A Relational Response to Seyyed Hossein Nasr's Critique of Iqbal's Reconstruction

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ABSTRACT

Seyyed Hossein Nasr is best understood, in terms of his philosophical orientation, as a leading proponent of the Traditionalist school, a religious rendition of the *philosophia perennis* movement, which posits that a perennial philosophy has been manifest throughout all the philosophical investigations of mankind. It is interesting to note that if Nasr and Iqbal were read with an eye towards their overarching authorial concerns, their thematic interests and to some degree their creative, literary expression, one would find affinities. Both are unmistakably concerned about the dire situation of religious thought in the contemporary world, and offer their respective diagnosis and remedies. Perhaps the mark of a truly subtle genius is that more insights reside in *how* he thinks, rather than *what* he thinks about. Iqbal is such a mind, and we have to significantly re-evaluate our interpretative paradigms to begin to unlock his *Reconstruction.* In the field of contemporary Iqbal studies, we should now look beyond familiar discussions of Iqbal's thematic broadness, his religious zeal, and his appropriation of Western philosophy, to investigate all of these afresh, not merely in light of propositional reasoning but of the Iqbalian method. This paper provides preliminary attempt into this investigation, but doubtless, more comprehensive studies of a similar nature, and on a wider range of themes, are required.

Despite many challenges having been posed to the perceived mutual exclusivity of the categories "Islam" and "West", (some notable ones being Edward Said's post-colonial breakthrough[1] in the 20th and T. J. Winter's nuanced re-appraisal[2] in the 21st century, respectively), the dichotomy "between the Self and the Other" endures robustly. Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis not only survives amongst prominent intellectuals in the contemporary "West", but continues to be enacted by a segment of its policy-makers. This stance is then mirrored in the Muslim world, by violent factions who see "the West" as the embodiment of hedonism and corruption and Islam as the bastion of purity and righteousness. It has already been noted that at the heart of such an ossifying Western Self/ Islamic Other dichotomy, or vice versa, lies a specific approach to reasoning which conflates duality with contradiction and divergence with conflict, by extending the "modern propositional model of reasoning...beyond its proper domain."[3] Thus, there is no dearth of arguments, opinions, and analyses regarding that complex matrix which "the contemporary Islam-West encounter"[4] has become. And yet, in spite of the familiar nature of "Islam-West" debates, one text which continues to provide fresh insights is Iqbal's major philosophical work of prose, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Indeed, Iqbal's work engenders polarized reactions from contemporary scholars of religion. While, for some, it illustrates that few other religious thinkers have "met the challenges of modernity as successfully" as Iqbal,[5] for others, it appears a "juxtaposition of contradictions"[6] and an "apologetic defense of Islam and the accommodation of modernity" at the cost of a stark departure from the Islamic tradition.[7] Therefore, it has been a challenging task for the field of Iqbal Studies to locate with precision Iqbal's *Reconstruction* within this complex "Islam-West"[8] intersection. Given the sheer multiplicity of responses evoked by *The Reconstruction*, an exhaustive and definitive investigation into Iqbal's bearings within the Islam-West encounter is beyond the scope of one article, and perhaps even impossible. A more humble exercise, which this paper attempts, is to address one of the more polemical critiques of Iqbal articulated by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and then allow for *The Reconstruction* to respond to this critique. Nasr's influence on the contemporary study of Islam is widespread, for he has long been acknowledged as "the foremost

living member of the traditionalist school and…a leading spokesman for Islam not only in North America but also world-wide", e.g. by William C. Chittick.[9] As such, generating a dialogue centred on Nasr's basic criticism[10] of Iqbal becomes a duty of contemporary Iqbalian scholarship. However, it would be inadequate to simplistically sketch a point-by-point rebuttal of Nasr's critique, or to reduce either Nasr or Iqbal's complex ideas to a deterministic "answer" on what comprises "Islam" or "the West." Rather, we must acknowledge that both are comprehensive thinkers who can be compared via multiple different paradigms, all of which are classifiable under this "Islam-West encounter"; from literary approaches that compare Nasr and Iqbal's views on classical Persian poetry[11] to the two thinkers' differing geo-political and historical contexts.[12] As such, there is the need for a specific interpretative framework to initiate our discussion. Such a framework can be found in the "scriptural reasoning"[13] of contemporary religious scholar, Peter Ochs. Ochs has highlighted at least two different models of reasoning relevant to our comparison: propositional logic and relational logic. We will develop Ochs' descriptive context in order to address Nasr's critique of Iqbal's *Reconstruction*. More specifically, we will compare Nasr and Iqbal's differing approaches to reasoning about binaries; the purported binaries of sacred/profane, Islam/modernism and Self/Other which characterize much of the thematic discussion in the "Islam-West" encounter. By "reasoning" I mean not an elaborately enunciated system of mathematical, formal logic (for neither Iqbal nor Nasr are logicians in the technical sense), but an *approach to thinking,* a broader and more general description of logical "patterns or rules that can be seen or imitated".[14] In this sense, we will be comparing the logical *context,* the logical *ethos* of these thinkers rather than the strict logical validity of their conclusions from their premises. Ultimately, by employing Ochs' logical descriptions, this paper will show how Nasr's basic criticism that Iqbal is "apologetic of Islam" and unduly accommodative of modernity, stems from Nasr's choice of a propositional model of reasoning regarding the aforementioned Islam-West binaries, while Iqbal looks beyond a propositional logical model to a more relational mode of reasoning.

What is the need for an external, descriptive model in comparing Nasr or Iqbal, when neither of these thinkers is ostensibly or primarily concerned with logical models *per se*? At first glance, it may seem like we are grafting artificial criteria upon religious thinkers, but a deeper look reveals organic affinities. In fact, Ochs' association with *The Reconstruction* contributed significantly to the practice of

"scriptural reasoning: [a] way of studying Abrahamic scriptures" for salutary effect upon "the ills of modern academic thought." [15] Ochs has already made the recognition that *The Reconstruction* is more a "reparative theology" than a formal system of "reparative logics" such as those of "Charles Sanders Peirce, the American pragmatist whose work in the philosophy of science preceded Iqbal by half a century."[16] Elsewhere, scholars have corroborated this recognition with the view that to see *The Reconstruction* strictly as a "system guided by formal logic" is an approach "beset with all kinds of problems."[17] Although Ochs and Noman-ul-Haq both agree on the primarily "liturgical"[18] and "metaphysical"[19] nature of Iqbal's concerns in *The Reconstruction*, their responses to this common recognition are sharply contrasted. For Noman-ul-Haq, this makes Iqbal's work, despite its author's "noble ambitions" and "invaluable concerns", burdened by; a "speculative edifice", "heavy metaphysical construct", an "idiosyncratic manner" of "recasting sources", and a "poetic fix."[20] Ochs offers a more sympathetic reading of *The Reconstruction* as a work "presented in developmental stages, so that the discourse offered in the early chapters presupposes a form of cognition and reception that will not be presupposed in the latter chapters."[21] Although Iqbal's primary concern is indeed a "liturgical" one, Ochs also sees *The Reconstruction* as a text which gradually calls our attention to "the limits of propositional science, warns gently of the dangers of overstepping them and concludes by introducing the remedy for overstepping: prayer itself". In Ochs' view, Iqbal then *directs* us to a "post-propositional" approach to reasoning, and gives us the lesson that "the reasoning that will guide us" in search for knowledge is not merely propositional but "relational, personal, interrogative, and probative."[22] Therefore, Ochs' invaluable contribution in reading Iqbal is to show us that we may need to expand our *own* vision of logical models in order to benefit from some significant insights of *The Reconstruction.* "The error is not, therefore, to trust in formal reasoning and thus logic, but simply to have nurtured too limited a view of how to practice formal reasoning and of what logical models we can build."[23]

