

BOOK REVIEWS

1 THE VISION OF ISLAM

Reviewed by Maryam Jameelah

2. IMAGINAL WORLDS:
IBN AL-'ARABI AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY

Reviewed by Elton A. Hall

3 FUNDAMENTAL SYMBOLS:
THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF SACRED SCIENCE

Reviewed by Seyyed Hossein Nasr

4 UNDLUS KI ISLAMI MIRATH (URDU)

Reviewed by Dr. Sayyid A. S. Pirzada

- 5 PROPHET MUHAMMAD AND HIS WESTERN CRITICS,
(A CRITIQUE OF WE. MONTGONERY WATT AND
OTHERS)

Reviewed by Maryam
Jameelah

- 6 EPISTEMOLOGY - THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Reviewed by Javid
Iqbal Amiri

- 7 MAWDUDI AND THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

Reviewed by Dr. Sohail Mahmud

The Vision of Islam, Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, Paragon House, 370 Lexington Avenue, New York City, N.Y. 10017, 1994, pp. 368, Pbk. \$ 17.95.

This book is the ripe fruit of more than a decade of teaching a basic course in Islam as part of the program of Religious Studies at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, Long Island. It is first and foremost directed to their American students coming from diverse backgrounds. Although primarily intended for young undergraduate students with little or no prior knowledge of Islam, this work throughout maintains its mature sophisticated intellectual standards.

It refutes once and for all the general idea widely held in the West that Islam consists of harsh legalism and outward formalism with little or no inward spirituality or beauty. This erroneous conception has been much enhanced these days by the militant activities of certain political groups loosely labeled as "fundamentalists" with whom the authors of this book share no sympathies. On the contrary, they show why indiscriminate violence for political ends is forbidden by the Shar'iat.

In contrast to so many other western publications preoccupied with current political events of this or that Muslim country. This work concentrates its exposition exclusively on the inner spiritual life of the practicing Muslim from within its own ethos - a perspective very sorely needed in the West.

The first part of this work discusses the exterior dimensions of the Five Pillars of Islam, emphasizing Salat or the obligatory five times daily ritual prayers, the Shar'iat, Holy Qur'an and the Islamic concept of revealed scriptures, the Sunnah or practice of the Holy Prophet upon whom be peace, the Madhhahs or schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The second part takes up the subject of Diniyat on all its aspects the Islamic creed or Shahadah, Tawhid and Shirk, the Divine Names or attributes of God, why Divine mercy takes precedence over Divine wrath and the necessity for a delicate balance between tanzih or Divine Majesty and Tashbih or Divine beauty, the Angels and their necessary role, Satan and the jinn, predestination verses free-will and the uniqueness of the human state and the purpose of human life. Also included are the relation of Islam to other major world religions followed by the Islamic concept of death and Hereafter. Part II ends with a brief commentary of Islamic theology, philosophy and sufism. The third and last part of this book describes Ihsan or the interior dimensions of Islam, including sincerity in attitudes, motivations and intentions, character-building, manners and the necessity in Islam for doing everything beautifully. Eloquent explanations are given why authentic - Muslim arts and crafts exemplified in correct Qur'anic recitation, calligraphy and mosque architecture are essential and exalted expressions of Islam.

The viewpoint throughout this book is traditional and orthodox, from beginning to end hostile to modernity and above all "progress" and "development" expressed in ever-intensifying mechanization and

indoctrination, their rampant growth spreading the most degrading ugliness all over the Muslim world. Although classical Islamic civilization included the natural sciences, perfection of human character and Din not technical progress - was its ultimate goal.

The value of this book lies in its emphasis on the necessity of beauty in Islam. Current political, economic and social activities in Muslim countries today have little if any concern with beauty. Activism in the Muslim world today expresses the very negation of beauty, With irrefutable evidence, Murata and Chittick convincingly argue why unless and until the Muslims give beauty its full expression in their everyday lives, the regeneration of Islamic civilization cannot possibly take place.

Maryam Jameelah

Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-'Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity. William C. Chittick, Published by the State University of New York (SUNY) Press, Albany, New York, 1994. 208 pages.

William Chittick and his publishers have rendered a significant service for reflective Akbarians who wish to understand the greatest Shaykh more deeply. Under three interconnected themes -- human perfection, worlds of imagination, and religious diversity — Imaginal Worlds brings together ten essays written over the last decade and published in a variety of places, including symposia proceedings of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society. Not content merely to make these thoughtful essays readily accessible, Chittick has substantially rewritten and revised them to eliminate unnecessary repetition and to exhibit an architectonic unity in their contents. He has been admirably successful in doing both. For those who have found his monumental *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (SUNY Press, 1989) daunting, the volume under review could serve as an introduction and guidebook for the longer work. Yet it stands on its own as a survey of major Akbarian themes.

Throughout his essays, Chittick is concerned to draw together and interweave metaphysical, ethical and psychological dimensions of the Shaykh's thought and to show that they are rooted in his profound spiritual

experience, including his remarkable grasp of, and devotion to, Islam. Beginning with a detailed discussion of *wahdat al-wujud* -- term, Chittick notes, not used by Ibn al-' Arabi but suitably applied to his ontology -- Chittick shows how the Shaykh would have understood it. This opening allows Chittick to inaugurate a discussion of the Divine Names and their relevance to the macrocosm, the microcosm (the human being) and the perfect human being. He returns to the Most Beautiful Names again and again, because they are essential to all three. Every time Chittick discusses the Names, he broadens our perspective and adds subtlety to it. They are the unifying theme of these essays.

In a fascinating chapter, 'Ethics and Antinomianism', Chittick clearly and convincingly demonstrates that human character traits are rooted in the Divine Names, showing that character traits are rooted in the Divine Names, showing that Akbarian ethics derive from ontology. All Names, including those generally associated with blameworthy character traits, are disclosures of Deity. No trait can therefore be blameworthy in itself. Rather, human misunderstanding or misuse of the creative power of a Name as it manifests in a person results in the judgment of blameworthiness. But existence (*wujud*) is one, which implies that all things are properties and effects of the Divine Names. 'This means', Chittick explains, 'that in the last analysis nothing can be found but various modalities of *wujud*, or various relationships and attributions' (p. 47). Being is one, but relationships are many. Outside being, there are no things in themselves, only relationships, each of which is a bridge (*barzakh*) between other changing relationships and between the world of plurality and the Names, themselves self-disclosures of, and bridges to, Reality. Only the prophetic tradition as embodied in the Shari' ah provides accurate guidance in ethics and spiritual development by situating actions in their proper contexts.

