training for the study of the first three and thus acquired an independent status on the Faculty of Philosophy which included in itself all the social and natural sciences. Thus it is quite clear that the very idea of the university represents the totality of knowledge. The conception of an institution devoted to the cultivation of universal

knowledge is not only an 'imperative accessory as Rashdall, an eminent Poritish philosopher, has so aptly insisted, it, in fact, provides the only justification for bringing together all the faculties to one place in order to promote and preserve the universality and totality of knowledge.

Indeed this idea of the university can justified in another way also. If, as the Rationalist believe quite legitimately, the universe is really an universum, a cosmos in which all the part have 'turned to me', that is, are interrelated, interconnected, and integrated into one, forming a system (system means parts set together), with no loose, insolated items, then surely the knowledge of this universe must necessarily be a system, unified and integrated, i.e. cosmic in its structure as well as in its scope. To say that the university is a composite body of scholars and students in the merely legal sense, means nothing if their knowledge taken together does not constitute a unified whole. All knowledge derives its ultimate meaning and validity from the totality of knowledge in the context of which it must finally be evaluated. If the different disciplines remain apart in the university, they would not produce cosmos of knowledge because none of them would reflect in itself the cosmos which is a systematized and unified whole. Unity of the universe calls for the unity of knowledge. Particular sciences, natural as well as social, are by their nature restricted in their approach and fragmented in scope, and as such, they cannot overcome or transgress the limitations imposed upon them by their respective subject matter. The knowledge gained by each one of them individually is partial that is, is valid only in respect of its particular subject matter and does not reflect the ultimate truth in an integrated form. Universal knowledge can be attained only by a discipline which inquires into the ultimate nature of reality taken as a whole, that is to say, by a discipline which deals with the most universal and widest possible concepts, applicable to the whole of reality and experience without in any way setting aside or discarding the parts.

Attenuation of Knowledge

In the present-day academic scene, however, the position of philosophy is different from the view taken of it in the above section. Though the natural sciences had required great prestige, they could not have undermined the position of philosophy, had rot the prevailing and dominating philosophy of the time given rise to, a revolt against itself in its own area. The historical roots of mans present intellectual crisis can he traced back to the

Enlightenment and its successors' 'logical positivism', 'logical empiricism' and 'utilitarianism'. The physical and spiritual crisis of the modern man is a logical outcome of the worship of the Sensuous and Scientific Fact and the divorce of values from knowledge. That the western civilization, and the intellectual framework which is its necessary concomitant, has failed mankind is now openly admitted by the pundits of the west itself. Let me here give a brief historical survey of the contemporary scene.

The epistemological and intellectual tradition which is responsible for the present status of modern knowledge and science has its roots in the Enlightenment which by many is considered to be the beginning of modern times. The Enlightenment was the work of the philosopher — the intellectuals who conceived and perfected it. These thinkers looked at science and exploration not just for new knowledge but also for new attitude towards knowledge. From science they acquired the skeptical attitude of systematic doubt (Descartes), and from exploration a new relativistic attitude towards belief and used them as ammunition against metaphysics and fables. The epistemological concerns of this moment derived from the seventeenth century. The intellectual spokesmen of that century — Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Newton — all appealed for a rational criticism of truth. The philosophy of the enlightenment takes up this call, particularly the methodological pattern of Newtonian mechanics and begins to generalize it. This then became the basic epistemological framework of the Enlightenment. However much individual thinkers and scholars agree or disagree with the end results, they are all unified in their framework of knowledge. The new tools of 'criticism' and 'analysis', however, were not only for mathematical and physical knowledge but they were also used by the philosophers to dissect all branches of human endeavour such fundamental disciplines as metaphysics, religion, politics and ethics were also analyzed in the basis of 'reason' and logic with a view to ending their perennial perplexities once and for all. The principles which the empiricist philosophers attempted to apply were the new scientific canons of the eighteenth century there was to be as a priori deduction from metaphysical principles without concrete experimental evidence. Isaiah Berlin writes on this point in his characteristic style.

"This use of observation and experiment entailed the application of exact methods of measurement, and resulted in the linking together of many

divorce phenomena under laws of great precision, generally formulated in mathematical terms. Consequently only the measurable aspects of reality were to be treated as real — those susceptible to equations connecting the variations in one aspect of a phenomenon with measurable variation in other phenomena. The whole notion of nature as compounded of irreducibly different qualities and unbridgeable 'natural' kinds, was to be finally discarded. The Aristotelian category of final cause - the explanation of phenomena in terms of the 'natural' tendency of every object to fulfill its own inner and or purpose -- which was also to be the answer to the question of why it existed, and what function it was attempting to fulfill - notions for which no experimental or observational evidence can in principle be discovered --- was abandoned as unscientific, and indeed in the case of inanimate entities without wills or purposes as literally unintelligible. Laws formulating regular concomitances of phenomena -- the observed order and conjunctions of things and events — were sufficient, without introducing impalpable entities and forces, to describe that is describable, and predict all that is predictable, in the universe. Space, time, mass, force, momentum, rest — the terms of mechanics — are to take the place of final causes, substantial forms, divine purpose, and other metaphysical notions."¹⁶⁹

The philosophies that followed the Enlightenment took the separation of knowledge from metaphysics and values further. The nineteenth century heralded the triumphs of reason in the unparalleled spread of materialism. Logical Positivism and materialism of which Marxism is a part) and their twentieth century counter-part, logical empiricism, throw metaphysics and values overboard altogether. In their epistemological framework both metaphysics and values are not considered proper knowledge. Utilitarianism declared that the goal, the ideal, of all moral endeavour is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. What came to be practiced, in fact, was the greatest number of material goods for the largest possible number of people. Industrialization, which also became the main agent of the environmental devastation, has produced this reality.

Henryk Skolimowski has aptly characterized the present age by Sergei Bazaroy (from Targeney's novel *Fathers and Children*) who is a robust, exuberant believer in science, in materialism and in the world in which fact

¹⁶⁹ Isaiah Berlin, *The Age of Enlightenment*, Mentor Books, New York, 1956, p. 17.

and positive know-ledge are supreme values.¹⁷⁰ He has no use for art, for poetry, for other 'romantic rubbish'. The modern man is engulfed so completely by the analytical reason, scientific fact and bogus empiricism that it is often difficult to see through them and access their impact on society. Bazaroy is at once an embodiment of the prevailing nihilism, materialism, scientism and positivism, which in their respective ways, regarded intrinsic values as second, insignificant, or even non-existent in the world of cold facts, clinical objectivity and scientific reason. According to the present social culture and academic milieu, reality begins with the group, with publicly available data. Spiritual and inner life is denied altogether.

The Academic Imperative

By raising reason and fact to the level of 'gods' the modern man has brought himself into the era of supersonic age. The achievements and success of modern science and technology no doubt have brought some benefits to humanity, but they have also brought him alienation, urbanization, moral degeneration and ecological crisis. The worship of economic growth has brought him fragmented and meaningless work, cracked and superficial relations. The assembly line symbolizes the way things should be done, rapidly, efficiently and, of course, massively. The whole society operates as a machine.

The only way out of this colossal malaise lies through responding to, and acting on, what I would call for want of a better expression, the ACADEMIC IMPERATIVE which necessitates a radical change in the conception of knowledge itself. Indeed the remedy calls for a reversal to the classical view of knowledge and wisdom: the view in which there was no separation between knowledge, values and metaphysics — between social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and natural sciences. It is an undeniable fact that the great mass of human beings have a real need for an enlightened philosophy, that is, for a consistent world-view and a body of guiding principles and clearly defined aims. This mass has been effectively deprived by contemporary positivist and linguistic philosophers of any ideological material which might prove relevant to their existences.

¹⁷⁰ Ecology, p. 5, 18 January 1975.

What I have termed the 'academic imperative' means in effect that an all-out effort must, be made to reject and refute the structure of present-day education which has enshrined a fact/value distinction in its very fundamentals. We should realize that we have had enough of analysis, positivism and skepticism. Indeed this trivialization of knowledge should no longer be tolerated. Contrary to the limited and restricted way in which epistemological questions are discussed in recent, analytical works, these questions should include knowledge about oneself, about the Ultimate Reality, about one's society and one's relationship with others. If this is done, one can easily see the truth of the contention that positivism (scientism included) is intrinsically a mystifying social formation in which people are systematically prevented from seeing the truth about their lives, destiny, ideals and their society. The question about knowledge has to be dealt with in the context of the question: what kind of metaphysics and social relations would enable a non-mystified view of reality, would replace illusion with knowledge. Thus it would involve issues about open and non-oppressive forms of education, an education which liberates people's capacities to discover and to do things for themselves and with others which enables them to understand their future and ultimate destiny. In short, the academic imperative enjoins the modern academies to liberate humanity from inhuman and enslaving philosophical presuppositions and reconstrue knowledge in the light of broad humanistic and metaphysical framework in order to establish human life in satisfying and meaningful relation to the universe in which man finds himself, and to get wisdom in the conduct of human affairs. In other words, it behaves them to abandon earstwhile cavalier attitude to metaphysical philosophy and attach utmost importance to intellectual understanding of the ultimate principle of reality.

It is only through such deep and profound intellectual understanding that man can reach self-integration and thus proceed toward genuine and infinite evolution. This type of committed intellectual will repudiate the currently fashionable trend which ridicules ideology and demands that writers, scholars and philosophers remain non-committed, un-ideological, and alien to the serious social and metaphysical problems of their time. A man who is 'educated' in the real sense of word is one who has achieved a sense of cultural and historical self-awareness. He is certainly able to change his inert and backward state, its mental and spiritual decadence into a dynamic state of

making and inventing and into a state of moral, spiritual and social creativity. Viewed from this angle, matter-of-fact on which positivists or anti-intellectual thinkers so much emphasize is an abstraction arrived at by confining thought to purely formal relations which then masquerade as the final reality. This is why science, in its perfection, relapses into the study of differential equations. The concrete world and human experience slip through the meshes of the scientific net. The exclusive concentration of attention upon matter-of-tact or science is the supremacy of the irrational. Any approach to such triumph makes learning and knowledge truncated and fugitive which shuns emphasis on essential connections such as disclose the universe in its impact upon individual experience. To quote a very relevant passage from A. N. Whitehead here: "Apart from detail, and apart from system, a philosophic outlook is the very foundation of thought and of life. The sort of ideas we attend to, and the background govern our hopes, our fears, our control of behaviour. As we think, we live. This is why the assemblage of philosophic ideas is more than a specialist study. It moulds our type of civilization"¹⁷¹

A society in which thought is stagnant is a dying society: it cannot look forward to a future. The task of a university is the creation of the future, so far as rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation, can affect the issue. Universities are created in the hope that they will not only help preserve the traditions of a community but also provide a group of scholars and an atmosphere of scholarship where ideas and values continually tested by the free play of thought. LIFE IS ENRICHED WHEN THERE IS TIME TO THINK AND A SUITABLE 'PLACE TO DO IT. THIS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL JUSTIFICATION OF UNIVERSITIES.

¹⁷¹ Whitehead, A. N., *Modes of Thought*, The Free Press, New York, p. 63.

AMERICAN, WEST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET ATTITUDES TO IQBAL

Riaz Hussain

Justice William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court of the United States says: "That (Iqbal's) simple tomb is a place of pilgrimage for me. For Iqbal was a man who belonged to all races; his concepts had universal appeal. He spoke to the conscience of men of goodwill whatever their tongue, whatever their creed."¹⁷²

Acknowledging the debt of religion that the West owes to the East, the Judge writes: "One great contribution of the East to the West is charity or love, as epitomized by Muhammad and Christ, Buddha and Confucius."¹⁷³

The judge is at one with Iqbal in condemning the machine for its role in turning man into an automaton. Iqbal's condemnation of capitalism and communism and his plea to mankind to inculcate spiritual values and control science and covetous instincts for the Public good are echoes of the Judge's own views. He quotes the following verses of Iqbal with hearty approval:

"The object of science and art is not knowledge;
The object of the garden is not the bud and the flower.
Science is an instrument for the preservation of life."¹⁷⁴

In the following stanza, Judge Douglas reads the meaning that a new spiritual understanding between the East and the West was uppermost in the poet's mind: "In the West intellect is the source of life.

In the East, love is the basis of life.
Through love intellect grows acquainted with reality.
And intellect gives stability to the work of love.
Arise and lay the foundations of a new world by wedding intellect to love."¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² William O. Douglas, Introduction to Hafeez Malik, ed., Iqbal, Columbia University Press, 1971.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

Commenting on this theme, Justice Douglas writes:

"The great needs these days is for bridges of understanding between the East and the West. The need is for bridges of understanding at the highest intellectual levels."¹⁷⁶

This is an American plan which has only recently come to some fruition. A few American universities have recently set up schools for the study of Urdu Literature and Iqbal has received a fair amount of attention from American scholars. Actually, the Americans have lagged far behind the Russians in waking up to the significance of Iqbal as a power house generating Third World Movements.

Justice Douglas' verdict on Iqbal is even-handed. Some American Academicians, however, do not agree with him. Prof. W. Cantwell Smith, for instance, is the progenitor of a myth which has over the past decade been sedulously propagated by a school of Western Writers. Prof. Smith argues that since Iqbal was anti-capitalist and capitalism fosters intellect, hence Iqbal was anti-intellect.¹⁷⁷

Now no connection between capitalism and intellect as Iqbal conceived it may be established. To prove that Iqbal was anti-intellect because he was anti-capitalist is to misread Iqbal. Whether Prof. Smith's canard against Iqbal is willful or due to incomprehension is hard to tell. The delight that an average American takes in defending capitalism and democracy is both genuine and unbounded. Freeland Abbot, Professor of History, Tuft's University asserts:

"Iqbal's view of the West was imperfect. He had not lived in the West long enough really to understand it. He was unable to picture the West apart from imperialism, and he apparently accepted the old Shibboleth that the West primarily fosters materialistic qualities, whereas the East primarily fosters spiritualistic qualities... an idea based on the belief that technology supplants religion."¹⁷⁸

Prof. Abbot rebuts Iqbal's thesis on the West on the following grounds:

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ W. C. Smith, *Modern /slam in India*, (London, 1946), p. 113.