However, the most compelling reason to employ Ochs' descriptive framework in understanding Nasr's critique of Iqbal is not just Ochs' degree of affinity with Iqbal, or his appreciation of those facets of *The Reconstruction* that have been less well noted by many Muslim scholars. Rather, the utility of Ochs' logical descriptions is based on their general and assimilative nature. In fact, Ochs identifies the roots of a need for post-propositional logic, in a domain *outside* of scripture: "As physicists, philosophers, and

logicians have learned since early twentieth-century discoveries in quantum theory, standard propositional logics are useful for mapping only a limited range of behaviors and beliefs. In briefest terms, one could say that they are useful for mapping only those things about which we have potentially little or no doubt."[24] Thus, the search for an alternate system of logics is not only a scriptural but a civilizational and scientific search. Notwithstanding their basis in scriptural reading, this makes Ochs' findings immensely useful as a way of addressing almost any dichotomization of concepts or propositions that involves reasoning.

What precisely is this framework, and how does Ochs distinguish between "propositional" and "relational" logic? Most simply, propositional logic is characterized by an "either this or that" approach. It "maps out" only "determinate values" i.e., those propositions or claims which are either certain or beyond reasonable doubt.[25] Thus, a propositional logic "requires all-or-nothing judgments (obeying the law of excluded middle as well as the principle of non-contradiction)."[26] If one claim is true, then the negation of its "opposite" is entailed. In such a method of reasoning, self-affirmation then becomes equivalent to the negation of all that which is defined as "other". Propositional logics, resultantly, have a tendency to make divergent claims *compete* for veracity, since the certainty of any one claim is guaranteed (or near-guaranteed).

By contrast, "relational logics" present themselves as an alternative to the rigidity of propositional logic. This alternative is necessitated because of the uncertain and "context-bound" nature of many propositions, and because an exploration of reality requires one to step outside of that "finite set" which consists only of very certain claims. Although Ochs suggests many such alternative "relational logics", ranging from "what the philosopher Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953) called a "three-valued logic" to "Charles Peirce's "logic of relations" ",[27] he also identifies for us the crucial feature of any relational logic: "its characterization of a given practice of reasoning will include a characterization of context."[28] Thus, any proposition or claim *will* be "context-bound"[29] in a relational mode of reasoning i.e. it will make context inextricable from meaning, and inseparably bound to it. In this way, a logic of relations is characterized by a very different *ethos* from propositional logic. Relational reasoning requires a humbling acknowledgment, on part of the proposition-maker, that their claim is tied to their individual, finite entity or context. This further leads to the recognition that multiple, possibly "nonfinite", "readings" of the same subject are possible. However, these recognitions do not compromise the force

of any individual reading or claim, nor blur its "specificity and authority".[30] Rather, they show us that "[m]eaning and truth are relational (relative to conditions) but not relativistic (arbitrary or strictly subjective)."[31] Relational reasoning thus opens up the space for dialogue between two perceived binaries, because in allowing for the "characterization of context", it enables a multiplicity of readings to engage, and enrich their own "context-bound" claims by interaction with others. By contrast, propositional forms of reasoning tend towards a static dichotomy, because the absence of a contextual grounding leads each reading to claim absolute or near-absolute certainty. Such a claim does not accommodate input, change or repair from any divergent reading/interpretation.

It is pertinent to point out, before we turn to a description of Nasr's critique of Iqbal, that we are not seeking to make value-judgments about one form of reasoning versus the other. The aim is not to disparage propositional forms of reasoning, which indeed prove very useful in "bringing a finite set of judgments to our self-awareness."[32] It is to show that propositional reasoning is applicable within a "finite set", which comprises of "judgments of certainty"[33], and that it has difficulty in mapping out less certain, and more "context-bound" claims. While propositional forms of reasoning are less conducive to dialogue than relational reasoning, not all thinkers esteem the need for an "Islam-West" dialogue as highly as others. In fact, some thinkers may prefer sustained dichotomy over dialogue, irrespective of the costs. This is why T. J. Winter can conclude: "Grounded in our stubbornly immobile liturgy and doctrine, we Ishmaelites should serve the invaluable, though deeply resented, function of a culture which would like to be an Other, even if that is no longer quite possible."[34] Thus, I am not presenting relational reasoning as intrinsically superior, but as an alternative and a choice that is more useful in mapping out claims which are cognizant of context, multiplicity and dynamism. Nor is it within the scope of this paper to give a detailed account of the scriptural context in which Ochs distinguishes propositional and relational reasoning. Sufficient for our purposes, as we have done above, is to sketch an idea of the basic attributes which characterize these two approaches to reasoning. A propositional mode will make claims of certainty minus context, entail negation of the "other" in self-affirmation, and lead to a static dichotomy when two opposing claims arise. A relational mode will ground claims in contexts, allow for exploration of the context of a seemingly opposing claim, and then open up space for relational dialogue. As we look at the ways in which Nasr and Iqbal approach the sacred/profane and Islam/modernism binary, we will

keep these attributes in mind to judge whether their approaches are relational or propositional. We turn, first, to elucidate the basic features of Nasr's thought, and then to understand how these lead to his critique of Iqbal.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr is best understood, in terms of his philosophical orientation, as a "leading proponent of the Traditionalist school, a religious rendition of the *philosophia perennis* movement, which posits that a perennial philosophy has been manifest throughout all the philosophical investigations of mankind."[35] In *Knowledge and the Sacred,* Nasr expounds on the various shades of meaning in which he understands "tradition"; it "is inextricably related to revelation and religion, to the sacred, to the notion of orthodoxy, to authority, to the continuity and regularity of transmission of truth, to the exoteric and the esoteric as well as to the spiritual life, science and arts"[36] and is, therefore, a broad concept. However, despite the comprehensive nature of "tradition", Nasr also defines the term "in its technical sense"[37] as "truths or principles of a divine origin" and "in fact, a whole cosmic sector" which "bind[s] man to his divine "Origin" and "Source".[38] We may infer, from this "technical" definition that Nasr does not just understand "tradition" as a mere custom or practice, but as a cosmology which contains "divine truths". In fact, these "divine truths" are not only *contained* within "tradition", but are *the* "Primordial Tradition or Tradition" i.e. the "*Sophia perrenis*" or "one single truth" which is manifested differently in "the plurality of religions".[39] Crucially, Nasr not only believes that tradition is "closely wed…to the sacred"[40] but that "the sacred" itself is "that Reality which is immutable and eternal"; and, in the Aristotelian epithet, "the Unmoved Mover". Nasr emphasizes this primacy and immutability of the sacred in many ways; he cherishes "traditional civilizations" whose "function…may be said to be nothing other than creating a world dominated by the sacred"[41] and in which "[t]here is no domain of reality which has a right to existence outside the traditional principles and their applications". Likewise, "traditional authority remains inseparable from the meaning of tradition itself"; "[i]ntellectual and spiritual authority is inseparable from that reality which is tradition and authentic traditional writings always possess an innate quality of authority".[42] Hence "tradition", "which is by nature concerned with the sacred and is the means par excellence of gaining access to the sacred", "the Immutable and the Eternal",[43] "also governs the domains of art and science"[44] and therefore has hold over those facets of life which may not be ostensibly "religious" or "traditional".