In his concern to elucidate how Ibn al-' Arabi's ethics are wedded both to his ontology and to the prescriptions of the Shari' ah, Chittick regrettably addresses only crude antinomianism, which declares that spiritual knowledge places one above normative ethics. The cliché that the line between genius and insanity is thin has become so threadbare that one might miss the truth behind it: both the genius and the deranged move beyond conventional reality. The genius, however, may attempt to translate his insight into

language and forms of understanding which can elevate ours; the insane demands that we acknowledge their 'reality' without connecting it to ours. Anyone whose consciousness is spiritually transformed, that is, whose very structure of thinking, feeling and perceiving is changed, does move beyond conventional views of normative ethics. He or she neither rejects nor mocks moral principles which are held to limit others, but his or her understanding of them is necessarily vastly expanded. Normative ethics become soul ethics, an integral part of the spiritual pilgrim and not just a set of rules to be followed. Were such not a result of spiritual insight, the illumination itself would be suspect. Thus, the line between crude antinomianism and the illuminated soul will also appear thin to those of lesser vision. Chittick modestly avoids this admittedly treacherous territory; but Ibn al-'Arabi did not.

Chittick provides a clear account of the Shaykh's explanation of religious diversity, which is resonant with his account of blameworthy character traits. Being is one and therefore the source of all beliefs, and every belief must have some connection with existence to exist itself. Nonetheless, every belief is limited; none can encompass the whole of wujud. To the degree that a belief is misguided, it is because of the less than perfect development of the believer. Our preparedness for understanding determines the beliefs we have. (Here a comparison with the Hindu view of absolute and relative truth and preparedness for insight would be enlightening. But Chittick, wary of superficial similarities and of ideas taken out of context, does not indulge in such considerations.) Those who follow the Qur'an do not follow the only path to God, but they follow the straightest path, which is 'the road of felicity' (p. 146).

On the basis of the Shaykh's view of religious diversity and the necessity for it, Chittick attempts a generous and inclusive perspective on all religious traditions. Yet his refusal to note comparable standpoints in other religions, notably Hinduism, Buddhism, mystical Christianity of the later Middle Ages, and even Taoism, gives his account a cold edge not found in the Shaykh. The tension between Ibn al-'Arabi's boldness -- it caused trouble in his lifetime and after - and Chittick's caution (noticed earlier in the discussion of antinomianism) here shadows the exhilarating conclusion of the volume. In the end, the Shaykh's own words win through: 'Be in yourself a matter for

the forms of all beliefs, for God is wider and more tremendous than that He should be constricted by one knotting (belief, world view) rather than another'. (p. 176). For Ibn al-' Arabi, there is no problem of religious diversity.

In dealing with these themes, Chittick broaches many subjects not touched on here, as essay titles indicate: 'Revelation and Poetic Imagery'; 'Meetings with Imaginal Men'; Death and the Afterlife'; and 'A Myth of Origins'. The entire volume merits close reading and sustained reflection. Thought not always luminous, Chittick's essays are invariably illuminating, and the careful reader will discern a certain beauty and integrity of thought in Chittick's consistently sober prose. Useful indices are included, along with a select bibliography. Unfortunately, *Mystical Languages of Unsaying* by Michael Sells containing two exquisite essays on Ibn al-'Arabi, apparently appeared in print too late to be included.

Elton A. Hall

Fundamental Symbols: The Universal Language of Sacred Science

By Rene Guenon. Translated by Alvin Moore, Jr., Compiled by M Valsan, and edited by Martin Lings. Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia, 1995. Pp. 369.20 diagrams. \$ 35.95, cloth; \$ 22.95, paper.

Even among those who have become interested in mythology and symbolism, it is too often forgotten that "myth," itself form the Greek mythos, is related etymologically to mystery and has to do precisely with the "Divine Mysteries," while "symbol" comes form the Greek verb symballein meaning to put together or bind, that is, to unite a thing with its origin. The French metaphysician and mathematician Rene Guenon stands as a beacon of light in guiding us to the understanding of symbols and in asserting with certitude the root of symbols in the immutable archetypes which are reflected on different levels of cosmic existence.

Despite the significance of so many of his works such as *The Crisis of the Modern World*, *The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Time*, and *The Symbolism of the Cross* (all published in English but now out of print),

Fundamental Symbols is perhaps the most important after *Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta* (which appeared in English in 1945 and is also no longer in print). As Martin Lings, himself the author of a major work on symbolism entitled *Symbol and Archetype*, states in his preface,

The universal language of symbolism is as old as humanity; and the light which Guenon throws on the intelligence and the intellectual unanimity of the ancient world is enough to dispel forever any lingering illusions about primitive man that we have subconsciously retained from our education.

In this work, Guenon not only speaks about various symbols which concern religion, art, the traditional sciences, and life itself, and in fact provide the language of both sacred art and sacred science, but also discusses the meaning of symbol in general. He demonstrates why symbols are rooted in the ontological reality of things, having their source in the noumenal and archetypal levels of reality rather than in the merely human or psychological.

In seventy-six chapters grouped into eight sections, Guenon deals with the metaphysical and cosmological meaning of symbols drawn from traditions as far apart as the Greek and the Buddhist, the Druid and the Islamic. The titles of the eight sections reveal the vast expanse of this seminal work: "Traditional Symbolism and Some of Its General Applications"; "Symbols of the Center and of the World"; "Symbols of Cyclic Manifestation"; "Some Symbolic Weapons"; "The Symbolism of the Forms of the Cosmos"; "The Symbolism of Building"; "Axial Symbolism and Symbolism of Passage"; and "The Symbolism of the Heart." This collection, assembled by M. Valsan after Guenon's death from his scattered essays, was published in the original French as *Symboles fondamentaux de la science sacree* (Paris: Gallimard, 1962). It is presented here for the first time in English, with the addition of two essays and the deletion of one from the French text. The English edition opens with a preface by Martin Lings, long-time friend and colleague of Guenon, on the significance of this book, and an introduction by another close associate of Guenon, W. N. Perry, on his life. It concludes with a list of the original sources of the essays, the bibliography of the books of Guenon, and a useful index.

Guenon's exposition of symbolism is a critique in depth of all those modernist writers who would reduce the symbol to an allegory, an agreed-upon image of a socially defined significance, or a reality of psychological origin emanating from the common historic experiences or collective unconscious of an ethnic or linguistic group. And, like other writings of Guenon, *Fundamental Symbols* is an exposition of metaphysical truths and a criticism of errors in the light of those truths.