¹⁷⁸ Hafeez Malik, ed., *Iqbal*, Columbia, 1971, p. 176.

1. Iqbal's physical stay in the West was too brief for him to acquire perfect understanding of the West.
2. Iqbal's view of the West was coloured by the West's imperialistic role in the world. Impliedly, Iqbal did not see the science, economy, technology, democracy and philosophy of the West in right perspective because of his prejudice against Imperialism.
3. Iqbal was anti-scientist, in other words, anti-intellect.

(An echo of Smith here!)

These are serious charges, but Prof. Abbot does not attempt to substantiate them.

Whether Prof. Abbot's arguments are imperfectly considered is better known to him. Changing tone, Prof. Abbot proceeds to establish another pet thesis i.e., Iqbal's ignorance of a half of the intellectual life of the West. By "half of the intellectual life of the West," Prof. Abbot means the works of Thoreau, Melville and Hawthorne, New England intellectuals whose work and fame have hardly survived their own age.

Prof. Abbot maintains that all that Iqbal could say in condemnation of Western Civilization had, all been said many times before by such American poets as Sidney Lanier and Walt Whitman. Not only that, but all the theories of Iqbal about the relationship of God and man were a mere repetition of the ideas of Emerson and Walt Whitman.

Delivering his final Judgment, Prof. Abbot observes:

"His (Iqbal's) vision of the West was naturally enough affected by his position, that of a proud Muslim remembering a proud past, and by his times, those of domination by Western Powers."¹⁷⁹

Prof. Abbot's charges and judgments offer but a poor defense against Iqbal's indictment of the West. The main burden of Prof. Abbot's thesis is that Iqbal did not understand the West since his stay in the West was too short. I wonder if this is meant as a serious argument.

Was Iqbal a journalist or a travelogue writer of the modern American type who, after a short stay in a country", begins to pontificate on all aspects of its

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 177.

life? Of course, Iqbal was none of these. His intellectual and physical contact with the West had begun long before he went to Europe in 1905.

The educational milieu in which Iqbal spent his teens was thoroughly Western. He attended Colleges of the Western type, had European teachers and studied Western Philosophy and Literature. He lived and moved in an India wherein Politics, Law, Education, Manners, Dress, etc., had become Western.

Hence the impressions which Iqbal formed during his stay in Europe (1905—1908) were really an extension of the impressions which he had already formed by his contact with Western Civilization in India. Prof. Abbot's contention that Iqbal's knowledge of the West was imperfect because his stay in the West was too short is, therefore, untenable.

Mr. Abbot's second allegation that Iqbal's view of the West was coloured by his prejudice against imperialism is equally hollow. Prof. Abbot has quoted chapter and verse to prove that Thoreau, Melville and Emerson found the same faults in Western Civilization as Iqbal did. Was their vision jaundiced also?

Is Justice William O. Douglas, as quoted above, anti-science, anti-intellect, anti-capitalism? Or are all these men of thought merely calling a spade a spade? The question does not seem to have occurred to Prof. Abbot. N. P. Anikoy, the Soviet biographer of Iqbal, states:

"(Iqbal is) great for his passionate condemnation of weak will and passiveness, his angry protest against inequality, discrimination and oppression in all forms i.e., economic, social, political, national, racial, religious, etc., his preaching of optimism, an active attitude towards life and man's high purpose in the world, in a word, he is great for his assertion of the noble ideals and principles of humanism, democracy, peace and friendship among peoples."¹⁸⁰

Such a balanced and accurate assessment of Iqbal was not always a Soviet norm.

It may come as a surprise to many that long before West Europe or America took any serious notice of Iqbal, the Soviet scholars were earnestly

¹⁸⁰ N. P. Anikoy, Muhammad Iqbal — An Outstanding Thinker and Poet (Moscow, 1959).

keeping track of Iqbal's thought. The history of Iqbal studies in Russia goes back to the pre-1917. Bolshevik Revolution period Prof. A. E. Krimiski of the University of Moscow made use of Iqbal's dissertation on "The Development of Metaphysics in Persia" in his work "Persia, its History and Literature" (Moscow, 1912). Prof. Krimiski was deeply impressed by the sympathy and keenness of Iqbal's views on Persian Sufism and calls Iqbal "a European Educated Muslim who has treated the subject of Sufism with great sympathy."

An eclipse came over Iqbal studies in the Soviet Union during and immediately after the 1917 Revolution. Then, after a long gap, doctrinal reviews of Iqbal's thought and action began to appear in Soviet writings during the Sixties. The impetus to Iqbal studies in Russia was provided by the Pakistan Philosophical Congress held in Peshawar in April, 1956. The Russian delegates to the Congress assessed the deep influence that Iqbal's thought exercised on the minds of the Muslims in this region and elsewhere. They realized the uppermost folly of ignoring the works of one of the champions of freedom and a leading Muslim thinker of South East Asia. Accordingly, the three delegates carried to their country the complete works of Iqbal in order that a scholarly assessment be made of him. Then appeared a long line of works replete with several misconceptions. Gordon-Polonskeya in their book "The History of Pakistan" (Moscow, 1961) took the line that the demand for Pakistan was especially created by the British on the principle of "Divide and rule." On this arbitrary assumption, the joint authors conclude that the "Muslim demand for self-determination bifurcated the all-India National Movement."¹⁸¹

The Soviet Encyclopedia 'published 1972 praises Iqbal for his anti-capitalism, humanism and dynamic outlook on life, but charges him with being in-consistent and unsystematic. "In his poetry," says the Encyclopedia, "Iqbal sang the creative activity of man and called him to a restructuring of human existence, his work inspired by humanism and patriotism. Notwithstanding this inspiration, the philosophical and political views of Iqbal were not free of contradiction. He was critical of capitalism, but defended property and individualism." What appears a "contradiction" to the Soviet Academician is no contradiction in Islam. A measure of the Soviet

¹⁸¹ Gordon — Polonskeya, the History of Pakistan, Moscow, 1961, p. 142.

author's inherent inability to comprehend Islam may be taken from his naive statement that "Iqbal welcomed the 'October Revolution' and showed sympathy for socialism, writing the poem 'Lenin', but at the same time he expressed himself against communist atheism."

Actually, Iqbal was magnanimous enough to give praise where it was due and there is no denying the fact that he applauded humanistic goals of the October Revolution. It is, on the other hand, equally incontrovertible that because of communist disbelief in God, Iqbal did not see the salvation of mankind through communism. Hence there is no inconsistency in Iqbal's praise and condemnation of the October Revolution.¹⁸²

Capitalist and communist intellectuals may not have anything in common, but their imperviousness to Islamic ideals is the common denominator. Hence their confused and arbitrary reactions to Iqbal. The earliest West European reaction to Iqbal came from Dickinson who, in his review of *Asrar-e-Khudi*, remarked:

"While Mr. Iqbal's philosophy is universal, his application of it is particular and exclusive. Only Muslims are worthy of the kingdom. The rest of the world is either to be absorbed or excluded."¹⁸³

Whether Dickinson's ignorance of the purpose and ideal of Islam is feigned or real, it is hard to tell.

Iqbal thought that it was real and patiently explained to Dickinson: "The humanitarian ideal is always universal in poetry and philosophy, but if you make it an effective idea and work it out in actual life, you must start, not with poets and philosophers, but with a society exclusive in the sense of having a creed and well-defined outline, but ever enlarging its limits by example and persuasion. Such society, according to my belief, is Islam."

Iqbal pointed out to Dickinson that bigotry and prejudice were the hallmarks of the Western Society and not of Islam. All men, and not just Muslims, were worthy of the Kingdom of Allah.

¹⁸² Iqbal supported all the progressive movements of his era that claimed to work for the same ideals to the extent that they remained faithful to these ideals but his own ideology i.e., Islam was above all these transient manifestation. (Editor's Note).

¹⁸³ *The Nation*, (London), 24 December 1920, p. 458.

"This (Islamic) Society has so far proved itself a more successful opponent of the race idea, which is probably the hardest barrier in the way of the humanitarian ideal... All men and not Muslims alone are meant for the Kingdom of God on Earth, provided they say goodbye to their idols of race and nationality and treat one another as personalities."¹⁸⁴

In England, E. M. Forster, the novelist, was perhaps the first reviewer and critic of Iqbal's work outside Academic circles. Commenting on Iqbal's poem "The Temple of Love", Forster wrote:

"The glory of the courtyard from Meccas shall inhabit that temple, the images on its shrine shall be gold, inscribed Hindustan, and it shall wear both the Brahman thread and the Muslim rosary, and the Muezzin shall call worshippers to prayer upon a horn."¹⁸⁵

E. M. Forster makes out as if Iqbal was propounding another Din-e-Elahi, containing elements of Hinduism and Islam. Such a faith might well have destroyed the distinct identity of either faith, which would have been tolerated neither by Hindus nor Muslims, as Akbar's experiment showed. Iqbal's temple is in India, but it is not of India. The temple is raised to love, which transcends the image in which it is expressed. It symbolizes the universal love which is the central purpose of Islam.

Despite Forster's readiness to misinterpret Iqbal on many points, he enjoys one major distinction of all the contemporary Indian or European critics of Iqbal in the early 1920s. Forster alone recognized that "poets in India cannot be parted from politics. Would that they could! But there is no hope in the present circumstances. One could as easily part Dante from Florence."¹⁸⁶

To have recognized the political core of Iqbal's work as early as 1920, speaks volumes for Forster's perception of the dynamics of Indian life and letters.

¹⁸⁴ S. A. Vahid, ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, (Ashraf, Lahore), p. 99.

¹⁸⁵ Riaz Hussain, *Politics of Iqbal*, Islamic Book Service, Lahore 1977), p. 14.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

JAGAN NATH AND IQBALEAN STUDIES

Dr. T. C. Rastogi

Despite its being common knowledge among the people belonging to the Urdu circles that the measure of success attained by 'Azad' in rehabilitating Iqbal's works, and for that matter respectability for Urdu Literature and Persian Literature, in post-partition India exceeds in worth and esteem-valuation of the awards and medals presented to him in India and Pakistan no one has said a word touching on this point. In post-partition India traumatic experience and emotions generated by in-human treatment meted out to the persons migrating from and into India, Urdu Literature tended to fall on evil days. The very name of Urdu, not to say of Iqbal, became a *bete noire*; it came to be associated with anti-Indian elements. It was in that dark and dismal environment that Jagan Nath Azad, who himself had been compelled by the conditions then obtaining to leave his hearth and home and seek refuge in India, rose above his bleeding psyche to speak in behalf of Urdu as well as Iqbal's poetic worth. His was the first voice, he began writing articles in English and in Hindi besides in Urdu of which he is a poet of no mean merit and a critic worthy of attention. His article on Iqbal, the one he contributed to esteemed Hindi Weekly *Dharma Yuga* (Time of India Publication), came a day none too soon; the article, not accessible to me now and yet its contents well-stored in my mind, did a yeoman's service. The misconceptions generated in the majority community were a little allayed. Urdu was once again put into the path. Had there been no-Azad, and a few other persons including myself who continued writing in Urdu, I do not think there would have been any respectability for Urdu and a soft corner for Iqbal's poetry; the first person running the gauntlet was Azad and Azad alone.

It was at this stage that Azad began to be described as *Hafiz-e-Iqbal*; doubtless he is such a *Hafiz*, not only in the sense that Iqbal's poetry is stored in his memory but also in the sense of Protector/Saviour of Iqblean studies in India. Why and how have we so far refrained from making an avowal of the role played by him? I am pained beyond measure to pose this question to even myself. Against this background he gains in esteem and stature the more. Anyway, this role, though very important and epoch-

making, should not be allowed to cast a halo round his literary and critical potentialities. An artist, whether a creative writer or poet, and also a critic, has a wide cultural perspective well-grounded in more than one language and at home in several disciplines including philosophy, sociology, anthropology, comparative religions, psychology and such others. Knowledge in true sense of the term is indivisible; various subjects are its categories. In addition to all these qualities a creative writer/poet or critic should be endowed with 'Intellectually calibrated acceptability', 'emotional potentiality' and 'moral honesty'. And, 'Azad' has all these concomitants in abundance. Born and brought up in the best traditions of Urdu and Persian poetry, he inherited poetic culture and also 'Urdu Culture.

(Urdu Culture, in true sense of the term, symbolises secular-get-together and non-communal sentiments and emotional responses); his father Munshi Tilok Chand Mahrum was a prolific poet of no-mean excellence. Thus, Urdu and Persian literatures have been 'Azad's hier-loom. His criticism is therefore informed by all that poetry calls for and consequently he can best get to first base. Besides innumerable articles written in Urdu and in English including the papers presented in the seminars he has written full-fledged books on Iqbal:

4. Iqbal Aur Uska Ahd (Urdu) Idara-e-Anis-e-Urdu Allahabad (1960).
5. Iqbal: Mind and Art (National Book House, Lahore: 1981).
6. Muhammad Iqbal: Ek Adabi Sawaneh-e-Hayat (Modern Pub. House New Delhi: 1983).
7. Iqbal Aur Maghrabi Mufakkarin (Jamia Islamia).

This first book, Iqba/Aur Uska Ahd, is a collection of three extension lectures delivered at the University of Jammu. The first lecture is entitled She'r-e-Iqbal Ka Hindustani Pasmanzar, (Indian Background of Iqbal's poetry); the second is captioned Iqbal Ke Ka/am Ka Mutasawwifana Lab-o-Lehja (Sufi trends and strands in Iqbal's poetry); and, the third deals with Iqbal Aur Uska Ahd (Iqbal and His Times).