Naturally, Nasr's "perspective of the traditional and the sacred" also shapes his view of "the profane."[45] He cleaves the "sacred" and the "profane" into two separate, and unequal, levels of reality. Hence, the "sacred" is that which "ultimately alone *is* while the desacralized, profane, or secular only *appears* to be."[46] Even if we do not challenge the problematic clustering of the terms "desacralized, profane or secular" as if they were roughly equivalent, we may still note how the profane is relegated to a lesser level of existence than the sacred. Nasr articulates this same judgment elsewhere, when he wonders how "an Italian by the name of Galileo, who also beheld the beauty of [natural] sites, could reduce nature to matter in motion and the beauty of nature to an irrelevant category and yet become not only a national hero, but the hero of a whole civilization."[47] Here, the scientific observation of "matter in motion" is being perceived as a form of "desecration", a reductionism, and a "loss of sacred knowledge."[48] While Nasr does believe that tradition should "govern the domains of art and science" the probability of "the profane" reciprocally informing *tradition* with a novel and valuable insight is far less likely. Thus, the "modern man" creates "unprecedented havoc over the globe", because there is "no higher knowledge to set a limit upon his profane knowledge of the world."[49]

We must note first how Nasr's account of the sacred/profane binary contains valuable insights. This account is not simplistic, and one could hardly challenge his accurate assessment of the "unprecedented" ecological havoc that has been wreaked by the advent of new scientific technologies. His concern to redress these damages is noble. However, it is equally clear that he *cleaves* the sacred and profane into two sharply distinct categories. The sacred "ultimately" is real, "immutable", "eternal" and unchanging, with no room for evolution, let alone repair. By contrast, the profane only appears real, is changing and ephemeral and needs to be "limited" by the sacred, lest it devolves into "unprecedented havoc", or reduces the sacred beauty of nature to "mere matter." Clearly, Nasr envisions not a mutually informing dialogue between the material and transcendent, but a guardianship of the former by the latter. As such, we see a static hierarchy in his account of the "sacred/profane" binary, since the certainty and immutability of "the sacred" prevent the admission of any novel insight from the empirical world. There is a sharp discontinuity between what "ultimately is" and what "only appears to be", which parallels the "either/or" arrangement of binary values in propositional forms of reasoning. Elsewhere, sociologist Ali Zaidi has praised Nasr's informed critique of "scientism" i.e. "the extension of modern scientific reasoning beyond its legitimate

boundaries."[50] Thus, we see that Nasr is cognizant of the inapplicability of binary modes of reasoning to all domains of thought. And yet, the cleft, hierarchy and dichotomization which characterize his view of the sacred and profane, all illustrate a propositional form of reasoning, and seem to belie the fact that Nasr had made such a subtle realization. May we say that he is extending this propositional reasoning beyond its proper domain, by cleaving the sacred and profane apart and establishing the sacred in a position of ascendancy? If we examine Nasr's view of another perceived binary i.e. Islam/modernism, then it will become clearer that the dichotomization is not arbitrary, but sustained.

Nasr's Traditionalism also shapes his definition of "modernism", which he could not be more unequivocal in identifying as that which is "contrasted with tradition"; "that which is cut off from the transcendent, from the immutable principles that in reality govern all things and that are made known to man through revelation in its most universal sense."[51] He articulates his view of the stark incompatibility of Islam and "modern thought" in very clear terms:

The characteristics of modern thought… namely, its anthropomorphic and by extension secular nature, the lack of metaphysical principles in various branches of modern thought, and the reductionism that is related to it and that is most evident in the realm of the sciences, are obviously in total opposition to the tenets of Islamic thought, as the modern conception of man from whom issue these thought patterns is opposed to the Islamic conception.[52]

As Nasr's claim of "modern thought" being in fundamental "opposition" to "the tenets of Islamic thought" is a strong one, it is pertinent to ask whether such a claim precludes, for him, any possibility of a fruitful encounter between Islam and "the West"? Nasr *does*, in fact, believe in the possibility of "the successful encounter of Islam with modern thought",[53] but most pertinent are the singular terms on which he believes such engagement must occur. Thus, a productive Islam-West encounter "can only come about when modern thought is fully understood in both its roots and ramifications by means of the principles of Islamic thought, and the whole of the Islamic intellectual tradition", is "brought to bear upon the solution of the enormous problems that modernism and postmodernism pose for Islam."[54] In other words, the Islam-West encounter must begin from an understanding of modernity through Islam, and its aim should be the rectification of "modernism" as per a diagnosis of the "enormous" ills of modernity based on "Islamic principles." Insofar as "modernity" is viewed from the lens of "the Islamic intellectual tradition", Nasr sees the possibility of a reparative

action, a "bearing upon" *on* the former, by the latter. However, this is only one side of the coin. In exploring his visualization of a productive Islam-West engagement, we must also ask: Does Nasr's outlook allow for the *possibility* of reparative feedback in the *opposite* direction i.e. the "principles of modernity" providing a diagnosis of contemporary Islam and potentially rectifying the latter's ailments?

Firstly, it is important to note that Nasr would probably not corroborate any articulation such as "contemporary Islam", since for him the sacred is both "immutable" and "eternal" ", and "that *hikmah* or *haqiqah*, that lies at the heart of the Islamic revelation" and, by derivation, "intellectual tradition", "will remain valid as long as human beings remain human beings". In less ambiguous terms; "Islam cannot even carry out a dialogue with the secular on an equal footing by placing it in a position of legitimacy equal to that of religion." Clearly, Nasr's sustained emphasis is on "the primacy of the sacred", as that which "ultimately alone *is* while the desacralized, profane, or secular only *appears* to be." Thus, Nasr relegates the "profane", worldly, or human, as opposed to the sacred or divine realm, to a less significant level of reality; a mere "appearance". For this reason, Islam must recognize its own "primacy of the sacred" and "face the secular with full awareness of what it [the secular] is, namely, the negation and denial of the sacred." Hence, the possibility of an Islam in need of repair is clearly non-existent for Nasr, let alone that of a perceived "assault of modern thought upon the citadel of Islam." In fact, it is "modernism and postmodernism" that must allow "Islam" to rectify their ailments without reciprocity. Nasr makes an accurate appraisal: "The reductionism that is one of the characteristics of modern thought has itself affected Islam in its confrontation with modernism." He identifies this reductionism as the conflation of "*Shariah"* with "Islam"[55]; the mistaking of part for the (Islamic) whole. However, we may expand Nasr's own recognition by noting that reductionism is not necessarily a feature of content, but of *method.* Nasr's claim that modernistic and Islamic thought are fundamentally opposed also reveals a method of thinking that stems from reductive, propositional reasoning. It does not allow for a multiplicity of readings of either "Islam" or "modernism", both of which are arranged as two fixed, static binaries. While he does allow for the differences in "various branches of modern thought", Nasr considers them all united in that they are "in total opposition to the tenets of Islamic thought". This multiplicity is being acknowledged, but simultaneously reduced to an insignificant factor which has no bearing on modernism's inimical relationship to Islam. Hence, we see an "either/or" dichotomy which

persists even in the face of multiplicity and precludes mutually reparative dialogue.