The translation of this extensive work has been a real labor of love for both the translator, who has spent a lifetime in the study of Guenon's works, and the editor, himself one of the foremost traditional authors. The result is an English text reflecting the lucidity and clarity of the original French, qualities which characterize Guenon's writings in general. It is a major addition to the English corpus of his work, one that it is hoped will kindle enough interest to bring back into print many of Guenon's books rendered earlier into English but now unavailable.

In any case the translator and editor as well as the publishers are to be congratulated for making this work available in English. The hardcover edition of the book is well-printed with a handsome cover characteristic of the *Quinta Essentia* imprint. One only wishes that Dr. Lings could have dealt in greater length with Guenon's significance. Perhaps he will do so in a future work, in response to the need in the English-speaking world for the reassertion of the call of tradition in general and the teachings of Guenon in particular.

S. Hossein Nasr

Undlus Ki Islami Mirath Ed. (Urdu) Dr. Sahibzadah Sajidul Rahman, (Islamic Heritage of Spain), Publisher Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, 1996, pp. 790; Paperback; Price Rs. 300/-

The book is an attempt to understand the Islamic heritage of Spain. The topic is interesting not only for lay readers, but experts on history and politics as well as those who want to peep into the present Islamic revivalism

Granada where the Islamic culture flourished during the reign of Umayyads was a citadel of learning at the time of its fall (1492). The excellence of Spanish Muslims encompassed philosophy, history, poetry, literature, physics, chemistry, geography, medicine, mathematics and many other fields of knowledge. The greatness of Granada attracts, not only the curious Muslim, but even those enemies who brought about its collapse. This enlightenment travelled upto Italy, Germany, France and other countries of Europe and in sixteenth century matured into renaissance in Europe. Muslim Spain was a fraternal home not only for the rulers Muslims, but also the Christians and Jews who lived there in accordance with the dictates of their religions. A substantial compartment of Muslim scholarship in Qur'an, tafsir, hadith, fiqah, philosophy, kalam, mysticism, culture and civilisation owes authorship to Muslim luminaries from Spain.

The idea behind this book-was to refresh the Muslim Spain's memory. With this objective in mind, the Islamic Research Institute of the International Islamic University, Islamabad brought out a special number of its three quarterly journals - Urdu Fikr-o-Nazar, Arabic al-Dirasatul Islami and English Islamic Studies. The present compilation consists of the articles published in Fikr-o-Nazar in its April, December 1991 issue.

In introduction entitled 'Islam in Spain through the history', Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud has given a brief account of the pre-Muslim and post-Muslim era of Spain. He traces the history of Spain before Christ, its geographical boundaries, the dynastic rule of Qutiah kings and the dawn of Muslim era in 711 AD. Spain's Muslim identity lasted till January 3, 1492 when Sultan Abu Abdullah of Granada surrendered before Ferdinand. In Ferdinand's reign Morisco Muslims suffered immense torture and economic exploitation at the hands of Christian rulers. They were also forced to adopt Christianity. Morisco Yielded to this intimidation, but never compromised on their Islamic beliefs. In December 1568 Morisco organised a rebellion under the leadership of an 'alim Abdullah Muhammad bin Umayya (whose declared name was Farnando Walor). The uprising was crushed and some of the Moriscos migrated to Tunis, Rabat and Turkey. However, a small number of them continued presence in Spain. They were Christians outwardly, but Muslims from the core of their hearts. In his concluding remarks the author makes the following exposure of the contemporary scene in Spain:

Recently in Spain Islamic regeneration has dawned after restoration of religious and political freedoms, and contacts with the Muslim world. The local Muslim societies have managed to regain the control of some of the mosques. They have also attained political influence on various political parties. In Undlusia, Spain's southern province, this Islamic movement is specifically active. In that - province, the people tag Islamic posterity with their distinct cultural entity. (p. 20)

The book has articles analysing the contributions of Spanish Muslims in tafsir (Dr. Muhammad Tufail), hadith (Suhail Hasan), siyrah (Dr. Nisar Ahmad), fiqh (Muhammad Miyan Siddiqui), history (Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Azhar, Dr. Aminullah Vithar and Dr. Tufail Hashmi), literature (Dr. Ihsanul Haq, Dr. Khurshid Rizvi, Muhammad Shard Sialvi, Habibul Rahman Asim, Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Azhar and Dr. Rahim Bakhsh Shaheen), Iqbaliat (Dr. Muhammad Riaz, Dr. Mahmoodul Rahman), medicine (Hakim Naeemul din Zubairy), philosophy and kalam (Ubaidullah Qudsi), personalities (Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Syed Ali Asghar Chishti Sabri, Dr. Sayyid Ali Raza Naqvi and Professor Muhammad Saleem Shah), culture and civilisation (Dr. Ihtisham bin Hasan, Dr. Tufail Hashmi, Dr. Abdul Rahim Ashraf Baloch, Dr. Muhammad Akran and Muhammad Sajid Khan), and bibliography (Akhtar Rahi). It has preamble by Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari and preface by Dr. Sahibzadah Sajidul Rahman.

Broad theme of the contributions by scholars is the Islamic heritage of Spain. There is no single consistently pursued thesis. All articles are independent units and follow their distinct theses relevant to the area of their study.

The contributors have largely based their analysis on the original books mostly in Arabic, Translations and scholarly works in Urdu follow the Arabic sources in number, and last come the books in Persian and English.

The authors have successfully depicted their particular themes within the overall gambit of Islamic heritage of Spain. However, looked at from the critical angle the book suffers from a few handicaps, one of which is very serious. The focus of all the scholars is on the source material and analysis available in Arabic, Urdu and Persian works. There is almost complete black

out of the Western primary sources on the Islamic heritage of Spain. A big volume of books is available on the Muslim Spain in English and other European languages. George Muqaddasi and many other Western scholars are of the view that to understand the Muslim Spain is essential to understand the contemporary Europe, and the world at large. (pp. 27-8) The Western appreciation of this important development in the world history cannot be ignored. Secondly, without a comparative study, the real nature of the Islamic heritage of Spain cannot be visualised. In the present form the book's theme more appropriately conforms to the "Muslim version" only. It minimises the universality of the Muslim rule in Spain. Thirdly the source material cited from English sources is of very insignificant and secondary nature published in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (Dr. Nisar Ahmad pp. 158-162; Dr. Khurshid Rizvi pp. 334-338; Dr. Muhammad Riaz p. 498; Dr. Ihtisham bin Hasan pp. 660-661; Dr. Tufail Hashmi pp. 677-679 and Dr. Abdul Rahim Ashraf Baloch pp. 726-728). This modus-operandi is generally not encouraged in scholarly and research oriented works. The approach dominates not only the entire contributions, but even the article exclusively dealing with bibliographic information in the end (pp. 745-790). Apart from this, there is no index.