Before reading out his first lecture Prof. Azad observed inter alia that"... Iqbal's poetry is almost an ocean of philosophy and meanings... Iqbal's poetry is read with interest outside Indo-Pak subcontinent and has been rendered into a number of foreign languages. Indo-Pak subcontinent which

has the pride of cradling Iqbal has been leading in the number of books written about Iqbal and a good many scholars have appraised his poetic worth and have paid tribute to the genius and Iqbal was... Since my attaining maturity in studies I have been drinking deep at the fountain of Iqbal's poetry, and I have been going through the books written about the poet... After the partition Iqbal, who was acknowledged as National Hero in Pakistan, began to be neglected in India on account of misconceptions born of the writings and utterances of the lovers of Iqbal's poetry; the process still continues. Iqbal loved Islam from the depths of his heart and this is palpably discernible in his entire poetry from beginning to end. But on this score there seems to be no reason why Iqbal should not be cared for and his works read. Milton and Dante were devout Christians; Hinduism surges along in the writings of Tulsidas and Rabindranath Tagore. The love of religion is in fact a healthy source for loving mankind... Iqbal suffered a set back because the lovers of his poetry read his poetry alone, leaving aside his prose-works which are in no mean number. Without keeping in view his 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia and Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' one can hardly understand that Iqbal stood for. Again, there are his letters written by him from time to time to the distinguished scholars; a study of these letters goes a long way towards an understanding of the evolution of Iqbal thought. Whereas he never parted with any healthy tradition he never regarded any tradition as his faith:

If conformity would have been good demeanor

Iqbal's Letter to Tilok Chand Mahrum

Mr. Tilok Chand Mahrum has produced an excellent little volume of Urdu poems. His translations from English as well as original poems are equally good. I have' no hesitation in recommending of this little collection of Mr. Mahrum's poems to the general public and to the Text Book Committee. I suppose the Committee can make selections from this volume for the purpose of school text books.

23rd Sep, 1915

Mohammad Iqbal Advocate, Lahore.

(With the courtesy of Prof. Jagan Nath Azad)

Even the messenger would have followed in the foot-steps of the foretellers.

(Payam-e-Mashriq)

Iqbal's poetry is both conformist and non-conformist at the same time... He confessed to his having studied Islam in the light of Western Philosophy of which he had been a life-long scholar."

(Harf-e-Awwal... tr. mine)

Azad describes Iqbal's personality, perhaps poetic personality, as 'multi splendoured' which deserves to be studied without mental reservations, and placed in the historical perspective. Since 1857 Urdu poetry and Persian poetry started assimilating political conscience which is palpably discernible. Iqbal had high regard for Indian culture and philosophy. The first poem HIMALA in Bang-e-Dara bears out the poet's feelings and sentiments. The poem 'Aftab', which is a versified translation of Gayatri Mantra, and the prose-introduction prefacing the poem point out the depth of study that has gone into the poem. Another poem, "Tasvir-e-Dard" brims with patriotic sentiments. Iqbal's poems on Lord Rama, Guru Nanak, Swami Ramtirth and a few others too in the same collection are replete with patriotic zeal. Payam-e-Mashriq, Bal-e-Jibriel, Bandagi Nama and others show love for the things dear to all Indians. In Javid Nama Iqbal shows himself meeting Vishvamitra, Bhartrihari, Ghalib, Tipu, among a good many Islamic personalities. In Zarb-e-Kalim and Armughan-e-Hijaz Iqbal as usual emerges as a poet of universal values. After his return from England, Iqbal of course began criticising pettifogging and 'chauvinistic nationalism; Iqbal faults patriotism that draws upon such a nationalism. Despite this his love for India and Indians did never wane.

The second lecture contained in the book being talked about so far deals with Tasawwuf (Mysticism). Azad has given a full description of the storm of opposition following the publication of Iqbal's Asrar-e-Khudi. Iqbal was a Sufi but a Sufi abhorring renunciation and a cloistered living; he stood for a dynamic life for the welfare of the society and Muslim community. He cried a halt to shying away from the problems facing the community and the mankind Azad has devoted thirty five pages to the controversial issue which at one time spat fire and embittered relations; given the full hang of the appropriate arguments he concluded saying that "Iqbal's poetry is a vast

ocean of surging mysticism" (p-85). One may join issue with Azad on a number of points here and there but none can doubt Azad's sincerity and depth of the study. The lecture merits reading between the lines.

The third lecture throws light upon the times Iqbal appeared on the scene. Azad has given an account of the conditions prevailing in post-mutiny India, and the establishment of the British Empire. India's response and reaction began reverberating even in literature. Urdu poetry and also Persian poetry written by Ghalib and Iqbal have a sharp note of social protest. Iqbal was against the alien rule; from the core of his heart he desired the extinction of Western influences eating into the vitals of the countries in Central Asia and India. Iqbal's poetry, in the light of the arguments advanced by Azad, begins to look like a Testament of a New Age. The book containing these three lectures ends with a bibliography running into a many as four pages containing useful suggestions for further reading.

Azad's Iqbal: Mind and Art (Edited by Dr. Mohammed Maruf, and published by Na..jnal Book House, Lahore: 1981) is a collection of articles contributed to leading journals and seminar-papers written by Prof. Azad. In the Foreword, Dr. Maruf describes Iqbal's thought as 'multilateral'; I add 'multinuclear and multilocular' as well. But, why? one may well ask. Iqbal was a eclectic genius. Being eclectic is neither derogatory nor does the quality detract from one's merits either. There are critics who attribute every thought of Iqbal to Islamic sources, labouring under a notion that pointing to other horizons of thoughts would lower Iqbal's position as a poet. Besides, a great many scholars why away from admitting any impact or influence other than that of Islam's. No genius is a 'windowless monad' rather; he takes in what attracts his attention with open arms. In addition to this, not many a critic knows what is really meant by 'Influence of Impact'. An influence or impact, if analytically appraised, is a process of reactive thoughts manifesting itself in "ac-quiescence, total or partial, or even in revolt" a criterion worked out by me while working on Western Influence in Iqbal which earned me a doctorate in English Literature. This very important point was missed by even Dar and Vahid as is borne out from their writings which otherwise fare of very high standard. This opposite remark is almost a digression from the topic in hand. Dr. Maruf deserves congratulations for his penetrating observation that Iqbal's thought "shows a multifarious influences, both Oriental and Accidental, classical and Modern". He has acumen and live

critical sensibility to infer that Azad's approach to Iqbal is satisfactory enough in as much as he does full justice to the 'multi-dimensionality' of Iqbal's works. The Foreword is followed by a well-written Introduction covering as many as twelve pages of the book. By and large, Dr. Maruf has acquitted himself quite creditably by looking through the works of Azad's touching upon the poet of the East, Iqbal.

The first paper contained in the book deals with the date of Iqbal's birth, which had-been once quite a burning issue. Azad's role in the controversy was in-deed construction based as it was on his having ransacked almost all the sources. Azad proved to the hilt that November 9, 1877 was the date of Iqbal's birth. Since it was accepted both in India and Pakistan it is needless to go into the question once again. Now we have shambled up to the date the issue should be regarded as settled. Nevertheless Azad's efforts made towards the end deserve to be complimented.

The second paper deals with Indian Background of Iqbal's Poetry. The arguments advanced by Azad are perspicacious and all told they constitute an improvement upon what he has put forward in Iqbal Aur Uska 'Ahd. Iqbal's approach to religions other than Islam was never hostile; the poet did welcome with open arms the thoughts not violative of Islamic spirit. In this connection I should recommend for close perusal of paper entitled Iqbal and Religions other than Islam and His Excellency S.M.R. Burney's lecture entitled Iqbal and National Integration (published by Haryana Sahitya Academy, which has been translated into Urdu, Hindi and Tamil; it is going to be translated into Assamese and Bengali too). Azad, it may be mentioned has been a pioneer.

Iqbal: Poet and Politician is one of the most controversy-invoking subjects. Azad quotes Iqbal: "...I have tried to meet, even though partially the urgent demand by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical tradition of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge". (Preface to 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.') And M.M. Sharif is quoted as observing that "Iqbal is the greatest thinker that the Muslim world has produced during the last six centuries". (p. 98) In About Iqbal and his Thought, Sharif writes: "Iqbal is undoubtedly a poet of Islam" (p. 37). Digressing a little from the arguments brought in by Azad, I tend to draw attention to the opinion held by Syed Abu! Hasan 'Ali Nadwi (popularly

known as Hadrat 'Ali Mian') who is the topmost Muslim thinker of the present day Muslim world. 'Ali Mian, while holds Iqbal's poetry in great esteem for it awakens Muslims to the need of purposeful living as Muslims and does enthuse them to espouse Islamic ways, is of the opinion that Iqbal's 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam', is not worth-paying attention to; he holds, better he should not have written the book. This is what Nadwa School of Muslim Thought has not been chary of acknowledging. The Zakir Hussain Institute of Islamic Research (Jamia Millia) does 'not share Hadrat's views on the point; but, the views are concurred in by the 'Ulamas of Shibli Academy Azamgarh too. If I remember aright, Gibb too has observed that Iqbal's views regarding Heaven and Hell 'as mental states' brings Iqbal 'on to the verge of heresy'. As a matter of fact, Iqbal's views concerning Hell and Heaven seem to have been derived from Al-Kindi and I khwan-as-Safa' School of Thought; the Mu'tazilah thinkers too held similar ideas. Anyway, Azad's observations derive from all sincerity and he is very right to caution against confusing relation with communalism. Iqbal did have a clear-cut Islamic ideology which went into forming his political views too. Whether or not Iqbal's views corresponded to the ideology of Pakistan is quite beside the mark now in as much as Pakistan is now a sovereign state and master of her own destiny. K.L. Gauba, a friend of Iqbal, has described Pakistan as the 'Mausoleium of Iqbal' in his autobiography entitled Friends and Foes (New Delhi); Khalid Latif Gauba, in place of Kanhiyya Lal Gauba, was suggested by Iqbal and Mr. Gauba has a lot to say about Iqbal in the book which may be turned to by researching persons. Azad puts with acumen: "Iqbal's greatness does not lie in his political views but in his creative art, which derived inspiration from four sources: Islam, Western Thought, Hindu Philosophy and, Last but not the least, his own Self or Ego". (p-106). Azad has very pertinently referred to Iqbal's remarks, "It must, however, be remembered that there is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought, and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it... (During) the last five hundred years religious thought in Islam has been stationary... With the reawakening of Islam... it is necessary to examine in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached... can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction of theological thought in Islam".

(The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam) Iqbal is a poet of worth and human values. Azad has referred to Kalimuddin Ahmad's observation that Iqbal has no place in world literature. Besides, Azad makes mention of Baqar Mehdi's rancous outpourings against Iqbal. Azad has not evaluated his standpoints; but he expects his (Iqbal's) admirers to undertake writing about Iqbal as a poet. I venture to add that despite so much of wrangling over Iqbal's place in world literature no one has as yet cared to examine what is really meant by world literature. To me, the term world literature is a beguiling literary term; for further elucidations, readers are requested to go through my articles captioned: 'Almi Adab... Ek Gumrahkun Adabi Istilah" (Sha'ir... Salgreh Number).

Then follows the paper entitled Iqbal: His Poetry and Philosophy which enlists, charges levelled against Iqbal and then it has Azad's arguing pro and con at length. Assembling the observations for and against Iqbal before refuting the constricted outlook of several critics has made the paper quite informative as well as keenly critical. Iqbal's multi-dimensional personality, his inquisitive mind, Iqbal in the context of 'Mosque Cordova', his views on Islam and Modernism, his art and thought, his vision of a new era, his views with regard to the individual and the people and such others are the topics as have come in for a threadbare discussion; Azad acquits himself creditably enough, though not always with disarming arguments. To him, Iqbal is indivisible whole and his poetry and philosophical ideas are almost inseparable; he is a poet standing for human values; his poetry is rooted in realism. Azad maintains that "armed with a progressive world outlook, Iqbal, whose poetry has been a worthy reflection of great historical change, has shown the younger generation of Urdu poets how to weld into a single whole the beauty of ideals of art and the truth of actual life". (p. 139).

Azad then proceeds to discuss the topic Iqbal, Schopenhauer and Quran. What has been stated on the topic by Azad has been or seems to have been disputed by Dr. Maruf. There seems to be a 'mix-up' both in the views of Azad and those of Dr. Maruf. Meliorism, a doctrine opposed both to optimism and pessimism, implies that the world is capable of improvement. It is not characteristically denied by any school that ours is an expanding universe, logic, philosophy, science and other disciplines are not exclusive of one another. Rather any one of these, if viewed critically, was not pessimist. Hegel, Fichte, and Schopenhauer were contemporaries. Gardinar Patrice in

his work Schopenhauer describes that Schopenhauer exercised an influence upon the thinking of Nietzsche, Henri Bergson and William James; developing and analyzing a new conception as a dimension of human behaviour Schopenhauer led philosophy away from abstract idealism and concern with pure reason and directed the discipline towards realism and search for new conceptions. Pain is doubtless the cardinal idea' the philosopher assimilated from his study of Buddhism. Buddhism enjoins upon it adherent righteous living; cloistered life, penances and such practices lead us no where. The Holy Quran, in my humble opinion directs us to lend a hand to Mustad'aafin (oppressed and exploited, have-nots) and lead a life in obeisance to the commandments contained in the Quran. With regard to Azad's views it would have to be admitted that his arguments have weight enough to carry conviction.

Iqbal, Islam and the Modern Age brims over worth-taking note of quotes, which in view of their importance need not be lost sight of:

"In, my reading of 'Asrur-e-Khudi' (Sic) and 'Rumuz-i-Bekhudi' I felt that one or two places, which I cannot now recall, I came across some contradictory ideas. I availed myself of the opportunity of taking up these topics with him. He tenderly smiled and observed: My dear Sharif, Asrur and Rumuz are poetic works and not books of philosophy" (About Iqbal & His Thought, quot. 153).

"I am afraid; I have no philosophy to teach. As a matter of fact, I hate system of philosophy, nor do I trust principles and conclusions of philosophy. No man has condemned the human intellect more than I i.e. as applied to the ultimate realities of religion. No doubt I talk of things in which philosophers are interested. But with me these things are matters, of living experience and not of philosophical reasoning" (Eminent Muslims, Madras, 1926).