Secondly, Nasr is less hopeful of any real, beneficial good *emerging from* modernism than from tradition. This does not mean that Nasr's Traditionalism denies the existence of any good in modernism: "[I]t does not neglect the fact that some element of a particular modern philosophical system or some modern institution may possess a positive feature or be good."[56] Rather, "one could say that the traditional worlds were essentially good and accidentally evil, and the modern world is essentially evil and accidentally good."[57] We must note the depth of Nasr's claim. He is not merely stating that "tradition" and "modernism" have some incompatible features, but that they are fundamentally opposed in their context and origins: "What tradition criticizes in the modern world is the total world view, the premises, the foundations which, from its point of view, are false so that any good which appears in this world is accidental rather than essential."[58] Here, the exploration of a possibly overlapping context has been negated *a priori*, based on the certainty and immutability which characterize "tradition" and the "sacred". This is an illustration of a propositional approach; not only is a binary erected, but the possibility of a relationship between the two poles of this binary has been dismissed based on the judgment, or "point of view" of one "side", i.e. "tradition". In addition, tradition is also understood by Nasr to possess an "innate" form of "authority",[59] which entails that its judgment cannot be effectively challenged by any claims outside the realm of "tradition".

It is in this vein that Nasr produces his basic criticism of Iqbal. In his broader criticism of Muslim thinkers who attempted to respond to the challenges of modernity, such as Muhammad Abduh, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Syed Ameer Ali, Nasr contends that "Muhammad Iqbal", "if one considers his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*", "sought to inaugurate modernism in Islamic thought" and, in doing so, "reflect[s] more the concern for an apologetic defense of Islam and the accommodation of modernity than the preservation of traditional Islamic intellectual life."[60] For Nasr, Iqbal himself, "although very philosophically minded and interested in Islamic philosophy, did not philosophize for the most part within that tradition". This applies most specifically to Iqbal's prose works, which were notably "influenced by nineteenth-century Western philosophy". Thus, Iqbal's use of "modern" philosophical texts seems to come, for Nasr, at the cost of an "eclipse of the Islamic philosophical traditions."[61] Clearly, Nasr's criticism stems from his dichotomization of "Islamic tradition" and "modernism", as shown

above, and this makes him consider endeavours such as Iqbal's *Reconstruction* to be "apologetic", rather than significant contributions to "traditional Islamic intellectual life". Ultimately, for Nasr, Iqbal's perceived concern for "accommodation of modernity" is not a productive vision of the Islam-West encounter, but a project flawed in its inception because of its attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable.

Before addressing Nasr's fundamental criticism, we may highlight certain features of the *Reconstruction* which seem to support it. Nasr is not the first scholar to have noted Iqbal's references to Western philosophy, or his admiration for some of its most dynamic thinkers. Nicholas Adams notes that the *Reconstruction* is "a quite eclectic" text which "jumps with alarming ease between eleventh century Tus, in Persia and eighteenth century Königsberg, in Prussia" and "reveal[s] not only a deep knowledge of the long tradition of European philosophy, but a concern to address late modern questions posed by his [Iqbal's] contemporaries. The *Reconstruction* shows broad engagement with several figures who are widely read today, including most notably William James, Friedrich Nietzsche, Alfred North Whitehead and Henri Bergson."[62] In fact, Iqbal's level of engagement with certain Western philosophers is not only "broad", but "deep", and as Syed Noman-ul-Haq has subtly appraised in the case of Bergson, Iqbal is "*appropriating* the French philosopher" for his own "metaphysical" aims.[63] Indeed, Noman-ul-Haq's assessment of Iqbal's endeavour in *The Reconstruction* has strong parallels with Nasr, and the former's judgment is that Iqbal's "harmonizing" of "Bergson with the *kalām* or sufi traditions, or with Greco-Arabic philosophy, is an impossible task due to the incompatible conceptual presuppositions upon which these various sets of ideas are severally grounded. Yet Iqbal tries to make this harmonizing possible by presenting to his audience a modern Bergsonian reading of classical Muslim thinkers; and in giving his own spin to both, in the end he effectively transmutes each beyond recognition."[64] Clearly, Nasr is not a lone voice in his assessment of Iqbalian thought as an "accommodation of modernity", or, as an attempted "harmonization" between the fundamentally discordant.

The first, and most pertinent question we may ask of this school of criticism, is whether *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is indeed, as its title temperately suggests, an exercise in transforming the *ways,* the *patterns* by which religious thought is conducted, or, as critics like Nasr imply, a *"Reconstruction" of* Islam; "some kind of magical wedding between the *Shari'ah* and modern science and technology"[65], two domains which Nasr clearly sees as incompatible. There are several obvious features of *The Reconstruction* which belie

this putative "accommodating" tendency towards modernity. Indeed, it is difficult to see *The Reconstruction* as a work of complacent "harmonizing" if we consider passages like the following:

The Great European War...must open our eyes to the inner meaning and destiny of Islam. Humanity needs three things today- a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis...The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement.[66]

From this passage, we may garner two significant insights, the first of which is Iqbal's sustained emphasis on "the spiritual" in his articulation of the basic needs of the contemporary world. Iqbal is far from de-valuing the sacred, or "spiritual." He sees it as a vital component of life. Indeed, he shows some degree of *affinity* with Nasr in his view that "the universe", the entire cosmos, *needs* to be (re-)interpreted spiritually. Secondly, Iqbal is no less unforgiving in his trenchant criticism of the human devastations of our time, than Nasr. He criticizes Europe, even before the calamitous outbreak of World War I, not only for its embrace of a dehumanizing technology and bureaucracy, but also for its hypocrisy in failing to live up to humane ideals, and exploiting the poor enmasse for the profit of a small elite. Again, Iqbal would not disagree with Nasr in the view that the modern West has produced serious calamities, the likes of which were unforeseen in human history. In this vein, critical verses such as the following from *Zabur-e-'Ajam* have been highlighted e.g. by M. Riaz in an article (perhaps, somewhat extremely) titled *Violent Protests Against the West in Iqbal's Lyrical Poetry:*[67]

اگر درد دل جہانے تازہ داری، بروں آور
کہ افرنگ از جراحت ہائے پنہاں بسمل افتاد
است[68]

If a New World thou hast
In thy bosom, declare thy faith
Wounded in heart and breast,
Europe is night to death.[69]

Clearly, from Iqbal's poetry and his *Reconstruction,* he is not an apologist for "the West", when he can state that "Europe" is "the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement."[70]

Significantly, while Nasr contends that Iqbal is unduly "accommodative" of modernity, other scholars like Nicholas Adams have interpreted *The Reconstruction* in a very different manner, based on passages like those quoted above. For example, Adams reads Iqbal holding up " as a warning the image of Friedrich Nietzsche: a brilliant, incisive genius whose course of life was determined solely from within, and thus lacked the necessary discipline and guidance that comes from seeking spiritual direction."[71] Thus, a Western philosopher like Nietzsche, "is the archetypal European man, a Bergsonian man, genuinely full of life, but lacking a telos."[72] Hence, we see not just from broader passages in Iqbal's *Reconstruction* but also from the manner in which other scholars have interpreted his critical view of individual Western philosophers, that to characterize Iqbal's work as an accommodation and even less an uncritical acceptance of modernity would be wholly unsubstantiated.