Besides above few shortcomings, the book is definitely a good • addition to the historical literature on the Muslim civilisation and culture. It reminds the reader of the greatness of the Muslims, when they ruled Spain. In his introduction Dr. Ansari writes that in Spain Christians are once again attracted to Islam. Muslim societies are being formed. Mosques are being built. With a small mosque in Granada near the historic Masjid-e-Qurtaba (now a Church), once again the call for prayer is being disseminated in the space of Spain. Dr. Khalid Masud points out the eagerness of the Western scholars to understand the Muslim Spain. An article dealing with this contemporary thinking added with the theme that why Muslims could not continue with that rich heritage, could have universalised this book.

Dr. Sayyid A.S. Pirzada

Prophet Muhammad and His Western Critics, (A Critique of We. Montgomery Watt and Others), Zafar Ali Qureshi, Idara Ma'arif Islami, Mansoor, Lahore, 1992, 2 Vols., pp. 1, 103.

For centuries orientalists in Europe and America have been engaged in the study of Islamic history and civilization in accordance with their own needs and aims. Since Islam is the only serious rival to its world supremacy the West has ever confronted, consequently, negative image of Islam has become an integral part of the cultural heritage of the West. Hence it is hardly surprising that Muhammad (peace be upon him) has been more maligned and denigrated than any other great man in history.

Montgomery Watt is prominent among these well-known orientalists. His two-volume biography: Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad in Madian, both written and published during the 1950's, has become a veritable orientalist classic upheld as an uncontested "authority" on the subject even at Pakistani colleges and universities.

Zafar Ali Qureshi, ex-Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies, Islamia College, Lahore, has arisen with a powerful pen and vast erudition to contest this "authority." Qureshi has evidently studied nearly every book in English about the Holy Prophet published during the last two centuries and effectively demolishes Watt's errors with copious quotations from western sources.

Typical of contemporary western scholars who refuse to acknowledge Muhammad (Upon whom be peace) as an authentic prophet of God and the Holy Qur'an as Divine revelation, Watt attributes the spectacular success of Islam to purely political, social and economic factors. He alleges that the majority of its followers were attracted to Islam due to worldly and materialistic motives: Although Watt is a clergyman as well as Professor, he does not write as a Christian but rather as a fervent adherent of Marxism.

In his Muhammad at Mecca, Watt plays down the persecution by the Quraish that, lasting for thirteen long years, it was so extraordinarily severe that during the three-year boycott, the Muslims nearly starved to death and at last the Holy Prophet was forced to flee from Mecca to Madina for his life. Watt says that the Holy Prophet, having stopped intertribal raiding, was

giving much "thought" to the economic basis of his system, thus the expansion of Islam into adjacent lands and the conquests of the Persian and Byzantine empires was done "to maintain the standard of living" and quest for loot and booty; Qureshi shows that the Arabs of the Prophet's time lived on camels and dates and that their lives were simple to the utmost austerity. Qureshi shows Watt's concern with their "standard of living" to be a ludicrous retrospection of present-day thinking to the distant past and a negation despite all evidence of Qur'an and Hadiths to the contrary of the spiritual role of the Holy Prophet's mission in history. Qureshi shows that the earliest Muslims were no "wild" bedu tribes driven by hunger and overpopulation to seek elbow room in the adjacent lands to the North but that Jihad was above all, spiritual, seeking the pleasure of Almighty Allah and eternal reward in Hereafter. Had Islam been only motivated by material factors, it could not have left a permanent religious or cultural impact

Qureshi also refutes the infamous "Satanic Verses" legend with which Watt and generations of his fellow orientalists have shamelessly used to denigrate the authenticity of Holy Qur'an and the Holy Prophet's mission or upholding and propagating Tawhid.

Unfortunately, the second half of Vol. II, which attacks the Bible, Judaism and Christianity, apparently having little 'coherent connection to the rest of the book, degenerates into futile apologetics and polemics. Qureshi unfavourably contrasts Muhammad upon whom be peace with Moses in the Bible and Jihad with the latter's horrible wars of extermination and genocide. Quoting from Sigmund Freud's Moses and Monotheism, he even casts doubt on the historicity of Moses and uses quotes from books of "Higher Criticism" to try to prove that the Bible is not Divine Revelation but only an ordinary book no better than other books full of errors. To quote atheists and renegades like Freud to attack the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West is outrageously unfair at the least - really "hitting below the belt", one must say. As Muslims we have no cause to gloat over the misfortunes of Christianity and the destruction of the spiritual tradition in the West, for the destruction of one religion leads to the destruction of others: the irreligiousness in the West cannot but adversely affect the rest of the world, including the Muslim world, to a catastrophic extent.

Qureishi's apologetics reach their height when he asserts that Islam is the parent of modern civilization without which there could have never been any Renaissance, Reformation, Age of Reason or even Industrial Revolution! Although Muslim scholars did preserve and hand on the classical Greek legacy to medieval Europe without doing any permanent damage to Islam, contemporary Muslim apologists are unique in all history in complaining about the immunity of their ancestors to a deadly virus. In the West, this same virus (the revival of the classical heritage of pagan antiquity) brought about the total destruction of traditional Christian civilization and the triumph of atheism, secularism and materialism. The much-praised "Renaissance" was really the resurrection of Greek and Roman paganism on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Since then Western civilization has taken a monstrous, abnormal course, being the only human culture known in all history based on denial of God and Hereafter. Instead of boasting of Islam's alleged contributions to this se-called "Renaissance", we Muslims should be fully aware that a terrible mistake was made and feel utmost sorrow and regret it ever happened.

While the first volume of this book is an eloquent refutation of Watt and fellow orientalist which should have ended there, regretfully the latter pages of vol. II are entirely irrelevant and ineffectual to Qureshi's basic task of rectifying their gross distortions of Seerat.

Maryam Jameelah

Epistemology - Theory of Knowledge by Archie J. Bahm. Published by Word Books, Ablurquerque, N.M. (U.S.A) Page svii + 261, 1995, price US \$ 15.00.