Stepanyants writes: "(Iqbal) was familiar with Western philosophy and sciences, and knew how to present the ideas of religious modernism with theoretical persuatopm (sic: persuasion). His desire to bring the teachings of Islam closer to Western Philosophy and the finds of modern science echoed the mood of younger generation of the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals,

who wanted to cast off the burden of the old dogmas and adopt new ideals... Iqbal did take from the West whatever corresponded most to the basic premises of his philosophical conception. He made it his goal to create a system resting on modernized Islam, and tried to prove that the philosophy of Islam was not out-dated, but merely needed to have its principles expressed in the terminology and ideas of the new times. From that premise it remained for him to find points of contacts between Muslim philosophy and the modern theories of the West".

Azad takes cognizance of all these arguments and then proceeds to point out that Iqbal was well aware of the modern age and its demands. He was well-grounded in Western and Islamic philosophical viewpoints. He used philosophy as a touch stone of religion. He was impressed by the teachings of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan as well as Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. Iqbal is a poet of all times; his message is not 'cabined cribbed and confined'. His message is universal. His sufi-stance is dynamic and vigorous. Azad's way of writing is characteristically his own; his arguments seem to have been formed by his love for Iqbal's poetry.

It would be most unfair if no mention is made of the 'notes' written by Dr. Maruf; each chapter is followed by notes. Dr. Maruf's perspicacity and literary talent deserve not only praise but a full chapter; taken all the notes together, and analyzed critically, one can write about Dr. Maruf's stance as well. I wish I could have written touching this aspect as well.

Iqbal: Mind and Art has a good number of appendices dealing with a number of topics and issues. "Thus Spake Iqbal" gives a few jottings made by Iqbal a few months before his death in 1938; Iqbal wanted to give them the caption "The Book of the Forgotten Prophet". Azad has very appropriately given a few jottings under the heading Thus Spake Iqbal, patterning it on Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zurthustra, Many of these jottings are available in note-book posthumously published under the title Stray Reflections; but Azad has not mentioned this point. Iqbal's views on Hinduism and Christianity and a few others seem to evoke further discussion and need not be regarded as a judgement delivered by the poet. Azad's three letters to the Editor, Hindustan Times add to the study of Iqbal and these are succinctly written. Then, there are two reviews — one on Iqbal Singh: The Ardent Pilgrim and the other on Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan's, Hatiz Aur Iqbal. These reviews are informative and thought-provoking. Appendix 'D' deals with

Anand Narain Mulla's translation of Lala-e-Tur into English. Had Azad given a few examples one would have benefited. I have not gone through Mulla's English rendering. Mention has been made of Arberry's translation too; despite many mistakes his translation remains quite English and he was grateful to those pointing out errors. His letter addressed to me acknowledging my interpretation better than his own is contained in my research-thesis Western Influence in Iqbal.

Muhammad Iqbal, written by Azad and published by Modern Publishing House: Delhi, contains five chapters: 1. Iqbal's Childhood and bringing-up, 2. Iqbal at Lahore, 3. Three years in Europe, 4. Twenty years: Iqbal's pre-occupations, 5. Last Eight years. There is no dearth of Iqbal's biographies including Hayat-e-Iqbal (Taj Company), Zikr-e-Iqbal, Roozgar-e-Fuqir and Zinda Rud. The one written by Azad stands out prominently especially because Iqbal's poetry has been always kept in view besides mentioning Iqbal's soft corners and soft-nothings too. It is labour of love and as such the book would have to be kept in view while appraising Azad's opinions centering on Iqbal.

Iqbal Aur Maghrabi Mufakkirin, published in India by Jamia Millia and in Pakistan by Maktaba-e-'Alia, centres on Iqbal's responses to Western thinkers. The book invites attention. Besides, Azad prepared Muraqqa'-e-Iqbal for Publications Division of Govt. of India, it contains requisite pictures and details about Iqbal. With a view to catering to the need of the children Azad wrote Bachoon Ka Iqbal, a book which evidences Azad's psychological insight into what children desire to know.

In the context of his writings on; Iqbal and connected topics Azad stands out as a critic with Encyclopedic erudition; he is Iqbal Academy incarnate; and, he is the first man who ventured to rehabilitate Iqbal and Urdu Literature in post-partition India. His strivings would continue to be appreciated and lauded for all times to come and his name would remain associated with Iqbal's.

JAVID NAMA: A STUDY OF WORLD CIVILIZATIONS

Dr. Mohammed Maruf

Javid Nama,¹⁸⁷ though generally believed to be a description of the spiritual ascension of man and purports 'to give a kind of philosophy of Mi'raj,¹⁸⁸ offers a study of the various levels of civilization, the various stages through which the human civilization has passed; it depicts these civilizations as they were extant in the times of Allama Iqbal. The "Sphere of Moon" may be considered as Prologue which ushers in the four master civilizations through the four Tasins¹⁸⁹ (Tablets), viz., the civilizations of India, Persia, Arabia, and the modern Western civilization which is a corrupted form of the Christian civilization. These civilizations have been represented in the book by such great leaders of mankind as Lord Buddha, the great mystic and sage of India; Zoroaster, the Persian prophet and thinker; Christ, the founder of the Christian civilization and Muhammad (p.b.u.h.), the Founder-Prophet of the Islamic civilization originating in Arabia. The book on the whole presents an inside study of the Eastern and Western civilizations, though in the main dilating on an incisive criticism of the so-called modern civilization.

Iqbal discusses the foundations of these civilizations thus: (i) The Indian civilization is founded upon an "attitude of detachment" — that is, 'to be in the world and to escape from the world...'¹⁹⁰ It lays emphasis on the 'beauty of action and fine ideals¹⁹¹ as the real enduring values; the only thing permanent being your own "Self" before which all else dwindles into insignificance; "Love" is a-great power.¹⁹² (ii) The Persian civilization, too, is based on the "Self", its basic principle being that Self matures with

¹⁸⁷ The title of Allama Iqbal's famous mathnavi in Persian, called his 'magnum opus' by his critics, first published in 1932.

¹⁸⁸ See "'Javid Nama' with a Note by N. M. Khan, C.S.P.", pb. in the book *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, ed. Syed Abdul Wahid, (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), Ch. XIX, pp. 225ff.

¹⁸⁹ Arberry A. J., *Javid-Nama*, an Eng. tr. of Allama Iqbal's mathnavi, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 46-52.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

"suffering" which helps 'rend the veil that covers God'.¹⁹³ This civilization is "mystical" in nature, with its object being the attainment of the "Beatific Vision". It teaches that the self of man is fashioned by Love; that "Solitude" and "Company" are both facets of God: 'Solitude' is 'Pain, burning and yearning; company is vision,...'¹⁹⁴ (iii) The Western civilization is represented by 'a slim-bodied woman'.¹⁹⁵ As it is based on 'dry' empiricism, science and technology, its fruits are industrialization, hunger after wealth, 'keen eye' but a 'dead heart',¹⁹⁶ cunning and infidelity, profit-mongering and devastation — all results of misuse of science and wisdom. And (iv) The Islamic civilization which is founded upon the idea of "Tauhid" ('oneness of God'), and is marked by the destruction of 'old monarchies and kingships',¹⁹⁷ lays stress on the equality and fraternity of man; and rejects any "racial" or stratal superiority claimed by any people over the others: it turns its gaze towards the "invisible".

Javid Nama comprises of seven chapters of which first six are devoted to different "Spheres". Through these Spheres Iqbal has discussed the various facets of the aforesaid civilizations. Each Sphere is represented by the personalities relevant to the particular facet it represents, and its basic ideas and concepts are expressed through their discourses. After the Sphere of Moon which is a prologue, next comes the Sphere of Mercury, inhabited by men like Sa'id Halim Pasha, the Turk leader, and Jamal ud-Din Afghani, an Afghan Scholar. According to Iqbal, the Sphere is the abode of saints and sufis like Fudait¹⁹⁸ (d. 803), Bu Sa'id¹⁹⁹ (d. 1049) Junaid al-Baghdadi²⁰⁰ (d. 910) and Ba Yazid²⁰¹ (877) all mystics of the traditional school. Generally speaking, this sphere offers an incisive criticism of the present state of civilization, both in the East and in the West, while also delineating a civilization having for its fundamental principle the beauty of action and fine ideals. Both Sa'id Halim Pasha and Jamal ud-Din Afghani were men of action

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., see the Martian Damsel in "The Sphere of Mars", pp. 67-69.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., He has sung of the destruction of Caesar and Chosroes, ..., p. 51.

¹⁹⁸ A famous ascetic (d. 803).

¹⁹⁹ A pioneer of Persian mystic poetry, d. 1049.

²⁰⁰ A central figure in the Baghdad School of "sober" mystics, d. 910.

²⁰¹ A leader of the Khorasan 'intoxicated' mystics, d. 877.

and high ideals. Afghani subjects to deep criticism both the East and the West, rejecting both as one-sided: 'For Westerners intelligence is the stuff of life, for Easterners love is the mystery of all being'.²⁰² He rejects both Capitalism and Communism as again one-sided. What is needed is an amalgamation of the love and intelligence, only then can we hope to design a new. World worthy of man's habitation.²⁰³ At least Islam promises such a World, a World 'without distinction of race and colour, its evening is brighter than Europe's dawn; a world cleansed of monarchs and of slaves, a world unbounded.²⁰⁴ The fundamentals of this world are the worth of man, establishment of the Divine Government, the belief that the means of production belong to God, and that wisdom is a Great Good.²⁰⁵ Afghani was a great advocate of Pan-Islamism in the Muslim World, he was rather the originator of this idea as a political concept.²⁰⁶ He also subjected Russian Communistic system to a searching criticism, making some very useful recommendations.

The Sphere of Venus takes the mind back to the ancient cultures of the world. It is the Sphere of old deities and gods, like the Persian god Mardukh and Arabian god Bal, etc. Thus, Mardukh says, 'Man has fled from God, fled from church and sanctuary, lamenting, and augment his vision and perception turns his gaze backwards to the past age. He takes delight in ancient relics, makes speeches about, our theophanies'.²⁰⁷ Ba'l adds, 'His soul takes repose in the sensible; would that the past image might return'.²⁰⁸ He announces joyfully, 'Behold the ring of the unity is broken, Abraham's people have lost the joy of Alast; its company is scattered, its cue is in fragments,... Free man has fallen into the bonds of directions, joined up with fatherland and parted from God; his blood is cold of the glory of the ancients,...'²⁰⁹ He adds, '... religion has been routed by sovereignty and lineage'.²¹⁰ Introducing the Sphere of Venus, Rumi tells Iqbal, "This is the place of power-drunk

²⁰² Arberry, op. cit., p. 57.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 58.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 59-65.

²⁰⁶ Dar B. A., ed. Letters and Writings of Iqbal, (Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1967), pp. 55-57.

²⁰⁷ Arberry, op. cit., p. 74.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. 24.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

arrogants denying the Unseen, worshipping the seen; ...²¹¹ The inhabitants of the Sphere are Pharaoh and Kitchener of Khartoum; 'both at war and blows with the man of God'.²¹² Iqbal here condemns Imperialism through the agency of Pharaoh, who remarks, 'Woe to a people blinded by avarice who have robbed the tomb of rubies and pearls'²¹³ (reference is to the European peoples). He discloses that the chief contrivance of imperialism is 'division': 'to seek security by contriving division'.²¹⁴ He adds, rulership is strong 'through the weakness of the subjects, its roots are firm through the deprivation of the deprived . . . Armies, prisons, chains are banditry; he is the true ruler who needs not such apparatus'.²¹⁵ Lord Kitchener offers an apology for the Europeans thus: 'The goal of the people of Europe is lofty, they excavate not any grave for rubies and pearls...'²¹⁶ Their object is historical curiosity. However, his apology fails before Mandi Sudanese.

The spirit of Mahdi bids 'Fouad, Feisal, Ibn Saud to 'Revive in the breast that fire which has departed, bring back to the world the days that have gone'.²¹⁷ He regrets that the Muslims have fallen a prey to prosperity and as such have gone away from their centre: 'My soul wails of the pain of separation; take the road where fewer grasses grow'.²¹⁸ Thus, prosperity has rendered the Muslim soft and listless, he regrets.

The Sphere of Mars depicts the scientific and technological advancements and achievements of the Western civilization. The Sphere opens with an astrological observatory in which a Martian astronomer carries on his research work. Iqbal, in the company of Rumi and led by the Martian astronomer, comes upon a big gathering of men, women and children. In the middle they see a damsel who claims to be a Prophetess. She is tall, slim, whitefaced, flat-chested, hair trimmed, having a 'keen eye' but a 'dead heart'; she represents the corrupted modern Western civilization. She boasts of her 'magical' achievements in the fields of science and technology. As she

²¹¹ Ibid., "p. 76.

²¹² Ibid., p. 77.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 78.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

represents the modern empirical civilization of the West, 'Her face was radiant, but without the light of the soul, . . .; her speech lacked fire, her eyes racked tears, not intimate with the joy of desire: . . .; she knew nothing of love and the laws of love,²¹⁹ She was 'simple and free of guile, without artifice', but "Farzmarz" taught her the art of prophethood. "Farzmarz" represents the cunning and guile of politicians, i.e., political manoeuvre. In other words, science was not originally cunning and devastating; it were the politicians who made it so. The damsel claims of miracles, that is, unnatural feats wrought by her. She claims, 'The time has come when by a miracle of science it is possible to see the foetus within the body; from life's field you may gather a harvest of sons and daughters exactly as you choose, . . .'²²⁰ Then she predicts that with the progress of science it is possible that 'the foetus will take nourishment of another kind, without the night of the womb it will find the day'.²²¹ Then she advises the womanfolk to 'rise up and wage war with nature, that by your battling the maiden may be freed. Woman's unitarianism is to escape from the union of two bodies; be guardian of yourself, and tangle not with men!'²²² 'Rumi condemns this so-called 'modern' civilization, describing it as 'the harvest of irreligious education'.²²³ Iqbal points out that it is excessive empiricism and rationalism which are devouring the West.