It would be equally flawed to view Iqbal's thought as an "apologetic defence of Islam"; an effort at tracking, shielding and explaining any discrepancies in the Islamic tradition which modernity may have exposed. Any number of verses, and in fact entire poems from Iqbal's poetic corpus would attest to his pride in the Islamic religion, culture and civilization. Indeed, who can fail to sense the *pneuma* of a vital, "vigorous", "young and powerful Islam",[73] in the iridescent poetic "masterpiece"[74] that is *Masjid-e-Qurtuba?* Yet, to be precise, Nasr's criticism pertains largely to Iqbal's prose and to *The Reconstruction,* which employs Western philosophy liberally. However, *The Reconstruction* challenges this criticism even more directly. Immediately preceding the passage quoted above, Iqbal has stated: "Equipped with penetrative thought and fresh experience, the world of Islam should courageously proceed to the work of reconstruction" which, "however, has a far more serious aspect than mere adjustment in modern conditions of life."[75] While he believes that "the idealism of Europe" never translated into reality, he exults over the opportunity now available to Islam:

The Muslim, on the other hand, is in possession of these ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation, which, speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalizes its own apparent externality. With him the spiritual basis of life is a matter of conviction for which even the least enlightened man among us can easily lay down his life...Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in light of ultimate principles, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam.[76]

Clearly, not only is this "reconstruction" an Islamic project, but one which brings Islamic civilization into ever greater fruition and self-realization which the "early Muslims emerging out of the spiritual slavery of pre-Islamic Asia were not in a position to realize."[77] Iqbal's vision of the "aim of Islam" is so vast, and his concern that it should be realized so deep, that he cannot allow us to ignore "that intellectual laziness which, especially in the period of spiritual decay, turns great thinkers into idols"[78] and which may resultantly thwart his cherished vision. Thus, his criticisms of contemporary Muslim thought are potentially self-corrective calls, to reform, reconstruct and resurge in the interest of Islam, rather than apologies for a tradition which he feels is already invested with grandeur and untapped potentiality.

Bearing in mind these characteristics of *The Reconstruction* which challenge Nasr's critique of the work as largely non-traditional and apologetic, we have, broadly speaking, two approaches available as contemporary interpreters of Iqbal: we may choose to marginalize his criticisms of the modern period in order to see him simply as "a bridge between East and West."[79] Or, we may take *The Reconstruction*'s criticisms of modernism seriously, and ask: If Iqbal is, in some degree of concord with Nasr, unsparing both in his regard for the spiritual and in his contempt for the destruction and greed of the modern period, *then* what is the root of Nasr's criticism?

Nasr's criticism, in fact, runs deeper than mere disagreement. His view, that Iqbal is making a reconciliatory attempt between the irreconcilable, stems organically from Nasr's broader conceptions of sacred/profane and Islam/modernism, which have been elaborated in detail above. We saw that Nasr cleaves the sacred and profane, and ensconces the sacred as that which "ultimately is" while limiting the "profane" and material world to an "appearance". Does Iqbal differ at all from this conception? Indeed, he disagrees significantly, for *The Reconstruction* tells us:

The critics of Islam have lost sight of [one] important consideration. The ultimate Reality, according to the Qur'an, is spiritual, and its life consists in temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being. The greatest service that modern thought has rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religions... [is] that the merely material has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the realization of the spirit. All is holy ground. As the Prophet

[Muhammad] so beautifully puts it: 'The whole of this earth is a mosque.'[80]

This remarkable passage is at once a succinct and comprehensive insight into all three "binaries" which we had identified at the outset; "sacred"/"profane", "Islam"/"modernism", and "Self"/"Other". It also provides a sharp contrast to Nasr's mode of reasoning about the same "binaries". Firstly, Iqbal does not draw a cleft between the sacred and the profane. Rather, he sees them both as expressions of the same "ultimate Reality", and in doing so illustrates a relational bent of reasoning. How may we infer this? Iqbal is grounding both "the sacred" and "the profane" in the same origin, "Reality", and by tying them inseparably to this source, he is making a move parallel to grounding a logical proposition in its contextual locus. This "context-binding" was, as we saw, the characteristic feature of relational thought. Indeed, to say that "Reality" is *the* "context" of everything real, and so the context of both the sacred and the profane, is to make a sound claim. The effect of such "contextualization" is deeply reparative; it allows these two "binaries" to inform each other on terms of parity, based on their mutual beginnings. Each becomes, as Iqbal beautifully puts it, an "opportunity" for the other. This recognition then opens up the way for dialogue between a broader (and in fact ubiquitous) binary: "Self/Other".

Although a contemporary reader may find the terminological conflation of "secular" with "non-sacred" somewhat antiquated, this does not obstruct us from understanding the *method* by which Iqbal is approaching these perceived binaries. To claim that the "secular is sacred in the roots of its being", this is not only a challenge to the stark dichotomization of sacred and profane, but also to that of "Self" and "Other". *Continuity* and *parity*, not between synonymous concepts but between *opposites*, is emphasised: "Reality...is spiritual [i.e. sacred/Self]" *and* "its life consists in [the] temporal [i.e. profane/Other]." What Iqbal is highlighting for us, by way of this account of the sacred, is that a "Self" may find its "Other", "in the roots of its" very own "being". But to do so requires the "Self", in this case the "sacred", to have the insight that it is finite and part of a wider context, which in this case is "Reality." The further recognition that the "Other", or the "profane" *shares* a contextual paradigm with the "Self", then opens up the way for real, mutually rejuvenating exchange. This is why Iqbal's next step is to point out the dynamism which characterizes this relationship: "temporal activity" is the "life" and "realization of the spirit"; the "Other" is offering a novel opportunity for the expansion and activity of the "Self". Such a

mutual, relational exchange was absent from Nasr's conception, which adhered more to a propositional form of reasoning. The sacred was "ultimately" real (and therefore superior) while the profane was a mere "appearance". By contrast, with Iqbal, the "spiritual" and "material" are distinct but inseparable, and equally valuable facets of the same "Reality".