Archie J. Bahm hasn't put forward any far reaching theory in philosophy. Yet he is known, quite well one might say, for his introductory book on the subject. This book, though seems to have been written with precisely the view that he claims that he sets forth therein, will be fundamentally different from the 'usual' track this of course is a liberal generalisation of Western philosophers. On the back cover is a photograph of Prof. Bahm with a brief mention of 'five innovative claims'. These are:

- 1) Intuition is essential to knowing...

- 2) Mind is substantial...
- 3) Mind and body are not merely interdependent but are also mutually immanent.
- 4) Mind body mutual immanence results from "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"
- 5) All reasoning is strictly analogical...

The blurb also indicates that Prof. Bahm has incorporated influences from Indian and Chinese philosophies in the book. Quite appropriately, one is warned though not in such harsh terms that the book was intended as a companion volume to the author's METAPHYSICS AN INTRODUCTION, which was published twenty years earlier. Indeed, many of the claims that Prof. Bahm makes would perhaps make more sense were they to be read with his earlier book. Of his novel claims three in fact pertain to what is known in modern philosophy as metaphysics, though the proper term for that is ontology.

Be that as it may, the novelty of the claim if that at all, is only skin deep. The fact is that Prof. Bahm has taken certain key notions from traditional philosophy and transposed them to a totally modern setting. By modern, of course, we mean that which is a consequence of the Cartesian project. With such a transposition, illegitimate as it is, there is bound to be a grand mix-up. Let's take his five innovative claims, one by one:

(1) Intuition: There is no doubt that intuition is essential to knowing but this intuition is not just any sort of intuition Cartesian so called rational intuition is far removed from the nihilistic intuition in Nietzsche, based as it is in instinct, and these two are poles apart from the intellectual intuition envisaged in traditional philosophy²⁰⁰ More pertinently, intellectual intuition from the latter point of view is not merely a guide to 'awareness of appearance' but to quiddity itself. Neither is it limited to quiddity of objects.

²⁰⁰ On this see the many works of Reno Guenon, Frithjof Schuon but especially S. H. Nasr. The latter's, "The Need for a Sacred Science" (New York, Suny, 1993) is especially instructive. So is the following article in Al Tawhid Vol, IX No. 1, which adumbrates the point from the vantage point of Mulla Sadra's theosophy, 'The Unity of Aqil and Maqul'.

Depending upon the nature of the self having the intuition, the intuiting is an immediate guide to the nature of reality which by definition exceeds the merely human. One could go on in this way to highlight the differences and hence the shortcomings of his conception but this is not the place for it. Suffice it to say that this concept of Prof. Bahm has a striking resemblance to the Cartesian 'natural light of reason'²⁰¹

(2) Mind: The term, as Prof. Bahm uses it, is quasi-Cartesian. He then goes on to intermingle concepts from the pragmatic school to build up his theory of mind. It is clear that he is not aware of the psyche/spirit distinction as it exists in oriental schools of thought.²⁰² Not surprisingly then he is led to assign all psychic functions to the mind. What is most lacking in this account, given his claim that 'mind is substantial', is the total absence of an ontological description of that faculty. He completely skirts this issue by simply skipping on to the functions of the 'mental' faculty. Accounts of 'mind-body' interaction are equally superficial. This also leads him to the next obscure statement viz.,

(3) "Mind and body... are mutually immanent".

This is an uneasy mix of the Cartesian and the pragmatic. Having already claimed substantiality for 'mind' one searches in vain for a fuller statement of its ontology. Without this his account remains incomplete and superficial. Need one remind oneself of the myriad problems that Cartesian ontology has generated for western and westernised posterity. It might be objected that in a tract on epistemology such things are beside the point. But that precisely is the point. Bahm's claims are inexplicable without an ontological account
an extended one at that given that in today's sceptical thought climate these claims do need substantiation. The fact is that he does profess a sort of naive realism but then, apart from the misleading terminology hinted at earlier, there is nothing novel about realism. In fact, 'realism', wholistic realism at that, is the hallmark of every traditional philosophy which

²⁰¹ See, for instance, Desecrates, Rene, 'Meditation-IV'

²⁰² See, Guenon, Rene, "The Reign of Quantity & the Signs of the Times (Lahore, Suhail Academy, 1983)

conceives of the universe as a multi-levelled entity, not the bicameral one that Bahm makes it out to be.

As to logic, there is a dash of Hegel with a basically Aristotelian structure. One must commend him for admitting that logic follows from 'metaphysics' (read ontology) and is not something independent and objective.²⁰³

As with his account of logic, his whole presentation shows influences from the various schools of European thought ranging from Hegeleanism to existentialism and to the consequent true appraisal of science for what it is.

The reader is welcome to look upon this as an attempt at eclecticism, one of many in the western fold. It would, be a grave error to imagine that the author has even been able to attempt feebly a marriage of the two trends of thought, Eastern and Western. The gulf that separates the two is far too foundationally real to be bridged by facile attempts like these.

Javid Iqbal Amiri

Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr's,

University of California Press, U.S.A, 1995.

Mawdudi is one of the leading Islamic ideologues of the contemporary world. His thinking has had a profound influence on Islamists and their increasingly important discourse. The book by Nasr was published after his earlier well-received *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islam of Pakistan*. Although published later the book should be read before the *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution* and not after.

In the first part of the book Nasr has done an excellent job of tracing Mawdudi's career and the milieu that helped shape it. The predicament of Indian Muslims at the loss of their power and their peculiar circumstances

led to a number of responses. Revivalism was one such response. The uncertainty of the Muslim fate and the challenges faced by them in India had

a profound impact on many Indian Muslims, including Mawdudi.