The Sphere of Jupiter is the Sphere of 'Continuous struggled martyrdom' from the Muslim World. Iqbal calls it the Sphere of travels, endless and continuous incursions into a vast variety of experiences. Its hallmark is: 'Seeing that the signs of God are infinite where, traveller, can the high-road end?'²²⁴ In short, it is the Sphere of incessant, insatiable, continuous struggle without any desire for achievement. It is the abode of such martyrs as Mansur al-Hallaj, Mirza Ghalib and Tahira.²²⁵ It may safely be called the Sphere of Persian civilization which pivots round 'Self' and 'suffering'. The inmates of this Sphere believe that 'Life without pickings is no true life; one

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 87.

²²⁰ Ibid., pp. 87-88.

²²¹ Ibid. 36.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid. 38.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 90.

²²⁵ Ibid. 40.

must live with a fire under one's feet'.²²⁶ They teach 'resignation and sub' mission' adding 'this garment does not suit the weaklings'. Hallaj calls them infidels who cry 'No god but God' and denied the 'Self'. He holds that the 'whole world has been founded on Selfhood'.²²⁷ He advises Iqbal to 'become drowned in the ocean of being'. His 'Servant' is the how and why of creation,²²⁸ 'His Servant' is the inward mystery of creation.²²⁹ He praises Satan as the champion of God's love and Unity: Satan's infidelity revealed to us the mystery of being and not-being.²³⁰ Hallaj says, 'The company of the radiant of heart is for a breath or two, that breath or two is the substance of being and not-being; it made love more tumultuous, and then passed, endowed reason with vision, and then passed'.²³¹ The closing portion hits upon the real object of 'suffering' which is the optimum development of the Self. "Iblis — Leader of the People of Separation",²³² declares in the end, 'I have become so saddened by my triumphs that now I come to you for recompense; I seek from you one who dares to deny me — guide me, to such a man of God. I need a man who will twist my neck, whose glance will set my body quivering,...²³³

The Sphere of Saturn is the abode of the traitors. Iqbal says, 'It is the lodging place of spirits that shall know no resurrection, which hell itself shrank from burning: therein live two ancient demons who slew a people's soul to save their skins,'²³⁴ He regrets that 'its manikins not intimate with their self's secrets'.²³⁵ He laments that 'they have estranged themselves from their selfhood, they have made a prison of ancient customs'.²³⁶ Due to these traitors a nation is made to suffer immensely and leads to oppression, requiring patience and 'constraint'; but Iqbal regrets that by their act they force a people to bear oppression and as a result a multitude becomes

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 94.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., p. 105.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 108.

²³⁶ Ibid.

'masochistic' as they become 'habituated to patience' He regrets that a free nation is rendered slaves to a foreign power who become sadistic and oppressive.

Iqbal condemns, in fact, all those agencies which cause 'division' and schism in a people. He remarks, 'Whenever a nation is devastated the root of its ruin is a Sadiq or a Ja'afar. God save me from the spirit of Ja'afar, save me from the Ja'afars of the present time!²³⁷ The two ugly spirits lament that 'being' and 'not-being'²³⁸ both refused to accept them. They found no place for themselves in the East or the West, and when they reached the gates of Hell,²³⁹ 'but Hell shot not a single spark at Sadiq and Ja'afar nor even a handful of ashes hurled at our heads, saying "Sticks and straws are better for Hell; my flame is better unsullied by these two infidels."²⁴⁰ He adds, 'Even sudden death would not accept them swing, "Such a task cannot be performed by death; the traitors' soul will not find rest in death".²⁴¹ Thus, treachery is the greatest sin, according to Iqbal.

The last chapter marks the final act of 'transcendence' beyond the world of Spheres of reason and perception; it marks a 'transition' from the world of sensation and reason into the realm of 'passion' and 'ecstasy'. Iqbal's philosophical 'wings' would carry him upto this limit, and then he would 'fly' on the wings of imagination and 'passion' in the leadership of Rumi, the mystic-poet from Persia. On the threshold of the 'world of ecstasy' they come across the great German thinker Nietzsche,²⁴² whose station is between the two worlds — the man who could reach only the half-way to the truth. Iqbal remarks, that Nietzsche 'broke from God, and was snapped too from himself. He desired to see, with his external eye, the intermingling of power with love;...'²⁴³ Iqbal compares him to Moses who was seeking the vision, which Nietzsche should have found, had he lived in the times of Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind (1564 — 1624), the great Indian Muslim reformer, better

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid., pp. 111-112.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 112.

known as "Mujaddid alf-i-'Thani".²⁴⁴ Iqbal says of Nietzsche in the *Payam-i-Mashriq*.

'He who built a temple on the foundation of 'haram' (sanctuary); His heart belived, though his head was infidel'.²⁴⁵

In fact, he had a 'burning heart' in him, but his philosophical legacy kept him on the empirical earth. He regrets that there was none in Europe who could understand his 'vision'; 'He was a Hallaj who was a stranger in his own city;...'²⁴⁶ Nietzsche, in sooth, 'remained fast in "no" and did not reach "but", being a stranger to the station of "Servitude". As they cross the threshold into the "World Beyond", he calls it 'the world of ecstasy and joy' of which 'Kauthar' and 'hour' are mere reflections.²⁴⁷ Here life is the Beatific Vision, naught else, the bliss of seeing and speaking with the Beloved'.²⁴⁸ The inmates of this Place are such dignified personalities as Syed All Hamdani, Mullah Tahir Ghani of Kashmir,²⁴⁹ the former an eminent Persian mystic and the latter an eminent poet of Kashmir. Both were great nationalists' and Muslims. Next are three kings of the East, viz., Nadir Shah (d. 1747), great conqueror and founder of the short-lived Afsharid dynasty of Persia; Ahmad Shah Abdali (d. 1773), founder of the modern nation of Afghanistan; and the martyr-king, Sultan Tipu of Mysore²⁵⁰ (d. 1799), a great Muslim nationalist of India who put up the last resistance to the expanding British power in India and laid down his life in the process. They all lament over the conditions obtaining in the Muslim Asia, in particular, and of the Muslim world in general. The champions of Muslim brotherhood once have now fallen into discord and strife themselves. Iqbal regrets through Afghani that 'Man's chronicle both in the East and West narrates a single tale, the tale of war and strife for land ...'²⁵¹ The West is now too barren to 'spawn' a new age; and under the impact of the West, the Turks, Iranians and the Arabs are also

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁴⁵ *Payam-e-Mashriq*. 60.

²⁴⁶ Arberry, op. cit., p. 112.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 114.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 63

lying quite dead.²⁵² The West with its Imperialism and Socialism has extinguished the flame of 'faith' in the East and has spiritually wrecked it. The fault of the East lies in its blindly following into the footsteps of the West. What the East needs is both the sword and the Quran, as advocated and practised by Sharf-un-Nisa, who was 'all ecstasy and yearning, anguish and burning...'²⁵³ We should not forget that the East is basically and essentially religious. What the East in general, and the Muslims of Asia in particular require is a critical attitude towards the learning's of the West and the Western civilization; for only such an attitude can help them in chalking out their own way through the labyrinth of the vast universe.

²⁵² Ibid., p. 55.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 115.

BOOK REVIEW

QUEST FOR THE ETERNAL

Shahzad Qaiser

Pakistan Publications, Faisal Abad

Rs.50.00 1985.

Few books nowadays justify the claims printed boldly — and sometimes badly -- on their titles, but Shahzad Qaiser's book is certainly up to the mark. It is the battle field of a thinking mind trying to come to grips with a perspective and a wisdom towards which he is strongly attracted but a clear and proper understanding of which calls for a destruction of mental idols and preconceived notions. Throughout his educational career he has been a serious student of philosophy and knows well where this wasteland ends. His attempt to reach out for the traditional wisdom from the confines of profanes of profane philosophy to timeless, perennial wisdom, pointing out various shortcomings of the former in its course. The essays collected in this volume were written over the last decade and these he has gathered without pruning and editing according to his later thought. The book, thus, should be regarded as a crucible of ideas where Shahzad Qaiser fumes and frets to get a glimpse of Reality.

The better half of the book is the second half which mainly concentrates on a critique of Western civilization. The first half concerns itself with the ideas of prophecy in Islam, existential 'understanding of God, stages of religious experience, Iqbal, Imam Hussain's existential choice and Imamate and Caliphate.

Not only in his first article 'Prophecy in Islam', but in many subsequent chapters of the book Shahzad's discussion and critique of the Muslim philosophers is limited only to the names that appear in the popular books on the history of Muslim philosophy, mainly written by the Orientalists and uncritically accepted by the modernists. The Mutakallimum, the traditionalists, Theosophers, mystics and even the distinguished figures among the later Muslim philosophers who, unfortunately, did not find their

place in the works in Western languages, 'since they happened to be born after Ghazzali, are kept out of the pale of his discussion. The only thinker of the later period that he mentions is Iqbal. As a poet, philosopher and political theorist, Iqbal is head and shoulders above his contemporaries, but Shahzad has mainly dwelt on his ideas about the phenomenon of Prophecy as they are voiced in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. After recapitulating the views of the Muslim philosophers on the question of prophecy and revelation in a few sentences he goes directly to Iqbal, but he cannot bring himself to agree with Iqbal's description of prophecy as "a type of my sticconsciousness" since that can lead us to believe that Iqbal made no distinction between the nature of mysticism and prophecy and that for Iqbal, in fact, the difference is only one of degree and not of kind. Shahzad is justified because this as well as the next assertion he cites from Iqbal about the destruction of the old and disclosure of the new directions of life, finds no support either from Iqbal's poetry or from the traditional literature. Scores of Israelite prophets who served to perpetuate the prophetic function of some law-giving prophet who preceded them bear witness that prophets confirmed and continued existing traditions contrary to what Iqbal proposes. Iqbal, in fact, contradicts the classical notion of prophecy by insisting that prophecy is the outcome of an evolutionary development of psychic energy. Full rightly, Shahzad has again differed with Iqbal on this point though his own comments are not sufficient to give us a clear idea of how he himself envisions revelation. An elucidation of the classical concept was due from Shahzad is such wise as is done by a contemporary authority on traditional metaphysics and religion: "Inspiration, like revelation is a divine dicatae, with the difference that in the second case the spirit dictates a law-giving and obligatory Message of over-riding force, where as in the first case the Message, whatever be its value, has no dogmatic significance, and has an illustrative role within the frame work of the fundamental Message."²⁵⁴

Iqbal's assertion that the return of the mystic "does not mean much for mankind at large", does not gain Shahzad's approval either and we can readily add that, till the modern times, even on the practical level, all the freedom-movements and movements of political, social and religious reform had, invariably, an eminent mystic at the helm of their affairs. If the return does

²⁵⁴ F. Schuon, 'Paradoxical Aspects of Sufism', *Studies in Comparative Religion*, Sum Mer-Autum, London, 1978, pp 131.

not mean much to mankind then how can one account for the spread of Islam outside Arabia in which the mystics were historically crucial?

Shahzad's next consideration is the question of finality of prophethood for it forms an integral part of the question of prophecy. Here he has agreed with Iqbal that God has sealed prophecy because mankind had undergone intellectual development in an expressedly evolutionary sense as to be possessed finally of inductive perfection which made prophecy henceforth unnecessary. This proposal raises some disturbing questions. If it is the gift of the inductive intellect that now distinguishes man, then how are we to look at the pre-Islamic man, including the prophets of the old? No one in his right mind would claim that they belonged to an inferior kind since they did not, supposedly, possess the so-called inductive intellect.

The second chapter, "Existential Understanding of God", as well as the fifth chapter "Existential Significance of Hussain's Choice" betray that Shahzad would still like to retain elements of the existential perspective which he struggles to reconcile with the traditional perspective. However, traditional metaphysics and existentialism are irreconcilably opposed. The two perspectives have no common ground because their very points of departure are contradictory. Existentialism has been described by a contemporary author as "the esoterism of stupidity". Metaphysical knowledge is sacred and it is the prerogative of the sacred to require of man all that he is; intellect, will and sentiments. That is to say that real knowledge is existential, but this type of knowledge pertains to the supra-individual truth. This truth is precisely what the existentialists refuse to admit, therefore it were better to speak of presential knowledge rather than existential knowledge when speaking of the metaphysical perspective, lest it be thought that there was any-thing in common between the two usages of the word. "The thing that is absolutely lacking with the existentialists, and which reduces to nothing their theories as well as their moral attitudes, is an objective truth which is metaphysically integral, whether it be an orthodox theology or an authentic metaphysics."²⁵⁵

Apart from the question of existentialism, Shahzad's treatment of Hussain's choice calls for an historical overview. Time and again in his book

²⁵⁵ F. Schuon, 'Letter on Existentialism', *Studies in Comparative Religion*, spring 1975, London, p. 68.

Shahzad has stressed the need for a critical examination of history but the facts on which he has based his observations are open to objections on the plane of historical records even. For example, he writes, "Hussain's stage was primarily ethical. He was grounded in a Tradition which left no room for romantic hedonism."²⁵⁶ But this is true for Yazid even if to a lesser degree. According to Shahzad's interpretation Hussain "Never experienced for a single moment that his existential freedom has been subjugated or captivated. He always felt himself a free man. Free to commit to God or to betray him." So was Yazid, though according to some, he chose to betray God.

Shahzad is all praise for Keirkegaard's "Fear and Trembling" and the parallels that Kierkegaard draws from the story of Abraham Kierkegaard, even at the heights of his thinking, fails to transcend the individual realm of subjectivity ('alam all Nafs) and his understanding of the trial of Abraham is only confined to the sentimental and, at the best, rational level.²⁵⁷

Both the chapters "Religious Symbolism and the Stages of Religious Life" and "Iqbal on the Possibility of Religion"; take their cue from Iqbal and revolve around the concept of three stages of religious life as expounded by Iqbal. Shahzad has posited a fourth stage which he places between 'reason' and 'discovery' and names "intellect". He agrees with the traditional writers like Guenon and Schuon in making a distinction between reason and intellect, the latter being supra-individual and capable of direct access to the realities beyond the confines of discursive thought.

These concepts of the stages of the religious life are, to say the least, problematic, for these would entail such judgments about the companions of the prophets that can never be entertained by the believers. Shahzad has very wisely pointed out that these should be construed in a non historical context and in a personal sense only. Moreover, the stages, contrary to the common interpretations, reveal a process of decadence rather than evolution. The earlier generations of any religion possess the degree of intelligence that, (thanks to a transparency of phenomenon, made possible by the presence of a prophet amidst these generations) is never attained in the later ages. The psychic element that makes its appearance only in the later ages is, thus, an

²⁵⁶ Shahzad Qaiser, *Quest for the Eternal*, p.25.