Iqbal's capacity to view perceived dichotomies in such relational terms stems from a characteristic feature of his thought that he in turn believes to be a feature of Islam, which "rejects the old static view of the universe"[81] to arrive at the "dynamic outlook of the Quran".[82] While Nasr characterizes the "sacred" as "immutable", "eternal", "transcendent" and the "Unmoved Mover", Iqbal's view is that "Reality" is an "Ultimate Ego", which continually "realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own undetermined creative possibilities."[83] For Iqbal, the Divine Reality which is the very heart of the sacred, is characterized by *activity* that unceasingly actualizes "creative possibilities", rather than being a static, "immutable" Unmoved Mover which passively contemplates its own perfection for eternity. For Iqbal, it is precisely this dynamism which allows the sacred/Divine to engage deeply with the material world and to see it as an opportunity for Self-expression, to the extent that "the humble bee [is] a recipient of Divine inspiration."[84] Reading Iqbal's *Reconstruction* in view of this sustained spirit of dynamism which he espouses, enables us to see the roots of his relational approach to sacred/profane, Self/Other, Islam/ West dichotomies. An immutable conception of the sacred, as held by Nasr, would not be able to reconcile the static perfection of the sacred/Divine with any intimacy with the erratic, disorderly natural world. Iqbal, on the other hand, envisions the potentiality of Divine activity in an infinity of contexts, from the humble to the grand. Although he has provided us with no formal, logical model, he describes and illustrates the dynamic conditions which nurture such a relational approach. In one sense, this is a more valuable and basic contribution than any logical system, because it teaches us *how* to think relationally, and shows us what *ethos* underlies relational thinking, rather than simply adumbrating its features. *The Reconstruction* thus cultivates a relational approach rather than describing it. A core feature of this text which makes it relational-minded is its dynamism and positive attitude to creative change. By contrast, a propositional mode of reasoning, when it extends beyond the "finite set" of "judgments of certainty", will be displaced from its habitat. Creation, activity and change all involve a movement from the known to the unknown, from one state to its opposite. But,

propositional logic is only equipped to map out certain claims, so how could it depict this dynamic interaction between the spheres of the known and unknown? Indeed, it would see this wavering between known and unknown, Self and Other, as at best a "contradiction" between binaries. As Ochs has highlighted, "propositional reasoning cannot provide an adequate account of the relationship between known and unknown and cannot therefore guide inquiries into the Unknown."[85] Precisely this limitation of propositional reasoning has caused critics to view Iqbal's *Reconstruction* as "an attempted synthesis" or an "accommodation" of the irreconcilable. Yet, if we respond to Iqbal's indications and understand these limitations, we may begin to see how he is not *endeavouring* to forge a synthesis between incompatibles, but recognizing how a deep relationship *already* exists between some binaries, and showing us the context in which this deep and mutually rejuvenating relationship operates. His work is thus aptly titled, for it truly attempts to reconstruct religious thought; the *method* by which we think about concepts and dichotomies central to Islam and modernity, rather than disfiguring either Islam or modernism "beyond recognition."

Iqbal contrasts with Nasr on another crucial point which, perhaps more the domain of a historiographer, nevertheless significantly informs his relational approach. Nasr provides a complex account of the European Renaissance as a development characterized by many philosophical streams, such as Platonism, Aristotelianism, Scholasticism and so forth.[86] However, "[i]n the matrix of the tapestry of the Renaissance", there "grew that humanism which has characterized the modern world since that time", with its "essentially anthropomorphic modes of thought".[87] Thus, Nasr sees the Renaissance as that pivotal moment in history, which shifted the focus of Western civilization from God to "man as the measure of all things as an earthly being." The Renaissance therefore culminated in a "modern mode of thought" which was inimical to "certain esotericisms such as that of Islam."[88] By contrast, Iqbal does not view either the Renaissance or the advent of modernity as the perfect antithesis of Islam, but identifies another contrasting historical period. For Iqbal, "the spirit of the Qur'an [is] essentially anti-classical"; which eventually culminated in an "intellectual revolt against Greek philosophy."[89] More specifically, for Iqbal the "purely speculative"[90] character of Classical philosophy stands in direct contrast to the Qur'anic emphasis on "the sense-perception of man."[91] This Islamic "revolt" against Classical Philosophy has led, in Iqbal's view, to "the foundations of modern culture in some of its

most important respects."[92] Nor is Iqbal isolated in this historical analysis. In our own time, T.J. Winter notes that the plurality and "diversity of Islamic civilizations" are in fact a direct contrast to "Rome, which was itself a kind of early monoculture" with "the forum, the theatre and the *insula*" remaining "remarkably consistent throughout the Roman Mediterranean."[93] At first glance, it may appear as if Nasr and Iqbal are advocating the same position: apparently, both emphasize the uniformity of Greek thought. However, this similarity is illusory, because for Iqbal, the "speculative" uniformity of Classicalism is *opposed* to the dynamic Qur'anic and Islamic *ethos*, but for Nasr, this very uniformity makes Islamic "*hikmah"* and Classical philosophy two compatible shades of the *same* perennial wisdom. Similarly, one might hastily conclude that both Nasr and Iqbal trace the origins of modern thought to a common source i.e. both emphasize modernism's focus on the material, empirical world. However, while Nasr *deplores* Galileo's empirical observation of matter as mere reductionism and anti-traditionalism, Iqbal *values* this empirical spirit, and in fact sees it as an organic product of the Qur'anic emphasis on nature. Thus, we may re-assert our claim that Nasr and Iqbal have two starkly contrasting approaches to the advent of modernity, and to modernism's relationship to Islam. If we appreciate these significant differences, then it becomes far more plausible that Iqbal should have engaged Islam and modernism in relational terms, rather than Nasr. For Nasr *cherishes* that same Classical World which Iqbal criticizes, as part of a traditional era in which "the Pythagorean and Platonic conception of philosophy"[94] provided one variant of that self-same perennial wisdom that also manifests in Islam as "*al-hikmat al-khalidah."*[95] Therefore, Nasr's perennialist orientation contributes significantly to his understanding of the "sacred" as "immutable" and "eternal", which obviates any engagement of the "sacred" with the "profane", material world on relational terms. By contrast, Iqbal's "intellectual revolt against Greek philosophy" foreshadows the dynamism and relational nature of his thought with regard to the Islam-West encounter. His view of material, empirical reality is far more positive, for he sees the natural world as continuously receiving the most sacred of "sacreds" i.e. Divine inspiration. Ochs corroborates this reading of Iqbal with a significant insight: "The defining relationship in *Reconstruction* is indeed between scientific reasoning and...'liturgical reasoning'. Liturgy begins in prayer; prayer, most simply put, begins in petition; and the scientific reasoner engages in petitionary prayer as soon as he or she names something out there 'unknown' and asks 'how can I know you?"[96] In this vein,

Iqbal would view Galileo's observation of "matter in motion", which is a scientific exercise, as a form of "petitionary prayer" or *ibadah*, and not, in Nasr's stead, as a "reduction" or deplorable departure from the "sacred".