His earlier writings are to be seen as largely "communalist" and as a "crusade for the preservation and propagation of Islam" which adds Nasr, "remained divorced from real political and social problems". The author adds that Mawdudi's "political views were formed in the abstract and had little to do with the political dynamics of the society to which they were meant to refer ... This apolitical approach to political thought and practice remained a mark of Mawdudi's movement and distinguished him from other revivalist leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini, who maintained a more accommodating approach to the Left and premised his ideas on the prevailing concerns of Iranian society". The remark is unwarranted and at best misplaced because Nasr later on does deal with Mawdudi attempt to politicize Islam. Just because Mawdudi does not agree with the so-called Left does not necessarily mean that he, unlike Khomeini, is any more less concerned with the affairs of his own society. Nasr points out interesting aspects of the development of Mawdudi's career and personality. One cannot but infer that Mawdudi had developed an earlier dislike for traditional Islam and the ulama establishment. He was confident of his own scholarship to the extent that he "had little patience for the restrictions of the institution of the ulama". Nasr quickly adds that "this castigation of the ulama was not free from the condescension that at least in part had emanated from the esteem in which he held his own familiarity with modern thought". Mawdudi's disenchantment with the ulama is well known and documented elsewhere also. It was this disillusionment that forced Mawdudi to chart his own course and even undergo a born-again type "conversion" to a new Islam. Mawdudi realized early on that the very enforcement of the famous Islamic injunction of "amr-ibi ma 'ruf wa nahy 'enl-munkar required the creation of a new party. It was only in 1937 that Mawdudi's revivalist "solution" and reconversion to Islam was stated in political terms, says the author. Nasr derides Mawdudi for his apparent personality and character flaws. For example, he points out that his marriage to a wealthy and liberal Mahmudah Begum "cast doubt on the extent of his commitment to the cause". Again, Mawdudi "allowed her greater latitude than he did Muslims in general". Nasr's biting remark follows. He

categorically declares that: "The standards that prevailed in his household were very different from the standards he required of others, including Jama'at members". The statement cannot be substantiated, however. Moreover, even if the allegation of double standard is correct it does not necessarily make Mawdudi a lesser scholar. Nasr does correctly point out that concept of tajdid required the establishment of a new party that would empower him and enhance his authority. "high opinion of his own abilities seemed to be confirmed by the approval with which his works were received". He finally founded the Jama'at-i Islami in August 1941. Nasr adds that "from the very beginning, it was the platform for Mawdudi'd ideas".

From here the author embarks on the more interesting part of the book pertaining to Pakistan.

Nasr says that in Pakistan the party was soon involved in politics. "Mawdudi became more and more a politician and less and less an ideologue and a scholar, and the Jama'at changed from a religious movement to a political party. The Pakistan years were therefore not a time of great intellectual activity for the Jama'at. In Pakistan, and the Jama'at would leave their mark as political actors". The statement is grossly exaggerated. A substantial part of Mawdudi's contribution was in Pakistan and the party itself perceived its primary role to be that of an intellectual movement. Perhaps it was later on, after the death of Mawdudi in 1979, that the Jama'at became more of a political party but certainly not during the early decades of Pakistan. sacrificed principle on the aegis of political pragmatism. President Ayub

Khan persecuted the party for its Islamic stands and the Jama'at reacted. Nasr points out that the party "even went as far as supporting the anti-Ayub candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah in the presidential elections of 1965, an endorsement that ran counter to Mawdudi's views on the social role of women". In this was severely castigated by some of the ulama. In the 1970 general elections the political hopes of the party were smacked when it won only four seats in the National Assembly and four in the Provincial Assemblies. The Jama'at joined the conflict in East Pakistan on the side of the government and tried to prevent East Pakistan from becoming Bangladesh. Nasr does not criticize the Jama'at for its role in thwarting democracy. A serious political mistake of the Jama'at has been ignored.

Nasr says that Mawdudi began having second thoughts about the Jama'at's political direction after the 1970 elections. "The party had lost its innocence and found itself in compromising moral dilemmas, most notably the rising number of violent incidents involving the Jama'at student wing.... In 1975, he advised the Jama'at shura to reassess the party's course of action and to opt out of politics, but by then the party was far too politicized to follow his counsel. By some accounts, Mawdudi was disappointed with what he had created". Nasr adds that Mawdudi confided to a friend that "when historians write of the Jama'at, they will say it was yet another tajdid movement that rose and fell." Although it is possible that Mawdudi was disenchanted with his party, especially the violence of the student wing, it does not seem probable that he really meant what he apparently did say. Most probably his remarks were made when he was in low spirits and need not be taken more than just that. After all, Mawdudi was not super human and his critics and biographers must be more charitable than what Nasr seems to be at this point. To the credit of Mawdudi and his Jama'at Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did admit in the end that they were the main forces opposing his rule.

On April 16, 1977 Bhutto even paid a visit to Mawdudi in Lahore. For this to happen was quite surprising given Bhutto's disdain for Mawdudi. The Jama'at did play a dominant role in ousting Bhutto from power. Nasr does not comment on Bhutto's tyrannical period of rule and his open antagonism with Islamist forces, including the Jama'at. The religious parties, including the Jama'at, were persecuted and subjugated by Bhutto. To their credit they stood their ground valiantly and opposed his socialist and liberal policies. Bhutto was a failure by all accounts and not only that of Islam. The readers of Nasr would expect him to point out this achievement of the Mawdudi and the Jama'at. A missed opportunity on part of the author.

Nasr says that General Zia ul-Haq sought Mawdudi's advice and counsel and accorded him the status of an elder statesman. Nasr writes that "Mawdudi proved receptive to Zia's overtures and supported his decision to execute Bhutto". It is well known fact that Bhutto was hanged on the decision of the Supreme Court after a lengthy trial in the Lahore High Court. Although the death sentence might not have been warranted but still it was the Court that executed Bhutto and not General Zia. Whether Mawdudi

agreed or disagreed becomes immaterial and its mention alludes to conspiracy which was certainly not the case. It is true that Mawdudi did support General Zia and saw in the military regime "access to power and more room to maneuver" and the plausibility of realizing the vision of an Islamic state. But Mawdudi did not live to see Zia's Islamization experiment becoming sour and the disillusionment it caused in the lama' at itself:

The second part of the book pertains to the -re-interpretation of Islam by Mawdudi. Nasr says that his views "involved a process of modernization, but under the guise and in the name of Islam". Nasr is correct to point out that this modernizing

impulse of Islamic revivalism is not only the use of modern gadgets but also includes institutions, values and idea. The author says that "Revivalists are not only moderns but modernists". Although Nasr did not say so but we can safely deduce that since Mawdudi is a revivalist therefore he is also a modernist. this is what Nasr would have us believe at this point. He continues to declare that Mawdudi did not hesitate to borrow from the West the very culture that he wanted to supplant by his own vision. He did this because he was "not all that firmly rooted in tradition and who was in addition enamored of the achievements of the West. Modernism was the path on which Muslims would be able to repeat the glories of the past". In Mawdudi'd view Islamic revival was essentially a political struggle that could succeed only if its modernizing impulse refashioned Muslim life and thought". Nasr is quite to the point in stating that "Mawdudi's ideal Islamic order was far more tolerant of western values, ideals, and institutions than his rejectionist rhetoric has suggested". The author notes and very correctly that: "This is an important aspect of contribution to contemporary Islamic thought because it sets him apart from those who wish to simply reform Islam". Nasr adds that "Mawdudi did not masquerade modern ideas behind an Islamic veneer; he interpreted and assimilated the foundations of modern thought and social organization into an essentially a new and integrated perspective". Nasr adds that Mawdudi" sought to appropriate modern scientific thought and Islamize it". Here Nasr adds that the "modernists wanted to modernize Islam whereas Mawdudi wanted to Islamize modernity. The distinction was enough to permit Mawdudi to inveigh against his modernist rivals". At this point it

becomes unclear whether Mawdudi himself is to be considered a modernist or not. Nasr had clearly implied that he be considered as one.