²⁵⁷ For a comparative study of Keirkegaard and Ibn 'Arabi see "Ibn Arabi and Keirkegaard", *Waqt Ki Ragni* (Urdu) Lahore 1979, p. 58.

indication of the fact that with the march of times hearts harden and the transparency of phenomenon and direct vision of reality becomes more and more inaccessible so that the travelers on the spiritual path have a certain need for psychic experience. Similarly the loss of the aforementioned vision creates a legitimate demand for rational or mystical theology. In this regard the objective pole of the "unquestioned acceptance", that is, the presence of the Prophet among the companions should never be lost sight of. These men were testifying to a presence that itself claimed "He who has seen me has seen the Truth". (Man ra'ani faqad ra'a al Haq) To the later generations it was available only indirectly and the inevitable process of degeneration justified the appearance of various disciplines that operated at different levels. This is the saga of "devolution" and not an evolution.

Shahzad's chapter, "Symbolic Understanding of Imamate and Caliphate" seeks to achieve a balance between the Sunni and Shi'ite theories of spiritual authority and temporal power. He suggests that there could be an elected assembly with an upper chamber, consisting of the *fugaha*, that would act as a guiding force. His approach is sympathetic towards both the perspectives and he tries to bring about a synthesis with a view to uniting the Ummah.

The better half of the book, as said earlier, starts from the chapter, 'Psychotherapy and Western Tradition'. In this article Shahzad gives a brief but informative account of the origins and development of psychotherapy in the West. He points out the shortcomings of psychotherapy and suggests the possibility of an other perspective that has always been the basis of this science in the East and, generally speaking, in all the traditional societies. Traditional science of the soul had two dimensions one "static" and non-personal, that is, cosmology and the other "operative" or personal, that is, ethics. The former determines the place of the soul and its modalities in the hierarchy of existence and is in turn based on metaphysics. Shahzad clearly perceives that this dimension is absent from modern psychotherapy and psychology and its absence leads to the dilemma which Jung described in his famous statement, "The object of psychology is the psychic, unfortunately, it's also its object". The soul cannot be properly and successfully studied except from a view point higher to it. This is why in all the traditions the sage and the metaphysician is the psychologist par excellence.

The next chapter discuss, again in the context of the Western civilization, tradition and the idea of progress. According to Shahzad the idea of progress

has formed the essence of Western civilization. Starting with an etymological inquiry into the meaning of tradition, he proceeds to give an overview of the idea of progress as it influenced different spheres of philosophy, religion and science. This analysis is interesting since he agrees with the traditional perspective in seeing in this idea of progress the very cause that undermined the Western civilization.²⁵⁸

"An Introduction to Critique of Western Metaphysics" is a review of almost all the important "system builders" of metaphysics in the West including brief remarks about their short-comings from the point of view of traditional metaphysics. His probing into the origins of philosophy start with Thales and this again echoes the histories of philosophy written by Western scholars, not only in the sense that it does not recognize the period before Tales as philosophy, but also in that it completely turns a blind eye to the symbolist element in the thought of these Greek thinkers. Had this symbolist element been properly appreciated the ancient doctrines might have been recognized as the lofty expression of the profound and supra-rational truth that it is. For example, a literalist intepretation of Thales doctrine that water was the basic stuff out of which the universe was formed²⁵⁹ makes him look quite naive in these times so dominated by the dogmas of scientism. Yet however "advanced" we may consider ourselves for having discovered the periodic table and for having split the atom, there are very few persons today who can understand the smallest part of these integral sciences of antiquity of which metaphysics is the source and which concerned themselves pre-eminently with the supra-formal levels of the Real, that is, the ontological dimensions.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ No other topic, perhaps, so readily gives rise to misunderstanding and sentimental reaction as that of progress. Since it is beyond the scope of this review to enter into a discussion or critique of progress and the concomitant idea of evolution, we would refer the reader to the masterly expositions of Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon and Lord North bourne specially relevant are the chapters, "Pictures of the Universe", and, "Planning for Progress" in North bournes. Looking Back on Progress, Lahore 1983, and "Civilization and Progress" by Rene Guenon in Iqbal Review Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1985, p.1.

²⁵⁹ Shahzad Qaiser, Quest for the Eternal, p. 60.

²⁶⁰ Water is a symbol of the passive pole of manifestation, the universal substance. For a detailed exposition of its symbolism see Martin Lings, 'The Ritual Purification', in A Sufi Saint of the 20th Century, p. 178 ff; "Quranic Symbolism of Water "In Studies in Comparative Religion; Book of Certainty, N.Y. 1974, pp 55-58; also see Rene Guenon, Reign of Quantity, Lahore 1983. For a reference to the Christian and Hindu traditions see,

Shahzad's critique of Heidegger is quite arresting and he is successful in showing the basic limitations not only of Heidegger, but of all the major figures of Western thought that fall within the ambit of his discussion. "The history of Western metaphysics is the history of the oblivion of the universal".²⁶¹ Such is the verdict he gives after his analysis.

In his criticism of the West he has relied on Guenon's works. But some of his statements about Guenon call for some explanation. Shahzad says that while differentiating between the universal and the individual orders, Guenon maintains that there is no common measure, co-ordination, symmetry, opposition or possible relationship between them. According to Shahzad Guenon maintains, they belong to distinct realms without any point of contact".²⁶² This is misrepresentation of Guenon for in fact he held no such view. Indeed, Guenon does differentiate between the two realms, but far from proposing mutual exclusiveness, he regards the individual order as dependent on and contingent to the universal in every respect. The dovetailing of the universal with the individual is the fundamental mystery whose apprehension is sought in all esoteric and initiatic teachings and Guenon had too keen an eye for the subtlety of metaphysics to endorse the erroneous view which Shahzad has attributed to him.

Shahzad thinks that Guenon "erred in stating that the sciences cannot be based directly upon metaphysics"²⁶³ Shahzad has missed the point completely. He should have given a bit more attention to the word "directly". What Guenon points out here is the intermediary science of cosmology is an application of metaphysical principles to the cosmic domain.²⁶⁴

"The phenomenon of Anti-Metaphysics in Western World" is complementary to the preceding chapter. It marshalls the facts about the

Genesis 1: 1-2 and Brhad-aranyaka Upanishad 1-2.

²⁶¹ Ibid. p.67.

²⁶² Ibid.p.69.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ For a discussion of cosmology and its relationship to metaphysics see Nasr. S.H., "The Role of Traditional Sciences in the Encounter of Religion and Science: An Oriental Perspective", in MAAS Journal of Islamic Science Vol. No. 1 Aligarh, India, Jan 1985, p. 9; T. Burckhardt, "Nature de la perspective Cosmologique", in Etudes Traditionnelles, 49, 1 216-219 (1984); also see his *Cosmology and Modern Science* in J. Needleman (ed.) *Sword of Gnosis*, Penguin Books Inc. 1974.

process of revolt against metaphysics in the West and not only contrasts the situations of East and West in this regard but also outlines the dialectics of the Western philosopher amongst themselves. Shahzad's chapter "Parameters of Humanism", is a vehement refutation of the prevalent notions of humanism as these exist in the modern West he traces humanism to its roots in the post-Renaissance period at which, time a Promethean attitude gained currency in which man saw fit to turn his back on heaven to conquer the earth. Shahzad has analyzed humanism in its religious, social, scientific, philosophic, pragmatic and existential forms and concluded that, "All forms of humanism cut man from the roots of his being."²⁶⁵ It is really reassuring that he escapes the trap of drawing false parallels between the "love for one's neighbour" of the religions and humanism of the Western brand.

The last chapter included in this book, "The Failure of Muslim Philosophers in the Realm of Islamic Metaphysics", comes as an anti-climax. It would have been better if the book ended with the preceding chapter. This chapter not only weak in its "home-work", but betrays a complete reliance on the secondary sources, primarily Western, for its material. This is nowhere more evident than where Shahzad enumerates the Muslim philosophers. His survey shows a somewhat puzzling period of some seven hundred years during which Muslims produced neither metaphysician nor philosopher worthy of the mention. Then after a lapse of centuries Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal appear on the scene. To cite Sayyid Ahmed Khan as a metaphysician is, for us, outrageous. He had not the least aptitude for metaphysics; all his philosophizing amounts to no more than servile apologetics. Although Sayyid Ahmad Khan prided himself as a rationalist, he was hardly that, for in his zeal to imitate the British, he was led into the worst kind of sentimentality. His contribution in the realm of social reform could be acknowledged, but with some reservations. However, in no way or manner can he be regarded as an exponent of the intellectual tradition which the Orientalists and their students amongst the modernist Muslims would have us believe ended in the twelfth century A.D.

The Islamic intellectual tradition, for a variety of reasons, is so poorly appreciated in the Muslim world in our era that it is hardly possible to mention it without briefly mentioning what it is. Pre-eminently it is the

²⁶⁵ Shahzad Qaiser, *Quest for the Eternal*, p. 85.

metaphysical (Ma'rifah, 'irfan) tradition but also a legitimate and traditional philosophy. Apart from the profane and rationalist philosophy which was largely suppressed by the Providential dialectics of men like Al-Ghazzali and Fakhruddin Al-Razi there emerged a tradition of legitimate philosophy based on the supra-rational certainties which were provided by revelation (Wahy) and inspiration (ilham). Properly speaking this should not be called philosophy but theosophy to distinguish it from the profane philosophy of the modern West and any philosophy which trespasses basic articles of faith and would be censurable, for example, under the twenty objections Al-Ghazzali raises against profane philosophy in Tahafut AI-Falaslfaq. The traditional theosophy, in Arabic sometimes referred to as hikmah dhawgiyyah. or kalam 7rfani, has ever been a living force in the Islamic World. It is quite in order to list briefly some of the more outstanding exponents of this tradition who appeared in the Muslim world after the period of the Western Renaissance, such as: Sadruddin Shirazi, Mulla Mahmud Jonpuri, Mulla Muhibullah Bihari, Shah Waliullah, Saed Nursi Badiuzzaman of Turkey, Maulana Ayyub Dehlevi, Ibn Rondi, Maulana Fazli I-Haqq Khayrabadi, Bahuddin Amuli, Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, Jalaludin Kashani, and Mulla Nuruddin Herati. Dr. S.H. Nasr has done much in recent decades to present the living intellectual tradition of Islam in Western languages and it is high time the Muslims recognized their own qualified spokesmen instead of swallowing the Orientalist version of their own intellectual heritage.²⁶⁶

The other aspect of the intellectual tradition, which, as mentioned above, is the metaphysical tradition (ma'rifah), is perhaps more widely appreciated and so there is less need to list its major exponents like Ahmed Sarhindi and quite recently Mir Ali Shah. Having mentioned so much we can return to Shahzad Qaisar's exposition and consider his remark that "both the medieval and the modern Muslim philosophers have failed in the realm of Islamic metaphysics."²⁶⁷ The brief survey we have just given above suffices to amply

²⁶⁶ See 'Living Sufism, London, 1980; "What Does Islam Have to offer the Modern World", pp. 147-153; idem. Islamic Life and Thought, Lahore 1985; "The Pertinence of Studying Islamic Philosophy Today" pp. 145-152, "Islamic Philosophy — Reorientation or Re-understanding" pp. 158-168 and Chapters 15, 16 and 17 in the same book. See also Nasr, Islam and the plight of Modern Man.

²⁶⁷ Shahzad Qaiser, Quest for the Eternal, p. 95.

refute this assertion. What is to be noted is that it is perhaps Shahzad's dependency on Orientalist literature that accounts for this breath taking disregard and denial of a living tradition. If he were only to have a look at what he ignores we could expect him to adopt a radical change of attitude.

We feel that it would not come amiss if we point out a few expressions that do not mesh in with his otherwise carefully worded exposition. In his first article he writes, "in the entire arena of human experience the era of Divine authority has passed away". What he, perhaps, wants to convey is that after the Prophet, direct revelation (Wahy) discontinued. An other sentence runs as follows, "God has been reduced to a mere concept or a symbol without any roots in human existence". (p.8) God can never be rooted in human existence. It's the existence that has its roots in God and not otherwise.

Throughout the book one feels the commitment that Shahzad has for his subject as well as a certain development of thought. We hope that he would continue to develop his ideas in the same direction and his quest for the Eternal would bear fruit in future in the form of some other treatise, more promising and written in the same vein.

Muhammad Suheyl Umar

IQBAL'S ANALYSIS OF MUSLIM CULTURE — A CRITICAL STUDY

Shahzad Qaiser

Iqbal's analysis of Muslim culture is primarily based on the method of induction which has given birth to the spirit of the concrete. Before undertaking a critical study of the method, it is essential to summarize the views of Iqbal as set forth in his lecture, 'The Spirit of Muslim Culture'.

Iqbal begins with the idea of prophecy and differentiates between the prophetic and the mystic types of consciousness. The former returns from 'the repose of unitary experience' whereas the latter does not long to return and when he re-returns, he does not bring much meaningful message for mankind. The pragmatic value of the prophetic experience is, no doubt, of immense significance, 'Why' (inspiration) is a universal property of life. During the early, stages of mankind, prophetic consciousness was parsimonious in the realm of thought and action. With the birth of inductive intellect, prophecy withered away in the world of Islam. Man re-gained an independent posture. Mystic experience, however, remained possible and desirable for it integrated emotion with reason. There was no qualitative difference between the prophetic and the mystic consciousness. The idea of finality in Islam meant that with the cessation of prophecy the era of Divine authority had ceased to exist:

Besides inner experience, Nature and History were the vital sources of know-ledge. The concrete and the dynamic spirit of the Quran was a point of departure from the speculative method of Greeks. It provided essential foundations for the growth of the modern world. The intellectual revolt against Greek heritage was visible in all avenues of thought including Mathematics, Astronomy and Medicine. It made its presence felt in Ash'arite Metaphysics and more profoundly in Muslim rejection of Greek logic. The limitations of purely speculative method gave birth to the quest for definite principles of knowledge. Nazzam's method of doubt was further developed by Ghazzali who anticipated the method of Descartes. The rationale was to provide strong foundations to the body of knowledge. In the realm of logic, Ghazzali remained essentially the follower of Aristotle. It was 'Iraqi and Ibn Taimiyya who undertook the

task of repudiating Greek logic. Abu Bakr Razi rejected Aristotle's first figure and anticipated the inductive method of John Stuart Mill. Ibn-i-Hazm laid stress on sense-perception as source of knowledge. Ibn-i-Taimiyya sponsored induction as a mode of argumentation. It gave birth to the method of observation and experiment. Al-Beruni and Al-Kindi made scientific contributions in the field of psychology. Bacon took the inductive method from the Muslims and passed it on to the Western world. The west, however, is not keen in appreciating the Islamic origin of her method.