We have seen that Nasr and Iqbal's differing approaches to *pre*-modernity engender, to a great degree, their respective methods of reasoning about the contemporary, modern or post-modern, Islam-West encounter. Nasr's perennialism commits him to an immutable *Sophia perennis,* which is inimical to an equitable engagement with the premises of modernity as he sees them. Iqbal's anti-classicalism leads to his view that Islam, in fact, contributed significantly to important features of modernity such as the emphasis on empirical investigation. This, naturally, leads to a relational approach since "the modern world" becomes tied to Islam in its inception. An Iqbalian critique of modernism thus becomes a critique from *within*, and not an irrevocable sundering of Islam and the modern West. Furthermore, we have also seen the manner by which Iqbal and Nasr's respective approaches to the thematic dichotomies of the Islam-West encounter operate: Nasr arranges the sacred/profane, Islam/ modernism and, ultimately, the Self/Other binary in a hierarchy, whereby a guardianship of the profane/modernism is possible, but not a reciprocal dialogue. Iqbal differs, by looking beyond the individual significance of the sacred or Islam, both of which he values immeasurably, to "characterize the context" (i.e. Reality/ the Divine) of these important categories and their putative opposites. In doing so, he illustrates the core feature of a relational approach and provides a contrast to Nasr's dichotomous, "either this or that" approach, which parallels propositional reasoning. In addressing Nasr's critique of Iqbal, I have therefore contrasted the broader differences in Nasr and Iqbal's respective patterns of thought, and suggested that their varying degree of affinity with the Classical component of pre-modernity is a strong basis, if not the lowest common factor, of these differences. Addressing Nasr's critique of Iqbal hence generates, reciprocally, a critical view of Nasr's own dichotomous approach to those binaries which characterize the thematic ground of the Islam-West encounter, and also of Nasr's perennialist outlook on pre-modernity and modernity. In concluding our comparisons of Nasr and Iqbal, then, it becomes relevant to briefly link them to the broader discussion on the limitations posed by a perennialist outlook.

David Ray Griffin provides one such critique, in his assessment of Huston Smith's perennialist philosophy. For Griffin, perennialism is based on that precise logic which it critiques in modernism, but in

an inverse form: It "reacts to the onesidedness of modernity by advocating an equally onesided premodern outlook."[97] Modernism can be critiqued for a propositional, binary mode of reasoning, which emphasises the primacy of empirical "progress" and "science" (read: modern science), and marginalises religion, tradition and belief as remnants of a primitive era. However, perennialism can be critiqued on precisely the same footing, for it emphasises not the future but "the past", or "tradition", by marginalising the current period of history as an aberration from the norm. This is why Nasr states: "From this point of view the history of Western man during the past five centuries is an anomaly in the long history of the human race...those who follow the traditional point of view wish only to enable Western man to join the rest of the human race."[98] Yet, as Griffin has noted, perennialism makes too great a leap in coagulating, as Nasr has in the quote above, "the long history" of "the rest of the human race"[99] into one traditional stronghold. Griffin goes on to critique: "It does not seem plausible...to think of the various great religions as equally embodying revelations of the same divine reality. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism are oriented primarily to a personal deity" while "Buddhism and Hinduism" largely "are oriented toward an impersonal, infinite, absolute reality. To say that devotees of both types of religion are really worshipping 'the same God' does not seem illuminating."[100] In this way, Nasr discusses the impersonal Aristotelian "Unmoved Mover",[101] the term "Orthodoxy",[102] which has its roots in the authority of early Christian clergy, the Islamic "*Shari'ah* and the *Tariqah*",[103] which are uncompromising on the Oneness of God, and the Hindu "*sanatana dharma*"[104] as if they were different manifestations of the same perennial wisdom. It is pertinent to note that even in the *unification* each of these starkly contrasted traditions, perennialist thought does *not* display a relational mode of thought, because it removes concepts like "Orthodoxy" or "*hikmah*" out of the unmistakably different contexts that they are organically embedded in, and presents them as if they were isolated manifestations of one self-same "*Sophia perennis.*" The characteristic feature of relational thought, as we saw, was precisely a "characterization of context", and a dialogue or affinity that is *based on* a deep and honest introspection into context, as well as claim. Yet, Nasr's grounding in the perennialist tradition takes him in the opposite direction; in analysing "tradition", he abstracts traditional concepts from their differing contexts, for the sake of a non-relational "harmonization" into an "immutable" perennial wisdom. It is crucial to note that in doing so, Nasr is making a move identical to that "accommodation" of the discordant which he sees

Iqbal as attempting, and for which he critiques Iqbal. However, in analysing "modernity", Nasr abstracts thought from context to the opposite effect, by cleaving "modernism" and "Islam" into two fundamentally irreconcilable positions. By contrast, Iqbal's tendency to "characterize context" makes him a relational thinker who can see both deep affinities (a spirit of empirical observation) and deep contrasts (Islamic opposition to modern materialism, greed and destruction) between "Islam" and "modernism" and engage these in a mutually rejuvenating dialogue. Ultimately, Iqbal's dynamic, relational approach makes his *Reconstruction* a truly insightful work, and one which remains liable to misrepresentation or criticism from an approach that is limited to propositional models of reasoning and interpretation.

In conclusion, this paper has been a contrast of two widely influential Muslim thinkers, both of whom shape the study and interpretation of Islamic thought in their respective time periods. It is interesting to note that if Nasr and Iqbal were read with an eye towards their overarching authorial concerns, their thematic interests and to some degree their creative, literary expression, one would find affinities. Both are unmistakably concerned about the dire situation of religious thought in the contemporary world, and offer their respective diagnosis and remedies. Indeed, for some admirers of both, it may seem surprising that Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a prominent Muslim intellectual, had ever made such a strong critique of Allama Muhammad Iqbal, whose name requires no introduction. However, we have seen the advantage of an in-depth, detailed examination of Nasr and Iqbal that is based on their logical *approaches,* on the *ethos* that they concretize in their respective reasonings about binaries. Such an examination dispels surprise, and in fact shows us how it is quite plausible that Nasr, a prominent perennialist, would have critiqued Iqbal, a dynamic, relational thinker. In this regard, we are indebted to Peter Ochs for providing us with a supple and comprehensive framework, and an invaluable set of logical descriptions and characterizations, by which our exploration of Iqbal enters a new phase. Perhaps the mark of a truly subtle genius is that more insights reside in *how* he thinks, rather than *what* he thinks about. Iqbal is such a mind, and we have to significantly re-evaluate our interpretative paradigms to begin to unlock his *Reconstruction.* In the field of contemporary Iqbal studies, we should now look beyond familiar discussions of Iqbal's thematic broadness, his religious zeal, and his appropriation of Western philosophy, to investigate all of these afresh, not merely in light of propositional reasoning but of the Iqbalian method. This paper provides one preliminary attempt into

this investigation, but doubtless, more comprehensive studies of a similar nature, and on a wider range of themes, are required. Ultimately, the very fact that Nasr has made such a critique of Iqbal today, after the limits of propositional approaches have been discovered, discussed and elaborated, suggests that *The Reconstruction's* relational *ethos* is yet to be adequately understood and appreciated by some of the most prominent contemporary Muslim thinkers, let alone realized.