Nasr says that Mawdudi's views were essentially reductionist in nature. He wanted to resuscitate the Islamic faith as a mujaddid would. He talked about Islam as a complete system. Mawdudi wanted to "scientifically prove that Islam is eventually to emerge as the World-Religion to cure Man of all his maladies." Nasr correctly points out that Mawdudi's "scheme was holistic and all-inclusive; it began with the individual Muslim and culminated in a new universal order." "The pivot of Mawdudi's thought was tajdid "I le described his agenda in great detail and with the compelling logic of a scientific formula." For Mawdudi, says Nasr, the tajdid doctrine was not just a religious one but more significantly "as a historical paradigm to relate political exigencies to faith, mobilize Muslims, and, above all, claim the authority to reinterpret and rationalize the Islamic faith." Mawdudi's stress was not on theology but on social organization emanating from a correct comprehension of what God's supremacy really meant. Nasr writes that

Mawdudi wanted to divert man's attention away from individual salvation and concern with spirituality, which he viewed as narcissistic anthropomorphism and the reason mankind neglected the nature of his or her relation to God. For whereas theology and philosophy provided humans with knowledge of God and the working of the world for solace, the power of ideology lay in its capacity to organize and activate its adherents, thus producing organization and action. For Islam to produce social action it had to pose as ideology, which in turn demanded less attention to salvation and more to social action." This is one of the most important aspects of Mawdudi's thinking and Nasr has certainly been able to capture its essence. Mawdudi's emphasis on ideology is what differentiates him from others like the revivalist 'Tablighi Jama'at. How this' will happen is not clear.

Nasr continues to explicate Mawdudi's rendering of Islamic history. In his view "the history of Islam stopped with the rightly guided caliphs, for the social and political institutions were incapable of reflecting the ideals of Islam in any fashion. The revival of Islam, it followed must entail the total rejection of what came after the rightly guided caliphs and would be realized by reconstructing that period... In effect, the history of Islam would resume, after a fourteen-century interlude, with the' Islamic state." This view, Nasr

notes, has shaped the viewpoint of many revivalists. What is the relationship of politics with religion? Nasr correctly points out that "the inseparability of religion and politics has been a part of the teachings of all schools of Islamic law and theology; however it has not necessarily been maintained in Islamic history. "throughout its course, institutions have been based on the de facto separation of religious and political authority." 'F he revivalist agenda, says Nasr, is "the transformation of the old into the new and of faith into politics". Simple as that."The differentiated meaning of history between Mawdudi and other traditionalists has been well explained by

Nasr. For Mawdudi the Islamic Prophet was" not only the ideal Muslim or a hallowed subject of religious devotion, but the first and foremost Muslim political leader and, hence, a source of emulation in political matters. It was this appropriation of the fundamental sources of Islam and a single-minded reinterpretation of their role within the framework of the Islamic faith that permitted Mawdudi to extend personal piety into a quest for political power. Politicization of Faith could only follow its rationalization, however." Well put, indeed.

His detractors accused Mawdudi of going over board in the direction of Islam's social dimension at the cost of personal faith. Nasr does point out that Abu'I-Hasan Ali Nadvi, a renowned scholar, emphasized that the establishment of a theocracy was "at best only a means to the higher end". Nadvi criticized

Mawdudi for his use of the, term iqamat-i din - the Islamic order -as covering only the social dimension of Islam. This view, according to Nasr was acknowledgment of the Tablighi Jama'at's apolitical work. Nasr does seem to suggest that the view was not wholly accurate. He says that: "Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini or Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi did not argue exclusively for a utopian order in this world; he was more directly concerned with salvation... This meant backtracking on, although not renouncing, his earlier position. The result of this contradictory posturing was to confuse the aim of his ideology and to check the chiliastic and revolutionary tendency of his formulation. Muslims should not be disheartened if their revolution (lid not materialize. Mawdudi wrote on occasion, for they would be rewarded in the hereafter." This, among other things, explains the Jama'at's ambivalent attitude toward revolution, says Nasr. Mawdudi, in practice stayed away from

revolutionary activism. Nasr is quite right to note that his "harangues" against the political order never went beyond "expressions of dissent and were never systematized into a coherent revolutionary worldview... When pressed to define Islamic revolution, it was of evolution, rather than revolution, that he spoke."

Mawdudi wrote extensively on the theme of the Islamic state. He thought that it was indispensable for Islam itself: Nothing more could be truer. Thus, Mawdudi is one of the trailblazers of the contemporary Islamist movement.

Nasr puts it brilliantly: Without political power, concluded Mawdudi, true Islam would remain only an ideal, forever threatened with annihilation. The Islamic state could not be only a utopian order - the end result of Islamization --it had to be the beginning of Islamization, the guarantor and harbinger of the entire process. This politicized Mawdudi and the Jama'at more completely.. Mawdudi retorted that the activities of the Jama'at had no meaning outside of politics and that politics was the logical end of the Jama'at's activities. Politically, he declared, was not merely a means to an end but the end itself. As politics came to be the *raison d'être* for the Jama'at, the concept of an Islamic state found new meaning... In the final analysis, the Islamic state was

not merely a means of creating an Islamic order of life, but a model for perfect government with universal application - political end for a political movement. In this light, the political teachings of Islam and, subsequently, the Islamization of politics would have to be implemented, even through coercion. This argument extended the discussion of the Islamic state further: If politics were to be subject to religious values, then religion could only be understood in light of politics. Islamization of politics in a logical continuum led to the politicization of Islam... In Islam the religious, the political, the economic, and the social are not separate systems; they are different departments and the parts of the same system."