The spirit of Muslim culture concentrates on the knowledge of the concrete, the finite. By dint of capturing and empowering the concrete, the human intellect passes beyond the concrete. The Greeks were merely oriented to the finite. Their ideal was proportion not infinity. As the Muslims were committed to the latter they developed a better understanding of space and time. Greek atomism with its corresponding concept of absolute space was not acceptable to the Muslims. The Ash'arites like the modern atomists tried to overcome the problem of perceptual space. Tusi in the realm of Mathematics felt the necessity of abandoning the very notion. It was, however, left to Al-Beruni to clearly perceive that a static view of the universe could not apprehend the function idea. Time was real and it was not a mere agent of space. This was the reason that Whitehead's view of Relativity was more acceptable to the Muslims than that of Einstein. The religious psychology of 'Iraqi and Khwaja Muhammad Parsa comes closer to the modern concept of space and time. Though 'Iraqi inherited the classical prejudice of a static universe, yet he tried to give a dynamic interpretation of the problem. However, his failure to discern the relation between Divine time and serial time did not let him appreciate the phenomenon of perpetual creation.

Ibn-i-Maskawaih's theory of evolution and Ibn-i-Khaldun's concept of history both are wedded to the dynamic spirit of the Muslim culture. History is another source of knowledge. The Quran frames the laws of the rise and fall of nations which are laid down as historical generalizations. It also establishes the principles of historical criticism. Islam initiated a scientific study of history. The sense of human unity and the dynamic conception of time were the basic ingredients of historical understanding. In the figure of Ibn-i-Khaldun, the revolt against Greek thought found its final fruition.

The revolt of Islam against Greek speculation gave birth to the anti-classical orientation of the modern world. Since Spengler conceived each culture as a specific organism without any relation to the preceding or following cultures, therefore, he was bound to deny this reality. Also, his attempt to equate Islam with 'imagian culture' showed his miserable failure to understand the essence of Muslim culture.

From this brief summary, the scenario of Muslim culture as envisaged by Iqbal stands absolutely clear. For him, Islam gives a dynamic conception of the universe. And the intellectual revolt of Islam against Greek thought gave birth to the anti-classical spirit of the modern world. Before probing these findings in detail, it is exceedingly imperative to lay down certain fundamental points in this regard. Iqbal tries to understand the spirit of Muslim culture in reference to the Greek culture which precedes it and the modern one which follows it. His thought and language, thus remains enmeshed in the tracks of both these worlds. The categories of 'static' and 'dynamic' 'classical' and 'anti-classical' which he uses so often, reflect this basic limitation. The method of comparison thus used, puts the essence of Muslim culture in oblivion. Also, his consideration of ancient cultures as the relics of the past, arises due to a false equation of the immutable with the static. The main reason for this misunderstanding is that he did not differentiate clearly between reason and intellect. His acquaintance with higher Sufism and the authentic tradition of Muslim philosophy did give him some inkling of intellect, but he could not capture the essence of this tradition. His purely religious views of the world coupled with an extensive exposure to Western science and philosophy made him oblivious of intellectual metaphysics. He did not appreciate that the very concept of rational meta-physics was a contradiction in terms. In the twilight of reason he attempted, to fathom the mysteries of the universe. If he would have embarked on the road of understanding Islamic intellectuality in the light of Eastern metaphysics, he would have seen for himself the fallacies or the rational venture.

The Greeks, as such, had no idea of prophecy. Iqbal built a case for prophetic and mystic consciousness on the level of religious experience. He provided an experiential basis to religion. And this constitutes his chief strength. However, his rational treatment of prophecy remained enigmatic. In his attempt to bring mystic experience at par with other levels of normal

experience, he assigned a complementary status to the categories of thought and intuition. But he understood them in the rational sense with the result that intellectual intuition as envisaged by the Eastern metaphysics remained opaque to his consciousness. He says: "In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect".²⁶⁸ His agreement with Bergson on this point clearly shows that he accepted the Western concept of intellect and intuition which were not in consonance with the primordial tradition. The matter did not end here. He used these categories to assert that Islam and the essence of the modern world were not opposed to each other. The weakness of this argument shall be evident in the course of this article.

The main problem with Iqbal was that he wrote in a religious tradition under the umbrella of Western thought and kept this religious tradition aloof from its intellectual foundations. In the ultimate analysis, it alloyed itself with the forces of European culture. This was precisely the reason that he felt no need of grounding revelation in pure intellectuality. He did not touch the chords of Islamic esoterism either. This resulted in a peripheral understanding of prophecy. The true relation which exists between intellect and revelation has been profoundly expressed by Schuon in these words: "The Intellect is infallible in itself or it is nothing; pure Intellection is a subjective and immanent Revelation just as Revelation properly so called is an objective and transcendent Intellection".²⁶⁹

We fail to agree with Iqbal in what he has said in denying the qualitative difference between the prophetic and the mystic experience. The prophet possessed the faculty of intellect in its fullest expression. Revelation was a process of actualization. From this emerged the reality of Divine authority. With the birth of inductive reason, there came a qualitative change in the nature of intellect. Now, no one could possess this faculty in its absoluteness. One could only inspire for particular intellection. All intellection had to be rooted in the Tradition.

The Muslim thinker's revolt against Greek philosophy was manifold. It was ratio-empirical and not intellectual as erroneously thought by Iqbal. The Ash'arites lacked intellectual metaphysics. Iqbal himself admits this in these words. "... yet, on the whole, the object of the Ash'arite movement was

²⁶⁸ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 3.

²⁶⁹ F. Schuon, *Logic and Transcendence*, p. 31.

simply to defend orthodox opinion with the weapons of Greek Dialectic".²⁷⁰ He further says: "But Ghazzali remained on the whole a follower of Aristotle in logic".²⁷¹ Even those Muslim thinkers who criticized Greek logic did not achieve much. They lacked true metaphysical basis. 'Iraqi and Ibn-i-Taimiyya did not repudiate Greek logic on the basis of intellectual foundations. Abu Bakr Razi's criticism of Aristotle's first figure reflects the inductive spirit only. The same is true of Ibn-i-Hazm who considered induction as the only form of reliable argument. The Muslim logicians did succeed in pointing to-wards certain limitations of Greek logic but that was-a partial success. Against', he fixed nature of Aristotelian logic they postulated sense-experience as a source of knowledge but they failed to understand the metaphysical basis of logic. Without metaphysics, logic remains a very limited discipline. It tends, in the ultimate analysis, to distort true understanding of Reality. The Western tendency to consider logic as all-embracing is equally fallacious. In a traditional doctrine, logic is a de-terminate aspect of the principles belonging to universal order. It takes its light from these principles. In their absence, logic loses its ultimate validity and reliability. Schuon says "Logic, in other words, is perfectly consistent only when exceeding itself".²⁷²

The principle of 'doubt' as initiated by Nazzam and developed by Ghazzali was an advance over the purely speculative nature of Greek philosophy but it fell short of true certitude.* Such a method was an

²⁷⁰ Iqbal, 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 4.

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 129.

²⁷² F. Schuon, *Logic and Transcendence*, p. 46.

* This view of Ghazzali's doubt, largely spread through the works of the orientalist and uncritically accepted by modern Muslim writers, to say the least, is a facile judgment that betrays a lack of understanding as well as a tendency that tries to classify every notion according to its preconceived categories. For an illuminating discussion of the issue see Osman Bakr, "The Meaning and Significance of Doubt in al-Ghazzali's Philosophy" in *Iqbal Review*, Lahore, April-June 1985, pp29---48. (Editor's Note).

See Osman Bakr, "The Question of Methodology in Islamic Science", in *Muslim Education Quarterly*, where he deals with the limited role of the scientific/inductive method in Islamic sciences and in Islamic epistemology in general. Of particular interest is his treatment of the questions concerning the precedence of Islamic civilization in the application of the Scientific Method over the modern West and its influence on the latter in this regard. He also critically examines the notion that modern science was created by means of a single methodology only, the famous so called Scientific Method. (Editor's Note).

impediment in the pursuit of true knowledge. Iqbal was fascinated by it, perhaps, for the reason that a way was prepared for Descartes method.

Iqbal states that the experimental method is not a European discovery. The inductive spirit of the Quran gave birth to the method of observation and experiment. For us, there is no ground to dispute either the Islamic origin of the inductive method or its transmission to Europe by Bacon. We have, however, certain reservations regarding the inductive method. The method, as such, has registered a great qualitative advance over Greek thought but the place assigned to it by Iqbal and the Western world is highly unjustified.** Divorced from the intellectual foundations, the method tends to become a reality in itself, which hampers true understanding of the universe. Guenon has made a remarkable observation in this regard. He says: ...Orientals show a strongly marked tendency to disregard applications. This is quite understandable, because any one who above every thing else cultivates the knowledge of universal principles can only take a lukewarm interest in the special sciences when one knows as a mathematical certainty, or one might even say as a more-than-mathematical certainty, that things cannot be otherwise than what they are, one becomes as a matter of course disdainful of experiment, because the verifying of a particular fact, whatever its nature, never proves anything more or anything different from the mere existence of that particular fact; at most, the observation of facts can occasionally provide an example to illustrate, but in nowise to prove, a theory, and any belief to the contrary is to labour under a grave delusion. This being so, there is clearly no object in pursuing experimental sciences for their own sake, and from the metaphysical point of view they only possess an incidental and contingent value, like the objects they are applied to.²⁷³ The European crisis in the field of physical, social and religious sciences is precisely due to the lack of these universal principles. Schuon says: "...the foundations of modern science are false because, from the "subject" point of view, it replaces Intellect and Revelation by reason and experiment, as if it were not contradictory to lay claim to totality on an empirical basis; and its foundations are false too because, from the "object" point of view, it replaces the universal Substance by matter alone, either denying the universal

²⁷³ R. Guenon, An Introduction to Hindu Doctrines, pp. 41-42.

Principle or reducing it to matter or to some kind of pseudo-absolute from which all transcendence has been eliminated."²⁷⁴

Though Iqbal admits that the capture of the concrete makes it possible for the human intellect to go beyond the concrete, yet-he forgets that in the absence of true metaphysics, it is the concrete which ultimately, captures and overpowers man. Schuon says: "Concretism coincides with what may be described as 'factualism', or the superstition of the fact, a fact being regarded as the opposite of a principle, the opposite therefore of what current prejudice regards as an abstraction. On the religious plane the tendency is- to emphasize moral facts at the expense of intrinsic spiritual realities, instead of maintaining a balance — humanly necessary — between inward and eternal values and social applications, or between essences and forms".²⁷⁵ The tragedy of the concrete, understood in the historical perspective, is that the Muslim Universities of Spain were not committed to the primordial tradition of Islam. Hence they could not impart the total ideal of the Infinite. Since then the Western world is lost in the tracks of finite.

Their irony of fate is that the Muslim Philosophers dealt with the Infinite rationally. It gave them a dubious view of space and time. From the metaphysical point of view, space and time are differently manifested. Ash'arite atomism did score a few points against Greek atomism but as it lacked true metaphysics, it could not understand the real nature of things. The same is true of modern atomism. Though Tusi and Al-Beruni, in the realm of Mathematics, committed themselves to a dynamic conception of the universe yet they failed to understand the non-dynamic aspects of thought. Since they lacked true principles, therefore, both Whitehead and Einstein could not unravel the essence of space and time. 'Iraqi succeeded to a certain extent in this regard but that was by virtue of religious experience.

The concrete, the finite are the manifestations of the Real. Without the disclosure of the Real, the universe is a closed book. Knowledge begins with the immutable. It is from the primordial source that the manifestations attain meaning. This is precisely the reason that intellect and revelation remained prior to inductive 'reason. Mere rational or empirical demonstration of the concrete leads, ultimately, to scientism which is the logical outcome of the

²⁷⁴ F. Schuon, *Light On The Ancient Worlds*, pp. 34-35.

²⁷⁵ F. Schuon, *Logic and Transcendence*, p. 30.

principles to which modern world stands committed. Schuon says: "...a distinction has to be made between terrestrial thought, aroused by the environment and finding its terms within the environment, and celestial thought aroused by that which is our eternal substance and finding its terms beyond ourselves and, in a final analysis, in the Self".²⁷⁶ For us, there is a dialectical relation between the immutable and the finite. If the concrete is not considered as the manifestation of the Real, then, true understanding of the universe becomes an impossibility, Ibn Ata' Allah further expresses the idea in these words: "How can it be conceived that something Veils Him, since, were it not for Him, the existence of everything would not have been manifested?"²⁷⁷

Iqbal was fascinated by the idea of evolution initiated by Jahiz and developed by Ibn-i-Maskawaih. Aristotle's concept of evolution as a transition from potentiality to actuality was rightly seen as representing a static universe. But does the dynamic view of evolution narrate the entire story? The answer is certainly, no. From the metaphysical point of view, the notions of evolution and progress have no such meaning. They are simply the manifestations of the Real, the Immutable. Iqbal's rational attempt to understand the process of evolution has gone on the wrong tracks.