NOTES AND REFERENCE

[1] Edward Said, *Orientalism,* (United States: Vintage Books, 1978), p.273.
As is well known, Edward Said's postcolonial breakthrough *Orientalism* contends that "some Oriental essence" is "purposely misrepresented" in contrast to the "Occident" or "West" for the latter's gains in "in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting" (273).
[2] Abdal-Hakim Murad, *Faith in the future: Islam after the Enlightenment.* 23 December 2002. www.masud.co.uk.
Winter(whose Islamic name is Abdal-Hakim Murad) argues:
"Despite its Arabian origins, Islam is to be not merely *for* the nations, but *of* the nations. No pre-modern civilisation embraced more cultures than that of Islam - in fact, it was Muslims who invented globalisation."
In this vein, Winter quotes Iqbal:
"*Behold and see! In Ind's domain*
Thou shalt not find the like again,
That, though a Brahman's son I be,
Tabriz and Rum stand wide to me." (*Zabur-e-'Ajam*)
[3]Footnote 8, Peter Ochs, "Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity", *Iqbal Review* (October 2008), www.allamaiqbal.com
[4]Basit Bilal Koshul and Steven Kepnes, eds., *Scripture, Reason and the Contemporary Islam-West Encounter: Studying the Other, Understanding the Self*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2007.
[5] Ochs, "Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity", *Iqbal Review.*
[6]Dr. Fazlur Rahman, "Iqbal's Idea of Progress", *Iqbal Review,* (April 1963), www.allamaiqbal.com
[7] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land*
*of Prophecy, (*New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 129.
[8] *Scripture, Reason and the Contemporary Islam-West Encounter.*
[9] William C. Chittick, Introduction, in, William C. Chittick ed., *The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr,* (Canada: World Wisdom Publications), 2007, p. xi.
[10] Ali Zaidi, *Islam, Modernity and the Human Sciences,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2011, p.61.
As Zaidi has noted, Nasr has made other critiques of Iqbal e.g. he "directs harsh criticism at Iqbal for attempting to synthesize the Islamic concept of *al- insan al-kamil,* the Perfect Man, with the Nietzschean concept of the *Überman*, concepts

that, for Nasr, are at antipodes, one from the other (Nasr 1975: 139)" qtd., Zaidi, 61. Relevant though this criticism may be, it is a subset of Nasr's basic critique that Iqbal is "attempting to synthesize" Islamic and modern thought. Our discussion here will be limited to Nasr's primary critique, bearing in mind its overarching relevance. A detailed discussion of both Nietzsche's *Überman* and Iqbal's *khudi* is an extensive subject which merits a further comparative study of its own.

[11] Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy,* p. 26.

Nasr has evaluated Iqbal's *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia,* as a work "which contains important insights, although it is also very incomplete and contains certain basic errors." Also noteworthy is the deep influence that the *Mathnawi-e-Mawnavi* of Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi has had on both thinkers. A future course of study might compare the ways in which Nasr's reading of Rumi converges and diverges with, for example, Iqbal's *Pir-o-Mureed* dialogue in Baal-e-Jibreel.

[12] Published in 1934, *The Reconstruction* lectures had not yet conceived of a Second World War, nor seen the Partition of India, and bordered the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. A contemporary writer such as Nasr, with a fuller knowledge of developments such as postmodernism and of major geo-political shifts since the Second World War, can be contrasted significantly with Iqbal in terms of the historical contexts of his responses to modernity.

[13] Ochs, "Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity", *Iqbal Review.*

[14] Peter Ochs, "From Two to Three: To Know is also to Know the Context of Knowing", in Basit Bilal Koshul and Steven Kepnes, eds., *Scripture, Reason and the Contemporary Islam-West Encounter: Studying the Other, Understanding the Self*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2007, p. 192.

[15] Ochs, "Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity", *Iqbal Review.*

[16] Ibid.

[17] Noman-ul-Haq, "Iqbal and Classical Muslim Thinkers"*, Iqbal Review, (*Oct 2009), www.allamaiqbal.com.

[18] Ochs, "Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity", *Iqbal Review*

[19] Noman-ul-Haq, "Iqbal and Classical Muslim Thinkers"*, Iqbal Review.*

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ochs, *Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity*, *Iqbal Review.*

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ochs, "From Two to Three", p. 188.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p.196

[26] Ochs, *Iqbal, Peirce and Modernity*, *Iqbal Review.*

[27] Ochs, "From Two to Three",p. 197.

[28] Ibid., p. 192

[29] Ibid., p. 193

[30] Ibid., p. 194

[31] Ibid., p. 197

[32] Ibid., p. 189

[33] Ibid.

[34] Timothy Winter, "Ishmael and the Enlightenment's *Crise de Coeur"*, in Basit Bilal Koshul and Steven Kepnes, eds., *Scripture, Reason and the Contemporary Islam-West Encounter: Studying the Other, Understanding the Self*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2007, p. 169

[35] Zaidi, *Islam, Modernity and the Human Sciences,* p. 60.

[36]Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred,* (Albany: State University of New York Press: 1989), p. 68
[37] Ibid., 67
[38] Ibid., 68
[39] Ibid., 74
[40] Ibid., 75
[41] Ibid., 76
[42] Ibid., 80
[43] Ibid., 78
[44] Ibid., 80
[45] Ibid., 74
[46]Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy, p.* 271.
[47]Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Religion and the Order of Nature,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.163
[48] Ibid 172
[49]Ibid. 179
[50] Zaidi, p. 61.
[51] Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy,* p.260.
[52] Ibid., 267
[53] Ibid., 271
[54] Ibid., 271
[55] Ibid., 271
[56] Nasr, *Knowledge and Sacred*, p.84.
[57] Ibid., 85
[58] Ibid., 84
[59] Ibid., 80
[60] Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy,* pp. 128-129.
[61] Ibid., 275.
[62] Nicholas Adams. "Iqbal and the Western Philosophers", *Iqbal Review,* (October 2009). www.allamaiqbal.com.
[63] Noman-ul-Haq, "Iqbal and Classical Muslim Thinkers"*, Iqbal Review.*
[64] Ibid.
[65] Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy,* p. 271
[66] Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* (Lahore: Published by Javed Iqbal, son of late Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal. Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf Publishers), p. 179.
[67] Prof. Dr. M. Riaz, "Violent Protests Against the West in Iqbal's Lyrical Poetry**",** *Iqbal Review,* (October 1989). www.allamaiqbal.com
[68] *Zabur-e-'Ajam, Kulliyat-e-Iqbal*, Farsi ed. (Lahore: 1973) p. 503.
[69] Persian Psalms, Eng. trans. of *Zabur-e-'Ajam*. Trans. Prof. A.J. Arberry. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publications, 1968, 3rd edition), p.95
[70] Iqbal, *Reconstruction,* p. 179.
[71] Nicholas Adams. "Iqbal and the Western Philosophers", *Iqbal Review.*
[72] Ibid.
[73] Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wing: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal.* (Brill: 1963), p. 145.
[74] Ibid. pp. 52, 173
[75] Iqbal, *Reconstruction,* p. 179.
[76] Iqbal, *Reconstruction,* pp. 179-180
[77] Ibid., p. 180.
[78] Ibid., p. 178.

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[80] Iqbal, *Reconstruction,* p. 155.
[81] Ibid., 164.
[82] Ibid., 166.
[83] Ibid., 77.
[84] Ibid., 3.
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[87] Ibid.
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[94] Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*, p. 82
[95]Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*, p. 68
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[98] Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred,* p. 85.
[99] Ibid.
[100] David Ray Griffin, p. 41.
[101] Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred,* p. 75
[102] Ibid., 78.
[103] Ibid., 76.
[104] Ibid., 68.