What was Mawdudi's Islamic state like? Nasr maintains that Mawdudi's debate with the Western political thought is belligerent, but it also "assimilated Western ideas into his interpretation of Islam and the Islamic state. Mawdudi was not influenced with liberal values but only with a

mechanism for promoting and protecting an Islamic order, says Nasr. He adds: "Whether or not the state would be a democracy was a later development, the inevitable outcome of his debate with Western political thought and the Jama'at's involvement in electoral politics in Pakistan". Nasr correctly points out that the nature of Mawdudi's Islamic state is ahistorical and idealist in essence.

In Mawdudi's thought democracy was "merely an adjective used to define the otherwise undefinable virtues of the Islamic state". He used the term because it had positive connotations. His critics did point out authoritarian tendencies implicit in his vision of the Islamic state. In his quest to attract educated people to his cause Mawdudi made the "concession" of democracy to them but not out of conviction. In Mawdudi's view the Islamic state would itself exercise ijihad which had been the domain of the ulama. Nasr writes that Mawdudi's Islamic state was "given shape through the use of unmistakably Western terminology and theoretical constructs. It was seemingly Islamic system that was in fact premised on modernising ethos. The issue of the absolute sovereignty of God aside, Mawdudi's assimilation of Western issues in his discourse flowed without interruption. The Islamic state duplicated, assimilated, and reproduced Western political concepts, structures, and operations, producing a theory of statecraft that, save for its name and its use of Islamic terms and symbols, showed little indigenous influence. The synthesis, although systematic and consistent in its method, was not always free of theoretical inconsistencies and operational handicaps". Nasr is not the first scholar who has complained of inconsistency in Mawdudi's thought but he seems to be one who does not fully appreciate his original indigenous Islamic contribution. We would hope that it be recognized in a much more positive manner. Nasr is at pains to explain to his reader that Mawdudi does not really understand contemporary Western democracy. Mawdudi Failed because he "understood democracy in parts, rather than as a whole, as a concession by the state and not as a system". Mawdudi has been rightly criticized by Nasr for having somewhat skirted the issue of human rights. Nasr writes that Mawdudi maintained that Islam in its pure form could never support despotic rule because by its very nature it was attuned to the needs of man and was the best guarantor of his rights. The human rights people in the West had to fight for, Mawdudi argued, already existed in the shari'ah. The

advent of Islamic state would resolve rather than generate the problem of guaranteeing human rights. Mawdudi's apologetics does not seem convincing and Nasr seems to be right on the point in saying that Mawdudi's Islamic state was democratic because its strengths could be best described by that term. In essence his Islamic state remained at odds with democracy. The inconsistency of the Jama'at's internal and external conduct is clear on the issue of elections. Inside the party there are no candidates but outside the party does field them in the general elections. Nasr says that the discrepancy "is just one example of the distinction Mawdudi was forced to make between the tenets of the Islamic state and actions permissible during the struggle to achieve it. It also underscores once again the difficulties of accommodating democracy in such a state". Nasr seems to have got it right this time.

Mawdudi's Islamic state was not prominently based on any system of checks-and-balances. Resultantly, the state is subject to discord and has no viable method to solve the dissension. Nasr maintains that in Mawdudi's Islamic state "the *din* was the only glue that bound the otherwise fragile structure of the state together". Nasr is right to point out that for Mawdudi, unlike Khomeini, Islamization of society preceded the Islamic state. This cause much confusion about the aims of the Jama'at "because participation in politics meant that the Jama'at sought to establish the Islamic state before the Islamization of the society", says Nasr. Mawdudi's orientation was essentially authoritarian. Allegiance to the Islamic ideology of the state "could be used to augment the powers of the executive and limit those of the legislature".

The question to be asked is whether Mawdudi was correct or not in his interpretation of the Islamic state? Nasr seems to suggest that Mawdudi was erring in his authoritarian tendencies. Later on Mawdudi, says Nasr, became suspect of the centralization of power in the executive branch. He gave greater scope to citizens rights which was in contrast to his earlier writings where he expected greater obedience from the subjects.

Whether the Islamic state is democratic or authoritarian is debatable. The evidence would suggest that the real Islamic state in its basic essence is not democratic in the way democracy is understood and practiced say in Western Europe and the USA. Meaning that Mawdudi may he was not all that wrong in his authoritarian proclivities.

Nasr is right to point out that Mawdudi was a gradualist and believed in evolution rather than revolution. The author correctly points out the main weakness of the Jama'at - lack of a populist ideology. The Jama'at made "no effort to respond to the demands of the underprivileged, whose problems would advent of Islamic state would resolve rather than generate the problem of guaranteeing human rights. Mawdudi's apologetics does not seem convincing and Nasr seems to be right on the point in saying that Mawdudi's Islamic state was democratic because its strengths could be best described by that term. In essence his Islamic state remained at odds with democracy. The inconsistency of the Jama'at's internal and external conduct is clear on the issue of elections. Inside the party-there are no candidates but outside it the party does field them in the general elections. Nasr says that the discrepancy "is just one example of the distinction Mawdudi was forced to make between the tenets of the Islamic state and actions permissible (luring the struggle to achieve it. It also underscores once again the difficulties of accommodating democracy in such a state". Nasr seems to have got it right this time.

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Nasr then narrates how Jama'at has been pushed back into traditional Islam but is adamant in creating some distance from it so that it can pass off as a vanguard of the Islamic revolution. The current leadership and policies of the Jama'at are ample proof of this setback. The Jama'at remains the best organized cadre party in Pakistan but is not expected to gain much politically.

In the book Nasr narrates some information that would have us believe that Mawdudi had a personal character flaw. He thought too much of himself and his abilities. His disciples called him a mujadid and one even referred to him as an Imam. He never liked disagreement in his circles. People were free to ask questions but not debate with the great scholar. It is not by chance that Mawdudi was not followed by a scholar of some ranking. May be Mawdudi's personality did not allow it to happen. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the book it is still an excellent effort. Nasr's account of Mawdudi's thinking is definitely eloquent and readable. The work is well researched and can certainly be counted among the best few on the subject. Along with the second hook, Nasr has made a sizable contribution of our understanding of an important part of Mawdudi is one of the leading Islamic ideologues of the contemporary world. His thinking has had a profound influence on Islamists and their increasingly important discourse. The book by Nasr was published after his earlier well-received 'The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution.' The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan. Although published

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On April 16, 1977 Bhutto even paid a visit to Mawdudi in Lahore. For this happen was Pakistani politics. I would unhesitatingly recommend the book for all students of Pakistani politics and that of Islam.

Dr. Sohail Mahmud