Iqbal rightly considers History as a source of knowledge. Beside historical generalizations, Quran states the canons of historical criticism. The scientific treatment of history merits great consideration. Unfortunately, the development of history as a science has not been very successful in the Muslim world. The uncritical acceptance of historical facts punctuated with the phenomenon of personality cult has violated the essence of history. The reason being that the scientific method alone cannot save such a discipline. In the absence of metaphysical principles, historical reality remains in oblivion. Likewise, the unity of mankind can be achieved only by remaining committed to the principles belonging to the universal order.

Ibn-i-Khaldun treated history as a scientific discipline. He considered time as a creative moment against the Greeks who considered it either as unreal or circular. Iqbal calls him a forerunner of Bergson. He says: "His chief merit lies in his acute perception of, and systematic expression to, the spirit of the

²⁷⁶ F. Schuon, *Language of the Self*, p. 241.

²⁷⁷ Ibn At ' I I lah, *Sufi Aphorisms*, p. 26.

cultural movement of which he was a most brilliant product. In the work of his genius the anti-classical spirit of the Quran scores its final victory over Greek thought..."²⁷⁸ Without underestimating the achievements of this great thinker, we simply ask a question: "How could a thinker hostile to Metaphysics win the final victory over Greek thought? The inductive method alone can neither reveal the entire anti-classical spirit of the Quran nor defeat the ideas of the classical heritage. It is also powerless in the face of traditional civilizations.

Iqbal's thesis that the anti-classical spirit of the modern world has arisen out of the revolt of Islam against Greek thought requires certain qualifications. The spirit of the modern world is not entirely anti-classical. It has not succeeded in severing all speculative ties from the Greeks. Though the method of observation and experiment reflects this anti-classical spirit, yet the deification of reason speaks of the classical bond. The errors of the Greeks have been well preserved in the modern world. What few genuine insights the Greeks inherited from the ancient world, the West failed to acknowledge. The spirit of the modern world is not so much anti-classical as anti-intellectualist. This is, perhaps, what makes the Muslim rationalists feel a strong sense of fraternity with the European world. They forget that from the intellectual point of view, Islam and the Western world are diametrically opposed to each other. The only point of contact was the religious tradition which the West has very neatly destroyed. The contemporary situation has been discussed by Rama P Coomaraswamy in, these words: "No Catholic can expect to keep his faith without considerable sacrifice and suffering".²⁷⁹ The Post-conciliar Church has joined hands with the modern world. The final word has been left to posterity.

To appreciate fully the import of these views, we shall discuss two basic tendencies in Iqbal's thought: First, his rejection of ancient cultures. Second, his ambivalent attitude towards the modern world. Regarding the first point, he says, "The cultures of Asia and in fact, of the whole ancient world failed, because they approached Reality exclusively from within and moved from within outwards. This procedure gave them theory without power, and on

²⁷⁸ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 142.

²⁷⁹ R. P. Coomaraswamy, *The Destruction of the Christian Tradition*, pp. 257-258.

mere theory no durable civilization can be based".²⁸⁰ One thing which stands absolutely clear in Iqbal is that his vision of the ancient world was-coloured by the prevalent notions of the Western world and the religious tradition alone could not ameliorate him. Under the impact of Western thought he endorsed wrong ideas regarding the ancient cultures. Schuon says: "Many things, with the ancients, now seem to us rudimentary for the simple reason that we are unaware of what these things meant to them, with the result that we set out to judge from fragments or on the basis of appearances of a quite deceptive kind".²⁸¹ He further says: "When one tries to reconstruct the psychology of ancestors one nearly always makes the serious mistake of failing to take into account the internal repercussions of corresponding external manifestations, for what matters is, not a progress towards an outward perfection, but the validity of our attitudes towards the unseen and the Absolute."²⁸²

Every study of the ancient cultures requires an understanding of its initiatic symbolism which is the key to traditional wisdom. All things participate in the universal principles. In other words, the multiplicity of the manifested world is the reflection of the primary unity. The understanding of which requires unveiling of traditional symbols Schuon says: "There are two aspects in every symbol; the one adequately reflects the divine Function and so constitutes the sufficient reason for the symbolism; the other is merely the reflection as such and so is contingent. The former of these aspects is the content; the latter is the mode of its manifestation."²⁸³

A purely rational analysis fails to decipher the real meaning of the unlimited possibilities inherent in the situation. It partially succeeds in the case of expressible but fails absolutely in the realm of inexpressible. Cooper rightly says: "The symbol, being derived from the archetype, must lead back to it and merge the finite mind with the infinite".²⁸⁴

All the great Traditions of the world are impregnated with rich symbolism. "And the disciples came, and said unto him. Why Speakest thou

²⁸⁰ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 14-15.

²⁸¹ F. Schuon, *In the Tracks of Buddhism*, p. 87.

²⁸² F. Schuon, *Light On The Ancient Worlds*, p. 107.

²⁸³ F. Schuon, *Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts*, p. 39.

²⁸⁴ J. C. Cooper, *Symbolism: The Universal Language*, p. 110.

unto them in parables. He answered and said unto them. Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given."²⁸⁵ The revolt of Europe against her own religious tradition is primarily responsible for the loss of higher symbolism. The Western symbolists including Paul Tillich remain on the periphery. They have become the sponsors of a barren culture.

Iqbal's observation that the cultures of the whole ancient world failed, should be understood in a relative sense. The ancient world is the possessor of that traditional heritage without which the modern world cannot survive. Schuon says: "The whole existence of the peoples of antiquity, and the traditional peoples in general, is dominated by two presiding ideas, the idea of Centre and the idea of Origin... Every thing in the behaviour of ancient and traditional peoples can be explained, directly or indirectly, by reference to these two ideas, which are like landmarks in the measureless and perilous world of forms and of change."²⁸⁶ The categories of success and failure cannot be applied as such to the ancient cultures. It is only the ancient world which by dint of pure intellectuality possesses the ultimate criterion of judging other cultures. It is not the other way round. The sharp distinction between the inner and the outer is the product of reason. The approach of intellect is unitive. There exists no dichotomy between theory and power in the great traditions of the world. The traditional world seems merely oriented to theory, for the West has installed power as a false absolute. Schuon has aptly remarked: "...if modern man is so intelligent, ancient man cannot have been so stupid".²⁸⁷ The same idea has been expressed by Guenon in these words "... there are other ways of showing intelligence than by making machines".²⁸⁸

Iqbal says: "The Quran opens our eyes to the great fact of change, through the appreciation and control of which alone it is possible to build a durable civilization".²⁸⁹ For us there is no denying the fact that change is very vital but it is not a solitary factor in the durability of civilization. Change has to be understood in reference to the immutable principle. Iqbal had some

²⁸⁵ St Mathew, XIII, pp. 10-11.

²⁸⁶ F. Schuon, *Light On The Ancient Worlds*, p. 7.

²⁸⁷ F. Schuon, *Logic and Transcendence*, p. 66.

²⁸⁸ R. Guenon, *East and West*, p. 11.

²⁸⁹ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 14.

inkling of it when he posited the categories of eternal and permanence, but unfortunately he treated them rationally. In the absence of metaphysical principles, he became inclined towards change at the cost of the immutable. Guenon says: "It would also be wrong to confuse immutability with immobility... The immutable is not what is contrary to change, but what is above it; just as the "superrational" is not the "irrational".²⁹⁰

The modern world feels a strong aversion regarding the traditional heritage. It has blocked the communication with the ancient world. It is in the ultimate interest of the modern man to understand what the great traditions stand for. Nasr says: "the traditions of Asia have emphasized the hierarchic nature of reality, the predominance of the spiritual over the material, the sacred character of the cosmos, the inseparability of man's destiny from that of the natural and cosmic environment, and the unity of knowledge and the interrelatedness of all things".²⁹¹

Iqbal says: "The Quran is a book which emphasizes 'deed' rather than 'idea'.²⁹² There is no denying the fact that the Quran lays emphasis on action but the action has to be rooted in the primordial tradition. Schuon says: "...all knowledge carries its benefit in itself, contrary to action which is only a momentary modification of a being and always is separated from its various effects. These effects belong to the same domain and order of existence as that which has produced them. Action can-not have the effect of liberating from action and its consequences cannot reach beyond the limits of individuality considered in its fullest possible extension. Action, whatever it may be, is not opposed to, and cannot banish, ignorance which is the root of all limitation; only knowledge can dispel ignorance as the light of the sun disperses darkness, and it is thus that the 'Self', the immutable and eternal principle of all manifest and unmanifest states, appears in its supreme reality".²⁹³

Iqbal's rationalism made him positive towards the West and negative towards the Greeks. The former taught him the priority of action whereas

²⁹⁰ R. Guenon, *East and West*, pp. 82-83.

²⁹¹ S. H. Nasr, *Western Science and Asian Cultures*, p. 5.

²⁹² Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Preface.

²⁹³ R. Guenon, "Oriental Metaphysics", in J. Needleman (ed.), *The Sword of Gnosis*, Penguin Books Inc. 1974.

the latter made him aversive to speculation. True metaphysics does not accept this dichotomy. Strictly speaking, in the modern world, action is not opposed to idea but to contemplation. School says: "In man stamped with the fall, not only has action priority over contemplation, but it even abolishes contemplation".²⁹⁴ For us, there needs to be a true harmony between action and contemplation. Both are united in a single whole. This is the traditional meaning of non-activity and non-action. This has to be qualitatively differentiated from inactivity and inaction. Cooper says: "Non-activity is a thing of the mind and spirit, the open mind and pure spirit which can move spontaneously in any direction in any given situation. Humanity is now so highly conditioned in mind by its beliefs and ideologies and worship of factual knowledge, that spontaneity is almost lost".²⁹⁵ A similar idea is expressed thus: "By non-action everything can be done."²⁹⁶ The matter does not end here. The Tradition goes so far as to say that "All actions are performed by the Gunas, born of Prakriti. One whose understanding is deluded by egoism alone thinks: I am the, doer."²⁹⁷ Ibn 'Arabi also does not impute action to outward existence which is passive. It cannot perform any action by itself. It is the immanence of the Lord which performs the act. In all such matters, the primordial and universal tradition by which every name you may call it, Philosophia Perennis, Lex Aeterna, Hagia Sophia, Din al Haqq, Tao, Sanatana Dharma points towards Reality which is opaque to the modern man. The future of the modern man is at stake unless this tradition becomes translucent.

At this stage it is imperative to discuss Iqbal's fundamental view regarding the Western world. He says: "...it is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam".²⁹⁸

This is precisely our point of departure from Iqbal. For us, Europe has nothing substantial to teach. Due to its lack of universal principles; it has not much to say to the rest of the world. The cult of science which it has

²⁹⁴ F. Schuon, *Light On The Ancient Worlds*, p. 49.

²⁹⁵ J. C. Cooper, *Taoism: The Way of the Mystic*, p. 76.

²⁹⁶ *TaoTe Ching*, XLVIII.

²⁹⁷ *Bhagavad Gita*, pp. 111,27.

²⁹⁸ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 8.

established is a pseudo-absolute. The only thing which she possessed of significance was the religious tradition which she has almost destroyed. The conclusion reached by her do not warrant any revision or reconstruction of theological thought in Islam. However, one fundamental lesson we can learn from Europe and that is to avoid the road she has taken. Inductive method belongs to our own tradition and we have not to uproot it in false imitation of the West.

Iqbal further says: "The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam. Our only fear is that the dazzling exterior of European culture may arrest our movement and we may fail to reach the true inwardness of that culture".²⁹⁹ Here, Iqbal has again the inductive method in mind while determining the position of both these cultures. This was partly responsible for the inflated role he assigned to this method. He also talked of the intellectual side of European culture. For us, Europe has no intellectual side. This, primarily, constitutes the crisis of the Western world.

Iqbal at times criticizes Europe and one is at loss to understand whether he is critical of its exterior aspect or the interior. However, keeping in view his main thesis on the subject, the balance moves towards the former. He says: "Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement".³⁰⁰

We fully endorse him on the subject with an addition that in almost all spheres the role of Europe is identical. But Iqbal stops short at the level of 'ethical advancement' and leaves out those realms out of his preview that are more vital and where the West has a far more subversive role to play.

Iqbal says: "It is only natural the Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together".³⁰¹ The dynamism of the Quran was a novel message for the Arab

²⁹⁹ Ibid., O. 7.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 179.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 147.

mind which lived amidst the static cultures touching its shores. It was in consonance with the Arab orientation to the practical. However, the Arabs were also familiar with certain religious traditions of the world. The Household of the Prophet developed an intellectual unexcelled standing of the Ultimate. 'Ali Bin 'Uthman Al Hujwiri says: "Ali is a model for the Sufis in respect to the truths of outward expression and the subtleties of inward meanings."³⁰² Ali symbolizes the intellectual tradition of Islam. The primordial sacrifice of Husain can only be understood in reference to this tradition. It is only the intellectual tradition which is oriented to the immutable. And this is the essence of Muslim culture. It qualitatively differs from the modern world which lacks this tradition. Guenon says: "For us, the outstanding difference between the East and West (which means in this case the Modern West), the only difference which is really essential (for all others are derivative), is on the one side the preservation of tradition with all that this implies, and on the other side the forgetting and the loss of this same tradition; on one side the maintaining of metaphysical knowledge, on the other complete ignorance of all connected with this realm."³⁰³

Before we conclude this analysis, it is necessary to say a few words regarding Iqbal's Doctoral Dissertation on 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia'. His choice of writing on Persian Metaphysics itself speaks of his earlier interest in the field. But, due to certain influences including that of Professor T.W. Arnold, to whom he also dedicated this thesis, he embarked on a qualitatively different road. The term 'Development' was a veil in the understanding of metaphysics. The very beginning of his philosophical quest, thus, landed him in the orbit of Western categories. He says: "I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern philosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done."³⁰⁴ For us, the language of modern philosophy was one of the main factors responsible for sealing the possibility of unveiling the quintessence of metaphysics. It is here that he needed a true teacher. However, in the presence of all these limitations, Iqbal still emerges as a more original thinker in this work than in the Reconstruction.

³⁰² A. Hujwiri, *Kashf Al Mohjub*, p. 74.

³⁰³ R. Guenon, "Oriental Metaphysics", in J. Needleman (ed.), *The Sword of Gnosis* Penguin Books Inc. 1974.

³⁰⁴ Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, p. xi.